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 Abstract 
Most of the existing literature on American public diplomacy focuses on 
both historic and present-day use.  Literature by academics and practitioners, as well 
as government reports and studies done by think tanks, all repeatedly highlight the 
same problems affecting public diplomacy of the United States (from the end of 
World War II through today): an absence of strategy - what public diplomacy should 
do and how; as well as clearly defining the role of public diplomacy in American 
statecraft; and uneven and ineffective implementation.  Interestingly, some of the 
literature on public diplomacy recognizes the practice to date back before the 
twentieth century, yet there are no studies examining public diplomacy practice 
prior to the twentieth century.  This study offers a new approach to evaluating and 
understanding the use of public diplomacy in American statecraft by broadening the 
understanding and interpretation of diplomacy.   
The aim of this research is to understand how past uses and techniques of 
foreign public engagement evolved into modern public diplomacy as a tool of 
American statecraft.  The study explores six historic cases where the United States’ 
government or private American citizens actively engaged with foreign publics, 
starting with the American Revolution in 1776 through the passage of the Smith-
Mundt Bill of 1948. Each case looks specifically at the role foreign public 
engagement plays in American statecraft, while also identifying trends in American 
foreign public engagement and making connections between past practice of foreign 
public engagement and public diplomacy, and analysing how trends and past practice 
or experience influenced modern American public diplomacy. 
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 Preface 
“Very few Americans have an adequate idea of the historical role America has played 
[sic]…The penetration of American missionaries in the Balkans during the early part of the 
19th century will some day be considered the brightest pages in the annals of the 
peninsula…The significance of their activities in the Near East…is much greater than it seems 
to many…” 
- American Influences in Bulgaria, Professor Constantine Stephanove1 
 
In Farmington, Connecticut on September 5, 1810, a coalition of churches, 
ministers, and parishioners formed the American Board of Commissioners for 
Foreign Missions (ABCFM).  The formation of the organization was a by-product of 
the Second Great Awakening, a spiritual revival in the United States which called 
upon Christians to not only work toward their own salvation, but also the salvation 
of others (Morone 2003; Oren 2007).  In order to bring about peace on earth, the 
ABCFM determined there was an urgent need to return people to Christianity, to 
ensure their salvation.  In 1818, the ABCFM decided to send missionaries to the 
Ottoman Empire to restore the Jews to Palestine (Kieser 2010; Oren 2007).  Pliny 
Fisk and Levi Parsons volunteered to be the first missionaries to travel to the 
Ottoman Empire, arriving in Smyrna (Izmir) in 1819.  For the first year or so, they 
were instructed to travel throughout the Empire, gathering information about the 
people and the environment and to learn languages before beginning any specific 
mission work (Grabill 1971). 
 Following the success of the American Revolution, the people of the United 
States and their leaders desired to shrink away from Old World entanglements and 
to enjoy independence.  Yet this was a luxury the US could not afford.  For at least 
the next forty years, the US’s relationship with the rest of the world would be of 
utmost importance to the nation’s survival.  Beset by pirate attacks emanating from 
the North African Barbary States2 since declaring independence and surrounded by 
                                                     
1 Attached to Despatch No. 1616, Sofia, 16 March 1930, Record Group (RG) 59, Central 
Decimal File (CDF) 1930-39, Box 5065, 811.42774/1 
2 The Barbary States were vassal states under the Ottomans and included what is present day 
Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Libya.  The Americans referred to them as the Barbary 
States due to their barbaric behaviour as reported by sailors, merchants, and former 
hostages (Oren 2007). 
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European powers: Britain, France, and Spain; the US could not isolate itself from the 
world.  Despite these dangers, America’s foreign ministry, the Department of State 
(DoS), remained a tiny government institution with very few ministers or consular 
officers posted overseas.  Thus, much of America’s interactions overseas were not 
initiated or maintained by the US government, but rather by private citizens, 
primarily merchants and missionaries up until the late nineteenth century (Daniel 
1964).   
Upon arriving in Smyrna, the first task for Fisk and Parsons was to ascertain 
what was most needed in the region.  “Our time has been occupied thus far, and will 
principally occupied for months, perhaps years, in studying languages, and in 
collecting information about the country, and in distributing Bibles and Tracts” (Fisk 
in Bond 1828, p. 117).  Both Fisk and Parsons learned Greek, Italian, Arabic, French, 
and Turkish within the first few years of living in the Empire.  They wrote to family 
and friends about the people they encountered, conversations with locals, the food, 
how people dressed, customs, and the government.  Reports were also sent to the 
ABCFM corresponding secretary.  These reports were then published in the ABCFM 
monthly publication The Missionary Herald.  Missionaries helped to provide 
knowledge of countries and people overseas. "Publications and talks by missionaries 
expanded understanding in the United States of foreigners " (Grabill 1971, p. 4). 
Shortly after commencing their explorations of the Empire, Fisk and Parsons 
received word from ABCFM that they were sending a printing press along with two 
more missionaries, Reverends Daniel Temple and Jonas King.  The arrival of the 
first print press heralded one of the more significant contributions American 
missionaries made to the region, an impact which reverberates through the present 
day.  Though the missionaries saw the press as a tool to print religious materials, not 
all of the publications were religious.  As one American touring a Turkish school 
noted, “[it] was gratifying to perceive that to America this and almost every other 
great school in Turkey and Greece is indebted for its elementary books of instruction” 
(An American 1833, p. 286).  The missionaries took American textbooks, translated 
them into Greek, Turkish, Armenian, and Arabic to use with students.  By 1850, the 
missionaries used their presses to print periodicals in five languages, dictionaries, 
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volumes of history and literature, and one magazine, which is credited as having the 
largest circulation in the Ottoman Empire (Grabill 1971).3 
Beyond just providing texts in local languages, the American missionaries in 
some instances helped to establish print versions of local languages.4  US missionaries 
ensured languages, which the Turks, Greeks, or Russians were trying to eliminate, 
thrived.  Not only was a standard removable Arabic type created, but the missionary 
press at Malta revived Armenian and Bulgarian languages.  When missionary Cyrus 
Hamlin opened Bebek Seminary in 1840, he 
 
…found a great many Turkish words mixed in, I resolved not to use them, 
but so far as possible speak a pure Armenian.  Bebek Seminary had no small 
influence in the introduction of a purer style of speaking and writing the 
modern Armenian...Our mission saw clearly that, as the language of the 
Armenian race, we must adopt it and make the best of it.  The idea of 
translating the Bible into such a language was ridiculed...The history of 
missions proves, by many examples, that no language is so degraded that the 
simple truths of salvation cannot be expressed in it...The modern Armenian 
is now wholly transformed; it has become a beautiful and cultivated 
language (Hamlin 1893, p. 210-211). 
 
The Bulgarian language also faced eradication under Greek authorities.  “The Greek 
church, with the sanction of the Turkish government, had introduced the Greek 
liturgy into all the Bulgarian churches...To throw off the Greek language and the 
Greek bishops, was the vow of every Bulgarian heart.  To have schools, newspapers, 
a literature of their own, were among their strongest aspirations” (Hamlin 1877, p. 
268).  Through the work of another ABCFM missionary, Elias Riggs, the Bulgarians 
soon had texts in their own language. 
                                                     
3 One newspaper, “Rays of Light,” carried a full-text translation of the Emancipation 
Proclamation in Arabic.  The newsprint is among Abraham Lincoln Papers held by the 
Library of Congress (13 May 1863, Library of Congress ( LoC): Abraham Lincoln 
Papers (ALP), Series 1. General Correspondence. 1833-1916). 
4 In 1820 there was no movable type in Arabic, but in the 1830s two missionary printers 
created movable type to produce "American Arabic," which earned the approval of 
Arab scholars (Daniel 1964; Grabill 1971).  "Arab classical literature, long in decline, 
was revived as the mission schools created an expanding audience for it and through 
the press, the means of reaching a still greater group.  Two native collaborators with 
[Eli] Smith and [Cornelius] Van Dyck became prime movers in kindling the Arab 
literary renaissance, compiling the Arabic-English dictionary and beginning an Arabic 
Encyclopedia" (Daniel 1964, p. 81). 
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US missionaries were also responsible for setting up hundreds of schools 
throughout the Ottoman Empire, many of which still exist today.  Between 1820 
and 1860, American missionaries established thirty-three schools.  In establishing 
schools throughout the region, American missionaries unwittingly shared American 
ideas and culture.  Unlike European missionary schools in the region, the ABCFM 
missionaries insisted on ensuring the curriculum was in local languages and as much 
as possible taught by natives (Bliss 1920; Penrose 1941).  Two schools were 
established around 1860: Robert College in Constantinople and the Syrian 
Protestant College in Beirut.  Both colleges remain today.  Robert College was a 
scheme devised by another missionary and Christopher Robert of New York who 
happened to be visiting Constantinople following the Crimean War.  The Christian 
college in Constantinople was to be an experiment. 
 
The probabilities of failure consisted in the division of Eastern populations.  
Religion has divided them…The spirit of race was also strong...These it was 
said will never unite in one institution of learning.  To suppose it possible is 
absurd.  But, on the other hand, it was urged, the East has made great 
progress in enlightenment...A Christian college, that shall offer the best 
intellectual training, as broad a culture as our best New England colleges, 
will meet the wants of this class, of whatever race or faith (Hamlin 1877, p. 
285). 
 
The Syrian Protestant College, now the American University of Beirut, was also 
created with the same mentality.  Of the first sixteen students to enrol at the Syrian 
Protestant College, only five were in the graduating class of 1870.  One of them 
returned to teach Arabic at the College and also founded an Arabic newspaper and a 
journal, Al Mukattam and Al Muktataf.  Al Muktataf became a leading scientific 
magazine in the region until 1909.  Three more students went on to medical school 
(Penrose 1941). 
The missionaries’ role in the region circa 1820 to 1830 is significant to the 
story and origins of American public diplomacy.  Not only were those initial efforts 
by the missionaries to engage with the Greeks, Syrians, Bulgarians, Armenians, 
Arabs, Palestinians, and Turks the same methods that other private organizations 
would employ to engage the people of the Middle East and Eastern Europe later in 
the century, but they are also the same methods used by the US government during 
World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII) and later throughout the Cold War.  
“American education in the Near East not only instructed residents there but 
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anticipated the United States government's Fulbright program and the work of the 
United States Information Agency.  These formal efforts by the American 
government were part of its new cultural diplomacy after the Second World War" 
(Grabill 1971, p. 299).  The Fulbright program would create partnerships with both 
Robert College and the American University of Beirut as well as the American 
University of Cairo, another former American missionary school.   
 While US missionaries were not very successful converting the Ottomans to 
Protestantism, they were exceedingly successful in sharing American culture and 
ideas.  Even more importantly, they shared the culture of the people they ministered 
to with Americans at home through speaking tours, missionary publications, and the 
many books written by missionaries about their experiences among the Greeks, 
Arabs, Turks, Bulgarians, and Armenians.  Though they were concerned and 
cautious about usurping local cultures, the American missionaries did not understand 
that the individualism, piety, and optimism of the Second Great Awakening 
influenced Protestantism and threatened the political status quo in the region.  "The 
original wise advice from Board leaders not to offend local mores was almost 
impossible for the missionaries to follow.  Puritanism, by its eager commitment to a 
city built on a hill for all to see, required conflict with competing ideas" (Grabill 1970, 
p. 7, emphasis added).  Furthermore, as those who have studied American 
missionaries’ work in the Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, the missionaries had more influence in the Ottoman Empire and Persia 
than American public officials; and with the help of philanthropists obtained 
"mandates" over most of Turkey, something many European nations never obtained 
except through force and occupation (Daniel 1970; Grabill 1971).   
 For at least a century, the US unwittingly conducted public diplomacy 
throughout the Ottoman Empire.  Missionaries, private citizens, and merchants set 
up libraries, schools, translated books, and arranged for students to study in the US, 
sometimes at great personal risk.  The first Americans entered into the region as the 
Empire became known as the “sick man of Europe.”  As the Bulgarian professor 
would later note in 1930, few Americans are aware of the historical role their nation 
has played in the region or the world. 
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 “What is clear to me is that there is a need for a dramatic increase in 
spending on the civilian instruments of national security – diplomacy, 
strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and 
economic reconstruction and development…We must focus our 
energies beyond the guns and steel of the military…”5 
Over two hundred years ago, as American colonial relations with Britain 
began to deteriorate, colonial leaders such as George Washington recognized the 
importance of informing and connecting with the public, both domestically and 
overseas (Waller 2007, p. 40-99).  Only a month after convening as a congress to 
represent the colonies of then British America, the representatives of the First 
Continental Congress deemed addressing the British public a prudent initial step 
toward resolving the ever-widening breach between the colonies and the British 
government.  The gathered congress “resolved, unanimously” on October 11, 1774 
to compose an address to the people of Great Britain, to explain the American 
colonists’ view of Parliament’s actions toward the colonies (Journals of the Continental 
Congress (JCC) Vol. 1:50) .  More open letters would be written to the people of 
Quebec and Jamaica in order to explain the colonies’ reasons for rebelling against 
England. 
Today, American leaders still note the importance of engaging with people 
abroad, evidenced not only by The 9/11 Commission Report, but also subsequent 
reports and public statements made by political and military leaders (Holbrooke 
2001; Mullen 2009).  Despite the renewed interest and prioritization of American 
public diplomacy, more than a decade after 9/11, America’s national 
communication efforts with foreign publics are inadequate; the “…public 
information campaign is a confused mess” (Holbrooke 2001).  When the nation was 
most vulnerable immediately following the 9/11 attacks and when America most 
needed to engage with publics abroad, the country was unable and remains unable to 
use public diplomacy effectively in US statecraft.  Since the onset of the Cold War 
“...the American people and their government struggled to define the appropriate 
role for overseas information.  There has always been a broad consensus on the need 
to more effectively communicate U.S. messages and values.  However, when it 
                                                     
5 GATES, R. 2007. Landon Lecture: Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert 
M. Gates, Manhattan, Kansas, Monday, November 26, 2007 [Online]. Department of 
Defense. Available: http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199 
[Accessed 26 August 2014]. 
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came to the specific nature of such communication, opinions diverged" (Guth 2009, 
p. 321). 
For over a decade, American political leaders, public diplomacy 
practitioners, and academics have raised the issue of how America practices and 
incorporates public diplomacy in its statecraft, especially in the last year (The 9/11 
Commission Report 2004; Carafano 2014; Epstein & Mages 2005; Gates 2007; Mullen 
2009; Thomas 2013).  Much of the debate focuses on the issues which continue to 
inhibit effective practice and bureaucratic questions as to public diplomacy’s place in 
American statecraft, as well as defining the concept.   
Between the public diplomacy of the American Revolution and the US 
missionaries in the Middle East and Asia, the US has a rich history of engaging with 
the people of other nations.  This prompts the question of how a nation, which 
entered the realm of international diplomacy by readily engaging with the publics of 
other nations consistently throughout the American Revolution, continues to 
struggle to find a place for public diplomacy in American statecraft.  This research 
intends to answer this question.  With all that has been written about the history and 
development of Cold War American public diplomacy, and now with the added 
literature of post-9/11 public diplomacy, there is nothing in the literature that 
attempts to explore or question how America arrived at public diplomacy as a 
distinct tool of statecraft and why the nation organized and practiced public 
diplomacy as it did during the Cold War or even today.  This study fills this gap in 
the literature.   
Much like nations conduct diplomacy in their own distinct way, they also 
practice and use public diplomacy in a way which fits their nation’s political system 
and culture.  Therefore, this research provides context for the practice of public 
diplomacy and its incorporation into statecraft today by reconstructing and 
examining specific episodes of American foreign public engagement spanning from 
1776 through 1948 and the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act which legally 
incorporated public diplomacy in US statecraft. 6   By looking at how public 
diplomacy evolves into a distinct tool of statecraft, the study tracks not only how the 
practice of engaging with people of other nations develops, but also looks to define 
                                                     
6 Even today, the Smith-Mundt Act is the legal authority and guidance for US public 
diplomacy.  The Act will be discussed in greater detail in the coming pages. 
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the role public diplomacy comes to play in US statecraft.  Subsequently, the study 
also provides a new way to conceptualize public diplomacy in the American context.  
Additionally, the research identifies common factors which either inhibited or 
facilitated the development of public diplomacy as well as determining the point of 
origin for many of the systemic problems confronting public diplomacy today.   
Ideally, further research using a similar approach could be done with other nations to 
facilitate comparison studies, and to identify commonalities in the development, 
practice, and role of public diplomacy more generally.  Perhaps such studies could 
lead to a general conceptual understanding of public diplomacy. 
Accordingly, the project is concerned with both the mechanical operations 
of the state as well as the intellectual motivations underlying the diplomatic 
functions of the American state.  Thus the research will provide a narrative of the 
mechanical development of American public diplomacy while also considering how 
America’s own political culture helped to shape the evolution of public diplomacy.  
These two angles of analysis will run throughout this study.  On the one hand the 
research will examine the practical experience of American foreign public 
engagement, while on the other hand, also evaluating how political principles of 
American culture have figured in the progression of American public diplomacy. 
The central premise of this research rests on the precedents and tradition of 
American historical experience.  According to some scholars the colonial years of the 
United States helped to determine and fix American foreign policy principles and 
diplomatic practice (Kirk 2006; Savelle 1934; Savelle & Fisher 1968).  “…Certain 
ideas were developed in the practical experiences of the colonies in America, in the 
course of their natural economic and political development and the relations of the 
French, Dutch, and English colonies with each other…Early United States 
diplomacy becomes a synthesis of American, English and European elements” 
(Savelle 1934, p. 349).   
 As Savelle and other historians of American diplomacy (Hartz 1955; Hunt 
1987; McDougall 1997) observe, American diplomacy and foreign policy is based on 
past experience, both in relation to other nations’ colonies as well as the colonies’ 
own relationship with Britain, coupled with observations of European international 
relations and political philosophies. American diplomacy is a compilation of 
traditions, collected and canonized throughout the nation’s existence (McDougall 
1997: 8-9).  These basic principles held firm not only through the seventeenth 
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century, but remain the basis for much of American foreign policy and diplomatic 
behaviour over the nation’s history, though the policies and actions taken to ensure 
tenets, such as freedom of the seas and economic attachments over political 
connections, manifest in different ways throughout American diplomatic history. 
The consistent nature of American foreign relations and enduring diplomatic 
traditions are reflections of American political culture.  This is a political culture 
composed of both past experience and long-held political values which determine 
the motivations and functions of American diplomacy.  Political culture “refers to 
the specifically political orientations – attitudes toward the political system and its 
various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system” (Almond and 
Verba 1989, p. 12).  Furthermore, Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, co-authors 
of The Civic Culture, go on to say there is a relationship between the political culture 
represented by the people who are involved in the political systems and the 
behaviour of a government (1989, p. 32).  By understanding the political orientation 
of a population within a political system, political behaviour can be analysed for 
particular trends (1989, p. 32). The apparent pillars of American diplomacy, 
identified by many diplomatic historians (McDougall 1997; Savelle 1934; Varg 
1963), suggest the American framework for foreign policy and diplomatic practice is 
deeply ingrained in American political culture.  The consistent character of 
American statecraft will likely be evident in the use of US public diplomacy, in 
understanding why it was used, how it was used, and the role such engagement 
played at various points throughout the history of American statecraft. 
As a nation made up of so many traditions which influence foreign policy and 
statecraft, this research will seek to understand how the use of foreign public 
engagement evolved and what role foreign public engagement played in American 
statecraft throughout the nation’s history.  Using primary and secondary sources, the 
study will investigate how public diplomacy fits into American statecraft in the 
context of its historic traditions and political culture by asking the following the 
questions: 
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How has foreign public engagement, from 1776 through 1948, shaped the role of modern 
public diplomacy in American statecraft? 
How does foreign public engagement and modern public diplomacy fit into American 
statecraft? 
How has American political culture impacted the development of American public 
diplomacy? 
In answering these questions, this study has four goals: to identify trends in 
American public diplomacy throughout the research period; to identify connections 
between past use of public diplomacy and present-day public diplomacy; to analyse 
how trends and past experience influence present-day public diplomacy; and 
determine how public diplomacy fits in American statecraft. 
“We ought not to look back, unless it is to derive useful lessons from 
past errors, and for the purpose of profiting by dear bought experience. 
To enveigh against things that are past and irremediable, is unpleasing; 
but to steer clear of the shelves and rocks we have struck upon is the 
part of wisdom…”7  
The approach to this research is guided by both the primary research 
objectives and the research questions.  The study is not intended to be a narrative 
history and the cases are not structured to retell events.  Instead, the research aims 
to provide general knowledge about the practice and role of public diplomacy.  In 
doing so, the method combines historical analysis and case studies to study the 
development of public diplomacy as a tool of the state, while each of the selected 
cases in the study look at the process of statecraft within the historical episode.  The 
goal then would be to use historical case studies to develop general knowledge of a 
phenomenon, public diplomacy, and then convert historical explanation into an 
analytic explanation in theoretically useful variables (George 1997, p. 48).   
This research merges techniques from at least three areas of social science: 
history, political science, and international relations.  In the last forty or fifty years, 
academics and practitioners in the field of political science and international relations 
have sought to combine expertise in order to conduct research which advances 
knowledge in the fields of political science and international relations while 
                                                     
7 George Washington to John Armstrong, 26 March 1781, Library of Congress, George 
Washington Papers, 1744-1799, Series 3h Varhick Transcripts, Letterbook 2 
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contributing practical knowledge for practitioners (Lauren 1979; Neustadt & May 
1986).  This research adapts methodologies of historical research while using 
political science concepts to construct structured, focused case studies.  By employing 
this approach, the goal is to provide a “middle-range theory.”  Middle-range theories 
“are deliberately limited in their scope; they attempt to explain different subclasses 
of general phenomena.  Middle-range theories attempt to formulate well-specified 
conditional generalizations of more limited scope.  These features make them more 
useful for policymaking” (George & Bennett 2005, p. 266).  This does not suggest 
the history of this study can or should be used in any one-to-one comparison for 
present-day US public diplomacy.  Policymakers require much more specific 
information for situations they are required to address.  However, policymakers do 
need a general conceptual model of strategies and policy instruments which provide a 
basic rationale for the effective use of a policy tool (George & Bennett 2005, p. 270).  
Consequently, this study endeavours to formulate a general conceptual model for US 
public diplomacy.   
 Using the structured, focused comparison developed by Alexander George 
and Andrew Bennett (2005), cases have been identified to analyse specific elements 
of each case and use the data collected to compare each case.  George and Bennett 
define a case as a class of events.  A class of events refers to a phenomenon of 
scientific interest such as types of governments, revolutions, or economic systems 
with the goal of developing general knowledge about the causes or differences 
among the class of events.  A case study is a clearly defined aspect of a historical 
episode that the researcher chooses for analysis, rather than the historic event itself 
(2005, pp. 17 - 18).8   
As this study will attempt to adequately cover the scope of the research 
while also looking to understand how American public diplomacy evolved and was 
shaped by past experience with foreign public engagement, the cases were identified 
based on three factors predicated on the research questions this study seeks to 
answer.  First, each case required conscious engagement of the public in another 
country either by the government or a private entity.  Second, each case required 
that any foreign public engagement either become incorporated into American 
                                                     
8 For example, the Cuban Missile Crisis is a historical episode which a researcher could then 
use to study several different classes of events, such as deterrence, coercive diplomacy, 
crisis management, etc (George & Bennett 2005). 
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statecraft or already apart of the country’s statecraft.  Since this study examines how 
public diplomacy became a tool of statecraft, this second criterion for case selection 
is important.  Finally, case selection is also based on the availability of records and 
information in relation to the questions posed.  There are other examples of 
American foreign public engagement; however, the lack of records discussing how 
and why engagement was used and the relationship between the use of public 
diplomacy and American statecraft disqualify these cases to be included in the study.  
For this research, six historic episodes have been identified spanning from 1776 
through 1948, in order to study the use of public diplomacy.   
In an effort to avoid analysing the past using anachronistic concepts and to 
facilitate archival research, this research uses a general term to identify past examples 
of public diplomacy.  The term foreign public engagement is used to identify cases and 
analyse archival records without imposing a confining modern concept onto the past.  
For the purposes of this research, foreign public engagement is any conscious effort by 
either the US government or private entities to interact or communicate with people 
of foreign nations, beyond superficial relationships such as trade and administrative 
correspondences. 
 Additionally, to facilitate evaluating how public diplomacy develops and 
identify practices used to engage with people abroad, this study uses core approaches 
to public diplomacy as described by Nicholas J. Cull (2008b; 2009b).  Cull identifies 
these core practices as listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, 
international broadcasting, and psychological warfare.  Listening is defined as the 
administration of the international environment by gathering information about 
foreign publics and their opinion; where an actor looks for a foreign audience to 
listen, not to speak.  Intelligence collection can sometimes be considered an actor’s 
attempt to listen.  Advocacy is when an actor promotes a specific policy or policies to 
people of another nation.  Cultural diplomacy ensures a nation’s cultural resources and 
achievements are highlighted overseas to transmit a nation’s culture abroad.  
Exchange is where citizens from a nation travel overseas or a nation hosts a citizen 
from abroad to study and learn of another nation’s culture.  International broadcasting 
uses communication technology such as radio, television, and the internet to engage 
with people from other nations.  Psychological warfare is where an actor 
communicates directly to the public of the enemy to achieve war objectives (Cull 
2009b, pp.18 – 23).  In this study, psychological warfare is applied in the most 
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literal sense, communicating with the people of a designated enemy nation during 
war.  The final case will touch on the confusion surrounding the term psychological 
warfare and in the concluding chapter there will be some discussion regarding the 
relationship between psychological warfare, propaganda, and public diplomacy.  
Most of these generalized practices can be found within the text of the 
Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, which effectively legalized public diplomacy in the US. 
 
The Congress hereby declares that the objectives of this Act are to enable 
the Government of the United States to promote better understanding of 
the United States in other countries, and to increase the mutual 
understanding between the people of the United States and the people of 
other countries.  Among the means to be used in achieving these objectives 
are –  
(1) an information service to disseminate abroad information about the 
United States, its people, and policies promulgated by the Congress, the 
President, the Secretary of State, and other responsible officials of 
Government having to do with matters affecting foreign affairs; 
(2) an educational exchange service to cooperate with other nations in 
–  
(a) the interchange of persons, knowledge, and skill; 
(b) the rendering of technical and other services; 
(c) the interchange of developments in the field of education, the 
arts, and sciences…(United States Information and 
Educational Exchange Act, 27 January 1948, Public Law 
402, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, emphasis added). 
 
The only practices not enumerated within the text of the 1948 law are listening and 
psychological warfare. 
To further critical analysis of each case and to permit cross-case evaluation, 
the structured, focused comparison method requires general case questions to be 
generated based on the research objectives and the posed research question.  The 
case questions are applied to each case, “thereby making systematic comparison and 
cumulation [sic] of the findings of the cases possible.  The method is ‘focused’ in that 
it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined…The method was 
devised to study historical experience in ways that would yield useful generic 
knowledge of important foreign policy problems” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 67).  
Thus, once each case was identified and prior to beginning archival research, case 
questions were created based on the aims of the study and the research questions.  
For each of the cases included in the study, the following questions were posed: 
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Who initiates engagement? 
What is the intent of the engagement? 
What do the initiators of engagement believe they are doing? 
What are the initiators’ beliefs about the people they are engaging with? 
What is the message behind the engagement? 
What methods are used to engage the public? 
How is the engagement connected to American statecraft? 
What is the impact of the engagement on American statecraft? 
 
This study focuses on understanding how foreign public engagement becomes a tool 
of American statecraft and in turn how this is related to the development and 
practice of modern American public diplomacy.  Hence, the archival research used 
in this work is primarily official records of the US government.  In some cases where 
private entities initiated foreign public engagement or became involved in 
government initiated foreign public engagement, private archival records are used to 
supplement official records and secondary sources.  Each case puts foreign public 
engagement in the context of the historical episode, providing background about 
American foreign relations at the time, and when relevant, information about other 
nations’ relations with the US. 
 “…America, in the assembly of nations, since her admission among 
them, has invariably, though often fruitlessly, held forth to them the 
hand of honest friendship, of equal freedom, of generous 
reciprocity…”9 
The study opens with a chapter examining the diplomacy of Benjamin 
Franklin and draws connections between his efforts to engage the French public with 
core elements of public diplomacy: listening, exchange diplomacy, international 
broadcasting, and advocacy.  In an effort to throw Franklin’s foreign public 
engagement into sharper relief, the chapter briefly summarizes the United States’ 
primary foreign policy objectives with regard to the American Revolution: foreign 
                                                     
9 John Quincy Adams, 4 July 1821, Speech to the U.S. House of Representatives on Foreign 
Policy 
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aid, recognition, and trade, and explains the difficulties facing France, despite a 
desire to undermine British power.  The case raises the issue of America’s identity 
and image as an obstacle to achieving stated foreign policy objectives.  Though the 
Continental Congress and the citizens of America may have been certain of their 
success against Britain, the rest of the world watched and waited.  If the US were to 
entice foreign investment and trade, the country needed to demonstrate that it was 
worth the risk and prove that a democratic republic was a stable form of government.  
In both instances – obtaining private aid and explaining America – Franklin engaged 
with the French public using various core elements of public diplomacy to procure 
supplies and encourage potential foreign investors.   
The second case in this study looks at how foreign public engagement was 
used throughout the American Civil War to ensure British neutrality and create 
favourable public opinion toward the Union.  When Charles Francis Adams arrived 
in Liverpool as America’s new ambassador to Britain, just a few weeks after the 
commencement of hostilities between the Union and Confederate states, he gave a 
public speech to the industrial town to provide assurances of the Union’s friendliness 
toward Britain and the impact of the blockade on the British cotton industry.  
American citizens supporting the Union travelled to England, and arranged public 
debates, books, and pamphlets regarding the war and the Union (Ferrell 1975).  
President Abraham Lincoln called on private citizens to go on speaking tours or 
publish works specifically directed at the British public.  Lincoln also penned 
memorials addressed to the British public. 
The third case looks at a couple of examples where foreign public 
engagement became a mutual endeavour between both state and private entities.  
The first episode looks at the year leading up the Spanish-American War, and 
President William McKinley’s decision to form an ad-hoc committee of business 
leaders, religious leaders, and elements of the American National Red Cross (ANRC) 
to organize and administer humanitarian relief to the reconcentrados in Cuba, the 
Central Cuban Relief Committee (CCRC).  In late December, after several attempts 
to negotiate White House approval to send the ANRC to Cuba on a humanitarian 
mission, the President along with the Assistant Secretary of State, William Day, 
agreed to use the ANRC to administer relief to displaced Cubans.  President 
McKinley’s decision was made with the idea of resolving a serious foreign relation 
problem through the ANRC’s efforts without resorting to war. 
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The next episode within Chapter 4 looks at the Fourth International 
Conference of American States.  In 1910, the body resolved to exchange professors 
and students from American universities with professors and students in Latin 
American institutions.  The recently established Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace (CEIP) later determined to provide funding for the exchanges.  
However, following the conference there was no rush to set-up the exchanges.  The 
CEIP requested DoS guidance arranging the scholarships, but the DoS deferred to 
CEIP and the Office of Education within the Department of Interior (Record Group 
(RG) 59, Central Decimal File (CDF), 810.42711/48,68, 79a, 80, 83).  The DoS 
remained at arm’s length regarding exchanges until the Conference for the 
Maintenance of Peace held in 1936 when a convention was passed by the Pan 
American Union and subsequently signed into US law by the Senate, leading to the 
creation of the Division of Cultural Relations within the State Department (Hart 
2013; Ninkovich 1984).   
Moving from the more ad-hoc private and public initiatives to engage 
foreign publics, this fourth case of public engagement examines the nature of 
government foreign public engagement through the institution, the Committee on 
Public Information (CPI).  In addition to looking at the practices used by the 
Committee to engage publics abroad, the case will highlight how the Committee 
relied on private organizations, such as American businesses, the American Red 
Cross, and the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), to assist with their 
foreign public engagement activities.  The case will also expose the origins of 
America’s repulsion towards propaganda and the tendency to differentiate the 
Committee’s activities as educational or informational activities.   
Not until December of 1917 would the CPI, in consultations with President 
Wilson, add a robust foreign branch to the organization.  Efforts by the CPI to 
engage a foreign audience up until December focused largely on American 
immigrant populations, using radio, public addresses, foreign language newspapers 
and magazines to address this audience.  In the winter of 1917, Wilson issued a 
second Executive Order (EO)10 authorizing the expansion of CPI by placing officers 
                                                     
10 An Executive Order is a power accorded to the President of the United States, established 
as a precedent by President George Washington with his Proclamation of Neutrality in 
1793.  An EO is not a law, but a grant of discretionary power to the President by the 
Constitution and the Congress to manage operations of the Federal government. 
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in posts overseas.  The CPI set-up offices in country capitals, both allied and neutral, 
to distribute news and film, arrange speakers, and provide reading rooms.  In 
Creel’s final assessment, “the net effect of the whole foreign campaign of the 
Committee has been to make a world of friends and well-wishers for the United 
States out of a world that was either inimical or contemptuous or indifferent” (Creel 
1920a, p. 7). 
The fifth case looks at foreign public engagement during the inter-war 
period, highlighting several key facets in the development of US public diplomacy.  
First, that despite discontinuing CPI operations completely, private organizations 
took up many of the same activities previously administered by the CPI or initiated 
new programs to engage with publics abroad.  Second, this case will serve to 
highlight the continuity of foreign public engagement generally.  Third, the case will 
contrast the US government’s relationship between different private entities 
operating or supporting foreign public engagement programs throughout the 1920’s 
and 30’s.  This case will focus particularly on how private foundations, specifically 
the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and 
the International Institute for Education, tangent to general American policy, used 
various programs to engage with the European public to ensure future peace and 
stability. 
As Katharina Rietzler argues, these philanthropic organizations made efforts 
to ensure mutuality in exchanges and with their cultural relations initiatives, but did 
not manage to isolate their activities from politics (2011).  Large foundations were 
well-connected to officials at the State Department and at American embassies 
overseas.  The foundations did not specifically direct US policy and the US 
government did not directly influence foundation policies, but there was certainly 
informal collaboration and coordination between them (Parmar 2012; Rietzler 
2011). 
Finally, the last case covers the propaganda and cultural relations 
organizations created just before and during America’s entrance into WWII, 
including the Department of Cultural Relations within the State Department, the 
Office of the Coordinator of Commercial & Cultural Relations between the 
American Republics (OCCCAR) later named the Coordinator of Inter-American 
Affairs (CIAA), and the Office of War Information (OWI).  All three of these offices 
were responsible for engaging with foreign publics in some capacity.  The 
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Department of Cultural Relations took on a more administrative role from the time 
of its creation in 1938 through much of WWII.  The department facilitated private 
American organizations’ foreign engagement programs (Ninkovich 1981).  The 
OWI was responsible for coordinating America’s information policy throughout the 
war.  The CIAA is a unique organization which was created by President Franklin 
Roosevelt at the suggestion and insistence of Nelson Rockefeller, who was 
concerned about Nazi influence in Latin America.  The CIAA’s main function related 
to countering Nazi (and foreign influence more generally) in Latin America through 
various public engagement initiatives.   
In looking at how the American government arrived at the Smith-Mundt 
legislation in 1948, the final case examines more broadly how policymakers and 
political leaders saw foreign public engagement, not just cultural diplomacy as 
Ninkovich’s (1981) work does, but also how the use of information was viewed as a 
form of engagement with people abroad.  In the wider context of the collective 
study, this case will also tie the State Department’s cultural relations department to 
the issues surrounding American WWII propaganda organizations and the 
government’s perceptions of propaganda use as a tool of statecraft in relation to 
public diplomacy, as the practice would later be named.  
The final chapter summarizes the major findings of each of the cases as well 
as raising significant themes or patterns which connect each of the cases together.  
Chapter 8 will strive to answer the primary research question of how foreign public 
engagement shaped the role of public diplomacy in American statecraft, using the 
past as context for American public diplomacy today.  In addition, this chapter will 
use lessons from America’s past practice of foreign public engagement to offer 
possible solutions to the problems facing American public diplomacy today.  The 
following chapter identifies the key issues affecting public diplomacy by exploring 
the literature on the subject. 
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Chapter 1  
Past is Prologue 
“…What’s past is prologue…” 
-William Shakespeare, The Tempest, Act 2, Scene I 
 
In the last thirty years, public diplomacy has become the subject of inquiry 
among academics, current and former practitioners, government research bodies, 
and independent think tanks.  Existing literature on US public diplomacy 
acknowledges the importance of public diplomacy and that its importance in 
international relations is increasing, rather than diminishing (Arndt 2007; Cull 
2008a; Cull 2012; Dizard 2004; Kiehl 2006; Lord 1998; Snow & Taylor 2009; Tuch 
1990).  Many of these works aim to further understanding of public diplomacy either 
from a historical angle, a practical perspective, or by looking at the impact of public 
diplomacy.  However, beyond identifying recurring problems which inhibit effective 
public diplomacy and recounting history, current literature does not seek to 
overcome these problems.  The objective of this study is to trace the origins of US 
public diplomacy to better understand the roots of the problems regularly cited by 
scholars, practitioners, and government audits. 
There is general agreement regarding the problems confronting US public 
diplomacy.  These problems or obstacles identified in the literature can be grouped 
into three categories: conceptual, organizational, and ideological.   
   
Figure 1.1  
Organizational 
Ideological Conceptual 
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Organizational problems refer to issues related to the agencies’ or departments’ 
responsible for administering US public diplomacy as well as the role or non-role 
public diplomacy plays in policymaking or carrying out foreign policy.  Conceptual 
problems are issues tied to what public diplomacy actually is, what public diplomacy 
is used for, and what it should or should not do.  Ideological problems are derived 
from deep-rooted beliefs and interpretations about America’s relationship with the 
world, what is appropriate or not.  Ideological issues are also connected to an 
ingrained view that American values and principles are universally acceptable.  Many 
of these issues plague other elements of US statecraft (diplomacy, intelligence, 
defence), but for US public diplomacy, each of these areas can be connected to all of 
the often cited problems confronting US public diplomacy both in the past and in the 
present (Cull 2012; Hart 2013; Ninkovich 1981; Tuch 1990; Zaharna 2010).  Thus, 
begging the question of where these issues originated, if they already existed when 
the US first legally incorporated public diplomacy into American statecraft.  This 
study will use a historical approach in order to see how these problems develop and 
better understand the origins of these three interconnected issues, providing full 
context to better understand the origins and practice of US public diplomacy. 
Whether looking at scholarly, practitioner, or government literature 
regarding the practice and use of public diplomacy; the problems cited fall into these 
three categories.  For example, Nancy Snow and Philip Taylor noted that while 
“scores of reports and white papers” are produced on the need for reform and new 
public diplomacy initiatives, there is little done to clarify and solidify the conceptual 
understanding of public diplomacy itself (2009).  Cull’s comprehensive historical 
work on the United States Information Agency (USIA) from 1945 through its 
eventual dissolution, recounts the repetitive structural and organizational problems 
which plagued the institution (2008a; 2012).  Many of the same issues are noted by 
Richard Arndt (2007), Wilson Dizard (2004), Hans Tuch (1990): the disconnect 
between public diplomacy and policymaking; overlap between USIA and other 
government agencies’ work; and problems clearly defining USIA’s mission, to name 
a few.  Even after the USIA’s absorption into the Department of State in 1999, 
structural and organizational problems continue to undermine the practice of public 
diplomacy (Cull 2012).  US political ideology is not often cited as a specific issue 
confronting American public diplomacy, but some scholars and practitioners have 
made passing references to this issue (Cull 2012; Kiehl 2006; Pilon 2008).  For 
example, Hans Tuch refers to an observation made by another public diplomat and 
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how Americans assume the world is essentially sympathetic to American ideas and by 
extension the nation's policies (1990).  This work will demonstrate how the United 
States’ political orthodoxy sometimes inhibited or facilitated foreign public 
engagement.  
Given this, the chapter will begin by examining the origins of the term public 
diplomacy and its association with propaganda.  This is followed by an evaluation of 
public diplomacy as a tool of statecraft and how it is a recognized mechanism of the 
state.  As America’s diplomatic and foreign policy traditions are largely shaped by 
both past experience and values internalized in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, this research asserts the practice and role of public diplomacy is also 
largely influenced by experience and principles embodied before America was an 
independent nation.  To better understand how modern public diplomacy evolved 
over a large swath of American history and put this process into the context of 
American diplomatic history, this chapter will describe the origins of American 
foreign policy traditions, diplomatic practices and institution.   
“Public diplomacy supplements and reinforces traditional diplomacy by 
explaining U.S. policies to foreign publics…”1    
The term public diplomacy is a modern concept, coined by Edmund Guillion 
in 1965, then the dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts 
University (Cull 2009a).  According to Guillion, “[by] public diplomacy we 
understand the means by which governments, private groups and individuals 
influence the attitudes and opinions of other peoples and governments in such a way 
as to exercise influence on their foreign policy decisions” (“What is Public 
Diplomacy?” 2012). A more specific and often cited definition, pulled from a 
brochure of the Murrow Center, defines public diplomacy as: 
 
...the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign 
policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond 
traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in 
other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one 
country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact 
on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as 
between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-
cultural communications (“What is Public Diplomacy?” 2012). 
                                                     
1 Annual Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. 1985, inside cover 
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More broadly, academics and practitioners tend to distinguish traditional diplomacy 
from public diplomacy as government to government communication whereas public 
diplomacy is described as being government or private communication with the 
wider public of another nation (Tuch 1990; Manheim 1994; Waller 2007).   
However, as J. Michael Waller notes, outside this very general definition, 
perspectives about public diplomacy vary (2007).  Academics, practitioners, and 
policy makers differ on whether public diplomacy is simply a euphemism for other 
mechanisms of communication or statecraft, such as propaganda, psychological 
warfare, political warfare, public affairs, or public relations (Gilboa 2008; Guth 
2009; Holbrooke 2001; L’Etang 2009; Signitzer & Coombs 1992), as well as the 
degree of government involvement with communication with foreign publics 
(Ninkovich 1981; Snow 2009) and the function public diplomacy should play in 
statecraft (Cull 2008a; Ninkovich 1981; Lord 1998).   
More recently, the idea that public diplomacy is related to public affairs and 
public relations has gained currency among academics looking to conceptualize 
public diplomacy (L’Etang 2009; Signitzer & Coombs 1992; Snow 2009).  However, 
former practitioners and other scholars object to connecting public diplomacy to 
public affairs or public relations (Kiehl 2006; Tuch 1990; Zaharna 2010).  Though 
much of American "public diplomacy's roots are in the persuasion industries of PR, 
marketing, and advertising as well as in the minds of Edward Bernays, Walter 
Lippmann, Harold Lasswell, and Edward Filene" (Snow 2009, p. 9), practitioners 
argue that to associate public diplomacy with PR and marketing practices reduces 
public diplomacy to a tactic (Kiehl 2006).  Eytan Gilboa argues 
 
...PR, advertising, political campaigns, and movies are related to public 
diplomacy as much as baseball is related to cricket.  Advertising and 
branding of products are specific and self-defining; movie-makers want to 
entertain, political strategies work in familiar domestic settings, and PR 
rarely goes beyond clichés.  Public diplomacy, on the other hand, has to deal 
with complex and multifaceted issues, must provide appropriate context to 
foreign policy decisions, and cope with social and political impetus not easily 
understood abroad.  In short, public diplomacy cannot be reduced to slogans 
and images (2008, p. 68). 
 
This is the same conclusion reached by Rhonda Zaharna in her assessment of post-
9/11 public diplomacy.  After the attacks, the US government determined that the 
United States suffered from an image problem and merely had to communicate 
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better to erase misconceptions.  As Zaharna demonstrates, this approach was an 
oversimplification of much deeper problems relating to America’s relationship with 
the rest of the world (2010).  Using a PR approach to US public diplomacy only 
exacerbated the tensions and anger toward the United States. 
The lack of consensus regarding the practice of public diplomacy as well as 
defining its role or usefulness to the function of state inhibits effective practical use of 
public diplomacy.  In addition, the absence of general agreement about what public 
diplomacy is and what the mechanism does complicates the systematic study of public 
diplomacy.  Recent academic contributions now distinguish public diplomacy of the 
Cold War era from public diplomacy of the Information Age, now referred to as new 
public diplomacy or public diplomacy 2.0 (Cull 2012; Snow 2009).  Of course the 
advent of the Internet, publically accessible communication platforms, and the 
transition into a multi-polar world undoubtedly have implications for the practice 
and role of public diplomacy.  Nevertheless, before moving forward with new 
conceptions of public diplomacy, there needs to be further discussion and consensus 
about what public diplomacy is and what it should do.  This research looks at past 
archetypes or manifestations of public diplomacy in order to understand how it 
evolved into a pronounced tool of statecraft; in order to come to a more general 
understanding of public diplomacy in the context of America’s former experience 
and political culture. 
 Interestingly, despite the novelty of the term public diplomacy, most 
academics and practitioners agree that the general practice of governments 
communicating with publics of other nations to be an ancient practice (Arndt 2005; 
Kiehl 2006; Tuch 1990).   
 
Public diplomacy activities are neither new nor unique to the United States.  
Its five core practices – listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange 
diplomacy and international broadcasting – all have considerable antiquity.  
Sun Tzu urged his ancient Chinese readers to know an enemy’s state of 
mind.  Herodotus tells of envoys from the Persian emperor Xerxes 
appealing to the citizens of Argos to remain neutral during the empire’s 
invasion of Greece.  The Roman Republic extended its influence by 
educating the heirs to neighboring kingdoms.  Celtic tribes build bonds by 
exchanging and fostering each other’s children, and long before shortwave 
radio, the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II anticipated its reach by 
circulating a newsletter about his activities to the courts of Europe (Cull 
2008a, p. xvi). 
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However, beyond general references to past practice there are not many specific 
studies which examine how early forms of public diplomacy or how such activities 
were used as a component of statecraft.2   
This neglect could be due to the contemporary tendency to distinguish and 
label such activities with the term public diplomacy.  What would be readily labelled 
as an act of public diplomacy today would not be identified as such a hundred years 
ago.  Based on the works of Francois de Caliéres (1983) and Abraham de Wicquefort 
(1716), the practice of diplomacy by professional diplomats encompassed many 
activities, including spying, which are not typically done in modern diplomacy.  In 
other words, diplomacy was a broad term used to describe many activities 
undertaken by an official representing another state or leader in another country, 
and even in the late eighteenth century was still an evolving practice among states.  
The point being that though, public diplomacy is a twentieth century concept; 
diplomacy as generally understood today is also a product of twentieth century 
interpretation.  This being said, much of the existing literature on diplomacy tends 
to evaluate past diplomacy using a modern understanding of the practice, where 
diplomacy and diplomats only include interactions among state leaders.   
Another potential reason for the lack of literature examining past use of 
public diplomacy or its development as a tool of statecraft could be because the 
traditional practice of diplomacy is more easily traceable throughout history.  The 
study of traditional diplomacy is easier to follow not only from secondary sources, 
but also in archives as most states have institutions which specifically administer 
foreign relations of the state.  Hence, the novelty of public diplomacy coupled with 
the changing practices of traditional diplomacy make historical investigation into 
previous uses of public diplomacy more difficult to trace.  For this reason the study 
uses a broad, general term, foreign public engagement, to not only signify activities 
which share similarities with present day public diplomacy, but also to help identify 
these activities within archival records.   
                                                     
2 A book on Japanese public diplomacy from 1904-1905 in the US was recently translated 
into English in 2010, Baron Kaneko and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05): A Study in the 
Public Diplomacy of Japan, by Masayoshi Matsumura.  Apart from this book, there are no 
historical examinations of earlier forms of public diplomacy. 
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“…for we should want to be careful to avoid giving the impression that 
we were consciously endeavoring to propagandize American ideas 
abroad”3    
A frequent criticism and concern for American public diplomacy 
consistently throughout the Cold War up to the present day is the concept’s 
relationship to propaganda, perhaps the most difficult conceptual issue confronting 
US public diplomacy.  Propaganda became something of an enigma after America’s 
experience with propaganda from World War I (WWI) to the end of World War II 
(WWII).  Upon the conclusion of WWI, Americans were incensed by revelations of 
propaganda used by foreign governments and the US government to encourage 
support for the war.  The fallout of WWI propaganda spurred intellectuals and 
journalists to publish exposés, to engage in experimental studies, and to investigate 
the use of propaganda by foreign and domestic entities (Gary 1999; Sproule 1997).  
Ironically, looking at the period from the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act in 1948 to 
the creation of the USIA in 1953 and the popularization of the term public diplomacy, 
the term propaganda is used regularly to describe American activities which would 
eventually be labelled as public diplomacy under the USIA (Canham, E. D., et al. 
1954; Reinsch, J. L., et al. 1963). 
As David Welch notes, propaganda has come to mean different things at 
different times, though the use of propaganda saw a dramatic increase in the 
twentieth century (2014).  Propaganda in the twentieth and now twenty-first 
century presents a conundrum for academics, political leaders, and citizens.  While 
the term itself connotes something different from its origins, providing an exact 
definition remains elusive and determining the ethics of using propaganda even more 
contested.  As with the literature on public diplomacy, the literature on propaganda 
remains largely historical, with a few dated texts exploring the mechanics and 
epistemological aspects of propaganda (Bernays [1928] 2005; Doob 1935; Ellul 
1965; Lasswell [1927] 1971). 
With the post-WWI revelations of foreign and domestic propaganda 
targeting the general population, Americans were appalled by not only how easily 
the public were manipulated, but also discomforted by the fact that the US 
government also used propaganda to persuade citizens to support the war through 
                                                     
3 Alling from Div. of Near East Affairs, 24 September 1936, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 
5064, 811.42767/78 
- 8 - 
 
the CPI (Gary 1999; Sproule 1990).  The use of propaganda infringed on Americans’ 
sense of fair play and independence, creating permanent fear and suspicion toward 
any government information.  Compounding this fear, American political leaders 
and academics never adequately defined what propaganda meant in relation to 
American liberal political values in the intervening years between WWI and WWII 
(Sproule 1990).  As WWII began, President Franklin D. Roosevelt created several 
agencies which used similar techniques and practices to those used by the CPI, 
without any consensus or resolution regarding the use of propaganda let alone how 
to define the practice.  Many of these agencies, including the Office of War 
Information (OWI) and the Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), were 
later absorbed by the State Department, becoming the forerunners of US public 
diplomacy.   
America’s twentieth century exposure to and the use of propaganda from 
1914 to 1945 contributed to how American institutional public diplomacy 
developed.  Based on the opposition aroused by propaganda among both 
policymakers and the American public, coupled with present-day suspicions that 
public diplomacy is simply a euphemism for propaganda,4 a logical conclusion can be 
made that the development of American public diplomacy is affected by the latent 
issues surrounding the definition of propaganda, propaganda’s role in American 
democracy, and the development of America’s own propaganda strategy.   
Perhaps the most significant impact of America’s encounter with propaganda 
was the complete loss of faith in the ability of the American citizen to differentiate 
propaganda from true information (Gary 1999; Sproule 1990).  A central tenet of 
American liberalism – the rationality of man and his ability to discern the truth – was 
diminished by America’s experience with propaganda in WWI.  As Philip Taylor 
notes in the introduction to Munitions of the Mind, 
                                                     
4 In the last two years, the US press featured dozens of articles and investigative reports on 
government public diplomacy programs.  Beginning with a 2012 attempt to update the 
Smith-Mundt Act, USA Today discovered the Department of Defence used several 
private contractors to conduct propaganda in Iraq.  The Smith-Mundt Modernization 
Act was stalled in part due to this report as well as Congress’s concern that the changes 
to the act open the door to allow propaganda in the US (Korte 2012; Vanden Brook & 
Locker 2012).  The bill was eventually passed in September 2013.  The issue of 
whether American public diplomacy is in fact propaganda was again raised when 
Congressman Edward Royce proposed new legislation to reform US international 
broadcasting and when the Associated Press revealed USAID was running a covert 
Twitter-like program to stir a political revolution among Cuban youth (Butler, D., 
Gillum, J. & Arce, A. 2014; Hudson 2014). 
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For the liberal-minded, its continued existence remains a cancer threatening 
to eat away at the body politic...a disease which somehow afflicts our 
individual and collective capacity to make up our own minds about what is 
happening in the world around us. Propaganda, it is felt, forces us to think 
and do things in ways we might not otherwise have done had we been left to 
our own devices...Propaganda thus becomes the enemy of independent 
thought and an intrusive and unwanted manipulator of the free flow of 
information and ideas in humanity’s quest for ‘peace and truth’. It is 
therefore something which democracies, at least, ought not to do. It 
suggests the triumph of emotion over reason in a bureaucratic struggle by 
the machinery of power for control over the individual (2003, p. 1). 
 
Two of the cases in this study look specifically at America’s “propaganda” agencies 
during WWI and WWII.  This is because they are not only a key piece to the story of 
American public diplomacy, but also because of the similar methods used by the CPI, 
OWI, CIAA, and the Division of Cultural Relations in relation to the methods used 
throughout the Cold War and in present day American public diplomacy.   
Propaganda raises some important issues for understanding public 
diplomacy.  First, just as public diplomacy lacks clarity, propaganda remains a 
relatively ambiguous term.  Due to the organic nature of language and the vast 
period of study, the research will simply examine how people engaging with foreign 
publics viewed what they were doing and when able, contrast this with what foreign 
publics thought they were doing.  Second, there is a tendency in public diplomacy 
literature to use techniques to distinguish between the terms.  Thus, much attention 
will also be given to the methods used and the intent behind the engagement, as 
“propaganda cannot be defined by the nature of the material propagated.  The 
definition must rest on the intent underlying the dissemination or, as in the case of 
censorship, the suppression of the material in question" (Cull 1991, p. xi).   
“Public opinion is the single most important item in foreign affairs…”5      
Three years after the conclusion of WWII, the United States Information 
and Education Exchange Act of 1948, more commonly known as the Smith-Mundt 
Act, was passed.  In comparison to the bills setting up the Fulbright program and the 
Central Intelligence Agency, the effort to incorporate public engagement formally 
into American statecraft was a hard fought battle, consuming the full three years 
                                                     
5 Archibald MacLeish, “Information Service Committee Meeting,” 4 January 1945, RG 353, 
Entry 401-403, Box 94 
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after the war just to draft an acceptable bill and get the act through both the House 
and the Senate.  The 1948 Act is recognized as being the watershed moment, which 
signalled the inclusion of public diplomacy into American statecraft.  Five years later, 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower would create the USIA, which assumed the 
responsibility for administering US public diplomacy.  The USIA remained the 
primary agency for US public diplomacy until 1999, when the agency was dissolved 
and public diplomacy was reabsorbed by the US Department of State. 
Since the demise of the USIA, practitioners, government think tanks, and 
some scholars attribute some of the problems facing US public diplomacy today to 
the fact that there is not an independent agency dedicated to engaging with people 
overseas (Fitzpatrick 2008; Johnson & Dale 2003).  However, even when the USIA 
existed, US public diplomacy was still inhibited by structural problems (Cull 2008a; 
Cull 2012).  As this study will demonstrate, the bureaucratic issue is rooted in a 
much deeper issue, which existed long before Smith-Mundt.  An independent agency 
might help to define the role or place for an element of statecraft, but as many 
practitioners have noted, US public diplomacy never really had a place among the 
other tools of American statecraft.  "Perhaps one of the most important lessons of 
the 9/11 period - is that public diplomacy, as a political and communication activity, 
needs to be strategically aligned to the political and communication dynamics of the 
international arena in order to be effective.  This alignment needs to occur on the 
higher level of grand strategy as well as the lower levels of strategy and tactics" 
(Zaharna 2010, p. 3-4).  This is a lesson of old.  Incorporating public diplomacy into 
the policymaking process was an issue fought over by the CIAA, OWI, and the State 
Department.  It was also a constant problem for the USIA, and remains a problem 
today (Cull 2008a; Cull 2012). 
Modern public diplomacy is recognized by political leaders and practitioners 
as a distinct tool of American statecraft, a mechanism wielded by the state or its 
leaders to maintain peace, order, stability of a state or to achieve particular 
objectives of a state (Arndt 2007; Dizard 2004; Holbrooke 2001; Lord 1998; Tuch 
1990; Waller 2007).  A former member of the US National Security Council, 
Carnes Lord remarks that “...those responsible for U.S. policy tended to conceive of 
public diplomacy as part of an arsenal of capabilities that could and ought be 
used...Public diplomacy programs thus emerged as an independent dimension of 
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national strategy fully comparable to diplomacy, military force, and economic 
power” (Lord 1998, p. 52).   
In general, the term statecraft is a rather broadly defined word.  As Carnes 
Lord ruminates, the term “is rarely analyzed carefully...Even its basic meaning is not 
especially clear.  The term is now used almost exclusively to refer to diplomacy or 
the conduct of foreign policy in a broad sense” (2003, p. 23).  Lord goes onto add 
that such a narrow view of statecraft does not take into account the cultural, 
domestic, and ideological influences and elements which are every bit apart of 
statecraft and the practice of statecraft.  As Lord notes, to see statecraft as only the 
external function of a state limits the understanding and function of diplomacy.  A 
state maintains foreign relations to maintain peace and to inform policy.  This 
function is not limited to just the external activities of a state.  Therefore, statecraft, 
can be said to be all the activities required for a state to function, to interact among 
other states and to fulfil the duties a state has to its own citizens.   
 
Like strategy in war, statecraft is an art of coping with an adversarial 
environment in which actions generate reactions in unpredictable 
ways…Like strategy, too, statecraft is also an art of relating means to 
ends…statecraft is an art of using wars and other instruments available to 
political leaders to attain national goals…Effective statecraft requires an 
understanding of the various instruments actually or potentially available to 
statesmen and an ability to use them in coordinated fashion in differing 
circumstances to achieve the objectives of state policy (Lord 2003, p. 24-
25). 
 
Various tools of statecraft have been identified by practitioners and academics in 
recent years to evaluate state policies and the effectiveness of particular mechanisms 
of statecraft as well as looking for best practices for future use.   
Ostensibly, American public diplomacy as a government-led institution 
began in WWII with various activities being conducted across multiple government 
agencies and war-time organizations, including the OWI, the Division of Cultural 
Relations in the Department of State, and the CIAA (Cull 2008a; Dizard 2004; Guth 
2009; Hart 2013; Ninkovich 1981).  Following WWII, the responsibility within the 
government for American foreign public engagement rested primarily with the 
Department of State, but other components were scattered among other parts of the 
US government (i.e. the US military and the Central Intelligence Agency) (Canham, 
et. al., 1954; Lord 1998).  With the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act, American 
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foreign public engagement became a legally recognized function of the Department 
of State (DoS).   
After the creation of the USIA in 1953, the agency managed American 
public diplomacy throughout the Cold War, but practitioners and political leaders 
remained divided on what the nature of public diplomacy should be (advocacy versus 
mutuality) and what role it should play in statecraft (Cull 2008a; Ninkovich 1981).  
These key issues would continue to plague American public diplomacy throughout 
the USIA’s existence, as described in histories of the agency (Arndt 2007; Cull 
2008a; Dizard 2004) as well as regular government reports done by an independent 
advisory council, the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (formerly the 
US Advisory Commission on Information) (Canham, et. al., 1954; Reinsch, et. al., 
1963; Stanton, et. al., 1968; Stanton, et. al., 1971).   
Almost a decade after the break-up of the Soviet Union, President Bill 
Clinton and Congress began to re-evaluate the purpose and use of public diplomacy 
in American statecraft (Clinton 1998; United States Advisory Commission on Public 
Diplomacy 2000).  This culminated in the decision to move the USIA under the 
Department of State.  Unfortunately, though the plan to consolidate the USIA into 
the DoS was intended to better integrate public diplomacy in American statecraft, 
the assessment six years later was that in the “era of the 1990s, public diplomacy was 
viewed as a low priority, and was often seen by lawmakers as a source of funds to tap 
for other programs” (Epstein & Mages 2005, p. i). 
Following the terror attacks of September 11th, US political leaders renewed 
focus and attention on American public diplomacy (The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; 
Epstein & Mages 2005).  In the thirteen years since public diplomacy became a 
priority, efforts to improve and hone public diplomacy in American statecraft have 
yielded mixed results as evidenced by Government Accountability Office reports 
(Ford 2004; Ford 2007), the Congressional Research Service reports (Dodaro 2009; 
Epstein & Mages 2005; Nakamura & Weed 2009), and Congressional hearings 
(America's Global Dialogue: Sharing American Values and the Way Ahead for Public 
Diplomacy 2002; An Around-the-World Review of Public Diplomacy 2005), in addition to 
studies by private think tanks (Lord 2008; Wolf  & Rosen 2004).  These reports and 
hearings repeat the same problems noted in 2001: an absence of strategy, what 
public diplomacy should do and how, as well as clearly defining the role of public 
diplomacy in American statecraft, and uneven and ineffective implementation (The 
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9/11 Commission Report 2004; Dodaro 2009; Nakamura & Weed 2009).  All of these 
problems suggest American public diplomacy is yet to be fully incorporated in 
American statecraft.   
“Let the thirteen States…concur in erecting one great American system, 
superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to  
dictate the terms of the connection between the old and new world!”6  
In an address to US Public Diplomacy Council, Donald Bishop outlined 
three challenges facing public diplomacy.  One of the challenges Bishop noted 
impacting US public diplomacy derived “from division among the American people 
over our nation's purposes in the world” (2013).  If the goal of public diplomacy is to 
assist with a nation’s foreign relations, how can public diplomacy be effective 
without consensus about the nature of the country’s relationship to the rest of the 
world?  The United States not only struggles to clearly define what its role should 
be, but also premises much of its public diplomacy on ingrained principles which 
date back to before the US became an independent nation (Pilon 2008).  These 
principles and ideas, such as freedom and the sovereignty of the public, are and were 
assumed to be universally acceptable and desired.  America’s evolving view of its 
relationship with the world and the principles which define American political 
culture, impact the development and role of public diplomacy. 
Examining US history, particularly looking at how American ideals, 
diplomatic practice, and pillars of foreign policy developed, reveals the paradoxes 
present in the political culture of the nation.  Scholars have noted the conflicting 
traditions and political philosophies which compose American political culture 
(Hartz 1955; Kloppenberg 1987; McDougall 1997).  “American political thought… 
is a veritable maze of polar contradictions, winding in and out of each other 
hopelessly: pragmatism and absolutism, historicism and rationalism, optimism and 
pessimism, materialism and idealism, individualism and conformism” (Hartz 1955, 
p. 63).  To this broad list, other political philosophies may be added, including 
republicanism, federalism, conservatism, Protestantism, and liberalism 
(Kloppenberg 1987).  The question then is how these many doctrines influenced the 
development and practice of foreign public engagement throughout the course of 
American history and subsequently public diplomacy.  Contradictions in the United 
                                                     
6 Federalist Paper No. 11, 24 November 1787 
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States’ political culture have long affected how the US sees and defines its 
relationship with the rest of the world.  "What is more, confusion and discord have 
been the norm in American foreign relations not because we lack principles to guide 
us, but because we have canonized so many diplomatic principles since 1776 that we 
are pulled every which way at once" (McDougall 1997, p. 4). 
Through much of United States’ existence, the nation’s relationship with the 
world remained passive.  However, as America grew geographically and 
economically; as the outside world changed; and as technological advances 
diminished physical boundaries the United States’ altered its view of the world and 
the role of the nation in the world.  By the end of the nineteenth century, the US 
prepared for a much more active relationship with other nations.  This altered stance 
toward the world and the paradoxes ingrained in US political culture both facilitated 
and hindered the development of public diplomacy throughout the course of 
American history.   
America established much of the country’s diplomatic practice and attitudes 
toward foreign affairs through colonial experience, European influence, and British 
legal tradition.  Keynote diplomatic traditions such as isolationism and the separation 
of the New World from the Old World originated in colonial experience and remain 
important frames guiding US relations with the rest of the world through WWII.  
Colonial and later American ideas toward foreign relations can be traced back to 
classical and European philosophies, while American diplomatic practice originates 
from not only British and European influences, but also from the use of colonial 
agents going back to the seventeenth century.  Looking at how American diplomacy 
developed reveals how much the colonial years of the United States helped to 
determine and fix American foreign policy principles and diplomatic practice which 
plays a role in the development of public diplomacy.   
Firstly, the colonies developed in such a way that made each colony take on 
“international” responsibilities equivalent to a sovereign state.  In the seventeenth 
and eighteenth century, the American colonies shared borders with colonies which 
were under Dutch, French, and Spanish administration, and by virtue of the 
colonies’ geographic separation from England, many of the colonies formed policies 
based both on the framework of the home government’s laws and based on practical 
need.  Edmund Burke coined the term “salutary neglect” to describe the relationship 
formed between the British American colonies and England (Kirk 2003).    A 
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relationship which was, generally, mutually beneficial for both: the colonial settlers 
escaped the political chaos of Europe and the European home governments 
benefitted from the raw materials and eventually, agricultural products of the 
colonies.  Thus, “American freedom and order grew ‘organically’ in colonial times, 
out of practical social experience of the colonial people, who adapted British political 
institutions to their American circumstances” (Kirk 2003, p.331).  The physical 
distance between America and Britain as well as the need for a strong government to 
handle colonial policy toward neighbouring colonies obligated the American colonies 
to take on an executive role rather early in their existence. 
American ideas of isolationism or separation from the Old World; freedom 
of the seas; neutrality rights in war; encouraging commercial ties as a means of 
ensuring peace; and free trade with all were well ingrained in the colonial mind as 
the proper course of relations with other nations prior to the seventeenth century.  
Interestingly, the concept of separate spheres, Old World and New World, was a 
European diplomatic idea.  In an effort to prevent conflict in one sphere impacting 
another, European nations in the sixteenth and seventeenth century agreed that 
hostilities in one sphere did not transfer to another.  The concept was built upon 
over the course of the seventeenth century as more and more settlers came to the 
New World (Savelle 1934).  At the time, not all the colonies in North America were 
British.  The colonies did not want to become entangled in the frequent conflicts 
which emanated out of Europe, in part because they left to escape the violence, but 
also as a matter of survival.  The colonies developed inter-colonial trade relations 
which would have been disrupted by any involvement in Europe’s disagreements.  
America maintained no interest in becoming involved in European power politics for 
more than a hundred years after the Declaration of Independence (Kertesz 1980). 
By the mid-eighteenth century, the attempt by the British to administer this 
inter-colonial trade which developed among the now British colonies angered the 
American colonists.  Over the next decade, colonial opposition to Parliamentary acts 
used the ideas of Continental writers such as Hugo Grotius, Baron de Montesquieu, 
and Emerich de Vattel along with the principles of the British constitution to argue 
against the new acts which the British government intended to assert more control 
and authority over the colonies.  Many pamphlets and letters written by colonists 
either referenced or quoted Continental writers.  Alexander Hamilton, in his letter 
“The Farmer Refuted” written in 1775, urges his epistolary opposition to read 
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Grotius, Puffendorf, and Montesquieu so he might have a better understanding of 
the limitations of government with regard to the natural rights of mankind.  James 
Otis, formerly the colonial Advocate General, critiques Grotius in his piece, The 
Rights of the British Colonies (1764).  What is important to note, however, is how 
these European political tracts permeated the understanding, foundation, and 
practice of American statecraft.   
Many of the principles of international law expounded upon by Vattel, 
Montesquieu, and Grotius, coincided with colonial principles already in practice 
from past experience.  The works of these European philosophers and jurists 
provided not only legal legitimacy to such liberal ideas, but also provided a new 
interpretation of Roman law of nations by connecting the law of nations to natural 
law and the “self-evident” rights of man (Reeves 1909).  Hence, the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century treatises on international law resonated well with American 
concepts of government and relations with other nations. 
The origins of American diplomatic thought and practice impacted the way 
the United States viewed the world and how the nation saw its role in the world.  
And as the American colonial experience influenced United States’ ideas about the 
inter-state relations, the historical origins of America’s diplomatic institution reflect 
the political debate throughout the nation’s history about the role of the US in the 
world, whether to retreat completely from the world or whether to maintain some 
form of contact (Ilchman 1961).  The Department of State’s development was 
shaped by tensions within the branches of government over the handling of American 
foreign relations and how both the Executive and Legislative branches each use 
Constitutional powers to maintain some authority over the form of the country’s 
foreign relations (Ilchman 1961; Waters 1956; Waters 1960).  These tensions over 
the character of American diplomacy as well as control over foreign policy 
profoundly impacted the bureaucratic organization and function of the State 
Department.  Understanding the debates surrounding the institution responsible for 
American diplomacy is important to understanding not only the origins of American 
public diplomacy, but also some of the recurring discussions about whether public 
diplomacy should be performed by a separate government agency.  The stagnated 
development of the Department of State in some cases forced American leaders to 
use non-traditional diplomacy to attain foreign policy objectives, such as engaging 
with foreign publics. 
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The Department of State’s modern organization and size has only been in 
place for about sixty years (Ilchman 1961; Plischke 1999).  The largest growth the 
Department experienced was in the middle of WWI, and again throughout WWII 
(Ilchman 1961; Plischke 1999). America’s first “foreign ministry” was formed on 
September 18, 1775 (JCC, 2:253-254).  The Committee of Secret Correspondence 
(CSC) acted as both a diplomatic and intelligence organization by corresponding 
with agents abroad to garner support for the colonies as well as to ascertain which 
European governments might recognize American independence and join their fight 
against the British (Crews 2004; Hunt 1914).  The committee membership tended 
to be rather fluid because frequently members were asked to serve as agents 
overseas.  Additionally, the committee lacked any authority and primarily performed 
secretarial duties for the foreign affairs of the colonies.  The issue of authority would 
plague the Committee and future early diplomatic organizations of America until the 
ratification of the Constitution.   
In an effort to better organize the American colonies’ foreign relations, the 
Second Continental Congress established the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
created the position of Secretary of Foreign Affairs in January of 1781 (Hunt 1914; 
Plischke 1999).  However, the issue of centralized control over American foreign 
affairs continued to trouble the Department.  Politically, no one in Congress saw a 
need, presently or in the future, to centralize or organize the handling of America’s 
foreign relations (Ilchman 1961).   
After successfully gaining independence from Britain, America struggled to 
function as a state under the Articles of Confederation.  One of the biggest problems 
facing the new nation was the inability of the Congress to effectively manage 
American diplomacy.  The issue of handling foreign relations figured heavily in the 
decision to organize the Constitutional Convention (Ilchman 1961; Kaplan 1972; 
Oren 2007; Varg 1963).  Once the Constitution was ratified, the Department of 
Foreign Affairs first came into existence under the new Federal government on July 
27, 1789 (Hunt 1914).  Less than two months later, on September 15, 1789, the 
former Department of Foreign Affairs became the Department of State and was 
given additional domestic duties because Congress felt the Department of Foreign 
Affairs would not have many foreign relations issues to manage (Hunt 1914).   
One of the main causes for the stunted growth of American diplomacy was 
the general opinion of Congress and the public regarding foreign relations with other 
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nations; many feared close, continual contact with other nations and others did not 
see a need for any foreign relations.  American political leaders throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century actively sought to avoid political ties with the 
outside world, particularly with Europe, fearing the Old World power politics 
would poison the new government which answered to the will of the people, who 
desired most to maintain peace with the outside world (Hartz 1955; Howard 1978).  
This reflected the liberal political conscience of the nation.  “[To] the generation that 
founded the United States, designed its government, and laid down its policies, the 
exceptional calling of the American people was not to do anything special in foreign 
affairs, but to be  a light to lighten the world"  (McDougall 1997, p. 20).  
Throughout the period from 1779 to 1888, the idea that diplomacy had a perverting 
effect or that it was contradictory to republican government and American liberal 
principles persisted among political leaders (Hartz 1955; Ilchman 1961).   
Consequently, American diplomacy as an institution and practice was fluid 
and lacked support throughout much of the nation’s existence.  Around the end of 
the nineteenth century, private citizens, missionaries and merchants began to 
actively urge reform and professionalization of American diplomatic institutions 
(Ilchman 1961; Rosenberg 1982).  The stunted growth of the Department of State 
reflects the fear of political entanglement and foreign influence within American 
political culture. 
“They all hated us for our principles. – They dreaded the effect of our 
example, the standing refutation of their doctrines in our prosperous 
condition, and the danger to themselves in our constantly growing 
power.”7  
The image of America as an ideal nation becomes embedded in American 
culture and character which impacts America’s approach to foreign relations 
throughout the nation’s history. The assumption of America as an exemplar model is 
apparent in the use of the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny in American 
foreign policy and by the end of the nineteenth century becomes the impetus to 
project America more actively.  Interestingly, this belief in America as a model for 
other nations is not actively promoted by the government throughout much of the 
country’s existence, but with the Second Great Awakening private entities became 
                                                     
7 John Quincy Adams Diary, Vol. 32, 30 Nov. 1821 
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motivated by religious and moralistic beliefs to travel abroad to solve social 
problems, and in doing so, unwittingly spread American idealism abroad. 
While simultaneously advocating for isolation or at least separation from the 
world politically, US leaders and the American public did hope to spread the 
American model around the world.  The belief that America was not only an 
exemplar nation for others to emulate, but also that American ideals would certainly 
spread remained a consistent and strong belief throughout the late eighteenth 
century up through the twentieth century.  This belief in America as the “city on the 
hill” influenced American statecraft even prior to gaining independence.  
Included in the concept of the “city on the hill” is the belief that America, the 
land and people, were chosen by God to establish a nation built on sound principles 
founded upon the Law of Nations and Natural Law; and that America was destined 
to change the old ways of the world by serving as a model to other nations.  Part of 
this belief in the exceptional nature of America is further influenced by a sense of 
national destiny and religious duty which go on to shape American political culture, 
diplomacy, and foreign policy. 
According to Sacvan Bercovitch, early Puritan settlers saw the American 
colony as a present-day Canaan (1978).  He details how Puritan typology, the 
exegetic practice of taking present day occurrences and equating them with Biblical 
events, were used to not only justify the Puritan’s departure from England, but also 
to encourage Puritan settlers to live in accordance to God’s wishes to ensure the 
development of a model society.  John Winthrop’s sermon, “A Model of Christian 
Charity,” carries this belief by admonishing his parishioners to live as devout 
Christians and in turn to develop a Christian society, so that their new community 
could become a model for others to observe and emulate.  The sermon raises key 
themes which influence American exceptionalism: a chosen people on a divine 
errand to create a model society in a chosen land. 
The influences of Puritan exceptionalism combined with the ideas of John 
Locke and Montesquieu created a colonial ideology among American colonists which 
expected the government to attend to the rights of the individual.  Rights were 
granted by God, not the government.  The government served the people by 
ensuring these rights were protected.  The Declaration of Independence even uses 
the accusation that the British government has tainted these exceptional principles of 
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American colonial governance, thus giving the colonists the right to sever the 
political ties between the two:   
 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights…That to 
secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their 
just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of 
Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or 
to abolish it, and to institute a new Government, laying its foundation on such 
principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem 
most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness (“Declaration of 
Independence” 1776, emphasis added). 
  
The mission of the new world to create an Eden on earth became tied with 
Enlightenment ideas of representative government, egalitarianism, free trade, and 
the rights of the individual.  All of which were to be protected, not diminished by 
the government.  In the eyes of colonial leaders, British policies threatened the city 
on the hill.  As Deborah Madsen explains: 
 
[Benjamin] Franklin redefined the mythology exceptionalism [sic], away 
from its religious origins as an errand into the wilderness where a grand and 
purified church would be established…Franklin represents the American 
errand as the creation of a secular state that is purified of the corruption of 
European politics and a social structure based on inherited title.  It is the 
secular America that will be a model of democratic government and the 
envy of all the nations of the earth (1998, pp. 36-37).  
 
The American drive to independence became connected to the idea that the colonies 
had successfully created an exceptional society for others to follow, and the belief 
that British policies toward the colonies attempted to apply Old World principles to 
the model society.  In order to preserve the American “city on the hill,” the colonies 
broke with England. 
This “city on the hill” motif serves as impetus for much of American foreign 
public engagement throughout the course of US history, as this study will 
demonstrate.  In addition to acting as a catalyst for US foreign public engagement, 
the idea of the United States as an exemplar for others to follow is also connected to 
the assumption US principles and ideas are universally appealing and compatible with 
other nations and cultures.   
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[Edmund Burke]...recognized in these colonists a whole new breed of man 
that deserved to be let alone...His warning...was prescient: the conviction 
that America was an example to every man because any man could hope to 
pursue his dreams there, at least in principle, led imperceptibly to an inability to 
comprehend how anyone would fail to acknowledge the universal validity of this 
system of government.  Specifically, it meant that democracy's appeal was assumed as 
'self-evident'...It meant that, in the US, strategic diplomacy and global 
communication have generally been an afterthought.  Unlike Crusaders from 
other times and cultures, Americans assumed that their democratic system 
and their motives required no rhetorical defense.  The pride which, as Burke 
astutely perceived, fatefully accompanied the otherwise commendable 
American religion of freedom, would eventually prove to be a handicap: The 
result has been a sorry chronicle of dismally ineffective public diplomacy 
(Pilon 2008, p. 133, emphasis added). 
 
A similar assessment is made by Rhonda Zaharna regarding US public diplomacy 
following 9/11.  The Shared Values initiative attempted to promote American values 
and Muslim values, but rather than demonstrating connections between the two the 
program came across as attempting to supplant Arab and Muslim cultural values.  
"The [Bush] administration argued that if international audiences could understand 
and appreciate the values upon which U.S. policy was based, they would be more 
accepting of the policy" (Zaharna 2010, p. 26).  This idea that US ideas are 
universally acceptable underlines much of US public diplomacy throughout WWII, 
the Cold War, and after 9/11.  Consequently, this mentality raises ethical concerns 
regarding the line between representing an ideal and imposing an ideal.  US public 
diplomacy tends to shift from representing the “city on the hill” to imposing 
American ideas and values on the world, which undermines the entire purpose of 
public diplomacy.  
“But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy.  She is the 
well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all.”8    
As the Introduction illustrated, US missionaries were often the most active 
component of American foreign relations up through WWI.  However, American 
missionaries were not the only private entities engaging with people of other nations.  
There is a rich literature which examines how US citizens and small organizations 
engaged with foreign publics for various purposes and in the process exchanged 
culture, ideas, and technical expertise (Curti & Birr 1954; Daniel 1964; Daniel 
                                                     
8 John Quincy Adams, 4 July 1821, Speech to the U.S. House of Representatives on Foreign 
Policy  
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1970; Grabill 1971; Parmar 2012; Rietzler 2011; Rosenberg 1982).  Some of this 
literature provides excellent narrative accounts of how private organizations 
developed relationships with citizens in other nations (Daniel 1964; Daniel 1970; 
Grabill 1971), while others combine historical accounts of private foreign public 
engagement and different analysis of its impact to American interests both abroad 
and domestically (Castigliola 1988; Curti & Birr 1954; Rietzler 2011; Rosenberg 
1982).  These works cover varying ranges of history and analyse foreign public 
engagement in different ways.  Relevant to this study, this literature on early 
American foreign public engagement raises the motivations and objectives of private 
engagement.  These works also highlight the connections between US foreign policy 
and private engagement; the methods used by private entities for engagement; and 
how private individuals and groups lobbied for government support for their 
engagement. 
As Merle Curti notes, American philanthropy began soon after the US 
became an independent nation.  American philanthropy tended to be ad hoc through 
much of the nineteenth century, except for ventures managed by foreign mission 
boards (Curti 1963; Curti & Birr 1954; Daniel 1970; Grabill 1971).  The main 
players in American engagement in the nineteenth century tended to be religious 
organizations and charities; hence, the motivations for outreach tended to be 
connected to a desire to convert aid recipients or simply to extend Christian charity.   
 
Yet two closely interrelated motives overarched all others.  One was related 
to Judeo-Christian teachings about the duty of compassion and charity.  This 
duty was sometimes expressed in the doctrine of stewardship - that 
whatever of worldly means one has belongs to God, that the holder is only 
God's steward and obligated to give to the poor, the distressed, and the 
needy...A second motive was humanitarianism, embracing the same 
conception of the brotherhood of man and of the duty of those who can help 
the need to do so, but secular in character.  It reinforced and supplemented 
the closely related Hebraic-Christian values (Curti 1963, p. 325). 
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, though the motivations for engaging with 
people of other nations becomes less directly connected to religious conversion, 
conversion does remain a goal to an extent.  The private entities who eventually 
assume responsibility for US foreign outreach at the end of the nineteenth century do 
not associate their mission with religious aims, yet their aims still include a type of 
conversion, to American ideas and way of life. 
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Out of the consciousness that the United States was no longer a weakling 
among nations and in the knowledge of her superior endowment of 
Christian ethics and attributes of civilization, both movements were 
impressed with America’s greatly increased responsibility for extending to 
the less fortunate peoples of the earth the blessings of democracy, order and 
progress (Osgood 1953, p. 86). 
 
This dynamic in America’s relationship with the world impacts the tone and 
objectives for US foreign public engagement from the Spanish-American War at the 
end of the nineteenth century through to the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act in 
1948.  Missionaries become less able to respond to the growing need in the world, as 
newly founded foundations begin to engage with people around the world (Karl & 
Katz 1981).  Though the players initiating engagement change, the objective 
ostensibly remains the same. 
 In addition to tracing the motivations for private engagement overseas, the 
literature on US foreign public engagement throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries also note the connection between private engagement and US foreign 
policy.  As both Robert Daniel and Joseph Grabill observe in their work on 
American missionaries in the Ottoman Empire, the activities of the missionaries 
often had implications for US policy in the region.  This was especially true when 
Parsons and Fisk entered the region just as the Greeks began to revolt against the 
Turks.  The US government was trying to broker a trade agreement with the 
Ottomans, while American missionaries pled for government support to assist the 
Greeks.  "The story of Protestant diplomacy and the Near East is not only a narrative 
of pathos.  It is a case study of a powerful lobby which wanted the United States 
government to organize part of the Old World" (Grabill 1971, p. 286).  Many 
private entities who did engage with people overseas became the most vocal and 
active lobbyists for US diplomatic reform and for the US government to become 
more actively involved in the world (Ilchman 1961).   
 Not all of private engagement hampered US relations.  Often, private 
entities provided the US government alternative solutions to foreign relation 
problems.  When both private engagement initiatives overlapped with US foreign 
policy objectives, the relationship between private organizations and the US 
government deepened and grew more complex.  Over the course of the nineteenth 
century and into the twentieth century the relationship between private individuals 
and organizations with the US government became less and less distinct, 
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intertwining private and public interests.  As Inderjeet Parmar observes, “[the] 
cooperative relationship of the modern American state with elite foreign affairs and 
other organizations blurs the distinction between the public and private sectors and 
calls into question theories...that advance a zero-sum view of power and pit the state 
against private interest groups or vice versa…cooperative state-private elite 
networks have played a powerful historical role in mobilizing for U.S. global 
expansionism..." (2012, p.15).  Emily Rosenberg documents this evolving 
relationship between the American government and various private actors from the 
Spanish-American War through WWII.  Her analysis focuses on the private 
businesses and financial enterprises which were used by the US government as 
“chosen instruments,” to supplement US diplomacy.  Though the US government 
championed trade and expanding the American market, the public-private 
partnership was not only restricted to business and finance.  This cooperative 
relationship between the private and public sectors is also an integral component to 
the development and practice of public diplomacy, as this study will demonstrate. 
In light of the factors outlined in this chapter, the following historical cases 
take these into consideration.  This research aims to go beyond a history, by 
recounting the evolution of public diplomacy as a tool of American statecraft and 
providing historical context for the mechanism. In looking at how public diplomacy 
developed and came to be seen as a distinct tool of the state, this study will identify 
the various factors contributing to the evolution of public diplomacy, what shaped its 
practice and the role it now plays in American statecraft.  The existing public 
diplomacy literature identifies the recurring problems facing public diplomacy 
without delving into the underlying reasons for these issues.  This study addresses 
this by looking at the past, to identify trends and factors which impacted the practice 
and development of public diplomacy. 
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Chapter 2  
America’s First Public Diplomat 
 “One Thing that he recommends to be done before we push our Points in Parliament, viz. 
removing the Prejudices that Art and Accident have spread among the People of this 
Country [England] against us, and obtaining for us the good Opinion of the Bulk of 
Mankind without Doors; I hope we have in our Power to do, by Means of a Work now near 
ready for the Press, calculated to engage the Attention of many Readers, and at the same time 
efface the bad Impressions receiv’d of us: But it is thought best not to publish it till a little 
before the next Session of Parliament.” 
- Benjamin Franklin to Thomas Leech and Assembly Committee of Correspondence, 
London, June 10, 17589 
 
This chapter explores how foreign public engagement was used by Benjamin 
Franklin during the American Revolution to not only obtain foreign aid and support, 
but also to explain to the world who and what America was as a nation.  Over the 
objections of the other commissioners and the Continental Congress, Franklin 
engaged with the French public perhaps more than the French government, 
especially in his first year as commissioner (Lopez 1990; Schiff 2005).  In light of the 
geopolitical positions of America and France between the end of 1776 through 1778, 
Franklin’s efforts to engage the French public were crucial to the success of the 
American Revolution.  As American commissioner to France, Franklin engaged with 
the public to secure private support and aid, to counter British misinformation and 
anti-Americanism, to entice European businesses to invest in American trade, and to 
convince the French public that the American colonies were a separate, sovereign, 
independent nation.   
In examining the correspondences of Benjamin Franklin, along with the 
accounts of his fellow commissioners and other members of the Continental 
Congress, 10  several patterns emerge which are significant to understanding 
                                                     
9 Benjamin Franklin Papers (BFP) 8:87 
10 A group of representatives sent to Philadelphia by each of the British American colonies 
between September 5 and October 26, 1774, initially to discuss a united response to 
the so-called Intolerable Acts or Coercive Acts.  The Congress reconvened a second 
- 26 - 
 
Franklin’s efforts to engage the public of France.  Firstly, the American 
commissioners and the Continental Congress regularly sought current, truthful 
information in order to counter British misinformation; to give the public accurate 
information about America.  Secondly, Franklin and even Arthur Lee were keenly 
aware of America’s image in the eyes of Europeans.  Franklin was attentive to the 
exigencies of explaining America’s character to a world which previously identified 
the people living in the colonies as English.  Thirdly, Franklin consistently 
distinguished between the opinion of the French government and the French public 
in his reports to personal acquaintances and to the CSC.  All this suggests not only an 
awareness of the importance of foreign public opinion, but also points to the crucial 
role the foreign public would play in America’s search for foreign assistance.    
To Franklin, countries were people – not a government, people to be 
understood, befriended, and wooed (Lopez 1990, p. 7); and this was reflected in his 
practice of diplomacy, especially when contrasted with his fellow commissioners’ 
diplomatic manner.  Franklin immersed himself in French society by interacting with 
the intelligentsia and bourgeoisie in various Parisian salons and through his 
continuing interest in natural science.  Much to John Adams’s dismay, Franklin spent 
more time at dinner, at the theatre, and at the Paris Academy than he did managing 
the mission books or engendering himself to the French government (Adams Archive, 
“Travel & Negotiations,” 25-29 May 1778).   
One of Franklin’s most pressing duties upon arriving in France was to 
explain the nature and character of America as a nation separate from England, 
convincing the French public of America’s strength and resilience in the face of 
repeated military defeats.  While at the same time Franklin tried to finagle French 
support through the government without making America seem too weak or too 
strong, patiently waiting for the moment when the French government would be 
willing and able to sign a treaty with America and join the fight against Britain. 
To illustrate the role foreign public engagement played during the American 
Revolution, this chapter will examine with some detail how Franklin employed four 
core elements of public diplomacy to engage the French public: listening, exchange, 
international broadcasting, and advocacy, using the framework outlined in the 
                                                                                                                                       
time in May 1775 and remained a de-facto governing body of the colonies throughout 
the American Revolution. 
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Introduction.  Before considering this, Franklin’s engagement with the French public 
will be put into the context of the period, with a summary of the Continental 
Congress’s foreign policy as Franklin left for France and France’s policy toward the 
American colonies in 1776. 
 “It has been thought wisdom in a Government exercising sovereignty 
to have some regard to prevailing and established opinions among the 
people governed…”11 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth century, negative perceptions of the 
American colonies and the land itself were widespread in Europe.  The early hopes 
of a prosperous new land had dissipated by the mid-seventeenth century (Chinard 
1947).  Disappointed hopes fed prejudiced and flawed perceptions about the 
colonists and the land of the American colonies.  The citizens of American colonies 
were likely aware of European distaste for the New World and its inhabitants: a 
savage, inhospitable land full of convicts, indentured servants, and uncivilized people 
(Ceaser 2003; Chinard 1947; Meunier 2005).12  Prior to the Revolutionary War, 
Americans did not concern themselves too much with countering these sentiments.  
Benjamin Franklin did make some early efforts to counter misperceptions about the 
land, flora and fauna, and the people of America, which can be found in his 
correspondences between various scientists of the day, who in turn published their 
conversations for a wider audience.13   
                                                     
11 “Causes of American Discontents before 1768”, The London Chronicle, Jan 5-7, 1768; BFP, 
15:3 
12 Several historians, including Ceaser, Muenier, and Chinard, all recount various 
perceptions of America which depict the land and the inhabitants of the American 
colonies as uncivilized, unintelligent, uninhabitable, and depraved.  Muenier’s work 
focuses on the evolution of French anti-American perceptions up through the present, 
while Ceaser outlines five periods which recount the origins, changes, and the 
movement of anti-American ideas throughout time and across the world.  Chinard 
explains that by the mid-seventeenth century much of the hopes that the New World 
inspired in Europe faded with the realities of the difficult climates and failures of the 
colonies to be a valuable investment for raw materials. 
13 Some examples of Franklin explaining about life in the American colonies can be found in 
the BFP collection.  The collection includes second hand accounts of conversations 
with Franklin which were later printed in Europe.  Swedish botanist, Peter Kalm, 
spent several years traveling in North America, interviewing notable Americans of the 
period to include Franklin.  Another example of this type of exchange is in a series of 
articles published in the spring of 1767 in the Hannoverisches Magazin.  The series 
recounts an oral interview of Franklin on varying subjects including weather in the 
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A more concerted effort to counter the negative perceptions toward 
America developed when the American colonies considered independence from 
Britain and sought French aid.  The Continental Congress hoped to arrange a trade 
treaty with France and other nations, but given the European and British public 
opinion at the time, colonial leaders needed to counter many misperceptions before 
they would be able to entice anyone to trade with the fledgling nation.  “In order to 
obtain assistance and credits for the United States, the American envoys had to prove 
that America was a ‘good risk’…” (Chinard 1947, p. 28).   
In addition to the external impressions of the New World, the late 
seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth century brought many changes to 
European societies which are relevant to understanding American foreign public 
engagement in the context of the period.  Ever since the Treaty of Westphalia in 
1648, establishing the legal concept of the sovereign nation-state, the theory and 
practice of diplomacy was still evolving by the mid-eighteenth century (de Magalhães 
1988; Nicholson 1963).  A diplomat’s duties were varied in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century and often included practices not considered appropriate or 
incorporated in modern diplomatic practice.  Before the end of the seventeenth 
century, several tracts on the theory of diplomacy or the laws governing nations 
were published, read, and debated among political leaders and jurists.  At the time of 
the American Revolution, Emer de Vattel’s Law of Nations was the latest publication 
on the subject and the most popular (Reeves 1909, p. 549).  Relevant to the 
understanding of American perspectives toward diplomacy, it is important and 
significant to consider not only the still evolving practice of diplomacy, but also that 
these seventeenth and eighteenth century diplomatic and international law theorists 
wrote a great deal about the responsibilities of the state to the people.  As previously 
mentioned in Chapter 1, these ideas coincided well with America’s own liberal, 
democratic ideas regarding the relationship between nations as well as a nation and 
the people. 
Around the same time that geopolitical relationships were changing, the 
introduction of the print press caused changes in the public’s relationship to the state.  
The print press combined with the legal relaxation of printing and censorship laws in 
England and parts of continental Europe marked the advent of newsprints.  The 
                                                                                                                                       
regions of the colonies, Native Americans, population growth, and general lifestyle of 
American colonists (BFP). 
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popularity and demand of newsprints ostensibly led to a more literate and informed 
public which in turn gave rise to political parties and the importance of public 
opinion to government leaders (Bickman 2009; Cowans 2001).  The public 
indirectly and directly asserted more influence over the government, giving rise in 
the mid-seventeenth century to the expression “politics without doors,” among the 
English.  According to Benjamin Carp, the term referred to extra-parliamentary 
activity occurring outside the closed doors of Parliament, since up through the end 
of the seventeenth century most of Parliament’s business remained secret – “indoors.”  
Subsequently, as people felt more freedom to discuss political opinions publicly, the 
idea grew that the politics of the people without doors could counter the fixed, 
secretive politics of Parliament (2007).  As the opening quote of this chapter 
demonstrates, before attempting to persuade those in government, Franklin was 
given council by an unnamed lawyer to first persuade the people “without doors” – 
referring to the general public.  America needed to attend to the world’s opinions of 
their nation and citizens if they were to get any foreign aid or investment. 
“...A Virgin State should ...not go about suitering for Alliances...”14 
America’s move toward independence and foreign assistance occurred with 
starts and stops, moves and countermoves.  When the Continental Congress 
convened in Philadelphia in 1774, the main objective was to present the colonies’ 
complaints about England’s policies toward America as a united voice.  The 
Congress eventually agreed to pursue a policy combining economic warfare and long 
distance diplomacy.  Petitions were drafted to King George III and Parliament 
enumerating colonial grievances relating to taxes levied on imported British 
manufactures (paper, tea, etc.); the stationing and quartering of troops within 
certain colonies; as well as the disbandment of colonial assemblies.  On September 
27, 1774, the Continental Congress passed a measure to stop the importation and 
consumption of British manufactured goods as well as to stop exportation of 
American goods to Britain (Journals of the Continental Congress (JCC) 1:43).  The 
representatives believed the loss of American trade would drastically cripple the 
British economy and force Parliament to negotiate.  The closure of American ports 
did not impact the British economy enough to force Parliament to negotiate with the 
                                                     
14 BFP 23:508 
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colonists, though the lack of trade did hurt the colonies’ economy and access to 
much needed manufactured goods (Kaplan 1975; Varg 1963).  
In October of 1774, petitions were drafted and published in the papers 
addressing the publics of Canada and Great Britain (JCC, 1:50; JCC 2: 79-80, 110; 
Letters of the Delegates 1: 175 - 179).  The petitions attempted to explain the 
colonies’ position to people of Britain and Canada.  Previous petitions to the 
Parliament (BFP 21:155 & 214) and King George were ignored (BFP, 21:495 - 497).  
Further angering the colonies and the representatives of the Congress, King George 
issued a “rebellion proclamation” on August 23, 1775 declaring 
 
Whereas many of our subjects in divers [sic] parts of our Colonies and 
Plantations in North America, misled by dangerous and ill designing men, 
and forgetting the allegiance which they owe to the power that has protected 
and supported them; after various disorderly acts committed in disturbance 
of the publick [sic] peace, to the obstruction of lawful commerce, and to the 
oppression of our loyal subjects carrying on the same; have at length 
proceeded to open and avowed rebellion… And whereas, there is reason to 
apprehend that such rebellion hath been much promoted and encouraged by the 
traitorous correspondence, counsels and comfort of divers wicked and desperate 
persons within this realm…we have thought fit, by and with the advice of our 
Privy Council, to issue our Royal Proclamation, hereby declaring, that not only all 
our Officers, civil and military, are obliged to exert their utmost endeavours to 
suppress such rebellion…we do accordingly strictly charge and command all 
our Officers, as well civil as military, and all others our obedient and loyal 
subjects, to use their utmost endeavours to withstand and suppress such 
rebellion…that they transmit to one of our principal Secretaries of State, or other 
proper officer, due and full information of all persons who shall be found carrying on 
correspondence with, or in any manner or degree aiding or abetting the persons 
now in open arms and rebellion against our Government, within any of our 
Colonies and Plantations in North America, in order to bring to condign 
punishment the authors, perpetrators, and abetters of such traitorous 
designs (By the King, A Proclamation, For Suppressing Rebellion and 
Sedition"; Papers of the Continental Congress 1774-1789, Item 152, Letters 
from Gen. George Washington, Vol 1., p. 271; RG 360, emphasis added). 
 
The proclamation not only cut off communications between the colonies and the 
British, but also accused the colonies of performing sovereign activities of the state 
such as obstructing commerce, preparing and making war, as well as refusing to 
uphold the laws of England. 
In need of supplies for the Continental Army as well as money, the 
Continental Congress formed the Secret Committee on September 18, 1775 (JCC, 
2:253-254).  The committee was to arrange covert contracts with merchants willing 
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to risk shipping and selling guns, ammunition, and other supplies to the colonies.  
More than two months later, the Congress formed another committee on November 
29, 1775, the Committee of Secret Correspondence (CSC), to contact America’s 
“friends” in Great Britain, Ireland, and other parts of the world (JCC, 3:392).  Most 
of the foreign contacts the committee corresponded with were Franklin’s contacts 
from his time in England and Europe serving as a colonial agent (Dull 1982).  Upon 
creating the CSC, Franklin contacted an old friend, Charles Guillame Frédéric 
Dumas, who worked as an editor and publisher in The Hague.  Dumas met Franklin 
when he visited Europe in 1766 and both shared an affinity for the printing business.  
Franklin immediately engaged Dumas to sound out who might be willing to assist the 
American colonies against the British: 
 
But we wish to know whether any one of them [European countries], from 
principles of humanity, is disposed magnanimously to step in for the relief of 
an oppressed people, or whether if, as it seems likely to happen, we should 
be obliged to break off all connection with Britain, and declare ourselves an 
independent people, there is any state or power in Europe, who would be 
willing to enter into an alliance with us for the benefit of our commerce, 
which amounted, before the war, to near seven millions sterling per annum, 
and must continually increase, as our people increase most rapidly.  
Confiding, my dear friend, in your good will to us and our cause, and in 
your sagacity and abilities for business, the committee of congress, 
appointed for the purpose of establishing and conducting a correspondence 
with our friends in Europe, of which committee I have the honour to be a 
member, have directed me to request of you, that as you are situated at the 
Hague, where ambassadors from all the courts reside, you would make use 
of the opportunity that situation affords you, of discovering, if possible, the 
disposition of the several courts with respect to such assistance or alliance, if 
we should apply for the one, or propose the other (BFP 22:287). 
 
Dumas would act as an agent for the Continental Congress throughout the duration 
of the war, performing various duties, primarily disseminating news and information 
about the US colonies and the war throughout Europe as will be discussed further in 
this chapter. 
The functions of these two committees, the Secret Committee and the 
Committee on Secret Correspondence, were rather different: the Secret Committee 
essentially administered what would today be considered to be a covert action 
program between America and France; and the CSC acted as a diplomatic and an 
intelligence organization (Crews 2004).  Benjamin Franklin served on both 
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committees prior to being nominated as a commissioner to France (JCC, 6:1061-
1068). 
Early in 1776, some members of the Congress recognized the need for 
foreign assistance.  Based on Britain’s relations with other European nations, the only 
country which might consider assisting the colonies in their fight against England was 
France.  However, tied to the issue of acquiring foreign support, the Congress faced 
the decision to officially declare the colonies independent from Britain.  Both 
independence and entering into a formal agreement with a foreign nation for 
assistance were seriously contentious ideas within the Continental Congress (Adams 
1856, Vol. 3).  “There was, however, still a majority of members who were either 
determined against all measure preparatory to independence, or yet too timorous 
and wavering to venture on any decisive steps” (Adams 1856, Vol. 3, p.31).  The 
debate of whether to open ports to all nations as well as the issue of declaring 
independence from Britain went on from February through June finally concluding 
with the formation of committees to prepare a plan of treaties for use with foreign 
nations as well as a draft declaration of independence (JCC, 5: 431).   
On July 18, 1776, the committee chosen to draft a model treaty presented 
their report to the Congress (JCC, 5:575-589).  The committee and the treaty 
emphasized that any formal agreement with another nation would be non-political, 
and non-military.  The treaty would simply facilitate equal, free trade between 
America and another nation.  The treaty and instructions to the elected 
commissioners to France were not finalized until September 24, 1776 (JCC, 5:813-
817).  As Stacy Schiff notes, Congress’s instructions simply asked “...that the Treaty 
should be concluded and... instructed to use every means in your Power for concluding it 
conformable to the plan you have received” (BFP Sept 24-Oct 22 1776, 22:624, 
emphasis added); how this was to be achieved was left to commissioners (2005).   
“Wars are not paid for in wartime, the bill comes later.”15 
 A brief summary of France’s situation in the late eighteenth century puts 
Franklin’s and the other American commissioner’s position into perspective and 
further highlights the role of foreign public engagement in relation to America’s fight 
for independence.  In 1764, just a year after the Treaty of Paris, the then French 
                                                     
15 Benjamin Franklin 
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foreign minister, Étienne François de Choiseul, sent observers to the American 
colonies to determine if a rebellion against the British stirred (Bemis 1957).  Clearly, 
the French wished for an opportunity to reverse the damage of their defeat in the 
Seven Years’ War.  However, when the American colonies did eventually begin to 
buck against British rule, France was not prepared – financially or militarily (Dull 
1982).  The arrival of American agents in 1775 and 1776 to France forced Vergennes 
to tread very carefully.  The country could not risk open war with Britain.  In 
addition, due to the family alliance between France and Spain, any support to the 
American colonies would need to be discussed with and agreed to by the Spanish 
court (Bemis 1957; Schiff 2005). 
 In 1775, Vergennes sent his own agent to the American colonies to observe 
as well as to indicate to the colonies France’s own position of support for the 
colonies’ independence from Britain.  After hearing from his own agent, along with 
the persistence of Pierre-Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais,16 a French dramatist, 
Vergennes drafted a report suggesting a course for French policy in 1776 which 
recommended military preparations be undertaken by both France and Spain against 
any potential British attack; provide friendly assurances to the British, deceiving the 
government as to France’s intentions toward the American colonies; and providing 
secret support to the American colonies without any treaty until their independence is 
firmly established (Bemis 1957, p. 24).  Vergennes’s plan was adopted by the King’s 
Council, leading to a royal command in April 1776 to rebuild the French navy.  To 
the third point, another report was drafted outlining Beaumarchais’s 1775 proposal 
to encourage the American Revolution through covert assistance masked as private 
commercial contracts (Bemis 1957).   
France’s policy stance toward the American colonies was eventually 
communicated to the members of the CSC.  On October 1, 1776, Thomas Story, an 
American agent working in England, sent an intelligence report to the committee 
                                                     
16 Beaumarchais sent many letters to Vergennes describing different schemes and providing 
reasons to support the American colonies.  Whether out of annoyance or due to his 
own persistence, Beaumarchais did manage to get Vergennes to take his idea to King 
Louis XVI to provide covert funds and supplies to the American colonies.  Against the 
guidance of Turgot, the contrôleur-général des finances, and Jean-Frédéric Phélypeaux, 
Count of Maurepas, the minister of state, King Louis agreed to grant secret funds and 
send supplies to the Americans using Beaumarchais as a cut-out agent (Bemis 1957; 
Schiff 2005).    
- 34 - 
 
which was received by Robert Morris and Franklin, being the only committee 
members present.  The report relayed information about Arthur Lee’s private 
conversation with the French ambassador in London who communicated that France 
was in no position to enter into a war with England and would not be in a position to 
do so in the near future.  The most France could do for America was to provide a 
secret lump sum of cash which would be transferred from a bank in Holland to St. 
Eustatius under the name Hortalez.  Robert Morris and Franklin made two 
important decisions based on this report.  First, the information would not be 
reported to the whole Congress out of concerns of secrecy.17  Second, aware that 
“altho [sic] disposed to support us in our Contest with them, we therefore think it our 
duty to Cultivate their favourable disposition toward us, draw from them all the support 
we can and in the end their private Aid must assist us to establish Peace or inevitably draw 
them in as Parties to the War” (BFP 22:636, emphasis added). 
This foreshadows the approach which Franklin would adopt in order to get 
French support.  In light of France’s diplomatic, military, and financial limitations at 
the time, the only way America could hope to get supplies and support would be 
with private aid by members of the French public in business and trade willing to risk 
possible confrontation with the British navy with an unknown trading partner.   
 Based on reports sent to the CSC from Franklin, he was acutely aware of the 
French government’s inability and unwillingness to engage in any diplomatic 
arrangement: “The Cry of this Nation is for us; but the Court it is thought views an 
approaching War with Reluctance” (BFP, 23:113).  France already took a great risk 
by allowing the American commissioners to remain in France.  The British 
Ambassador Lord Stormont complained regularly to Vergennes about the Americans’ 
presence and demanded to know what business they had in Paris (Schiff 2005).  
Vergennes stalled and feigned ignorance regarding the American commissioners’ 
mission, despite already arranging a secret meeting between the commissioners and 
                                                     
17 Franklin and Robert Morris’s reason for keeping Thomas Story’s information secret from 
even the Continental Congress was their concern that the agreement by the French 
government to provide monetary assistance might be made public.  "As the Court of 
France have taken Measures to Negotiate this loan and succour in the most cautious and 
Secret Manner, shou’d [sic] we divulge it immediately, we may not only loose the 
present benefit, but also render that Court Cautious of any further Connection with 
such unguarded People and prevent their granting other Loans and assistance that we 
stand in need of…” (BFP 22: 636).   
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his undersecretary, Conrad-Alexandre Gérard (BFP, Dec 1776 – Jan 1776 23:82 & 
124; Schiff 2005). 
 In the meantime, Franklin and the other commissioners worked to get 
support and supplies where they could.  King Louis XVI and Vergennes allowed 
American merchant ships to use French ports, as long as all treaty agreements 
relating to war contraband were honoured (BFP, 23:164).  Franklin and his 
grandnephew, Jonathan Williams, not only arranged for contracts with French and 
European merchants for weapons, arming of ships, and material for uniforms, but 
also directed American privateering operations in accordance with the Secret 
Committee.  These contracts were made through Franklin’s own personal contacts 
which he developed throughout the spring of 1777. 
Thus began what would be a tense year of waiting: waiting for both France 
and Spain’s naval forces to be readied for war; waiting for possible British attack; 
waiting for a definitive sign of resolve from America; and waiting for a firm 
commitment from Spain.  All these factors made the possibility of a formal treaty 
between America and France in 1776 seem very unlikely to ever occur, hence 
obtaining private aid and access to supplies was essential to the United States’ ability 
to continue their fight for independence.    
“He that speaks much, is much mistaken.”18 
In light of the situation in the America colonies faced at the end of 1776, 
when Benjamin Franklin left for France, the only logical course for American 
diplomacy was to include foreign public engagement alongside more formal and even 
secretive diplomacy with the French government.  Furthermore, in consideration of 
the American character at the time, the fact that American leaders engaged the 
public of other nations is unsurprising.  Previous attempts to engage with British 
leaders were ignored, leaving no other option than appealing to the public.  America 
was in many respects already a democratic nation, where the government structures 
served the public’s interests and answered to the public, extending this practice of 
the state’s relationship with the people beyond domestic boundaries is not 
incongruous.  The Continental Congress published much of their proceedings in the 
papers to guarantee transparency.  Franklin would later ensure these proceedings 
                                                     
18 Poor Richard, 1736 (BFP, 2:136) 
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were also published in European papers to bolster the legitimacy of America in the 
eyes of Europe.   
As already noted, Franklin’s diplomatic approach differed from the other 
American commissioners; many of Franklin’s characteristics or methods as a 
diplomat are noted by his French acquaintances and fellow commissioners which 
included listening.  "In prattling Paris,… Franklin did something extraordinary.  He 
listened" (Schiff 2005, p. 48).  John Adams and Franklin’s friends in France all 
remarked on his capacity to listen, and how his ability to listen garnered him further 
respect and popularity among the French (Adams 1856, Vols. 1-3; Schiff 2005).  
Franklin consistently demonstrated his desire to listen, made an effort to listen, and 
then used what he heard to achieve the objectives of his mission in France. 
The last time he visited France as a colonial agent, he dressed as an 
Englishman; however, when Franklin landed in France in December of 1776, he 
dressed simply in what the French presumed was either the garb of a Quaker or an 
American frontiersman (Lopez 1990).  He wrote several letters noting the simplicity 
of his attire and his reluctance to assume a public character to Silas Deane, John 
Hancock, the CSC, and Mary Hewson.  He acquainted “no one here [France] with 
this Commission, continuing incog. [sic] as to my publick [sic] Character; because not 
being sufficiently acquainted with the Disposition and the present Circumstances of 
this Court, relative to our Contest with GB [sic].  I cannot Judge whether it would be 
agreable [sic] to her at this time to receive publickly [sic]  Ministers from the 
Congress as such, and I think we should not embarras [sic] her…on the one hand, 
nor subject ourselves to the Hazard of a disgraceful Refusal on the other” (BFP, 
23:28).  This demonstrates Franklin’s intent to listen before attempting to attain any 
of the official objectives he was charged with by the Continental Congress.  He was 
aware that his very presence could embarrass the French government and that a 
refusal to recognize him in his official capacity by the French court would humiliate 
America in the eyes of the world.   
As many historians have noted,19  "Franklin had a flair for feeling public 
opinion, and for approaching it " (Bemis 1957, p. 49).  Franklin was not just aware 
                                                     
19 Historians looking at Franklin’s time as a printer and newspaperman note his acute 
awareness of public opinion (F.B. Adams 1956; Bemis 1957; Lemay 2005).  Franklin 
himself makes many observations and remarks regarding public opinion and his ability 
to both gauge public opinion as well as alter it in his Autobiography (1904). 
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of the importance of public opinion in relation to his mission, but also made time to 
gather the opinion of the public and tried to listen.  Much to the consternation of 
Adams, Franklin’s first concern seemed to be engaging the French public rather than 
keeping the mission books straight and making daily trips to Versailles to interact 
with other diplomats.  In Adams’s autobiography, he gave a detailed account of 
Franklin’s usual schedule as an American commissioner:  
 
It was late when he breakfasted, and as soon as Breakfast was over, a crowd 
of Carriges [sic]  came to his Levee or if you like the term better to his 
Lodgings, with all Sorts of People; some Phylosophers [sic], Accademicians 
[sic] and Economists; some of his small tribe of humble friends in the 
litterary [sic] Way whom he employed to translate some of his ancient 
Compositions, such as his Bonhomme Richard …; but by far the greater part 
were Women and Children, come to have the honour to see the great 
Franklin, and to have the pleasure of telling Stories about his Simplicity, his 
bald head and scattering strait [sic]  hairs, among their Acquaintances. These 
Visitors occupied all the time, commonly, till it was time to dress to go to 
Dinner. He was invited to dine abroad every day and never declined unless 
when We had invited Company to dine with Us. I was always invited with 
him, till I found it necessary to send Apologies, that I might have some time 
to study the french [sic] Language and do the Business of the mission (Adams 
Family Papers, "Travels, and Negotiations," 1777-1778, 25-29 May 1778). 
 
This description by Adams of Franklin’s activities as America’s commissioner 
indicates that Franklin spent a great deal of his time listening to the French public.  
Franklin made time for everyone, including reading and responding to hundreds of 
letters he received seeking advice or favours.20   
 In addition to making time for callers at Hotel de Valentinois where Franklin 
resided in Passy, Benjamin Franklin also made time to visit various salons.  In 
eighteenth century France, the best place to listen to the people was in the cafes and 
salons (Censer & Popkin 1987; Cowans 2001; Darnton 1982; Schiff 2005).  Franklin 
was such a celebrity among the French and well-known among the Republic of 
Letters in France, that he gained access to several influential salons, including Marie-
                                                     
20 Upon arriving in France, Franklin received an anonymous memorandum from a French 
person explaining the current dynamics in France.  The anonymous writer observed 
that governments in Europe almost always cede to the general interest, and that 
America’s cause of liberty has the general interest of the people of France.  Franklin 
marked the memorandum in his own hand “Good advice” (BFP, 23:104).  In the fall of 
1777, Franklin writes to Dr. Dubourg to vent about the hundreds of commission 
requests he continued to receive (BFP, 25:20). 
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Louise-Nicole-Elisabeth de La Rochefoucauld Duchesse de Enville,21 Madame Anne-
Catherine de Ligniville d’Autricourt Helvétius, 22  and Anne Louise Boivin 
d’Hardancourt Brillon de Jouy23 (Lopez 1990; Schiff 2005).  In these salons, he was 
introduced to Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas Caritat Marquis de Condorcet and 
Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier, among other notable French intelligentsia and people 
with connections to the court. 
In contrast, Adams noted that Arthur Lee made himself repulsive to the 
French “…by indiscreet speeches before servants and others, concerning the French 
nation and government – despising and cursing them” (Adams 1856, 3:139).  Adams 
too, struggled to make peace not only with Franklin’s preference for socializing with 
the people of France rather than handling mission business, but also Franklin’s 
widespread popularity among the French: "On Dr. Franklin the eyes of all Europe 
are fixed, as the most important character in American affairs, in Europe: neither 
Lee nor myself are looked upon of much consequence” (Adams 1856, 3:189).  
Adams records little about French perceptions toward Silas Deane, but does say that 
he “seems to have made himself agreable [sic] here to Persons of Importance and 
Influence, and has gone home in such Splendor [sic]…” suggesting that Deane 
engaged only with those who benefitted him personally (Adams 1856, 3:138).  In 
comparison to the other American commissioners, Franklin appears to be the only 
one who prioritized engaging with the French public, specifically listening to them. 
Using what he heard, Franklin provided general indications regarding French 
public opinion to the Continental Congress.  His reports to the Continental 
Congress regularly distinguished court opinion from the general public of France 
(BFP 23:113; 23:194; 23:466; 24:514); even reporting to John Hancock, President 
of the Continental Congress, that America’s French supporters were disheartened by 
the reports in a French Gazette of British victories in the United States: 
                                                     
21 A fervent supporter of the American colonies.  Her salon hosted Adam Smith, Turgot, 
and Franklin.  She introduced her son, Louis-Alexandre, duc de La Rochefoucauld and 
de la Roche-Guyon, to Franklin who would play an important role in American 
advocacy and international broadcasting. 
22 Widow of French philosopher, Claude Adrien Helvétius, and patron of arts and sciences.  
Diderot, Condorcet, Raynal, and Turgot frequented her salon. 
23 An accomplished musician and composer and neighbour of Franklin while he stayed at 
Passy.  She helped edit Franklin’s Bagatelles and composed a song, Marche des Insurgents, 
in honour of the American victory at Saratoga. 
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Our Friends in France have been a good deal dejected with the Gazette 
Accounts of Advantages obtain’d [sic] against us by the British Troops.  I have 
help’d [sic] them here to recover their Spirits a little, by assuring them that 
we shall face the Enemy…(BFP, 23:31) 
 
In addition to providing intelligence to the Congress about how negative press 
reports about the Revolution impacted French public opinion, Franklin also used 
public opinion to gauge his advocacy needs.  Benjamin Franklin provided material to 
Continental papers to counter negative reports in the British and Continental press, 
in some cases, in response to concerns raised by American supporters in France and 
in Holland.  Thus, Franklin used what he heard to manage the French environment 
to guide American policy and gauge further public engagement needs. 
“Who is wise? He who learns from everyone.”24 
In the years leading up to and throughout the American Revolution, another 
ongoing revolution persisted quietly in the background: the science revolution.  Of 
note to the discussion of public diplomacy and exchange diplomacy particularly, is 
the use of scientists, artists, and men of letters by European monarchs to further 
their nation’s standing and influence abroad.   
 
Monarchs and state bureaucracies were, in fact, interested in the possible 
gains associated with the development of science and technology as well as in 
the prestige of scholarship.  Through the academies, they tried to organize 
the management of scientific research, which was considered a source of 
personal glory and national wealth (Sigrist, 2009, p. 40). 
 
The connection various governments made between the use of science as well as the 
arts as a tool of improving prestige manifested itself in European cities where royal 
academies were established by state governments where “scientific activity assumed a 
stately character and was financed by administrations with practical goals in mind” 
(Sigrist 2009, p. 57).  A nation could project power and prestige through the 
Republic of Letters and national academies, drawing eminent artists, philosophers, 
and scientists of the period. 
                                                     
24 Poor Richard Improved, 1755 (BFP 5:467) 
- 40 - 
 
 As a self-educated and trained scientist Franklin became a part of the 
eighteenth century “republic of letters” and the network of scientists, philosophers, 
writers, and artists from all over Europe.   
 
Networks of correspondence among men of science were also an essential 
tool for the emergence and social definition of a community of scholars 
devoted to the study of nature.  They were the concrete side of the 
imaginary “Republic of Science,” which can be seen as a system of person 
relations, and in particular correspondence (commerce de lettres), between 
scholars who shared an interest in the study of nature. (Sigrist, 2009, p. 45).   
 
Thus, the most significant and meaningful foreign public engagement occurred 
through Benjamin Franklin’s work as a scientist and philosopher.  Franklin’s own 
curiosity coupled with the eventual acceptance of his electrical experiments garnered 
him many prestigious and influential contacts within the Republic of Letters.  As 
Stacy Schiff notes, “Franklin’s scientific career…played a vast role in his diplomatic 
one…” (2005, p. 369).   
Upon his retirement in 1748 from the printing business, Franklin put more 
time into his intellectual pursuits.  In the past, he corresponded with members of the 
Royal Society in England to request publications of the latest experiments and 
discoveries in natural science.  Franklin corresponded regularly with Royal Society 
members Joseph Priestley and Peter Collinson.  These relationships Franklin 
fostered between members of the Royal Society spurred him to create the American 
Philosophical Society in 1743.   
In the mid-eighteenth century, experiments with electricity were in vogue 
and peaked Franklin’s interest; however, Franklin’s knowledge and interest in 
electricity started when he made his first trip to England in 1725-26 (Lemay 2008).  
Eventually Franklin conducted his own experiments and wrote about the results.  He 
passed his work onto his contacts in the Royal Society as well as others in Europe.  
Initially, his experiments did not receive much attention and were written off by 
some members of the Royal Society, but after the experiments were performed 
successfully in front of King Louis XV, Franklin’s reputation rose throughout Europe 
(Heilbron 2007).  M. Jean-Baptiste le Roy, a French scientist and member of the 
Paris Academy of Sciences, arranged to have Franklin’s writings on his electrical 
experiments translated into Latin, Italian, and German, which furthered his fame as 
an international scientist (Gossick 1964). 
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With use of the Leyden Jar 25  for electrical experimentation, electricity 
experiments became a public form of entertainment in England and Europe.  It is 
possible that even Franklin’s own experiments were used to entertain crowds.  Due 
to Franklin’s experiments and the invention of the lightning rod, “he was the world-
renowned tamer of lightning, the man who had disarmed the heavens, who had 
vanquished superstition with reason...He was America's first international celebrity" 
(Schiff 2005, p. 2-3). 
Within the Republic of Letters, Franklin maintained correspondence with 
many men of science or men of letters from all over the world with varying 
connections to national leaders.  Initially, this collaboration served no other purpose 
for Franklin other than a genuine interest in the latest experiments, advances, and 
philosophies of the day.  He enjoyed the intellectual exchange he shared with many 
of his correspondents in France and England as well as other parts of Europe.  Later, 
these relationships between leading scientists and intellectuals from all over Europe 
would serve as a network of connections to obtain access to political leaders, to 
people with access to intelligence, and to people willing to provide aid to America. 
Thus, Franklin’s involvement in both the Royal Society and the Academy of 
Sciences is an example of exchange diplomacy – a core element of public diplomacy as 
understood today.  Though Franklin’s active involvement in the European scientific 
community did not initially have any political objective, when he became the 
commissioner to France his science did become politicized.26 
                                                     
25 A glass jar device used to study static electricity in the eighteenth century. 
26 While Franklin served as a commissioner in France, King George III and the Privy 
Council commissioned the Royal Society to determine whether blunted or pointed 
lightning rods were better at protecting structures from lightning strikes.  The 
investigation divided scientists within the Royal Society along political lines – those 
who sympathized with America and those who did not (Heilbron 2007).  Franklin 
refused to become involved in the debate, but stuck by his own conclusion that a 
pointed rod was better than a blunted rod.  “The connection between politics and 
science…had an immediate parallel in real life in England in fight between royalists and 
Franklinists over the shape of lightening rods” (Heilbron 2007; p. 364-365).  Franklin 
was aware of how his position as both an American and serving American 
commissioner created divisions between himself and his colleagues in the Royal Society.  
In some of his letters to David Hartley, British scientist and a member of Parliament, 
he explains how he avoided writing him simply because he did not wish to cause 
trouble for his friend (BFP, 25:64).   
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In many of his letters between other scientists and intellectuals, he 
exchanged not only his thoughts on various scientific ideas of the day, but also 
political information about the colonies and Britain.  The correspondence between 
the Jan Ingenhousz 27  and Franklin illustrates how exchange diplomacy allowed 
Franklin to explain America’s relations with England and the future of the country.  
The two were connected through John Pringle, a Member of Parliament and the 
Royal Society.  Ingenhousz wrote to Franklin frequently throughout 1776 and 1777.  
Writing to Franklin on November 15, 1776, Ingenhousz expressed confusion by the 
revolt as “You made me consider them as one nation…You told me more than once 
that no more distinction should be made between a man residing in England and one 
residing in North America, than between the inhabitans [sic] of London and cheffield 
[sic]” (BFP, 23:7).  Franklin explained in his reply on February 12, 1777 the reasons 
for the breach between the colonies and Britain, even adding the purpose of his 
mission to France. 
 
I long laboured in England with great Zeal and Sincerity to prevent the 
Breach that has happened, and which is now so wide that no Endeavours of 
mine can possibly heal it… It would therefore be deceiving you, if I suffer’d 
[sic] you to remain in the Supposition you have taken up, that I am come 
hither to make Peace. I am in fact ordered hither by the Congress for a very 
different Purpose, viz. [sic]  to procure such Aids from European Powers for 
enabling us to defend our Freedom and Independence, as it is certainly their 
Interest to grant, as by that means the great and rapidly growing Trade of 
America will be open to them all, and not a Monopoly to Britain as 
heretofore; a Monopoly, that if she is suffer’d [sic] again to possess, will be 
such an Increase of her Strength by Sea, and if she can reduce us again to 
Submission, she will have thereby so great an Addition to her Strength by 
Sea and Land, as will together make her the most formidable Power the 
World has yet seen, and, from her natural Pride and Insolence in Prosperity, 
of all others the most intolerable. 
 
You will excuse my writing Politicks [sic]  to you, as your Letter has given 
me the Occasion. Much more pleasing would it be to me to discuss with you 
some Point of Philosophy...(BFP, 23:310). 
 
The letter continues to further discuss Franklin’s role in France as well as 
Ingenhousz’s query about the dispute between which lightening rod, blunt or 
                                                     
27 Jan Ingenhousz worked as the personal physician to Joseph II and Maria Theresa of 
Austria.   
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pointed should be used to protect gunpowder magazines.  Two months later, 
Franklin writes again to Ingenhousz, further explaining the breach between America 
and Britain and noting in the same letter that “nothing new in the philosophical Way, 
or I should have a Pleasure in communicating it to you” (BFP, 23:613). 
 Ingenhousz was not the only man of science with whom Franklin readily 
provided information to regarding America’s position and the nation’s plans for the 
future.  Franklin met regularly with French scientists and scholars, such as Antoine-
Laurent Lavoisier, Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, and Jean Baptiste le Roy, 28  to 
collaborate and perform the experiments of other scientists and discuss politics (BFP, 
24:142; 24:210).  In addition, many of Franklin’s British men of science continued 
to correspond with him using trusted couriers.  This allowed not only for continued 
exchange on subjects relating to science and philosophy, but also politics.  With 
Franklin’s contacts in Britain, he tried to secure an exchange of prisoners and kept 
communications open for peace negotiations. 
 Hence, Franklin’s exchange diplomacy afforded many opportunities which 
helped to further facilitate the most urgent needs of America – a sympathetic ear and 
people willing to offer assistance.  Some of Franklin’s contacts simply told him who 
might be willing to provide aid to America, others introduced him to people who 
wanted to help, and some became actively involved in providing aid to America, 
such as his friendship with Lavoisier.  Lavoisier was the inspecteur général des poudres et 
salpêtres for the French government as well as a member of the ferme générale29 
(French 1979).  His father-in-law, Jacques Paulze, was the Director of the Tobacco 
Department, a component of the ferme générale.  Through these connections, 
Franklin opened negotiations with Paulze for a two million livre advance on 
American tobacco shipments to France as well as access to much needed gunpowder 
supplies (BFP, 23:328; 23:388; 33:486).  Franklin’s exchange within the Republic of 
                                                     
28 Le Roy was also a well-regarded scientist interested in hygiene and ventilation in hospitals, 
and shared an interest in electricity with Franklin.  He was the director of the royal lab 
in Passy near where Franklin resided while serving as an American minister.  Turgot 
was the former controleur general of King Louis XVI’s council. 
29 The ferme générale was a syndicate of tax “farmers” who were contracted by the French 
government to collect taxes by leasing the land.  The syndicate paid the government a 
fixed rent or share of revenue for the bail or the lease of the right to collect taxes 
(White 2004, p. 640). 
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Letters also gave him the opportunity to represent America, dispelling rumours, and 
providing a truer portrait of America. 
“I endeavoured to prepare the Minds of the People by writing on the 
Subject in the Newspapers, which was my usual Custom in such 
Cases…”30 
Once Franklin and the other commissioners arrived in France, they quickly 
learned that the British used the European press to downplay the war with the 
colonies, play-up their inevitable defeat, circulate rumours of reconciliation, 
accusing Americans of war atrocities, and to ridicule America’s complaints against 
the British government.   
 
When we reflect on the Character and Views of the Court of London, it 
ceases to be a Wonder, that the British Embassador [sic], and all other British 
Agents, should employ every means, that tended to prevent European 
Powers, but France more especially, from giving America Aid in this War. 
Prospects of Accommodation, it is well known, would effectually prevent 
foreign Interference, and therefore, without one serious Design of 
accommodating on any other Principles, but the absolute Submission of 
America, the delusive Idea of Conciliation hath been industriously suggested on both 
Sides the Water, that, under colour of this dividing and aid-withholding 
Prospect, the vast British Force, sent to America, might have the fairest 
Chance of succeeding; And this Policy hath in fact done considerable Injury to the 
United States…(BFP 23:50, emphasis added).   
 
Aware of the impact such reports had on the French public as well as the French and 
European governments, Franklin and his colleagues regularly requested information 
from the CSC about the latest news from America in order to counter the 
information spread by the British: 
 
We have had no Information of what passes in America but thro’ [sic]  
England, and the Advices are for the most part such only as the Ministry 
chuse [sic] to publish.  Our total Ignorance of the truth or Falsehood of Facts, 
when Questions are asked of us concerning them, makes us appear small in the 
Eyes of the People here, and is prejudicial to our Negotiations (BFP 23:466, 
emphasis added). 
 
In this February 6, 1777 report to the CSC, the American commissioners requested 
current information regarding the course of the war.  The repeated pleas for news 
                                                     
30 Autobiography (BFP, Part 13, 50:13) 
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about the progress of the war demonstrate the importance of providing accurate 
information to the European public. 31   The commissioners did not resort to 
conjecturing about the current situation in America.  In her book, The Great 
Improvisation, Stacy Schiff suggests Franklin overstated America’s success to the 
French; however, based on the letters written by Franklin, there is nothing to 
suggest that he ever claimed American military success.  He did tend to obscure the 
precariousness of America’s situation in terms of money and military supplies, but he 
optimistically spoke of the inevitable success of America. 
In addition, this report, as well as subsequent reports to the CSC, 
specifically highlight the negative effect such news had on not just the French 
government, but also the French public – the people who would invest in trade with 
America: 
 
The want of intelligence from America, and the Impossibility of 
contradicting by that means the false news spread here and all over Europe by the 
Enemy, has a bad Effect on the minds of many who would adventure in Trade to our 
Ports, as well as on the Conduct of the several Governments of Europe (BFP, 
23:285, emphasis added). 
 
Letters between both the commissioners in Paris and the Continental Congress 
repeatedly express concerns about how negative news would impact public 
perspectives toward the colonies and hurt commercial prospects, a major foreign 
policy objective for the young nation.  On his way to Spain, Arthur Lee observed 
“…by the Papers, that Agents of the [British] Ministry are endeavouring to cover 
their cruelties on Long Island, by charging us with having wantonly hangd [sic] some 
                                                     
31 A letter from CSC to American Commissioners, Feb 2, 1777 explains that the heavy 
presence of British cruisers prohibits more frequent communication, but also 
complains about the lack of information and supplies from Europe.  The American 
Commissioners write to the CSC on February 6, 1777 to complain about having no 
way to refute “the false news” spread  by the British all over Europe (BFP 23:285).  On 
March 4th and 12th, 1777 the commissioners write again to the CSC asking for current 
information from America.  Several months after the commissioners established a 
packet service, the commissioners write to the Committee for Foreign Affairs 
(previously the CSC) on September 8, 1777 again asking for current information and 
saying they had received no correspondence from the committee for some months, 
though the committee had written several letters between March and August.  In one 
of the letters from the committee dated May 30, 1777, they indicated they did not 
receive the dispatches sent via the packet ship. 
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hessian Prisoners previous to that transaction.  This they are constantly repeating 
both in the foreign and domestic Gazettes, in order to establish it as historical fact” 
(BFP, 23:339).32  He suggests to Franklin and Silas Deane that Congress should 
publish something to contradict this report.  Lee hoped the nation’s “name will be 
unblemished” (BFP, 23:339). 
As Franklin indicated to the CSC in his reports, he needed facts to help 
counter British “false news” and to reverse the effect of such unfavourable news.  
Perhaps the most crucial tasks for the American commissioners were to establish 
United States identity as a nation, distinct from England, and to bolster the nation’s 
legitimacy in the eyes of potential investors.  To accomplish these objectives, 
Franklin advocated the US by arranging for the Declaration of Independence, state 
constitutions, the Articles of Confederation, and articles from the American press to 
be translated.  With the help of Charles Dumas in The Hague and Duchesse de 
Enville’s son, Louis-Alexandre, duc de La Rochefoucald, Franklin was able to 
translate US founding documents, publish them, and circulate them around France 
and Europe (BFP 23:522 ;25: 327).    
 
All Europe is for us. Our Articles of Confederation being by our means translated 
and published here have given an Appearance of Consistence and Firmness to the 
American States and Government, that begins to make them considerable. 
The separate Constitutions of the several States are also translating and 
publishing here, which afford abundance of Speculation to the Politicians of Europe. 
And it is a very general Opinion that if we succeed in establishing our 
Liberties, we shall as soon as Peace is restored receive an immense Addition 
of Numbers and Wealth from Europe, by the Families who will come over 
to participate our Privileges and bring their Estates with them. Tyranny is so 
generally established in the rest of the World that the Prospect of an Asylum 
in America for those who love Liberty gives general Joy, and our Cause is 
esteem’d [sic] the Cause of all Mankind. (BFP 24:6). 
 
The objective was to not only counter the perception that the United States was 
weak, but also to demonstrate that a democratic republic was a solid government 
and unlikely to collapse into anarchy.   
                                                     
32 General George Washington attempted to push the British out of New York by launching 
attacks at Trenton (December 26, 1776) and Princeton (January 3, 1777).  In both the 
Battles of Trenton and Princeton, most of the casualties were Hessian soldiers under 
British command. 
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Furthermore, the translation of these documents served to illustrate 
America’s identity as separate from England.  Approximately ten years before the 
start of the American Revolution, the American colonies stood loyally with Britain, 
fought and professed their solidarity with their “mother country” in the Seven Years 
War or French and Indian War.  A war which put the American colonies in 
opposition to most of the world, the very same nations which America now sought 
trade and friendship.  The commissioners also had to prove the steadfastness and 
unity of the colonies to continue to fight until Britain recognized their independence.    
The negative perceptions of America and Americans, coupled with the lack of 
information from home, made the commissioners’ task to entice the French 
government to recognize the US or to obtain private aid from French investors and 
businessmen all the more difficult. 
Prior to Franklin's arrival, Vergennes set up a newsprint to counter British 
propaganda. The publication was entitled the Affaires de l'Angleterre et de l'Amerique and 
ran from 1776 through 1779.  The Affaires de l’Angleterre et de l’Amérique is an early 
example of international broadcasting, though unusual.  In this case the paper was 
created by another foreign government, but Americans and French citizens put 
materials together for the paper.  The newsprint had three primary objectives: to 
provide a narrative of events; to reprint information from other newspapers and 
pamphlets of particular interest; and to give inside political history and parliamentary 
proceedings of Great Britain (Ford 1889).33  
Upon Franklin’s arrival in France, he worked with the editors, Edemé-
Jacques Genêt, Antoine Court de Gébelin, Jean Baptiste René Robinet, and others 
to provide material, later John Adams would also provide material (Ford 1889; 
Echevarria 1953).  
 
                                                     
33 Given France’s policy stance in late 1776, Vergennes’s actions seem to contradict policy.  
However, Vergennes was influenced more by his own feelings, decidedly anti-British 
and eager to right the wrongs of the Seven Years War.  Vergennes also saw the 
American Revolution as an opportunity to raise France’s world power status.  Though 
official French support of the United States was not possible, he hoped that by 
galvanizing the public’s opinion he might persuade the other members of the King’s 
Council to favour more direct involvement (Bemis 1957 p. 43, 45, 50; Hardman 1995, 
p. 168)   
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Edited to a certain extent in a partisan manner, it was clearly intended to 
neutralize the accounts published by the ordinary French journals, who drew 
their news from the English press, and by giving the French people accurate 
information concerning the causes and progress of the war, encourage them in 
their sympathy with the American cause, and so add another lever to the forces 
that were action on the French government to make it 
recognize...[America's] independence (Ford 1889, p. 222, emphasis added).   
 
The 1776 draft of the Articles of Confederation appeared in Affaires along with the 
Pennsylvania state constitution, Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, and later five state 
constitutions would also appear in 1777 and the Declaration of Independence 
(Bédard 1986; Echevarria 1953; Ford 1889).  “…[The] Affaires de l’Angleterre et de 
l’Amérique did constitute the most important publications of American political 
documents in France…and their number and variety indicate the breadth of the 
French audience they reached (Echevarria 1953 p. 316).    
Franklin also contributed original essays, usually under a pseudonym as he 
used to do when he worked as a printer (Bédard 1986; Lemay 2005).  One 
contribution of note, was an essay published on October 18, 1777 entitled 
“Comparison of Great Britain and America as to Credit” under the byline “Bankers 
Letter” (Bédard 1986).  The essay outlines seven factors contributing to good credit 
and goes on to compare America’s credit to Britain’s, making a case for people to 
invest in America.  The autumn of 1777 was a particularly tense period for both 
France and the American colonies with funds nearly depleted and Franklin’s 
hesitancy to request additional funds, “Franklin may have been trying to inject new 
enthusiasm  in an old refrain” to support the colonies (Bédard 1986, p. 81). 
 As well as using the Affaires de l’Angleterre et de l’Amérique to advocate America 
as a stable nation and attractive trade partner, Franklin also used other popular 
European newsprints to reach audiences beyond France.  As mentioned earlier, 
Dumas acted as an intelligence agent of sorts for the Continental Congress. He also 
helped to disseminate propaganda and other information about the colonies 
throughout Continental Europe.  He wrote to Franklin that he was “…very 
connected for some time with the Gazetteer françois Leiden, that promotes long as 
he can [Americans]…” and “…has already …inserted in its leaves several small items 
that I [Dumas] have provided, and who will insert others if I can provide [them]…” 
(BFP 23:459).  This Dutch agent was well connected to the editor of the Nouvelles 
extraordinaires de divers endroits, popularly known as the Gazette de Leyde, Jean Luzac.  
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Through Franklin’s contacts in the Republic of Letters, Louis-Alexandre de La 
Rochefoucauld, helped to translate material for print in both the Gazette de Leyde and 
the Affaires de l’Angleterre et de l’Amérique.   
 In March of 1777 Dumas wrote to the commissioners in Paris and 
mentioned a connection to the editor of a French gazette published in Leiden.  
Dumas apparently already passed materials for the editor to publish, but the editor 
offered to publish more.  “I strongly advise you, gentlemen, to take advantage of his 
good will by giving me something …(but more facts than political arguments), because [the] 
gazette is widespread, both in this country throughout Europe, is estimated as one of 
the most impartial” (BFP 23:459, emphasis added).  The Gazette de Leyde was a highly 
influential French paper during the 18th and 19th century.  The paper, though 
printed in Amsterdam, had a wide circulation in France (over 2,000 subscribers in 
July 1778), despite government censorship and control over imported printed 
materials.  Also of note, the Leiden paper was free from any government control or 
influence as opposed to its competitors (la Gazette d’Amsterdam or la Gazette de France), 
making it a fairly reliable news source throughout Europe (Mercier-Faivre 2012).   
Based on another letter from Dumas on May 23, 1777, Franklin apparently 
provided an article which compared George Washington’s treatment of Hessian and 
British prisoners of war to British treatment of American prisoners of war, an effort 
to counter the claims made in the British press as reported by Arthur Lee (BFP, 
24:68; 23:339).   The same piece was also featured in a Dutch newsprint, 
Rotterdamshe Courant.  The editor, Reinier Arrenberg, was a fervent supporter of 
American independence (BFP 24:71).  Another supporter of America living in 
Holland, Benjamin Sowden, reported back to Franklin regarding public reception of 
news items from America as well as acting as a courier for Franklin, delivering 
materials to Arrenberg from Franklin and newsprints from the American colonies 
(BFP 24:134, 25:317, 26:568).  This demonstrates the vital importance information 
played throughout the American Revolution, not just from an intelligence 
perspective.  Information was needed to engage the French public to counter 
rumours or misinformation.  The commissioners were without means to refute these 
reports.  Some of Franklin’s contacts, eager to support the American cause, begged 
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him to provide information to dispel the negative reports coming from the British.34  
Many of these contacts were long-time correspondents and friends of Franklin 
through the Republic of Letters.  In place of current news, Franklin provided 
founding documents of the colonies and the US to demonstrate the character and 
reliability of the fledgling nation. 
“It takes many good deeds to build a good reputation, and only one bad 
one to lose it.”35 
 This chapter presents several interesting points not only with regard to the 
use of foreign public engagement preceding and during the American Revolution, 
but also the role of foreign public engagement as a mechanism of statecraft.  First, as 
stated in the opening of the chapter, Benjamin Franklin was keenly aware of the 
importance of America’s image in connection to what the representatives of the 
Continental Congress hoped to achieve in severing ties with England. 36   The 
importance of the US image was two-fold: commercial enticement and to represent 
the character of the nation.  Both were crucial to the success of the Revolution and 
also tied to the future success of the nation.  Franklin knew this and worked 
                                                     
34 For example, Franklin received a letter from Thomas Walpole, dated February 1, 1777 
where he complains about the lack of engagement from America to explain their 
position to the British.  “All those who are friends to both Countrys [sic] think they 
have much reason to complain of the neglect with which they have been treated by 
America, in not having been made acquainted in some authentick [sic] manner with her 
real views and circumstances at the opening of this unhappy rupture, nor with a true 
representation of the events which have followed. The want of which advices it is 
thought has not been less prejudicial to the reputation of America in the eyes of the rest 
of Europe than in the public opinion here, as the friends of both Countrys [sic] have 
thus been deprived of all means of refuting the tales which have been imposed on the 
world by the artifice of Administration and which have principally contributed to the 
delusion of the people of England” (BFP 23:264).  Also, Georges Grand, writes from 
Amsterdam on 27 February 1777, “…it is important that [for] your Interests You sent 
me all the good news you would receive to insert for [the] paper in Dutch and French 
[to] support for Your Credit, and maintain the will of spirits in this country…” (BFP 
23:393 ). 
35 Benjamin Franklin 
36 In one report to the CSC, Franklin reported on the unprofessional behaviour of Mr. 
Merkle, a commercial contracts agent working for the CC at Bourdeaux.  Franklin 
wrote “...his Character is marked for low Debauchery incompatible with the 
Gentleman or the Man of Business. Persons of such a Character giving themselves out 
for Agents of Congress and producing Contracts in support of their Pretensions, hurt 
the Commercial reputation of the United States, and can be of no service in any shape 
whatever” (BFP 23:421). 
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diligently, and sometimes at odds with the other commissioners and the Continental 
Congress, to attempt to minimize damage to the US colonies’ image as well as build 
up confidence in the nation as a stable, secure investment. 
 Second and also connected with the importance of America’s image, was the 
need for accurate, current information about the war and the progress of the 
Revolution.  This is also an important point in connection to the general 
development of American foreign public engagement, as will be discussed further in 
Chapters 5 and 7.  The need to present the truth about America is a recurring 
strategy in American public diplomacy throughout the Cold War.  Countering 
inaccurate information disseminated by the British government was also connected 
to the importance of maintaining the image of the US.  Later, this need for using 
truth to counter misinformation about America is used to differentiate between 
American foreign public engagement and enemy propaganda.  In the eighteenth 
century, the use of lies to counter British inaccuracies about the colonies and the war 
was seen as being beneath the dignity of the colonies. 
 
...therefore we conceive that the english [sic] papers are calculated to deter 
the french [sic] Merchants from beginning to taste the Sweets of our Trade. 
Their falshoods [sic] rightly understood are the Barometers of their fears, and 
in Proportion as the Political Atmosphere presses downward the Spirit of 
Fiction is obliged to rise. We wish it to be understood that we pay too much 
respect to the wisdom of the French Cabinet to suppose they can be 
influenced by such efforts of visible despair, and that we have too much 
reverence for the Honor of the American Congress to prostitute its authority by filling 
our own News papers [sic], with the same kind of invented Tales which characterize 
the London Gazette (CSC to American Commissioners, BFP 24:12, emphasis 
added).   
 
The desire for accurate, current information was often inhibited by the limitations of 
communication technology at the time.  The American colonies suffered from a lack 
of navy or even a merchant fleet robust enough to carry messages between France 
and America.  Ironically, despite advances in communication technology, the 
requirement for access to truthful information in a timely manner does not dissipate 
over the course of this study.  This remains a recurring problem.  Yet, the emphasis 
on truth and the strong desire to represent the US to foreign publics is a recurring idea 
as American foreign public engagement evolves and ties in with the issue of 
conceptualizing public diplomacy.  The nation’s political values, influenced by 
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eighteenth century liberal ideas, dictated only the truth should be used to represent 
and explain the new nation.  
 Another remarkable finding in this case is the attention and value placed on 
public opinion, particularly by Benjamin Franklin, but also by the other 
commissioners and the Continental Congress.  All the more so, given the socio-
political environment of eighteenth century France.  Despite the French 
government’s control over the press, a robust domestic police (pseudo-intelligence) 
service, and professed faith in absolute monarchy, Benjamin Franklin and the 
Continental Congress did not seem to be deterred by these considerations.  Engaging 
with foreign publics was taken as a pragmatic, natural course. The Congress was 
eager to know not only political developments in Europe, but also desired to know 
what the people of Europe thought about the US. 
 
We have Nothing further to add at present, but to request, that you will 
omit no good Opportunity of informing us, how you succeed in your 
Mission, what Events take place in Europe, by which these States may be 
affected, and that you contrive us in regular Succession some of the best 
London, French, and Dutch Newspapers, with any valuable political 
Publications, that may concern North America (CSC to American 
Commissioners, BFP 23:50). 
 
Franklin was careful to differentiate between public opinion and government opinion 
in each of his letters to either the Continental Congress or even in personal letters.  
This was important, as the Congress continually pressured the commissioners to get 
France to recognize the American colonies as an independent nation, to enter into a 
trade treaty, and to provide the colonies substantial loans.  As Franklin was well 
aware, this was impossible for the French government to do.  Such actions would 
have meant war with England, for which France was neither militarily nor 
monetarily prepared to engage, as Franklin wrote to another member of the Royal 
Society in May 1777: “The People of this Country are almost unanimously in our favour. 
The Government has its reasons for postponing a War, but is making daily the most 
diligent Preparations; wherein Spain goes hand in hand” (BFP 24:8, emphasis added).  
The distinction between public opinion and government sentiment as well as the 
concern and care for public opinion is reflective of the liberal, democratic values 
expressed by the founders of the US, and also foreshadows future calls for a 
democratic diplomacy, a diplomacy between the US government and the people of 
other nations, rather than other governments.  The correlation between American 
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political values and foreign public engagement, helps to conceptualize public 
diplomacy, an idea developed further in the course of this study.  Unfortunately, as 
the proceeding case demonstrates, the US government adopted a more “traditional” 
diplomatic practice.  However, private American entities continued to engage with 
the people of other nations, as this study will reveal. 
 In addition to these key findings, this case sets out methods of engagement, 
which will be used again in forthcoming cases.  The need to listen, to collect 
information about the people was more important to Franklin than interacting with 
the French government regularly.  Educational exchanges played a vast role in not only 
telling people about the character of the US, but the contacts Franklin made through 
the Republic of Letters were instrumental to the American Revolution’s success.  
Philosophers, artists, poets, musicians, and printers throughout Europe offered their 
assistance to Franklin in varying ways.  Often these contacts acted as couriers for 
letters and news from the colonies; sometimes these contacts offered access to 
people in government or much needed supplies.  For Franklin, engaging the French 
public was the only means of obtaining what the US needed: ready money and 
supplies.  Most of the contacts who Franklin regularly interacted and corresponded 
with during his time in France provided some conduit for him to obtain these items.  
Lavoisier, Le Roy, Dumas, Jacques-Donatien Le Ray de Chaumont (Franklin’s 
landlord), and others were all connected to Franklin’s work as an eminent scientist 
and respected philosopher as well as having connections to the ferme générale and the 
French government.  Chaumont and Le Ray helped Franklin establish connections 
with European merchants willing to ship uniforms and weapons to French ports and 
onward to America (Lopez 1964; Schiff 2005). 
 These same contacts were also instrumental to US advocacy and international 
broadcasting.  With the help of Dumas, Arrenberg, and La Rochefoucauld, Franklin 
was able to take founding documents of the US and use them to supplement current 
news from the colonies.  This technique of using official documents and officials’ 
words to advocate the US position, in place of or alongside current news, is utilized 
in the course of American foreign public engagement in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.  The foreign public engagement of Benjamin Franklin sets the foundation 
for the future development of American public diplomacy as a tool of statecraft. 
 Proceeding cases will build upon and echo some of the issues highlighted in 
this chapter.  Patterns emerge in this case and continue to run through the following 
- 54 - 
 
five chapters.  One major theme, communication, manifests in three different ways 
in this study.  First, communication problems impacting the correspondence 
between US representatives abroad and policymakers in Washington due to limited 
communication technology.  Second, the unwillingness of US leaders to heed reports 
from those serving abroad.  Third, the awareness by US leaders and private citizens 
of the need to communicate with people abroad to preserve the reputation of 
America around the world.  In this instance, both communication technology and 
neglect by the Continental Congress to consider Franklin’s reports impacted 
engagement in France.  Additionally, this case demonstrates recognition by 
American representatives of the need to communicate with the public of another 
nation as way to represent itself, the nation’s policies, and to maintain its image.  
Another theme is the consistency of the methods used by Franklin to engage the 
French public. Future cases will feature similar methods of engagement.    
And finally, the case exposed the roots of one of the three interconnected 
issues impacting US public diplomacy today.  Benjamin Franklin believed the liberal 
ideals upon which the US was founded would serve to attract people around the 
world to settle in the US.  He advocated the United States using these values when 
current information from the Continental Congress was unavailable.  In the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, US leaders and citizens believed nothing further 
was required to advocate America because the nation’s liberal, democratic values 
were enough to secure peace and friendship with the world.  As the US matures and 
grows as a nation and the world changes, this passive attitude toward America’s 
relationship with the world dissipates.   
The following chapter will build upon some of the themes identified in this 
case, particularly problems caused by advances in communication capabilities as well 
as communication issues between Washington and US representatives abroad.  Tied 
to this theme, the next case will look at the integration of engagement into statecraft 
as a means to inform policy.  Another pattern will also be introduced in the next case 
with the first attempts at a public-private partnership to conduct engagement with 
people abroad.     
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Chapter 3  
The Importance of Non-Important Foreign Public Engagement 
"...allow me to remark that every European government takes pains to correct, officially, 
through its diplomatic agents, and through the press, all injurious statements that may get 
currency with regard to its affairs.  So far as I can see, our government has given little or no 
heed to this matter.  Even the telegraph from New York appears not to be used in our interest.  
The consequence is that all the public men of Europe live in an atmosphere of falsehood as to 
our war.  This might have been prevented at first.  It is not too late to remedy it now." 
- Reverend Dr. John M’Clintock to Secretary of State William Seward, 18 
November 186337 
 
 Unlike the fame and accolades which Benjamin Franklin received upon 
arriving in France, the newly appointed US minister to St. James Court, Charles 
Francis Adams,38 arrived in Liverpool to a crowd of anxious merchants, keen to 
know what President Abraham Lincoln’s blockade meant for their businesses (Adams 
to Seward, 17 May 1861, M30, R74; The Liverpool Mercury 14 May 1861).  Adams 
was so concerned with the local sentiments in Liverpool that he delayed his journey 
to London by one day.  He remained in Liverpool to listen to merchant concerns and 
assure them that the US would do everything to maintain trading relations despite 
the secession and the start of the Civil War.  He told Secretary of State William 
Seward he would have remained longer, but after hearing of the Queen’s Neutrality 
Proclamation, he hurried on to London (Adams to Seward, 17 May 1861, M30, 
R74). 
Throughout the American Civil War, the United States was not the only 
place where battles occurred.  The battle for the hearts and minds of the British 
raged in the papers, in Parliament, and across British society.  This case looks at how 
and why British public opinion was a significant component to both the Union’s and 
Confederacy’s success or failure, focusing particularly on Union efforts to engage the 
                                                     
37 In Baylen, J.O. 1959, pp. 143 - 144. 
38 Charles Francis Adams is the grandson of John Adams, former US minister to Britain and 
US president, as well as the son of John Quincy Adams, a former Secretary of State and 
US president. 
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British to garner the public’s support.  Union leaders knew once Britain recognized 
the Confederacy as an independent nation, there would be no hope of reunification 
(Stahr 2012).  The Confederacy wanted European recognition, but the Confederate 
leadership did not see recognition as necessary to their successful bid for 
independence until very late in the war (Blumenthal 1966; Herring 2008). 
During the Civil War, the Union struggled to balance domestic politics and 
war aims with foreign relations. By prioritizing retention of the Border States39 and 
emphasizing reunification over emancipation, the Union not only caused political 
strife in the US, but also alienated much of the British public.  Furthermore, there 
was a tendency for the Union government to give precedence to traditional 
diplomacy (state-to-state) and employ bellicose diplomatic tactics over foreign public 
engagement, missing opportunities to foster friendly relations and eliminate the 
potential for foreign intervention.   
While the previous chapter devoted considerable attention to the methods 
of engagement, this chapter focuses less on the actual practice of engagement, in part 
because very little was used by the Union, and the engagement with the British 
public was inconsistent and sporadic.  Though the Union did use listening and 
advocacy to garner British sympathy, efforts to engage the public were not as 
intensive as Benjamin Franklin employed in France.  Instead, the case concentrates 
more on the role foreign public engagement played in American statecraft 
throughout the Civil War.  What makes the case relevant to understanding the role 
and origins of public diplomacy is the recognition by the Union of the need to engage 
with publics abroad to facilitate both foreign and domestic policy objectives.  This 
case raises important questions about the role of foreign public engagement and the 
methods used to engage people abroad such as how much consideration should be 
                                                     
39 The Border States refer to the states who though slave states remained in the Union, due 
in large part to extreme internal divisions.  The key Border States were Delaware, 
Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, but others included Tennessee, West Virginia, and 
Kansas.  In the case of Kentucky, Missouri, and Kansas, the states’ legislatures broke 
down, rival governments were created, and bitter fighting among the citizens occurred.  
In Maryland, President Lincoln and William Seward arranged for non-loyal state 
representatives to be arrested and imprisoned without trial, replacing them with men 
loyal to the Union.  Throughout the first year of the war, Lincoln withheld 
emancipation in large part because he feared losing the Border States to the 
Confederacy.  Lincoln’s administration believed that the loss of one Border State to the 
Confederacy would determine the war, thus indicating the significance of their 
importance to the Union’s overall war policy. 
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given to foreign public opinion in the formation of national policy; should foreign 
public engagement be used to attain national objectives; who should be responsible 
for carrying out foreign public engagement (public or private entities); and whether 
foreign public engagement is an appropriate mechanism for the state.  On top of 
these questions, the case also raises some concerns about using foreign public 
engagement such as how changes in communication technology alter a nation’s 
audience; the importance of clearly explaining national positions and policies; and 
the prioritization of government opinion over public opinion.  
 “We are now in a position to see why the sympathy of this and every 
civilised people is asked, and even claimed as of right…The world’s 
opinion has forced on this war.” 40 
In the previous chapter, the limitations of transportation and communication 
technology remained a recurring obstacle for Benjamin Franklin in his engagement 
efforts.  Communications technology is a factor which plays a role in this case with 
the advent of the telegraph. The telegraph sped up communications over long 
distances.  This meant newspapers were able to obtain reports more quickly and 
consistently from all over the world using foreign correspondents, but this also 
changed the audience dynamics for nations (Black 2001; Winston 2012).  American 
news was reported more regularly throughout Europe and many foreign 
correspondents followed both the Confederate and Union armies as embedded 
reporters (Foreman 2010).  When US officials spoke to their American audience, 
they were also heard by Europeans, as Ambassador Adams reported to his son Henry 
Adams: 
 
                                                     
40 “English Sympathy with Slavery,” The Birmingham Daily Post, 10 January 1863, Issue 1391 
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The impression is general that Mr. Seward is resolved to insult England until 
she makes a war.  He is the bête noir, that frightens them out of all their 
proprieties.  It is of no use to deny it and appeal to the facts.  They quote 
what he said to the Duke of Newcastle about insulting England as the only 
sure passport to popular favor in America,41 and a part of a speech in which 
he talked of annexing Canada as an offset to the loss of the slave states.  This 
is the evidence that Mr. Seward is an ogre fully resolved to eat all 
Englishmen raw.  Pitiful as is all this nonsense, it is of no trifling 
consequence in its political effect...And if war finally happens, it will trace 
to this source one it most prominent causes (20 December 1861, in Ford 
1920, pp.88 – 89). 
 
This created issues for foreign relations, especially in terms of foreign public opinion. 
The belligerent and anti-British rhetoric often used by Secretary of State Seward as 
well as the American press alienated the British public and soured the British public’s 
opinion toward the US government (Duberman 1960; Foreman 2010).42  The Union 
often prioritized the domestic audience over their foreign audience. 43   This is 
perhaps understandable given the US was engaged in a civil war, but there were 
                                                     
41 While visiting in England in 1859, William Seward remarked to the Duke of Newcastle 
that the best way to garner political favour from the American public was to threaten 
war with England.  The British press reported the exchange as well as other remarks 
made by Seward where he suggested annexing Canada. 
42 The New York Herald in particular was known in the US and by the British as being 
vehemently  anti-British and initially supported the secession.  The editor, Scotsman 
James Gordon Bennett, believed Northern abolitionists were to blame for the secession.  
The Herald had a large circulation in Europe which influenced public sentiment overseas.  
American representatives in England, France, and Belgium were apprehensive about 
the impact on public sentiment caused by The Herald.  President Lincoln raised the 
issue of The Herald's influence before the cabinet, where it was decided that Thurlow 
Weed would approach Mr. Bennett to alter the tone of the paper (Weed 1883).  
Though Weed was able to alter his stance toward the secession, The Herald continued 
to produce caustic articles about England which were reprinted in and often remarked 
upon by the British press (see “Anti-English Feeling in America,” 28 December 1861, 
The Morning Post, p. 6, Issue 27466). 
43 Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Ambassador Adams elder son, complained of how the Union 
press undermined any attempts at improving British public opinion toward the Union.  
On October 6, 1861 he wrote to his brother Henry: “...I must confess I think the 
government’s cards, so far as the public sees them, are played badly enough both here and 
in England.  While the agents of the Confederates are abroad working the whole time 
at public opinion and at the foreign mind, influencing papers and thinkers and 
undermining us the whole time, our press at home does but furnish them the materials they 
need and our agents abroad apparently confine their efforts to cabinets and officials and leave 
public opinion and the press to take care of themselves” (in Ford 1920, p. 52, emphasis 
added). 
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some occasions where the lack of consideration for the foreign audience actually 
endangered US war objectives. 
In addition to improved communications between the US and Europe, 
international law played a large role in maintaining and endangering Anglo-American 
relations during the Civil War.  As will be discussed later with the Queen’s 
Neutrality Proclamation and the Trent crisis, new international legal standards caused 
the US and Britain to reverse their stances with regard to neutral rights and freedom 
of the seas.44  Secretary of State William Seward decided the time had come for the 
US to revisit the Declaration of Paris with the onset of the Civil War.  Initially, he 
hoped concluding an agreement on the Declaration would prevent the Confederacy 
from obtaining belligerency rights; 45  however, with the Queen's Neutrality 
Proclamation, he was too late (Duberman 1960).   
Another matter of international law which was a source of conflict between 
the US and Britain was the abolishment of the slave trade.  In the 1830s, Britain 
attempted to get America to sign an international agreement whereby the navies of 
signatory states would have the right to board and search any vessel suspected of 
transporting slaves.  The US refused to sign, mainly due to national pride.46   
“In this conflict many false theories and many prejudices which have 
been fruitful of controversy will necessarily perish.”47 
 Historical memory and the divided opinions of those involved in the war 
have shaped the real reasons for the Civil War (Brauer 1977).  For some historians 
                                                     
44 In 1856, France, Russia, Austria, Turkey, Sardinia, and Prussia all signed the Declaration 
of Paris.  The declaration abolished privateering, established neutral rights, broadened 
the freedom of the seas for non-combatants, and required blockades to be effective in 
order to be binding.  Previously the US refused to sign the convention because the 
nation wished to add a fifth article which would protect all non-contraband private 
property at sea.   
45 When an entity is recognized as a belligerent, they are permitted to use ports of other 
nations to make repairs and obtain provisions before returning to sea as well as obtain 
loans (Lootsteen 2000).   
46 Even after the War of 1812, Americans remained sensitive to the idea of any nation’s 
navy, especially the British Navy boarding American ships.  The US said it would police 
its own vessels, but cutbacks in military spending depleted the US Navy’s resources 
and the slave trade continued to flourish.  Slave traders sailed under the American flag 
to avoid being searched by the Royal Navy (Campbell 2003).   
47 Despatch No.137, Seward to Adams, 2 December 1861, M77, R77 
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and for those who lived through the war, the battle was about state’s rights, for 
others it was about the survival of democracy and republicanism; and yet popular 
belief attributes the reason for the Civil War to ending slavery.  However, part of 
the confusion for the British public and the government was that neither was entirely 
certain of what the war was really about because there were many conflicting 
explanations (Blackett 2001; Duberman 1960; Herring 2008; Foreman 2010).48 
 From the Union’s perspective, the seceded states began the war when they 
attacked Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861.  To many Unionists, like Secretary of State 
William Seward and Charles Adams, the seceded states violated the Constitution and 
stole land and property from the American people by separating from the Union 
(Duberman 1960; Herring 2008; Foreman 2010; Stahr 2012).  As Adams also 
explained in his first meeting with the British foreign minister, Lord John Russell, 
the Confederacy 
 
…had undertaken to withdraw certain states from the Government by an 
arbitrary act which they called secession, not known to the Constitution, the 
validity of which had at no time been acknowledged by the people of the 
United States, and which was now emphatically denied.  But not content 
with this, they had gone on to substitute another system among themselves 
avowedly based upon the recognition of this right States to withdraw or 
secede at pleasure (Despatch No. 2, 21 May 1861, M30, R73, emphasis 
added). 
 
There was no provision in the Constitution which allowed states to leave the Union.  
From the North’s perspective the states which held referendums for secession 
contravened American republicanism and democracy.  For conservatives in the 
North, the war was about saving the ideals America was built upon, not about 
slavery.  On the other hand, “radical” Republicans and abolitionists in the North 
believed the war was to end slavery and competed with other Northern leaders to 
make their views heard. 
 Similarly, the Confederates were equally divided on the reasons for the war.  
To a certain extent, some Confederates believed the war was about preserving the 
state’s rights and semi-autonomy from the federal government (Blumenthal 1966; 
Moore 1986).  Others fought to escape the power and authority of the industrial 
                                                     
48 Some of Charles Francis Adams’s despatches also describe the varied explanations which 
swirled around England: Despatch Nos. 1, 9, and 61 (M30, R73).  
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North to dictate the nation’s economy and commercial interests abroad.  However, 
for those leading the Confederacy, the real reason for the war was to maintain the 
“peculiar institution” of slavery (Moore 1986). 
 While the historical interpretations about the underlying reasons for the 
Civil War are not particularly relevant for this study, the perspectives of the Union, 
the British people, and the government at the time are important.  Union 
perspectives shaped not only their domestic policy and their war objectives, but also 
framed their foreign policy and the way the Union engaged with the British public 
and the government.  Firmly believing that the secessionists were rebels and traitors, 
the Union adamantly opposed any foreign interference in the conflict, particularly if 
some sort of foreign recognition was given to the Confederacy.  Members of the 
British public and government viewed the reasons for the conflict in varying ways as 
the following paragraphs will demonstrate.  These views conflicted not only with the 
Union’s perspectives, but also caused the British public and the government to be 
critical of the Union’s pursuit of their war objective to reunify the United States.  
This accounts for the gulf of misunderstanding between the British public and the 
Union so frequently noted in the correspondences to Lincoln and Seward by US 
representatives and private citizens residing in England as well as other parts of 
Europe. 
“…We…have declared our royal determination to maintain a strict and 
impartial neutrality…” 49 
 Just as Adams arrived in England, relations between the US and Britain were 
tested after Queen Victoria issued her Neutrality Proclamation on May 13, 1861.  
“…[The] tenor of the proclamation itself which seems to recognise in a vague 
manner, indeed, but still does seem to recognise the Insurgents as a belligerent 
national power” (Despatch No. 14, 3 June 1861, M77, R76).  The phrasing of the 
Proclamation does not explicitly state that the British government recognized the 
Confederate States of America as a belligerent power, but did acknowledge 
hostilities between both the United States “…and certain States styling themselves as 
‘the Confederate States of America’” (The Times, 15 May 1861, p. 5).  The rest of the 
Proclamation quotes the Foreign Enlistment Act, prohibiting British subjects from 
                                                     
49 Excerpt from Queen Victoria’s Proclamation of Neutrality, printed in The Times, 15 May 
1861; Issue 23933 
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providing aid or service to “any foreign Prince, state, or Potentate, or of any foreign 
colony, province, or of any province or people, or of any person or persons 
exercising or assuming to exercise any powers of government in or over any Foreign 
State, colony, province, or part of any province or people…” (The Times, 15 May 
1861, p. 5).   With this application of the law, the Confederates were thus viewed to 
be exercising the powers of government.   
From the Union’s perspective, the Confederacy was not a fully formed 
government.  “There seemed to be not a little precipitation in at once raising the 
disaffected States up to the least of a belligerent power, before it had developed a 
single one of the real elements which constitute military efficiency outside of its 
geographical limits” (Despatch No. 1, Adams to Seward, 17 May 1861, M30, R74).  
To the Union, the Confederate states were not belligerents, but insurgents.  
Ironically, the British government granted the Confederacy belligerent rights 50 
largely in response to the Union’s and the Confederacy’s own actions.   
On April 17th, Confederate president Jefferson Davis issued letters of 
marque, permitting Confederate merchant ships to privateer, and in response 
President Lincoln ordered a blockade of all Confederate ports on April 19th.  
Lincoln’s order was considered an act of war, in and of itself granted belligerency 
status to the Confederacy.  Between the Union blockade and the Confederate 
privateering, the British government feared for its own commercial interests and did 
not wish to be entangled in the fray (Duberman 1960).  According to Adams, Lord 
Russell explained that the government was concerned about their own citizens 
joining in the contest.  The Queen’s Neutrality Proclamation was intended to keep 
British citizens from joining the controversy, to avoid citizens from influencing 
either side (Despatch No. 2, 21 May 1861, M30, R74).   
With the news of the Proclamation, the Union public and press reacted 
negatively, raising anti-British sentiments (Foreman 2010).  "Since it thus appeared 
that the Queen's Proclamation had not been demanded by a pressing situation, it 
                                                     
50 The US objected to the British recognizing the Confederacy as a belligerent because they 
viewed the seceded states as insurgents, rebels.  Although many actions by President 
Lincoln prior to Queen Victoria’s proclamation, accorded belligerency status to the 
Confederacy, such as the Lincoln’s blockade order (Lootsteen 2000).  In international 
law, belligerent status is essentially one step away from full state recognition; hence, 
the Union’s panic upon hearing of the Queen’s Neutrality Proclamation. 
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seemed logical to many Northerners to assume that England had acted from a sinister 
predisposition to favor the Confederacy" (Duberman 1960, p. 260).  For the first 
few months of Adams posting in London, Seward attempted to get the British to 
revoke their recognition of the Confederacy as a belligerent by quickly signing the 
Declaration of Paris.  However, Lord Russell also told Adams that while Britain 
would agree to negotiate the Declaration, the British government would not enter 
into any agreement that would have impact on the internal conflict in America 
(Duberman 1960).  This demonstrated Britain's unwillingness to alter their neutral 
stance or reverse their recognition of the Confederacy as a belligerent.   
As the war continued over the next four years, British neutrality was 
tested. 51   With the Civil War, British investments were threatened and the 
livelihoods of hundreds of thousands British people were put on hold throughout the 
war; thus putting the British government in a difficult position to consider 
intervention or mediation in order to alleviate the economic costs to investors and 
the British public, even at the risk of war with the Union. 
“…but English opinion is, after all, the opinion of the world…”52 
 Identifying what British public opinion during the Civil War is difficult to 
put into simplified categories of either pro-South or pro-North.  Some scholars have 
noted the tendency of other historians to oversimplify not only the various 
viewpoints of the British public, but also the main reasons for shifts in opinion 
(Blackett 2001; Campbell 2003; Hernon 1967).53  Typically, historians divide British 
public opinion along class lines: British aristocracy and ruling class favoured the 
                                                     
51 Beginning in 1862, the impact of the “cotton famine” began to be felt in Britain causing 
some British to suggest mediation or recognition in order to restore the flow of the 
cotton supply.  In the summer of 1862, a series of battles (Bull Run II and Antietam) 
caused tremendous loss of life which shocked the British public.  There were renewed 
calls for mediation on humanitarian grounds, believing the war would only lead to 
continued senseless loss of life. In the fall of 1862, the Union presented evidence that a 
ship, 290 – later CSA Alabama, being built in Liverpool in violation of the British 
Foreign Enlistment Act. Loopholes in the law as well as biased interpretations of the 
law prevented the British government from stopping the Alabama leaving port to wreak 
havoc on Union merchant ships.  
52 The Times, 12 July 1862, p. 10, Issue 24296 
53 Hernon is particularly critical of the idea that Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation 
altered public opinion as much as other historians claim (1967).  This will be addressed 
in greater detail, later in the chapter. 
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Confederacy based on commercial interests and the working class generally favoured 
the Union (Blackett 2001; Campbell 2003).  Union victory promised higher tariffs 
whereas a Confederate victory would mean a large free-trade market, from the 
perspective of some.  British manufacturers hoped to benefit from the North’s defeat 
and put their competitors at a disadvantage.  In addition, the British aristocracy and 
government leaders saw the unified America as a hegemonic threat to their way of 
life (Blackett 2001; Herring 2008).54  The British working class and a large portion 
of the middle class favoured the Union on the assumption that the North fought to 
end slavery.   
However, this is a simplistic way of understanding the divisions and conflicts 
which existed among the British public with regard to the Civil War.  There were 
aristocratic supporters of the Union and there were portions of the working class 
who expressed sympathy for the Confederacy.55  Not to mention, the significant and 
regular fluctuations of British public opinion, as Adams regularly reported to Seward: 
 
                                                     
54 This sentiment is captured in an article featured in The Liverpool Mercury, 25 February 
1862, reporting on Union attempts to gain British sympathy and speeches made by 
various Americans at a celebration in honour of George Washington’s birthday.  The 
Liverpool Mercury reported “[the] keynote of the meeting was Union, Empire, 
Conquest...We cannot say that it is particularly suited to win the sympathies of a free 
people.  The extension of the American “empire” from ocean to ocean is an object the 
value of which will be differently estimated by different minds.  American patriots may 
naturally think that the interests of the human race coincide with the territorial 
aggrandisement of their Imperial Republic, but impartial observers may be permitted 
to regard the point as open to controversy…It is remarkable that even when 
Americans are specially anxious to interest the feelings of Englishmen in their favour, 
they should be so devoid of prudence and self-control as to suggest the precise topics 
which a more judicious advocacy would suppress.  Mexican wars, projects of Cuban 
annexation, ‘manifest destiny,’ and the rest of it, are reminiscences which it is alike 
unnecessary and inexpedient to recall.  If there is one thing more than another which 
reconciles the moral sense of mankind to the disruption of the American Union, it is 
the recollection of that insolent and profligate foreign policy which North and South 
jointly pursued, but which in future will perhaps be effectually checked by their mutual 
vigilance” (“American Appeals to English Sympathy,” Issue 4381).  
55 Specifically, the Duke of Argyll and the Duchess of Sutherland were avid supporters of 
the Union, based on the belief that the Union would eliminate slavery from America 
(Blackett 2001; Campbell 2003; Duberman 1960; Foreman 2010).  Arguably, even 
Lord Lyons, British minister to the US, came to favour the North over the South 
(Foreman 2010).  Blackett provides an in depth analysis of the varying viewpoints from 
working class men who supported the Confederacy in his book, Divided Hearts: Britain 
and the American Civil War (2001). 
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The popular feeling varies according to the character of the intelligence from 
America.  It has now reverted almost to the state prior to the action at Bull 
Run…The Ministry feeling as it does [sic] very insecure as to its hold on 
power is not anxious to stir up any cause of internal discord…Besides which 
the aspect of things all over Europe is so threatening as to inspire caution in 
every quarter (Despatch No. 58, 11 October 1861, M30, R73).  
 
Major changes in opinion sometimes occurred month to month or even week to 
week, depending on the news from America, news of the hardships facing cotton 
factory workers, America’s own domestic policies, and the speeches or motions 
made in Parliament as well as speeches made by US leaders.56  This caused extreme 
anxiety for not just Adams, but also British supporters of the Union as well 
(Duberman 1960; Foreman 2010). 
 While this study does not seek to gauge British public opinion throughout 
the war, the perceived connection by various members of Lincoln’s administration57 
between English public opinion and US policies is relevant.  Within the first few 
months of fighting, both Lincoln and Seward received letters from British and 
American citizens living in Europe and England advising them that the Union’s 
conduct of the war, their policies at home, and the speeches of leaders had an impact 
on public opinion in England and in turn on the British government’s determinations 
toward the US (Library of Congress (LoC): Abraham Lincoln Papers (ALP), General 
Correspondences, Series 1; M30, R73).  The Union’s inconsistent stance toward 
slavery, the Morrill Tariff,58 Seward’s bellicose rhetoric and policies, as well as the 
Union blockade all had a negative impact on public opinion and influenced the 
perceptions of Lord Palmerston’s cabinet.   
                                                     
56 The situation was so tense throughout the four years of the Civil War that Adams only 
leased accommodations in London on a monthly basis, fearing that at any point, Anglo-
American relations would break (Duberman 1960). 
57 Those who seemed to be most concerned about foreign public opinion in relation to both 
US foreign policy and war aims were ministers and consuls serving abroad.  
58 The Morrill Tariff passed through Congress just before the South began to consider 
secession in March 1861.  The bill raised tariffs on imported goods,  a measure 
supported by US industrialists and factory workers. 
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In 1859, Lord Palmerston became Prime Minister after a decade of 
instability in British parliamentary politics.59   "...[The] Palmerston Ministry was 
made up of an unsteady coalition and was therefore peculiarly tied to public opinion.  
And in the country at large, Adams realized, sentiment had not yet fully crystallized" 
(Duberman 1960, p. 265).  Adams noted the tenuous position of the British 
government and its reliance on the public support in a despatch to Seward in 
October 1861 (No. 58, 11 October 1861, M30, R73).  He observed that the 
ministers made fewer distinctions between themselves and their more radical 
supporters.  “As a consequence they have nothing left to stand upon but their 
personal popularity, a very unsteady prop in the direction of so many and so difficult 
public questions as must be perpetually presenting  themselves for the decision of a 
leading power like Great Britain” (No. 61, M30, R73).60 
This raises the question of why Britain and British public opinion remained 
so important to both the Confederacy and the Union throughout the war in 
comparison to other European countries.61  The reason was two-fold.  First, British 
                                                     
59 Sir Robert Peel commanded a powerful faction within Parliament throughout the 1840s 
and 50s, but refused to form an official party (Stuart 1954).  With Peel’s death, British 
politics was thrown into chaos causing a series of unstable governments to form in 
1852, 1855, and 1859.  Both Tories and Whigs remained divided on domestic reform 
issues (wider male suffrage, universal education, etc.) and trade issues while the 
Peelites vacillated between the parties.  Some order was restored in June 1859 when 
Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell formed the Liberal party and subsequently 
formed a government.  The government under Palmerston created a coalition cabinet 
composed of former Whigs, Peelites, and Liberals (Brown 2001; Stuart 1954). 
60 Adams’s characterization of public opinion is typical of American leaders at the time.  
Despite the liberal, democratic political culture of the US, American political leaders 
were suspicious and sceptical of the general public to hold informed opinions and 
believed public opinion to be very susceptible to varying influences.  This attitude 
becomes particularly pronounced in the twentieth century with new mass 
communications and increasing concerns about the public’s susceptibility to influence 
and propaganda.  Lord Palmerston viewed public opinion similarly.  Palmerston's 
conception of public opinion included only the educated middle class whose interests 
his foreign policy were directed toward and whose opinion he could read and engage in 
newspapers, pamphlets, letters, and petitions. Palmerston did not ignore or belittle the 
support he received from the working class, but he also did not rate it as politically 
valuable (Brown 2001).  
61 The Union and Confederate representatives abroad did give some consideration to 
publics in other nations, but most of their attention remained focused on Britain and 
some in France.  The emphasis placed on British public opinion and British official 
policy is echoed by other US ministers serving abroad in other parts of Europe such as 
Russia, Belgium, Germany, Spain, and Italy (Brauer 1977; Crooks 1876; Clay to 
Lincoln, 25 Jul 1861: LoC: ALP: General Correspondence, Series I; Schurz 1913). 
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naval and economic resources were significant; posing a threat to the Union should 
such resources be made available to the Confederates.  In addition, British investors 
held $444 million invested in stocks and securities in the US (Foreman 2010).  
Though the Confederates were convinced that British dependence on Southern 
cotton would lead them to recognize them as an independent nation, British 
investments were also heavily tied to US railroads, telegraphs, and other industrial 
sectors based throughout the US, not just the South (Blumenthal 1966; Foreman 
2010; Herring 2008).   
The second reason for giving priority to British public opinion over 
European public opinion more generally was based on the instability and flux of 
European politics at the time of the Civil War.  With the collapse of the Concert of 
Europe following the Crimean War, the European powers were keen to maintain 
the balance which existed between them (Schroeder 1986).62  Therefore, when the 
Civil War began in the US, though France and Spain both had colonial and 
commercial interests at risk, they followed Britain’s lead in defining Europe’s policy 
toward the Civil War.63   
 “There were symptoms already of a disposition to get up agitation and 
to give to the discontent of the distressed operatives a political 
direction.”64   
British public opinion was not only valued by British and Union leaders, but 
also by the Confederacy.  By 1862, Adams, as well as other Union supporters, 
                                                     
62 In light of the previous conflicts between the powers in the eighteenth century, an 
understanding was reached among European powers which separated international 
politics from colonial, maritime, and commercial competition between European 
powers in the non-European world.  The other European powers accepted British 
control of the seas and as a colonial power due to the fact that neither position posed a 
threat to them and their interests (Schroeder 1986).   
63 Furthermore, looking at the political agendas and current positions of other European 
countries at the time of Civil War, Britain was really the only country that maintained 
a “free hand” to form an independent policy.  Napoleon III faced both domestic and 
foreign concerns after obtaining his position through a coup.  This coupled with his 
colonial aspirations in South America necessarily prohibited his ability to define an 
independent policy.  Between Spain’s recent upheavals domestically and within its own 
colonies, its primary concern was the US’s intentions toward Cuba and other 
Caribbean colonies.  Russia backed the Union not only as a counter to British 
hegemony, but also in response to the solidarity the US showed Russia during the 
Crimean War (Herring 2008; Kissinger1994; Schroeder 1986). 
64 Despatch No. 182, Adams to Seward 3 July 1862, M30, R76 
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became aware of the Confederates’ active attempt to sway public opinion in their 
favour (Baylen 1959; Despatch No. 182, M30, R76; Owsley 1961).  A former 
Swedish journalist, Henry Hotze, and a Liverpool merchant, James Spence, worked 
vigorously to generate support for the Confederacy using the British press, 
pamphlets, public meetings, and petitions (Campbell 2003; Foreman 2010).65  As 
Adams and other US citizens noted while living in England, “the distressed 
operatives” of the Confederacy were active in using the press and public opinion to 
their advantage.  Despite being warned in May 1861 by Reverend Dr. M’Clintock66 
and Cassius Clay67 to use the British press for the Union’s advantage and to correct 
the misunderstandings which existed among the public in England, Union leaders 
continued to focus on the immediate domestic issues confronting them (LoC: ALP; 
General Correspondence, Series I). 
As mentioned previously, the Union used engagement only sporadically 
throughout the Civil War.  Though the Union recognized the role of foreign public 
opinion in relation to the Civil War, Union leaders tended to value domestic opinion 
and policies over the importance of foreign public opinion and foreign relations.  
Secretary Seward did not see the need to engage with foreign publics while the US 
was fighting for its survival, as he wrote to the US ambassador to Spain.   
 
But, on the other hand, it is never to be forgotten that although the sympathy 
of other nations is eminently desirable, yet foreign sympathy or even foreign favour 
never did and never can create or maintain any state; while in every state that has 
the capacity to live, the love of national life is and always must be the most 
energetic principle which can be invoked to preserve it from suicidal 
indulgence of fear of faction as well as from destruction by foreign violence 
(Seward to Schurz 10 October 1861, in Schurz 1913, p. 192, emphasis 
added). 
                                                     
65 James Spence, a British merchant, authored a book, The American Union.  The book 
explained the causes for the war, countering Union arguments on the unlawfulness of 
the secession.  Spence argued England was a natural ally of the South.  The book was 
widely read in England (Bennett 2008). 
66 M’Clintock served as the reverend of the American Chapel in Paris, but became very 
active in England as well as France in countering misperceptions about the Union and 
the Civil War (Baylen 1959). 
67 Cassius Clay was an American Congressman who was selected by Seward and Lincoln to 
serve as the US minister to Russia.  On his way to Russia, he spent several months in 
England and France, attempting to garner public support for the Union and countering 
misinformation circulated by the British press and Confederate agents (LoC: ALP; 
General Correspondence, Series I). 
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Only when Britain or France threatened to intervene or recognize the Confederacy 
did Seward give foreign public opinion any consideration.  Part of Seward’s attitude 
toward foreign public opinion may also be due to his and other Union leaders’ 
perspective toward the war itself.  As explained earlier, the Union firmly believed 
the conflict to be nothing more than a rebellion, easily reconciled in a few months 
(M77, R77).   
This erratic approach to foreign public opinion is demonstrated repeatedly 
throughout the war when attempts were made to engage the British public, while 
pursuing policies which made the British unsympathetic to the Union or when events 
in America or Britain riled British public opinion.  Union war aims and policies as 
well as international events which touched both America and England tended to have 
an adverse impact on any engagement with the British public.  In particular, the 
Union’s ambiguous stance toward slavery, trade policies, and Secretary Seward’s 
antagonistic foreign policy all tended to detract British public support from the 
Union (Campbell 2003).  Added to this were various incidents which further 
alienated the British public from the Union.  First, there were public revelations of 
Union ongoing espionage operation in England in the fall of 1861,68 and shortly after, 
the Trent affair.69 
Looking at the Union efforts to engage the British public during the Civil 
War each can be summarized into three categories: official, private, and semi-official.  
These categories are defined by who initiated foreign public engagement.  In the 
                                                     
68 American Henry S. Sanford was appointed to serve as the US ambassador to Belgium; 
however, through much of the Civil War he remained in England and France.  In 
England, he established a network of spies to track the movements of Confederate 
agents and contractors.  He gained access the English mail and cable services to read 
Confederate messages sent to and from the Confederate government.  The network 
was discovered and its activities were made public in the British press in the fall of 
1861, just before the Trent crisis.  Ambassador Adams was unaware of Sanford’s 
activities until he read about them in the press.  According to correspondence between 
Secretary of State Seward and Sanford, Seward specifically tasked Sanford to collect 
intelligence on Confederate activities throughout Europe and provided secret funds for 
these activities (Adams to Seward 1 November 1861, M30, R73; LOC: ALP, Series 1, 
Sanford to Seward 4 July 1861). 
69 US naval Captain John Wilkes stopped a British mail ship, RMS Trent, and forcibly 
removed Confederate commissioners, James Mason and John Slidell, and their 
secretaries in November 1861, nearly causing Britain to declare war on the US. 
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official category, Secretary Seward and President Lincoln sent three men to England 
and France just before news of the Trent affair reached Britain in 1861 and then sent 
two more men to address the English public in 1863.  Then there were unofficial 
efforts to engage the British by private US citizens.  These efforts were more 
persistent throughout the war.  Finally, there was semi-official engagement to 
alleviate the suffering of those who were out of work due to the cotton famine.  
Though private citizens organized donations and arranged for goods to be shipped to 
England, Congress considered legislation to provide US naval escort for the ships, in 
addition there were connections between the Lincoln administration and those who 
travelled to England with the donated supplies to explain the Union’s reasons for 
fighting the Confederacy.  The development of semi-official or public-private 
partnerships for foreign public engagement initiatives is an important development.  
As future cases will illustrate, public-private foreign public engagement is integral to 
the development of American public diplomacy as a mechanism of statecraft. 
The following sections will touch on how the Union attempted to engage 
the British public throughout the Civil War and how these efforts were often undone 
by the Union’s own policies and rhetoric.  The focus will remain primarily on the 
more official engagement efforts, though some of the private engagement initiatives 
will be discussed as they coincide with Union foreign public engagement.    
“…I confess to a very strong ‘yearning’ that the English Government, its 
press, and its people, may be disabused of an impression…that our 
Government seeks occasions for disagreement…”70 
 In the late fall of 1861, a group of three men were sent to Europe to garner 
public support for the Union and explain the reasons for the war.  The men included 
Thurlow Weed,71 Bishop Charles McIlvaine,72 and Archbishop John Hughes.73  The 
                                                     
70 Thurlow Weed, “To the Editor of The Times,” The Times. 14 December 1861, p. 7, Issue 
24116 
71 Thurlow Weed was a nineteenth century campaign manager and political lobbyist for the 
Republican Party.  In the 1860 campaign, he campaigned for Seward to receive the 
presidential nomination.  Later he consulted with Lincoln regarding cabinet 
appointments.  Weed was a close friend and confidant of Seward’s (Stahr 2012; Weed 
1883; Weed 1884). 
72 Episcopalian Bishop of Ohio 
73 Irish-born Archbishop of New York 
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idea to send a special mission to Europe was likely precipitated by General Winfield 
Scott’s decision to retire in late October 1861.74  Upon resigning as commander of 
the Union armies, General Winfield Scott wrote to Seward to tell him he intended 
to travel to Europe for his health.  While in Europe, General Scott said he hoped to 
counter the influence of Confederate commissioners, John Slidell and James Mason 
(Stahr 2012).   
 The inevitable arrival of Slidell and Mason in Europe clearly caused 
President Lincoln and Seward concern as Secretary Seward wrote to Adams 
explaining why the delegation of Weed, Hughes, and McIlvaine was sent to Europe.  
Seward intimated concerns about the influence of the Confederate commissioners: 
 
When in November, we thought we had reason to apprehend new and very serious 
dangers in Europe, the subject was taken into consideration that the insurgents 
were represented abroad by a number of active, unscrupulous, and plausible men, who 
manifestly were acquiring influence in society, and in the press, and employing it with 
dangerous effect, and it was thought that such efforts could be profitably 
counteracted by the presence in London and Paris of some loyal, high-spirited, and 
intellectual men of social position and character.  We considered that the 
presence of such persons there, unless they should act with more discretion 
than we could confidently expect, would annoy and possibly embarrass our 
ministers abroad.  It was decided that hazard must be incurred in view of 
dangers which seemed so imminent.  All our individual sensibilities must 
give way in time of public peril.  The persons selected were thought to be 
among the most prudent and considerate in the country.  When all our agents 
and friends abroad, consular as well as diplomatic, official and unofficial persons, 
united in warning us of a serious danger…(No. 201 Seward to Adams, 7 March 
1862, M77, R77, emphasis added). 
 
Seward also raised concerns about the dangers of sending the delegation, a concern 
that was not only voiced among Lincoln’s cabinet, but also those people initially 
selected: Edward Everett and Archbishop Hughes, as well as Weed were concerned 
about the appropriateness of the mission (Weed 1883). 
                                                     
74 There are varying accounts providing various reasons for the mission.  Thurlow Weed’s 
memoirs suggest the idea was only discussed between Secretary Seward and President 
Lincoln (Weed 1883; Weed 1884).  Bishop McIlvaine wrote in his diary that it was 
President Lincoln, Secretary Seward, and Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase 
who arranged the mission to Europe (Carus 1888).  Edward Bates makes no mention 
of the mission in his notes about cabinet meetings held through the fall of the 1861 
(Beale 1933).  Salmon P. Chase does not mention the mission in either his 
correspondence or diaries (Donald 1954; Niven, et al. 1996) 
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When Weed and his fellow delegates arrived in France, the news of the 
Trent affair just reached Europe.  The mission changed from an engagement initiative 
into crisis control.  Upon arriving in England, Weed and the other delegates saw for 
themselves what had been reported by Adams, Cassius Clay, and others that British 
public opinion was opposed to the Union in most respects.  
  
But much of the abuse of the Press here might have been prevented if our 
Government had looked to it.  I am already in communication with 
prominent men, some connected with the Government and some with the 
Press, to have changed the whole tone of popular sentiment.  But to do this 
able writers, here…must be paid. The Secessionists understood this – have 
paid what was necessary, and we are suffering the consequences.  I am 
working as hard as I can, on my own hook, tho’ distinguished People here 
believe, and trust me, as in some way connected with the Government 
(Weed to Seward, 11 December 1861, LoC: ALP; General Correspondence, 
Series 1).75 
 
In late November 1861, Weed, Hughes, McIlvaine, Reverend Dr. John 
M’Clintock, 76  US consul John Bigelow, US Minister to Paris William Dayton, 
General Winfield Scott, and US Minister to Belgium Henry Sanford met at the café 
in the Palais Royale for a “council of war” to devise how to handle the Trent crisis as 
well as explaining the Union’s views about the war (Baylen 1959; Weed 1884).  The 
men determined that Thurlow Weed and Bishop McIlvaine should travel to England 
with a public letter outlined and signed by General Scott, but written by Bigelow.  
Archbishop John Hughes would remain in Paris and meet with the French emperor.   
                                                     
75 No archival evidence was found to suggest that Weed ever paid journalists to write 
stories favouring the Union.  Henry Sanford did pay French journalists to write 
favourable stories for the Union, but this did not last long.  Once Sanford’s espionage 
activities were revealed in England in the British papers, Seward ordered Sanford to 
take up his post in Belgium.  Sanford no longer had the funds to either run spies nor to 
pay journalists (Owsley 1961). 
76 M’Clintock had already been very active in England, giving public addresses, publishing 
pamphlets, and attending public meetings, to explain the North’s views about the 
ongoing war in America.   M’Clintock realized the seriousness of the situation in the 
US and decided that though he was not officially empowered, he would do his best to 
represent his country as a private citizen (Crooks 1876).  Since his arrival in France, he 
had made many contacts in England who remained sympathetic to the Union and were 
willing to help.   
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Before Weed left for England, M’Clintock wrote a letter of introduction to 
Reverend William Arthur.77   With this letter, Weed was immediately introduced to 
several members of Parliament and editors of the London press (Weed 1883; Weed 
1884).  Weed ensured General Scott’s letter to the British public was published and 
began writing responses to pro-Confederate editorials in the London press such as 
one article written by a Confederate Lieutenant, Mathew Maury.  Maury wrote an 
article in the Athenæum accusing Federal Union troops of looting and destroying 
civilian property.  Weed declared that “the Federal army, wherever it goes, spares 
towns and respects household property. Not so with the rebel army. In retreating 
from Gosport, Harper's Ferry and Hampton, they kindled incendiary fires, leaving 
the old, infirm and poor homeless and destitute” (“Thurlow Weed in Reply to Liet. 
Maury,” The Globe, reprinted in The New York Times, 21 January 1862).  He also 
countered Maury’s accusation that the Union mistreats prisoners.  “Our treatment of 
prisoners, and our respect for non-combatants, is a distinguishing feature in our 
favor. Indeed, it has been hard for our Northern troops to engage in this war ‘with a 
will.’ While our enemies lie in ambush to shoot sentinels, and in battle aim 
systematically at officers, we have failed to retaliate in either respect” (“Thurlow 
Weed in Reply to Lieut. Maury,” The Globe, reprinted in The New York Times, 21 
January 1862).  Weed accused Maury of “impugning history” to garner English 
sympathy.  However, Weed’s reply backfired.  He compared the conduct of Federal 
forces with that of British forces in the War of 1812, where he claims the British 
burned Alexandria, Havre de Grace, Frenchtown, and Buffalo.  In a letter to the 
editor, signed “One Who Was Present,” explains why the British burned the towns.  
He claimed the inhabitants of the town refused to surrender weapons stores and 
some instances used the weapons against British troops.  Burning the weapons stores 
in the towns was done to protect British soldiers. (“An Answer for Mr. Thurlow 
Weed,” The Standard, 3 January 1862, p. 5, Issue 11669).   
Another article featured in The Standard further undermined Weed’s 
attempts to explain the causes for the Civil War, by assailing the Union’s position on 
slavery.  The article accuses Weed of glossing over key facts, such as when he admits 
that all states were originally slave-owning, “but he omits to say under the 
                                                     
77 Reverend William Arthur maintained personal contact with Lord Palmerston and other 
ranking members of the British government (Baylen 1959; Crooks 1897). 
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constitution of the United States property is recognised in slaves…Mr. Weed also 
omits to say that upon each state joining the Federal government…it pledges itself to 
return all slaves that should escape…” (“Mr. Thurlow Weed on the American 
Question,” The Standard, 10 February 1862, p. 6 Issue 11700).  The writer, 
pseudonym Fair Play, argued that the Fugitive Slave Law was not a compromise, but 
a police agreement to enforce what was already in the Constitution.  Unfortunately 
for Weed, the article demonstrated that either Weed did not have a full 
understanding of the facts and dates, or that he deliberately omitted facts to make the 
case for the Union.   
Bishop McIlvaine was perhaps more successful in his efforts to reach the 
British public.  McIlvaine restricted most of his engagement to personal, face-to-face 
engagement.  He travelled around England as a guest preacher and was often invited 
or asked to speak on the Civil War.  Former Liberal MP, Arthur Kinnaird and his 
wife, hosted the Bishop and Thurlow Weed “to give information on the present war 
in the United States…Mr. Kinnaird explained, that his object in calling his friends 
together was to aid in removing the misapprehensions which prevailed in the 
unhappy conflict now raging in America” (“The Causes and Probable Results of the 
American Civil War,” The Lady’s Newspaper, 8 February 1862, p. 87, Issue 789).  
Bishop McIlvaine denied “the assumption…that there was an inherent and 
irreconcilable incompatibility of union and association between the people of the 
North and South respectively.  The close intercommunication in all matters – 
educational, ecclesiastical, and social – which prevailed between the two parts of the 
country, prior to the disruption, entirely negatived [sic] the allegation” (“The Causes 
and Probable Results of the American Civil War,” The Lady’s Newspaper, 8 February 
1862, p. 87, Issue 789).  Thurlow Weed provided information on the US 
government as well as explaining the policies of the Whig and Republican Parties.   
McIlvaine also wrote articles for the British press.  In one article he wrote to 
correct the misprinting of President Lincoln’s annual message to Congress.  He 
observed that the way the message was printed in “certain London journals…seemed 
so at variance with my reading of the message, that I [McIlvaine] was lead to compare 
the extract which one journal gave as ‘the text’ on which its censure was based, with 
the true text as given in American papers.  McIlvaine found in one British journal 
“important clauses were omitted (not to speak of changes in punctuation) which did 
great injustice to the President’s true meaning”  (“The American President on 
- 75 - 
 
Foreign Relations,” The Morning Post, 31 December 1861, p. 2, Issue 27468).78  
According to McIlvaine, an English paper quoted the President’s message as:  
 
“The insurgents have seemed to assume that foreign nations in this case 
(discarding all moral, social and treaty obligations) would act solely and 
selfishly for the most speedy restoration of commerce…” 
 
And McIlvaine corrects the passage in the President’s message to read: 
 
If it were just to suppose, as the insurgents seemed to assume, that foreign 
nations in this case discarding all moral, social, and treaty obligations, would 
act solely and selfishly, for the most speedy restoration of commerce… 
 
The first passage, as printed, suggests that President Lincoln did believe that 
Europe’s motives for intervening in the Civil War were guided by commercial 
desires, rather than higher motives.  If President Lincoln’s message was in fact 
misprinted as McIlvaine claims, the statement would have only engendered further 
animosity among the British toward the Union.  McIlvaine sought to counter the 
potential impact of such a misstatement. 
In looking at the Weed mission, there are several issues which make the 
success of the mission questionable, despite the claims made by both Adams and 
Bishop McIlvaine.79  The first issue being the arrival of the delegates just as the Trent 
affair news came to Europe.  The Trent crisis altered the mission perceptibly from an 
engagement mission to interact with the British public to a crisis control operation.  
The next couple of months, Weed and the other delegates spent much of their time 
meeting with British leaders assuring them the US did not intend to start a war with 
England, as Weed wrote in an editorial to The Times: 
 
                                                     
78 No newsprint examined in this study carried the misprinted version of President 
Lincoln’s message.  Even papers which tended to favour the South, such The Times and 
The Liverpool Mercury, both had accurate prints of the President’s message. 
79 Adams wrote to Seward in Despatch No. 95 on 27 December 1861, “I am happy to say 
that I have seen and conferred repeatedly both with Bishop McIlvaine and Mr. Weed.  I 
think their services have already been of material use, and that they will be of still more 
hereafter, if peaceful relations should be preserved” (M30, R73).  Later, Bishop 
McIlvaine also wrote to Seward, reporting “[w]hatever the cause, every body [sic] sees 
the change in public opinion, or expression of it, recently…” (21 February 1862, LoC: 
ALP; General Correspondence, Series 1). 
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…I confess to a very strong “yearning” that the English Government, its 
press, and its people, may be disabused of an impression which has so 
generally obtained, that our Government seeks occasions for disagreement, 
or cherishes other than such feelings as belong to the relations of interest and 
amity that blend and bind us together…I quite concur…in the opinion that 
these rebel emissaries are not worth a war, and, individually, would not 
hesitate to make large concessions, in feeling, for peace (Thurlow Weed, 
“To the Editor of the Times,” 14 December 1861, The Times, p. 7, Issue 
24116). 
 
More consideration was given to the Union’s perspective towards the questions 
raised by the Trent affair, than other concerns such as the Union’s stance toward 
slavery or dispelling the idea that the Union pursued the war merely for self-
aggrandizement.   
In these efforts to defend Captain Wilkes actions against the Trent, the 
unofficial Union representatives often did more harm than good in explaining why 
the US public cheered Captain Wilkes’s actions.  For example, General Scott’s 
public letter attempts to argue legal precedence justifying Wilkes’s action 
 
Her [Britain’s] statesmen will not question the legal right of an American 
vessel of war to search any commercial vessel justly suspected of 
transporting contraband of war.  It was even guaranteed to her by the Treaty 
of Paris; and British guns frowning down upon nearly every strait and inland 
sea upon the globe are conclusive evidence that she regards this right as one 
the efficacy of which may be not yet entirely exhausted.  Of course there is 
much that is irritating and vexation in the exercise of this right under the 
most favourable circumstances, and it is to be hoped the day is not far distant 
when the maritime States of the world will agree in placing neutral 
commerce beyond the reach of such vexations.  The United States 
Government has been striving to this end for more than fifty years (Winfield 
Scott, in The Morning Chronicle, 5 December 1861). 
 
Here General Scott points out that the British searched neutral ships and confiscated 
items or whole ships in the past, and goes on to suggest that in light of the British 
outrage at the Trent imbroglio, perhaps the British government will consider 
adopting the United States’ long-held foreign policy objective of neutral rights on the 
seas.  Not only does this sound patronizing, it also does nothing to engage the public 
on the issues facing both nations in relation to the Civil War.  For those who had 
resided in Britain since the onset of the Civil War, the British public’s antipathy 
toward the Union went beyond their irritation over the Trent (Campbell 2003).  
Thus, begging the question of whether the Weed mission could have more 
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adequately addressed British concerns about the war if either Captain Wilkes had not 
stopped the Trent or if the Union had done more earlier in the war to address the 
British public as urged by M’Clintock, Cassius Clay, and Charles Adams. 
 Another concern raised by the Weed mission is how the Union’s use of 
“traditional” diplomacy (state-to-state) to guard against foreign intervention actually 
undermined the Union’s relations with Britain.  With the secession and the Queen’s 
Neutrality Proclamation, Seward used threats to ensure no European nation would 
consider recognizing the Confederacy.  Some historians argued Seward used 
belligerent rhetoric as a deterrence mechanism, hoping that no European nation 
would want to go to war with the US on behalf of the Confederacy (Herring 2008; 
Stahr 2012).  Unfortunately, the tactic only made the British believe Seward wanted 
to start a war with Europe as a means of reuniting the Union (Foreman 2010; “Mr. 
Seward,” 3 December 1861, Daily News, Issue 4856).  With the Trent crisis, the 
British tended to believe Seward wanted to provoke a war with England as part of his 
own war strategy.  After being in England for a few weeks, Weed was alerted to 
“[the] great cause of insecurity is that neither this Government or People [British] are 
our Friends. The Morrill Tariff and the belief that you [Seward] are unfriendly to 
England prepared the Country [Britain] to go first, for Secession, and next for War” 
(Thurlow Weed to Seward, 4 December 1861, LoC: ALP, Series 1).  Seward could 
have created an alternative policy to fend off the threat of foreign intervention in the 
Civil War.  However, in order to devise a policy, taking into account the peculiar 
position of the Palmerston ministry and British sentiments, would have required the 
US government to incorporate information provided by Ambassador Adams, Henry 
Adams, Cassius Clay, and John M’Clintock regarding public opinion in Britain.  The 
reports on public opinion were largely ignored by Secretary Seward; he paid more 
attention to the British government’s actions and intentions, in spite of repeated 
warnings.   Only eight months after assuming responsibility for US diplomacy and 
foreign policy did Lincoln or Seward attempt to approach relations with Britain 
differently by sending unofficial representatives to engage the public. 
Notably absent from all the planning and efforts of Weed and his cohorts, is 
US minister Charles Adams.  Interestingly, Seward did not forewarn Adams about 
the special delegation before Weed arrived at the legation in late November, nor was 
he forthcoming with any information regarding the Administration’s response to the 
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Trent affair, based on surviving official State Department records.80  Weed arrived at 
the US legation in London in December 1861 and provided Adams with a letter 
Seward wrote to introduce him and explain his mission. 
Dear Sir, 
It is deemed important to the public interest that citizens of well-
known high standing should visit Europe for the purpose of assisting to 
counteract the machinations of the agents of treason against the United 
States in that quarter. 
This opinion having become known to Thurlow Weed, Esq., of 
Albany, N.Y., the bearer of this communication, he has kindly offered his 
services, which, as he has the full confidence of both the President and 
myself, have been promptly and cheerfully accepted.  It is not intended that he 
shall take part in or interfere with your official proceedings.  His unofficial character, 
however, as well as his great knowledge and experience in public affairs may 
enable him to be of usefulness to us in a way and to a degree which we could 
not reasonably expect from you… 
I am sir,  
  Your obedient servant, William H. Seward (Weed 1884, p. 351, emphasis 
added). 
 
Seward did not provide Adams with additional information about Weed’s mission 
until March 7th, more than four months after Weed arrived.  There were clearly 
concerns about the appropriateness of the mission and it is possible that Seward 
avoided mentioning anything to Adams to give him distance from any controversy 
should one arise.  None of those who expressed concerns specified what objections 
Congress or the US public might have against such a mission.81  If Seward and others 
in Lincoln’s cabinet were not concerned about the constitutionality of the mission, 
perhaps it was the nature of the mission itself: to counter the influence of the 
Confederates.  The irony is that the British press was aware of Weed’s arrival “…in 
                                                     
80 Adams despatches (No. 84 – 99) indicate he was left in the dark regarding the 
government’s position.  He discovered the US answer to the British regarding the 
release of Slidell and Mason in the British press and not from Seward: “Though not yet 
favored with any information from the Department respecting the course of the 
proceedings between the two Governments in regard to the case of the Trent, at 
Washington, I am bound to believe from what I see in the newspapers that the 
difference has been settled by the release of the captives” (No. 99, 10 January 1862, 
M30, R73). 
81 The precedent for sending special agents by a President was established in George 
Washington’s presidency and used regularly by successors (Waters 1956; Waters 
1960).   
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pursuance of the resolution…to send unofficial ambassadors or representatives to 
England and France to counteract the effects of Mr. Mason and Mr. Slidell’s mission 
and to make explanations…as well as to sound the depths of public feeling, and ascertain the 
views of leading men in the political world” (The Times, 26 November 1861, p. 9, 
emphasis added).   
 At the end of Weed’s mission, Adams did offer his assessment of the 
initiative, raising other significant issues regarding the use of foreign public 
engagement and its relationship to traditional diplomatic practices.  Adams 
seemingly admits his scepticism toward using unofficial representatives to counter 
the Confederates influence, and goes on to make other suggestions.  
 
Neither has it been in the least in my disposition to call into question the 
policy adopted by the Government…of sending out some loyal, high 
spirited and intellectual men of social position and character, to counteract 
the supposed influence acquired in London and Paris, of the intriguing 
emissaries of the Confederates.  On the contrary though placing a much 
lower estimate than many did of the degree of influence attained by these 
persons, it was with great pleasure that I heard of the intention of the 
Government to counteract it and that I welcomed the gentlemen who 
actually came to London on that errand…I have borne free testimony to 
their effective service whilst here…At the same time that I gladly express 
these views, it is due to my sense of the public interest to add that my remark 
is confined to persons who come in their apparently private position.  There is a 
difficulty in regard to employing recognized official representatives to other 
Governments in the same way which will not fail to be injuriously felt 
whenever the experiment is attempted.  They necessarily occupy a false 
position in the face of the regularly accredited agent, or they force him into 
one.  They must be wholly admitted into his confidence in which case they 
can not [sic] fail to take his responsibility out of his hands; or they must be 
kept out of it when there is perpetual danger of running into contradictions 
which neutralize the influence of both.  Added to which, the inference of 
strangers is almost unavoidable that the Government sends a second person 
because it fears the ability of the first one to be equal to his work…I would 
respectfully submit to your judgment the expediency of keeping perfectly 
distinct the responsibility of the respective Diplomatic Agents (No. 136, 
Adams to Seward, M30, R75; emphasis added). 
 
This issue of who should initiate foreign public engagement and the relationship of 
such engagement with politics is one that becomes more and more complex with 
each of the succeeding cases.  As future cases will demonstrate, private-public 
cooperation for foreign public engagement initiatives becomes a dominant feature. 
Adams observations regarding how “private” people who are sent as unofficial 
representatives can potentially cause serious problems if they contradict the policy of 
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the official representative or are seen in the public and government’s eyes as being 
more representative of the US government’s position.   
Looking ahead to the fall of 1862, as Lincoln considered his plans for an 
emancipation order, other unofficial delegates were sent back to England.  This time 
Edward Everett 82  agreed to go to England unofficially.  The correspondence 
between Lincoln and Everett suggests Adams’s suggestions were incorporated in 
subsequent engagement missions: 
 
22 September 1862 
My dear Sir, 
Mr. Blair urged me to seek an opportunity of conversing with you, on a 
subject he has mentioned to you.  I should be greatly obliged to you, if you 
would be pleased to name a time, when you will allow me to wait upon you 
for that purpose… 
Edward Everett 
 
September 24, 1862 
Whom it may concern 
Hon. Edward Everett goes to Europe shortly.  His reputation & the present 
condition of our Country are such, that his visit is sure to attract notice and 
may be misconstrued.  I therefore think fit to say, that he bears no mission 
from this government, and yet no gentleman is better able to correct 
misunderstandings in the minds of foreigners, in regard to American affairs… 
Abraham Lincoln (LoC: ALP; General Correspondence, Series 1). 
 
In addition to Edward Everett, a minister, Julian Sturtevant, was also sent to England 
to engage the public, as well as, Charles W. Denison, a former chaplain (LoC: ALP; 
General Correspondence, Series 1).  These efforts to engage the British and other 
parts of Europe tended to rely on advocacy as a method of engagement.  Union 
representatives engaged the British public through the press, writing editorials and 
responding to Confederate misinformation; using pamphlets; attending public 
meetings; and giving speeches.  The intent of the engagement efforts was to explain 
the reasons for the war, from the Union’s point of view, and to garner sympathy 
                                                     
82 Former Secretary of State 
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from the British public.  Despite these efforts, the Union’s slavery policy tended to 
undermine any show of sympathy or friendship from the British public. 
“…proving that the American struggle is after all the ever recurring one 
in human affairs between right and wrong, between labor and capital, 
between liberty and absolutism.”83  
 Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of the Union’s policies in the eyes of the 
British public and the government was the vacillation on the slavery question.  
Despite receiving repeated encouragement from US representatives abroad to make 
the war about slavery,84  both Lincoln and Seward's unwillingness to attack the 
institution of slavery and announce it as the Union’s cause for war undermined the 
Union's moral superiority and denied the US the opportunity to exploit antislavery 
sympathies of the European public.   
However, Lincoln and Seward had legitimate reasons to deny slavery as the 
main cause of the war.  “Every demonstration against slavery puts our assured 
positions in Maryland Kentucky Missouri and Virginia at hazard, and tends to 
combine the revolting states in mass” (No. 163 Seward to Adams, 11 Jan 1862, M77, 
R77).  On the one hand, Union leaders were concerned about losing the Border 
States to the Confederacy, as Seward explained to Adams, which they deemed to be 
catastrophic to the Union’s cause.  On the other hand, they were also concerned that 
Northerners would be unwilling to fight a war to end slavery.  At issue was how 
much foreign relations should influence or guide domestic policy.  The Civil War 
                                                     
83 Adams to Seward, 27 December 1861, M30, R73 
84 Charles Schurz, US ambassador to Spain, wrote to Secretary Seward imploring the 
government to make the war about slavery.  He argued “… public opinion will be so 
strongly, so overwhelmingly in our favour…Our enemies know that well, and we may 
learn from them.  While their agents carefully conceal from the eyes of Europeans 
their only weak point, their attachment to slavery, ought we, to aid them in hiding 
with equal care our only strong point, our opposition to slavery?  While they, well 
knowing how repugnant slavery is to the European way of feeling, do all to make 
Europeans forget that they fight for it, ought we, who are equally well acquainted with 
European sentiment, abstain from making Europeans remember that we fight against it?  
In not availing ourselves of our advantages, we relieve the enemy of the odium attached 
to his cause.  It is, therefore, my opinion that every step done by the Government 
towards the abolition of slavery is, as to our standing in Europe, equal to a victory in 
the field.  I do not know how this advice may agree with the home-policy of the 
Government.  But however bold it may seem, I am so sincerely convinced of its 
correctness, as far as our foreign policy is concerned…”(Carl Schurz to Seward, in 
Schurz 1913, pp. 190 – 191). 
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provides an extreme example of this problem; a problem often debated by political 
leaders even today.  There were some critics of the Lincoln administration, including 
British people, who believed if the Union declared the war to bring about the end of 
the slavery in America, the war would have concluded much sooner (Schurz 1913; 
Weed 1883; Weed 1884).  Much of these assessments at the time of the war were 
likely influenced by the view of situation from abroad versus in the US as well as 
political predispositions.85  From Seward and Lincoln’s perspective, maintaining the 
Border States and troop levels was a matter of national survival. 
Once the Border States were sufficiently secured in the summer of 1862, 
Lincoln began to consider issuing a military order to free slaves in the Confederate 
states (No. 303, Seward to Adams, 18 July 1862, M77, R77; Stahr 2012).  
Interestingly, Seward asked Lincoln to wait before publically announcing anything 
about emancipation.  First, Seward believed Lincoln should wait for a decisive Union 
victory to announce emancipation (Herring 2008; Stahr 2012).86  After the battle at 
Antietam87 in September 1862, Lincoln wanted to go through with emancipation, 
but Seward delayed again out of the expressed concern that emancipation would 
cause Europe to declare war on the US because slavery would mean the end of the 
cotton supply (Brauer 1977; No. 303, M77, R77; Stahr 2012).  In light of the many 
letters and despatches from private citizens and US representatives who strongly 
encouraged the Union abolish slavery, Seward’s explanation for delay is surprising.  
Especially since, just six months prior to the discussion of emancipation, Adams 
wrote to Seward explaining how the real reasons for the war were becoming more 
apparent to the British public. 
 
The progress of affairs in America is daily more and more exposing its real 
character.  Much as the commercial and manufacturing interests may be 
disposed to view the [Morrill] tariff as the source of all our ills, and as much 
as the aristocratic classes may endeavour to make democracy responsible for 
                                                     
85 Many of the US representatives overseas were avowed abolitionists, including Carl 
Schurz and Cassius Clay. 
86 Seward thought that emancipation might look like a desperate act to the world, an 
attempt to initiate slave riots in the South to keep the Confederates from fighting 
(Brauer 1977; Campbell 2003; Foreman 2010).   
87 Though not a decisive victory for either side, the battle was a strategic victory for the 
Union, forcing General Lee to forgo any invasion of the North. 
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them, the inexorable logic of events is contradicting each and every assertion 
based on these notions, and proving that the American struggle is after all 
the ever recurring one in human affairs between right and wrong, between 
labor and capital, between liberty and absolutism.  When such an issue 
comes to be presented to the people of Great Britain, stripped of all the 
disguises which have been thrown over it, it is not difficult to predict at least 
which side it will not consent to take (No. 95, Adams to Seward, 27 
December 1861, M30, R73). 
 
To which Seward hastily replied that demonstrations against slavery endangered the 
Union’s war objectives (No. 163, 11 January 1862, M77, R77).  Apparently, 
Adams’s declaration that Britain would not stand against the Union if the nation 
ended slavery, was forgotten by Seward when Lincoln brought up emancipation in 
July of 1862.  He wrote to various ministers in Europe, casually asking what reaction 
might be expected, all of the ministers he contacted responded similarly: public and 
official opinion would wholeheartedly support emancipation (Brauer 1977). 
 Although, when the Emancipation Proclamation became public in 
September of 1862, reactions in England were mixed.  As Seward initially predicted, 
some believed the proclamation to be a desperate military tactic and was not brought 
about by any moral conviction.  Furthermore the British public was confused as to 
why the Proclamation only extended to the Confederate states and did not include 
the Border States as well as why the Proclamation would not go into effect until 
January 1, 1863.  This lack of understanding reflected the limited impact of the 
Weed mission, and the subsequent attempts by the Union to explain war aims.  The 
Union’s use of foreign public engagement also demonstrates the disconnect between 
engagement initiatives and policymaking.  Though many of the official and unofficial 
representatives of the Union did listen to the British public, providing detailed 
reports depicting the varying viewpoints of both the government and different 
segments of British society, these reports were often overlooked by Seward or 
elicited a fiery response from the Secretary of State.  President Lincoln was more 
concerned by the reports; concerned enough to send Thurlow Weed and others to 
“correct misunderstandings in the minds of foreigners.”  But correcting foreign 
public opinions and connecting such initiatives to national policies had not developed 
and would remain elusive in the future as well. 
The impact of the Emancipation Proclamation on British public opinion 
would not be apparent until the end of 1862 through the beginning of 1863, when 
Adams became inundated with requests to attend public meetings in support of the 
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proclamation as well as resolutions and letters of support addressed to President 
Lincoln (M30, R77 & R78).  These expressions of sympathy and friendship were 
passed onto to the State Department and eventually President Lincoln.  Adams 
requested an approved official response to distribute as needed; however, Lincoln 
responded to some personally, including the Workingmen of Manchester and the 
Workingmen of London, which was printed in The Leeds Mercury, 14 February 1863 
(M30, R77; LoC: ALP, General Correspondence, Series 1). 
Though there are historians who question the actual impact of the 
Emancipation Proclamation on British public opinion (Campbell 2003; Hernon 
1967), the importance of the Proclamation is that it shifted the reason for the war 
from national survival to a moral reason, thus making intervention in the conflict 
nearly untenable to European leaders, especially the Palmerston ministry.  The 
strong anti-slavery sentiment among the British public as well as members of the 
cabinet made it difficult for the government to intervene.  At the very least, the 
Proclamation quieted demands for intervention till the fall of 1863. 
“…the idea occurred to him [Cobden] that some manifestation should 
be made by the government…its consciousness of the nature of this 
distress among the foreign nations, and of its desire to aid in relieving 
it.”88   
 After adverting war with Britain at the end of 1861, the next major concern 
for diplomatic relations between Britain and the United States was the so-called 
“cotton famine.”  In Lancashire, England, some 400,000 textile workers were left 
without work due the Union's blockade against Southern cotton exports.89  At the 
beginning of the year, members of Parliament and Palmerston’s ministry grew 
concerned by the number of textile mills either shut down or operating only part 
time.  Liberal MP, Richard Cobden, voiced his serious concerns to Adams about 
what the British government or other European governments, such as France, might 
do if large swaths of their populations continued unemployed (No. 182, 3 July 1862, 
M30, R76).  He suggested that the US government acknowledge the suffering 
                                                     
88 No. 182, Adams to Seward, 3 July 1862 , M30, R76 
89 British leaders and the press often cited the Union blockade as the cause of the cotton 
famine; however, the Confederate government issued orders to burn cotton 
throughout the war as part of their King Cotton diplomatic strategy (Blumenthal 1966). 
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endured by the textile workers and to provide “some rather careful friendly 
exposition of the whole question as bearing upon the policy of other countries might 
be of use to check the direction of popular opinion against us in Europe” (No. 182, 3 
July 1862, M30, R76). 
 Seward’s response to the suggestion that the US government express 
sympathy for the textile workers was indignant and accusing.  He refers back to the 
Queen’s Neutrality Proclamation, granting belligerency rights to the Confederacy, 
and necessarily prolonging the rebellion. 
 
All our efforts are measurably counteracted by the attitude of those 
governments who recognize our internal enemy as a lawful public 
belligerent, and thereby are understood as encouraging it to hope for 
recognition and intervention...And still more are they counteracted by the 
now conceded political sympathies of European masses and classes, who 
improve the civil war in this country and the distresses it works to the 
manufacturing and commercial interests of their own country to raise 
against us there a prejudice which has the moral effect of sustaining and 
prolonging that civil war (No. 303, 18 July 1862, M77, R77).    
 
In Seward’s eyes, the policies of the US government were not the reason for the 
distress of British textile workers; but rather the British government’s policies.  He 
even blamed the European public’s lack of sympathy toward the Union’s plight for 
undermining US policy.  Though Cobden’s observations and advice were considered 
“with much interest” by President Lincoln, there was no immediate action taken by 
the US government to acknowledge the impact of the blockade on British textile 
workers. 
 On the other hand, when private US citizens heard of the British textile 
workers’ situation in the American press, they began to organize a relief operation in 
mid-November of 1862.  On November 28, 1862, the New York Chamber of 
Commerce circulated an invitation to the merchants of New York to attend a 
meeting on December 1st to discuss what could be done to assist the textile workers 
in England (American International Relief Committee 1864).  A series of resolutions 
were passed at the meeting whereby a committee was formed, the International 
Relief Committee, to organize the collection of food and money to send to England.  
Shipping magnates, Nathaniel and George Griswold, agreed to donate a ship to carry 
the collected supplies to England.  The members of the committee and those 
donating goods or services contacted merchants in Manchester and Liverpool, asking 
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them to help supervise the distribution of supplies.  By January 9, 1863 the George 
Griswold was ready to depart for England, arriving on January 14, 1863 (American 
International Relief Committee 1864).  The very same Liverpool Chamber of 
Commerce which awaited Adams arrival in 1861, now eagerly thanked the captain of 
the George Griswold and the American people “…to convey to the donors its sense of 
the liberal and friendly spirit in which your merchants and agriculturalists have united 
to send forward to our distressed cotton operatives, so acceptable a message of 
good-will and sympathy” (American International Relief Committee 1864, p. 40). 
 What makes this an example of foreign public engagement are the methods 
of engagement which are used in order to engage with the British public in multiple 
strata of society: textile workers, merchants and the middle class, and the British 
aristocracy and governing officials.  First, the American public listened to the fact that 
their own government’s war policies were having an adverse effect on the citizens of 
Britain, damaging the good feelings of the public there toward the US (Weed 1884).  
Second, the American representatives traveling with the supplies advocated the 
Union’s causes for fighting the Confederacy and the need for the blockade.  There 
was also some two-way exchange, where British textile workers expressed gratitude 
and desire to emigrate; and British merchants expressed their attitude toward the 
ongoing war:  
 
…[It] is well known, great differences of opinion prevail as to the causes and 
objects of the contest now unhappily raging among you, it would be 
evidently unbecoming in us to put forward any statement that would create 
dissension and mar the general harmony of the occasion; but we think we 
are warranted in saying, that men of all shades of opinion would rejoice to 
see this war terminated in any way that would not be inconsistent with your 
honor as a people, and with the great and responsible position which you 
occupy among the nations (Address of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce to the 
Commander of the “George Griswold,” American International Relief Committee 
1864, p. 41).  
 
Even more importantly in terms of the overall study of the development of 
American public diplomacy, is how humanitarian aid was used to build relations with 
the British public as well as the Union’s involvement with the private operation to 
help cotton textile workers.  As future cases in this study will explore, a trend 
developed in the second half of the nineteenth century where private entities and the 
government increasingly worked together in their efforts to engage foreign publics.  
In this particular instance, the government considered providing a US naval escort 
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for the George Griswold (US House Journal. 37th Congress, 3rd Sess. 15 Dec.; US Senate 
Journal. 37th Congress, 3rd Sess. 15 Dec).90   
 
Some members thought that perhaps by inaugurating this movement, some 
national vanity and enmity to England might be attributed to the Chamber.  The 
majority of the speakers deprecated conducting the movement in a way to 
obtain favour with one class in England, but urged that it should be based 
exclusively on the grounds of Christian charity.  England was a great 
customer of America for grain, and it was a plain case that it was America’s 
duty to feed a brother nation in distress (“Reuter’s Telegrams,” The Times, 
16 December 1862, p. 8).  
 
Congress’s reluctance to provide assistance out of concern that it might be looked 
upon as a ploy by the government to curry favour with working class is significant in 
light of later debates regarding the role of public diplomacy and whether public 
diplomacy should be used to achieve foreign policy objectives.  The Congress desired 
the act of providing relief to be untainted by government, and so both resolutions in 
the House and Senate went no further.  However, there is a curious letter sent by 
the chaplain of the George Griswold to Abraham Lincoln, almost a month after arriving 
in Liverpool.  The letter reports on the results of the humanitarian operation. 
 
February 11, 1863 
Sir; 
I have the honor to inform you that this ship of mercy for the suffering 
operatives of England, Scotland and Ireland, has been received at Liverpool 
with many demonstrations of public favor. – 
The Mayor, the Chamber of Commerce, the newspapers, the citizens of 
Lancashire, of Manchester, Kent, and other parts of England have vied with 
each other in recognizing and doing honor to this act of kindness in America. 
–  
As you are aware of my humble share in the mission of the George Griswold, 
I avail myself of the opportunity to state that I shall being at once my labors 
among the labouring classes, especially those of the Baptist denomination, 
with a view to laying before them the facts of our great struggle for 
constitutional government and the rights of mankind… 
Chas. W. Denison (LoC: ALP, General Correspondence, Series 1). 
 
                                                     
90 At this point in the war, the CSA Alabama, which was built by Liverpool shipbuilders, was 
sinking and capturing Union merchant ships.   
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The last part of the letter would seem to indicate Denison was another special 
representative sent by Lincoln or Seward to engage with the British public.   
“The secessionists have colored a glass for England – and all England 
looks through it.  Some body [sic] should break the glass!”91   
Though this case is not a shining example of American foreign public 
engagement,  the case does demonstrate US leaders’ awareness about the need to 
engage foreign publics as a part of statecraft as well as raising questions about foreign 
public engagement’s role in statecraft.  These questions include how much 
consideration foreign public opinion should be given and should influence national 
policies; whether foreign public engagement should be used to attain national policy 
objectives; who should be responsible for foreign public engagement; and the 
appropriateness of foreign public engagement as a tool of the state.  In addition, the 
case also highlights obstacles or concerns for using foreign public engagement such as 
how advances in communication technology change national audience dynamics; the 
importance of clearly explaining national positions and policies; and the 
prioritization of government opinion over public opinion.   
Unlike the American Revolution, the Civil War demonstrates how 
American representatives both serving abroad and in Washington recognized the 
connection between engaging with the public of another nation and foreign relations 
generally as well as with foreign policy.  Benjamin Franklin’s letters to members of 
the Continental Congress and the replies of the CSC show how while Franklin 
understood the need for engagement with the French public, the Continental 
Congress did not.  Nor did many of the other commissioners in France.  Though 
slow to respond to reports from Charles Francis Adams, Cassius Clay, Zebina 
Eastman, and others, once President Lincoln understood the need to address British 
public, he sent commissioners to both France and England in an attempt to salvage 
US foreign relations. 
However recognizing this need to explain and correct misunderstandings 
about national policies led to other questions and issues which the Union was never 
able to adequately resolve.  For instance, Secretary Seward frequently denied that 
foreign public opinion should be considered in the formation of national plans, as he 
                                                     
91 Zebina Eastman (US consul, Bristol) to Abraham Lincoln, 10 December 1861, LoC: ALP; 
General Correspondence, Series 1 
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wrote Carl Schurz, despite regular warnings about how US policies negatively 
impacted foreign public opinion and by extension the opinion of foreign 
governments.  Yet US citizens residing abroad or representing the US in an official 
capacity understood how public opinion could be used to inform policy.  As Henry 
Adams observed "…England was perfectly welcome to think what she liked.  Her 
opinions were of no consequence to us, except as they indicated her actions” (“An 
American in Manchester,” The Times, 9 January 1862, p. 6, Issue 24138).  Henry’s 
father, Minister Adams, reported on the apparent connection between popular 
opinion and the Palmerston government and suggested that public opinion should be 
considered in the formation of US policy toward Great Britain: 
 
Whilst the struggle between the two parties (Liberals and Conservatives) 
seems to be carried on upon faint and shadowy lines of divisions…After the 
organization of the last ministry (Palmerston’s) upon what seemed a tolerably wide 
basis, of popular support, the policy naturally adapted itself so far as was 
practicable to the elements constituting its strength, and indicated sympathy 
with liberal ideas all over the globe.  But not being provided with any imposing 
amount of personal abilities, the friction of disputed domestic measures, and the 
inevitable fluctuations of public opinion, have had their natural effect on lowering 
their moral strength to the least possible standing point…In view of this State of 
things it becomes important to consider how the interests of the United 
States are likely to be affected as a result.  To judge correctly, it becomes 
necessary to examine the form which opinion takes here and the distribution made of it 
between contending parties… (No. 9, Adams to Seward, 21 June 1861, M30, 
R73). 
 
The Civil War presented an extreme situation where President Lincoln had to decide 
whether domestic policies took precedent over the possibility of foreign intervention 
either in the form of an outright war or mediation.  In a real sense, Britain’s entrance 
as a second combatant in the Civil War, whether on the side of the Confederacy or 
simply as an independent belligerent, threatened US national security as much as the 
loss of the Border States.  Seward attempted to temper this threat with 
aggressiveness, asserting that the US would readily fight any European nation who 
interfered.  Unfortunately, this tactic not only hurt Anglo-American relations, but 
also exacerbated the potential for British intervention.  The British public did not 
appreciate Seward’s bullying and tended to give more sympathy to the Confederates. 
This question of how much attention should be given to foreign public 
opinion continues to be debated even today and is connected to the organizational 
issues confronting US public diplomacy.  The Union’s situation throughout the Civil 
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War suggests the level of attention and consideration depends on the foreign 
audience and the nation.  In the case of Great Britain, the precariousness of the 
Palmerston government and its reliance on public opinion should have raised the 
importance of British public opinion in the eyes of American leaders in the formation 
of not only national policy, but also war objectives and the use of foreign public 
engagement, especially in light of US government’s perception of Britain’s power 
and influence over the other European nations.   
Though there was a great deal of listening done by private and public US 
representatives, many failed to use the information to inform US policy, to clarify the 
reasons for the war and the Union’s position toward the Confederacy, and to utilize 
engagement much sooner.  Even the Union’s advocacy failed to take into 
consideration the opinion of the British public, only exacerbating public irritation, as 
with Thurlow Weed’s articles in the press and General Scott’s open letter.  In 
addition to the policy issues and considerations of whether to engage the British 
public, the Union committed several blunders which frequently hurt engagement 
efforts: the revelations of the Union’s extensive espionage operation in London and 
Liverpool to track Confederate movements; the Union’s avoidance of the slavery 
issue; and the first publication of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS).92   
While recognizing the connection between engaging the foreign public, 
maintaining foreign relations, and implementing foreign policy, this case also raises 
questions about the appropriateness of using foreign public engagement.  The 
question of appropriateness was considered in terms of whether the government 
should engage with foreign publics as well as who should be engaging foreign publics, 
whether they should be done by private entities unaffiliated with the government or 
private individuals or even whether the government and private entities should 
jointly work to engage with people abroad.  The Weed mission stirred these 
questions among those asked to go as “unofficial ambassadors” and for Union leaders.  
Seward’s letter of introduction for Weed to Minister Adams emphasized Weed and 
the other commissioners as representatives in an “unofficial character.”  According to 
                                                     
92 Seward arranged for diplomatic correspondences to be published, mostly to quiet 
criticism and questions from the US Senate.  He published the correspondences 
without warning Adams, who discovered his despatches printed in the British press, 
also around the same time as the Trent crisis.  Though the British officials were not 
seriously put off by the publication, Adams recognized that the publication undermined 
public perception of him as a fair representative of the US. 
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Weed, Seward initially refused to provide the commissioners with diplomatic 
credentials until pressured by another politician (Weed 1884, p.638).  Even those 
first asked to travel to Europe were uncomfortable with the mission.  Edward 
Everett was asked initially, but declined the request, believing that it was 
inappropriate for him to take up such a mission as a former Secretary of State (Weed 
1883; Weed 1884).  Bishop McIlvaine also felt uncomfortable with the mission, but 
later found the British supportive of his mission there:   
 
Some thought I was coming on a semi-diplomatic mission – the rest that I 
was at least on a mission of peace.  They [the British] instinctively 
interpreted my coming at such a time, as meaning that I had some good, 
kind object for the two countries.  They therefore neither asked, nor needed 
any explanation, and I needed no concealment…It requires a readiness and 
courage, a quickness of answer, and a fertility of resources, which I was 
afraid I should fail in; but I am satisfied as yet (Bishop McIlvaine to Bishop 
Bedell, December 1861, in Carus 1884, p. 225). 
 
McIlvaine’s characterization of the British understanding of the Weed mission is 
reflected in the British press reporting the appointment and arrival of a special 
delegation to England and France.  Weed, Archbishop Hughes, and Bishop McIlvaine 
were referred to as “unofficial ambassadors.”  The British press also recognized that 
the mission was to specifically address the British public vice the government. 
 Nevertheless, Adams felt that representatives whether declared “unofficial” 
undermined and potentially caused problems for those who were official 
representatives of the US.  He supported the object of the Weed mission, but felt 
that any future mission should be confined to private persons unaffiliated with the US 
government.  Adams’ views must have been taken into consideration, as later 
“unofficial representatives” travelled to Great Britain quietly and without mention in 
the press.  Edward Everett, Julian Sturtevant, and Charles Denison all travelled to 
Great Britain to engage the British public, but did so without any overt connections 
to the Lincoln administration.   
 In addition to raising questions about the appropriateness of foreign public 
engagement generally and who should be responsible for such engagement, another 
question was raised about the propriety of joint private-public foreign public 
engagement.  Though the House and Senate determined that providing a military 
escort for the George Griswold might be interpreted by the British as the government 
attempting to curry favour and let both motions die, the idea of combining or 
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coordinating private and public engagement initiatives abroad does not disappear.  
As the next case will explore, the lines between private and government foreign 
public engagement initiatives become blurred; future cases demonstrate how the 
distinctions between public and private engagement become even more indistinct.  
Even in the case of the George Griswold, the letter from chaplain Charles Denison 
suggests that President Lincoln did not balk at conjoining government engagement 
efforts with private ones. 
 As with the previous case, there are important themes in this chapter which 
appear in subsequent cases.  During the Civil War, the Union struggled with the 
new communication environment which permitted broader and faster dissemination 
of political speeches and remarks made by Union leaders.  Here again, 
communication technology impacted foreign public engagement.  In addition to 
communication advances effecting Union engagement, this chapter also raised the 
problem of synchronizing Washington’s expectations of the field and what 
representatives in the field reported to Washington.  As explained, Seward tended to 
overlook reports from the field which did not align with his conception of what was 
important.  Despite being told repeatedly by multiple sources to pay attention to 
foreign public opinion, Seward disregarded it.  This case illustrates another aspect of 
the communication theme: the importance of communicating with the people of 
other nations to explain national policies and preserve America’s image. 
The following case will add to the communication theme as well as 
introducing two important themes.  At the end of the nineteenth century, the US 
government began partnering with private entities to supplement various elements 
of statecraft including foreign public engagement.  The case will also introduce key 
figures and organizations which play important roles in the development and 
continued practice of foreign public engagement.  Additionally, the chapter will 
bring to the fore some of the issues impacting public diplomacy today.  
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Chapter 4  
Blurred Lines: Private & Government Foreign Public Engagement 
 “The political and civil institutions of the countries of this continent having been 
consolidated, it is proper for them to develop, in conformity with their kind and the national 
aspirations, the resources wherewith nature has so richly endowed them.  In this work of 
progress, there devolves upon universities the noble task of assisting the State as also to form 
and direct public opinion which exercises such a decisive influence over modern democracy.” 
- “Report of the Tenth Committee on Interchange of University Professors 
and Students,” July/August 191093 
 
The end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century marks the 
start of public and private cooperation with foreign public engagement initiatives.  
Unlike earlier chapters where either the government or private entities clearly 
initiated engagement with people abroad, this chapter looks specifically at how the 
US government consciously worked with private groups to engage publics overseas for 
specific political objectives.  Though private foreign public engagement sometimes 
overlapped with government engagement or helped to achieve national policy 
objectives, there was not much coordination of these efforts between private entities 
and the US government.  By the end of the nineteenth century, government and 
private entities worked together to engage with people abroad.   
Not only does this case tell the story of the early relationship between 
private entities and the US government with foreign engagement efforts, but also the 
deliberate use of engagement in US statecraft to achieve foreign policy goals, moving 
closer toward institutionalizing the practice of foreign public engagement as a 
mechanism of statecraft.  The previous case highlighted how the government 
recognized the need to engage with people abroad to correct misperceptions and 
explain policies.  This case looks at how the US government employed foreign public 
engagement to attain policy objectives.  A significant development, the use of foreign 
                                                     
93 RG 59, Central Decimal File, hereafter, CDF 1910-1920, (Unnumbered document), 
710.D/212 thru 710.D/291, Box 6462  
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public engagement for political ends becomes a contentious debate, as later cases 
will show. 
Furthermore, the organizations and key figures of this case play significant 
roles in developing more consistent and organized efforts to engage foreign publics 
in the following three cases of this research.  The organizations and individuals in this 
case make recurrent appearances as American public diplomacy develops.  This is 
also essential to answering the primary research question of how foreign public 
engagement shaped the role of modern public diplomacy in American statecraft, as 
these organizations and individuals undoubtedly contributed to this.    
Rather than focusing on a singular event, this case uses two examples of 
public-private foreign public engagement as part of a period trend which began 
around 1890 up through WWI.  The last decade of the nineteenth century is 
frequently noted by scholars of American history as a significant turning point for 
America, especially in the area of foreign politics (Beisner 1986; Dulles 1965; 
Herring 2008).  At the turn of the century, American diplomacy became more active; 
American leaders and the public saw the US as playing a decisive and powerful role 
in the world (Beisner 1986; McDougall 1997).   
Several factors contributed to this new activism.  Perhaps the most 
significant factor was America’s transition from a raw materials exporter to an 
industrial goods exporter.  Emily Rosenberg notes this trend in America for foreign 
expansion was brought on largely by American industrialization (1982).  American 
businesses of industry wanted to broaden their market base and sought overseas 
markets.  As they did so, businesses noted the inadequacy of the American 
diplomatic service, criticizing the Department of State for not doing more to 
facilitate access to foreign markets or protect American investments and goods 
overseas.  This private dissatisfaction with American diplomacy coincided with the 
onset of American Progressivism94 and a drawn out effort to reform the American 
diplomatic and consular services (Ilchman 1961).   
American public opinion about the nation’s role in the world also changed 
from the passive “City on the Hill” to one of active reformer (Ilchman 1961; 
                                                     
94 American Progressivism was a reform movement.  Most American Progressives sought 
practical reforms for social institutions, this included both foreign and domestic 
institutions. 
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McDougall 1997; Rosenberg 1982).95  Private citizens urged the US government to 
be more proactive in facilitating trade relationships between American business and 
foreign nations as well as expecting the government to protect American trade and 
economic interests overseas.  
 
Private impulses, more than government policies, laid the basis for 
America's enormous global influence in the twentieth century, an influence 
based on advanced technology, surplus capital, and mass culture.  Yet from 
the 1890s on, as Americans sought wider and easier access to foreign lands, 
the government had necessarily to define its relationship to these overseas 
activities.  Operating on the assumption that the growing influence of 
private groups abroad would enhance the nation's strategic and economic 
position, the government gradually erected a promotional state; it 
developed techniques to assist citizens who operated abroad and mechanisms 
to reduce foreign restrictions against American penetration (Rosenberg 
1982, p. 38). 
 
Coupled with America’s economic expansion, private humanitarian organizations 
managing education initiatives and technical training also grew in importance in 
American statecraft.   
 
American citizens and their government imagined a new position for the 
United States in the world.  Through the provision of overseas assistance, 
they characterized the United States as a new breed of world power, strong, 
benevolent nation committed to guiding the world in peaceful cooperation 
and modernization.  In the process, they made international assistance a new 
American civic obligation and a central component of American statecraft 
(Irwin 2009, p. 2).   
 
This attitude toward foreign expansion allowed the US to distinguish between 
European imperialism and America’s own foreign acquisitions.  “With outright 
colonialism out of fashion, the expansionist debate revolved around other means of 
control: tutelage under theoretically independent protectorates, or more important, 
                                                     
95 As explained in chapter 1, America’s sense of mission is sometimes used to explain 
American relations with the world, which is connected to the old belief of America as a 
“City upon a Hill.”  In the early nineteenth century, this idea was more passive, 
America stood as an example for others to follow.  By the late nineteenth century, the 
idea merged with Social Darwinism and the “white man’s burden” to turn America’s 
sense of mission into a more active force.  See Steven G. Calabresi’s article, “ ‘A 
Shining City on a Hill’: American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court's Practice of 
Relying on Foreign Law,” in Boston University Law Review for a summary of 
America’s sense of mission over the years (2006). 
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governmental encouragement of private connections, especially economic ones” 
(Rosenberg 1982, p. 47).  In an effort to augment access to foreign markets and 
spread American ideas, culture, and influence, the US government worked with 
private entities.   
To demonstrate the development of both the public-private relationships 
and the use of foreign public engagement as a tool of statecraft, two rudimentary 
instances of public diplomacy within the period are explored.  The first portion of 
the chapter examines how President William McKinley decided to use the American 
National Red Cross (ANRC) in Cuba in the winter of 1897 to ameliorate both 
American and Cuban public opinion.  The second episode investigates how the US 
government started what would prove to be a long-term relationship with the 
Carnegie International Endowment for Peace (CEIP) to support and administer 
student and academic exchanges between the US and Latin America following the 
Fourth Pan American Conference in 1910. 
 “The active record of these years, has, we trust, served to convince each 
and all of the forty nations within the treaty that the Red Cross of 
America has never sought its own interests nor acted without 
discretion”96 
 After a chance encounter with Dr. Louis Appia, a committee member of the 
International Red Cross, in Switzerland in 1870, Clara Barton began to organize 
efforts to establish an American Red Cross (ARC) which would eventually lead to 
America joining the Geneva Convention.97  Upon returning to the US, Barton wrote 
a pamphlet in 1878, The Red Cross of the Geneva Convention: What It Is.  The most 
                                                     
96 Clara Barton to President Grover Cleveland and Minister Dupuy de Lome, Jan 6, 1897; 
LoC: CBP, MSS 11973, Box 129 
97 Before the IRC formed, the US was invited to participate in the second conference in 
Geneva in August 1864.  The US minister to Switzerland attended only as an unofficial 
observer to the proceedings along with Charles Bowles of the US Sanitary Commission 
(Dulles 1950).  The US declined repeatedly to sign the Geneva Convention and join 
the IRC, due to American isolationist concerns, the then Secretary of State Seward 
disapproved completely.  The Geneva Convention required the US government to 
agree to cooperate with the society, accept their services in the event of war, and 
permit centralization under its administration of all wartime relief to sick and wounded 
(Hutchinson 1996).  This was perceived by various American leaders and Congress 
through the end of the nineteenth century to compromise American national interest 
and sovereignty.  Ironically, it was the work of the US Sanitary Commission 
throughout the Civil War that inspired IRC co-founder, Jean Henri Dunant, with idea 
for the Red Cross. 
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important part of the pamphlet was that it created public support for adherence and 
participation in the convention based on her descriptions of peacetime programs 
(Dulles 1950).  Barton made eight attempts between 1887 and 1900 to obtain 
Congressional approval for the US to sign the treaty.   
In addition to lobbying the government, Barton and her associates decided 
that having a Red Cross society already established might help to encourage Congress.  
The American Association of the Red Cross established in May 1881 provided for an 
Executive Board and a Board of Consultation, which included the President, his 
cabinet, the General of the Army, the Surgeon General, the Adjutant General, and 
the Judge Advocate General (Dulles 1950).  Congress did not grant a federal charter 
to the newly named American National Red Cross until 1900, and even then, did 
not recognize the organization as the sole manager of voluntary services in wartime 
(Hutchinson 1996).   
 The story of Clara Barton’s efforts to ensure America’s participation in the 
IRC is connected to the ANRC’s partnership with the US government to provide aid 
to Cubans in 1897 and 1898.  The ANRC had a parallel objective in their assistance 
to Cuba which becomes apparent in some of the exchanges between Clara Barton, 
her nephew, Stephen Barton, and auxiliary organizations under the name of the Red 
Cross.  Conflicts between the American National Red Cross and similar 
organizations claiming affiliation with the IRC arose during the Central Cuban Relief 
Committee’s (CCRC) operations.  The ANRC was protective of its image and the 
relationship it shared with the US government.  Throughout the spring of 1898, the 
ANRC lobbied for legislation to be passed, naming the ANRC as the sole 
organization to use the Red Cross insignia and IRC affiliation (Library of Congress 
(LoC): Clara Barton Papers (CPB), MSS11973, Box 129).98  While Clara Barton and 
the other members of the ANRC were motivated to alleviate the human suffering of 
                                                     
98 Letter to Alvey Adee, Assistant Secretary of State, from Stephen Barton, Chairman of the 
CCRC, dated March 22, 1898: “It is only another emphatic demonstration of the 
imperative need of Congressional lesiglation [sic] which would enable the National Red 
Cross to restrain the ambitious desires of members of other Red Cross organizations, 
who feel they can with safety, and without injury to the Red Cross, pursue their own 
methods independently.”   Letter to Stephen Barton from Charles H. Howell, 
President of the Red Cross Society of Philadelphia: “We beg to submit that we are not, 
in any sense responsible for that which you are pleased to call ‘independent action’ 
since there has been no apparent desire upon the part of your body to have us act in any 
other manner”  (LoC: CPB, MSS11973, Box 129). 
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the Cubans, there were ulterior motivations for the ANRC to ensure they obtained 
US government support prior to organizing any aid for distribution. 
“Whatever circumstances may arise, our policy and our interests would 
constrain us to object to the acquisition of the island or an interference 
with its control by any other power.”99 
In 1868, Cuba began to rebel against Spanish rule.  Due in part to economic 
and humanitarian interests, American presidents from General Ulysses S. Grant to 
William McKinley offered to mediate between both the insurrectionists and Spain.  
Spain remained confident they would be able to quell the insurrection and bring 
peace to the island; however, fighting continued until a truce was agreed to by both 
sides in 1878 (FRUS 1897, p. xi-xxi).  The truce broke in 1895 with renewed 
violence and determination on both sides to obtain victory.  The fighting between 
1895 and 1898 destroyed the island agriculturally, economically, and socially.  
Insurgents destroyed the country's infrastructure (railroads and telegraphs) as well as 
destroying cane fields and mills which processed sugar cane.  The goal was to 
decrease Cuba’s economic worth to the Spanish and force the Spanish to relinquish 
control.  In February 1896, Governor General Valriano Weyler implemented a 
policy whereby Cuban peasants in rural regions were forced by the Spanish military 
to relocate to Spanish controlled military garrisons and cities (Dobson 1988; Offner 
2004).  When the local Cubans left their homes, the Spanish burned the villages, 
farms, and killed livestock to cut off rebel food supply.  Essentially, both sides were 
using economic warfare to get the other to surrender. This caused a humanitarian 
crisis to develop inside Cuba, with civilians dying of disease or starvation due to poor 
sanitation and food shortages (Offner 2004).  Reports from both private US citizens 
and politicians on the conditions inside Cuba were publicized in America, stirring 
public opinion in favour of some type of intervention. 
In addition to creating a humanitarian crisis, the Spanish-Cuban war created 
economic consequences for the US.  Much of the situation between America, Spain, 
and Cuba was exacerbated by the inconsistent trade policies of the US.  In 1890, 
America signed a reciprocity treaty with Spain which caused a boom in sugar exports 
from Cuba (Herring 2008).  Thus, in 1894 when Congress passed the Wilson-
                                                     
99 Cleveland, Grover (1896). “Message to Congress,” in Papers relating to the Foreign Relations 
of the United States, with the Annual Message of the President and the Annual Report of the 
Secretary of State, p. xxxv 
- 99 - 
 
Gorman tariff, Cuban sugar exports fell dramatically and subsequently led to 
increased civil unrest and fighting on the island.  By 1895, America was going 
through a depression which caused industrial and agricultural prices to drop and led 
to strikes and rioting (Offner 2004).  With the onset of the Cuban revolution, trade 
between the US and Cuba dropped by two thirds which caused importers and 
exporters to lobby the American government to pressure Spain to make peace.   
Many historians have argued that American public opinion was set on US 
military intervention in Cuba (Dobson 1988; Herring 2008; Hilton 1994); however, 
much of American opinion was divided on what was the right course to take.  Even 
American businessmen were divided on the right approach.  Some favoured strong 
diplomacy to get Spain to settle the conflict and others preferred cooperation 
(Dobson 1988; Offner 2004).  While many Americans sympathized with the Cuban 
rebels, they did not advocate for annexing Cuba to the US.  The very idea of US 
intervention divided Americans.  Some felt any intervention would be a violation of 
Spain's sovereignty while others believed that the Cubans were unprepared to self-
govern (Dobson 1988; Offner 2004).   
Exacerbating the situation, the American press led by Joseph Pulitzer and 
William Randolph Hearst as proprietors of the two leading papers, New York World 
and New York Journal respectively, played on American sympathies in favour of the 
Cubans. In addition, the Cuban Junta headquartered in New York circulated 
propaganda favouring the Cuban rebels in the American press.  The Spanish were not 
able to counter either propaganda effectively (Herring 2008).  Despite the mounting 
domestic pressure, McKinley delayed war and intervention of any kind in Cuba for 
over a year, hoping that the Spanish would alter their policies in Cuba (Dobson 1988; 
Herring 2008; Offner 2004). 
As the fighting continued, McKinley and his cabinet explored different 
options to try to end the violence, including recognizing the Cuban rebels and 
offering to purchase Cuba from Spain.  These ideas were floated, but never seriously 
pursued.  McKinley supported Cuban independence, but also worried about any 
approach which would hurt US economic recovery (Herring 2008).  According John 
L. Offner, McKinley desired to keep American policy options in Cuba open 
following Spain’s departure from the island (2004).  In this respect, he was forced to 
balance political and public pressure at home as well as the public sentiment within 
Cuba, but at the expense of Spanish public opinion both in Spain and in Cuba.  
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“I feel that the foundation is laid for a work of intelligent relief that will 
gladden the hearts of all, Spanish, Cuban, and Americans, for we are ill 
at ease as it is.”100 
 In the midst of President McKinley attempting to alleviate tensions between 
the US and Spain as well as between the Cubans and Spain, Clara Barton made 
multiple appeals to the US government, including President Grover Cleveland, the 
Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy (LoC: CPB, MSS11973, Box 148 & 
129).  "She realized that the situation was explosive, involving the three-cornered 
relationship of the United States, Spain and the Cuban insurrectos, and that no move 
could be made without the full approval and authorization of the governments 
concerned" (Dulles 1950, p. 43).  Thus Barton wrote to then President Grover 
Cleveland and the Spanish minister in Washington, Dupuy de Lome.  Barton was 
first able to get permission from the Spanish government to provide aid to Cuba, 
receiving a response from de Lome on February 11th, graciously accepting the 
ANRC’s offer of aid to Cuba (LoC: CBP, MSS11973, Box 129).  The US 
government’s reply to Barton’s offer was more lukewarm.  Secretary of State 
Richard Olney responded on February 13th asking “What do you now propose doing 
in view of the consent given by the Spanish Government to allow the distribution of 
alms to destitute and suffering people in Cuba?...Inasmuch as the Government as 
well as yourself has taken considerable pains to procure from Spain the permission 
she now accords it would be rather mortifying, would it not, if there was no other 
practical issue to the matter?” (LoC: CBP, MSS11973, Box 129).  This suggests 
scepticism on the part of the Secretary of State, at least, that any aid given to the 
Cubans was unlikely alleviate the bigger issues at play between Cuba, Spain, and the 
US. 
 Interestingly, Barton did not begin any relief operations for the Cubans, 
despite having received permission from the Spanish government and no specific 
objections from the US government; adding weight to the earlier suggestion that 
Barton’s offer of ANRC aid to Cuba was in part motivated by a desire to manoeuvre 
the government into joining the IRC.  Instead, she persisted to obtain official US 
blessing to begin aid to the Cubans.  She contacted President McKinley at the 
beginning of June 1897 (LoC: CBP, MSS11973, Box 129).  This time she was 
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granted a meeting with the President, in July of 1897, but Barton still did not 
receive the official support she sought.  Barton tried to contact the Secretary of War, 
Russell Alger, on August 3, 1897 who forwarded her letter to the Department of 
State.  The Second Assistant to the Secretary of State was confused by Barton’s 
correspondence and referred her to the Congressional resolution passed on May 24th 
to appropriate fifty thousand dollars for aid to US citizens residing in Cuba (LoC: CBP, 
MSS11973, Box 148).101 
While Barton pursued official approval for the ANRC to distribute aid in 
Cuba, the President attempted to use traditional diplomacy to reverse Spain’s 
reconcentration policy in Cuba.  Secretary of State John Sherman wrote to Minister 
Dupuy de Lome to protest General Weyler’s policies in June 1897 (FRUS 1897, 
p.506).  Later in July of 1897, Secretary Sherman instructed the US minister in 
Madrid, Stewart L. Woodford, that the US stood ready to mediate between the 
Cuban rebels and Spain.  Spain refused to alter Weyler’s policies in Cuba and felt 
confident his methods would end the rebellion, forgoing any need for mediation.  
Then in August, the Spanish Prime Minister, Canovas del Castillo, was assassinated 
by an anarchist, resulting in a new, liberal government under Praxedes Sagasta (FRUS 
1897, p. 525-526).  Sagasta changed Spanish policies in Cuba by changing military 
leadership, cutting back on troop levels, ending the reconcentration policy by 
recalling General Weyler, and increased food and public works for those in need 
(Offner 2004).  With these promises of reform, McKinley refrained from 
recognizing Cuba. 
Despite the reversal of Weyler’s harsh policies and the promise for a more 
liberal colonial policy in Cuba, conditions in Cuba continued to deteriorate.  General 
Fitzhugh Lee was the Consul-General for America in Havana.  Lee reported in a 
despatch to the Department of State (DoS) on June 8, 1897:  
 
                                                     
101 US citizens residing in Cuba added another complication for the McKinley 
administration as well as previous administrations.  Spanish authorities often arrested 
and imprisoned US citizens, then refused to allow US consul officials access to 
prisoners.  Much of the correspondence between the consuls stationed throughout 
Cuba focused on determining who were American citizens and getting the Spanish 
authorities on the island to cooperate (see M899, roll 130, Consular Despatches from 
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…that neither the Spanish, or the Cubans, or the Spanish army, or the 
forces of the insurgents seem to take the slightest interest in said reforms, 
and their presence in Habana [sic] has not produced a ripple upon the surface 
of affairs.  No one who is well acquainted with the existing conditions now 
has any hope Spain can grant reforms approximating, even, to Canadian 
autonomy, such as is so often mentioned (M899, R130). 
 
A few months later, on 27 November 1897, Lee sent another despatch detailing the 
conditions of the reconcentrados within Havana, which depicted overwhelmed 
hospitals, extreme unsanitary conditions, and people dying of starvation in the 
streets.  This coupled with reports of rioting in Havana, plans to destroy American 
property and target American citizens in other parts of Cuba may have pushed 
President McKinley to seriously consider Clara Barton’s offer.102 
According to John Dulles, Assistant Secretary of State, William R. Day,103 
contacted Barton to meet with President McKinley and himself on November 30, 
1897 (1950).  Subsequent correspondences between Secretary Day and Barton 
suggest there were several meetings between the President, Secretary Day, and 
Barton to discuss plans for Cuban relief from the end of November through the end 
of December 1897.104  What is most interesting about these letters is the way Day 
talks around Cuban relief and the arrangements made between Barton and the 
government. 
                                                     
102 On December 1, 1897, General Lee reported on the Matanzas conspiracy to retaliate 
against Americans if the US attempted to intervene in favour of Cuban independence. 
In another despatch dated December 3, 1897, Lee reported “that the rumors have been 
more or less frequent regarding riotous intentions of some of the dissatisfied elements 
towards citizens of the United States dwelling here…Any riotous demonstration here 
must come from the Spanish non-combatants or from volunteer forces” (M899, Roll 
131).  President McKinley seemed to prioritize the humanitarian, economic, and 
domestic impact of the Cuban rebellion without considering how either the Spanish 
public in Spain or the Spanish citizens residing in Cuba might view American 
intervention, even on humanitarian grounds. 
103 President McKinley appointed John Sherman as Secretary of State at the age of seventy-
four despite failing health and forgetfulness.  McKinley was aware of Sherman's 
shortcomings and to compensate, nominated William R. Day as Assistant Secretary of 
State.  Day ran the Department of State and served as a link between the President.  
Second Assistant Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee also helped to bolster the weak 
Secretary of State appointment (Dobson 1988). 
104 None of these correspondences are held in the National Archives Department of State 
records or the Red Cross files.  There are some letters between Secretary Day, Second 
Assistant Secretary of State Alvey Adee, and Barton in the Red Cross files within the 
Clara Barton Papers collection in Library of Congress.   
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Dear Miss Barton: 
I have your favor [sic] of  the 18th instant.  When Mr. Carsen of 
Philadelphia called at my house sometime ago, in the interest, as he stated, 
of the Red Cross Association of Philadelphia,105 I advised him that I had had 
some conversation with you and preferred to continue communication on 
that matter with you.  I therefore suggested that he come to the Department 
when you could be present…I then stated to you the position of the 
President and the Department upon the matters to which you referred, all of 
which was practically in confirmation of the conversation with the 
President…The Department has not taken any further or different action in the 
matter, and is quite content to leave it in your hands as I stated to you when you were 
here.  I think you fully and properly appreciate the position of this Government in the 
matter, and as you know, full confidence is reposed in your discretion and 
judgment…(From William R. Day, 21 December 1897, LoC: CPB, MSS 
11973, Box 148, emphasis added). 
 
The President and the Department of State arranged for a committee to be created 
to manage the call for donations and ensure the donations were transported to Cuba 
where US consuls would be responsible for distribution to those in need.  The 
committee, The Central Committee for Cuban Relief (CCRC), was composed of 
three people: Stephen Barton, Chair; Dr. Louis Klopsch, Secretary; and Charles 
Schieren, Treasurer.  Stephen Barton served as the Vice-President to the ANRC, and 
Louis Klopsch owned The Christian Herald.  Charles Schieren was a member of the 
New York Chamber of Commerce and owned a leather factory.  Secretary Day 
assigned a State Department despatch agent to the committee, I.P. Roosa, to handle 
transactions between the government and the committee as well as correspondence 
and logistics for aid.  However, there were issues with this arrangement, and the 
ANRC became more directly involved with the humanitarian effort in Cuba. 
 As the committee began to collect donations from American businesses and 
private citizens, there were obstacles which cropped up along the way in the 
relationship between the CCRC, the US government, and the ANRC.  First, there 
was the matter of distributing funds which came into the US treasury.  The DoS chief 
of accounts and disbursements, Frank Branagan, had to purchase drafts instead of 
cutting checks for payments of goods (Branagan to Roosa, 5 January 1898, RG 59, 
Entry 362, Box 3).  This was overcome when Stephen Barton proposed to Secretary 
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Day that the CCRC treasurer, Schieren, should keep all accounts and provide 
regular reports to the DoS on donations received and purchases made by the 
committee.  Second, General Lee needed assistance with the actual distribution of 
the large shipments of flour, cornmeal, and clothes coming into Havana (28 January 
1898, M899, R131).   
 On January 11, 1898, General Lee cabled the CCRC with a list of needed 
items, including a request for nurses.  Then on January 31, 1898, Louis Klopsch 
wrote to Clara Barton to ask her to go to Cuba and provide reports of her activities 
for The Christian Herald to publish in exchange for a monthly donation of $10,000.  
He briefly mentioned that General Lee had requested nurses and that Barton would 
be well qualified.  Finally, on February 3, 1898, Assistant Secretary Day wrote to 
Stephen Barton to let him know that Clara Barton intended to travel to Havana to 
assist General Lee with aid distribution (LoC: CBP, MSS11973, Box 129).  Within 
weeks of settling the roles between the government and the CCRC (and the ANRC), 
the arrangement essentially dissolved.  Upon Barton’s arrival with Mr. John Elwell, 
General Lee turned over all elements of aid and aid distribution to them.  Elwell and 
Barton were appointed as special agents to Cuba by the President and the 
Department of State, but shortly after taking responsibility for aid distribution, 
Barton requested additional members of the ANRC be permitted to come to Cuba to 
assist with setting up hospitals and orphanages as well as training the locals in basic 
care of the sick (LoC: CBP, MSS11973, Box 129 & 143).  Clara asked J.A. 
McDowell, then working for the Department of Treasury, to help manage the 
warehouse where all the donations were stored.  Thus, less than a month after 
beginning humanitarian relief for Cuba, the lines between public and private 
engagement became decidedly blurred. 
“[Clara Barton] is giving ‘mana’, which falls from the American 
Heaven”106 
 Humanitarian aid can be considered a form of public diplomacy because the 
act of giving such aid and engaging with those receiving it involves two core elements: 
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listening and cultural diplomacy, as seen in the previous case.107  Both practices are 
used in delivering humanitarian aid.  The actor delivering aid needs to listen to know 
what type of aid to give, and when giving aid, the actor tends to administer aid 
according to cultural practice.  As described in Preface, the Christian missionaries in 
the Ottoman Empire passed on the American style of teaching and technical know-
how, thus transferring elements of American culture. 
   
American international assistance was not simply propaganda, however, nor 
was it just a tool of American statecraft and national expansion.  For many 
Americans, participation in overseas humanitarian endeavors represented a 
way to act upon and extend their domestic social commitments...These 
physicians, nurses, social workers, and public intellectuals recognized relief 
and assistance activities as a way to disseminate their reform ideas to the rest 
of the world...reformers relied on ideas about social improvement, public 
health and democratic governance that they had adopted in Progressive Era 
America...guided by the conviction that acquiescence to American 
biomedical and social welfare ideas was key to fostering a peaceful, 
democratic, and healthy world (Irwin 2009, p. 3-4). 
 
As the ANRC arranged for distribution of food and clothing as well as restoring basic 
sanitary conditions, orphanages, and hospital facilities, the ANRC transferred the 
latest practices in American health and sanitation as developed during the course of 
the Civil War.   
 In order to deliver the aid that was needed, the CCRC needed to know what 
items were most needed in Cuba.  Here again the relationship between the private 
entity and the government caused some issues as to who should be doing the 
listening and then taking action based on the information.  Also, listening was not 
always done, especially initially.  On January 11, 1898, General Lee sent a list of 
needed items to the CCRC which included flour (LoC: CPB, MSS11973, Box 129).  
As was later discovered when Clara Barton and Elwell arrived in Cuba, Cubans did 
not use flour in their cooking.  They also found that Cubans use a great deal of lard 
to cook, which was different from American style cooking (J.K. Elwell to Phil 
Armour, 16 February 1898, RG 200, 900.26-900.3, Box 65).  Elwell wrote to 
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Stephen Barton to tell him that the flour sent from the US had been sitting for weeks 
in storage, so they arranged for a local man in Havana who ran a cracker factory to 
use the flour to make hard biscuits by mixing the flour with cornmeal.  Just five days 
later, Elwell asks the CCRC to send large quantities of corn meal to Cuba instead of 
flour (J.K. Elwell to S.E. Barton, 15 February 1898, RG 200, 900.26-900.3, Box 
65).  Though this seems rather trivial, it does demonstrate listening, an effort to 
engage with the locals, and respect for cultural practice in Cuba. 
 Other communications from General Lee, Clara Barton, Elwell, and Consul 
Pulaski Hyatt specified things such as the type of clothing most needed and medicines.  
However, there was confusion about who should tell whom about what supplies to 
purchase.  The CCRC seemed to defer to the DoS on what should be purchased, and 
the DoS tended to defer to the CCRC on what to purchase.  For example, on 
January 19, 1898, the CCRC treasurer, Charles Schieren asked I.P. Roosa to let the 
committee know what was most needed (RG 59, Entry 362, Box 3).  Yet on January 
11th, Roosa received a telegraph from Secretary Day telling him to defer to the 
committee on what to purchase or to use his own discretion (RG 59, Entry 362, Box 
3).  After Clara Barton and Elwell arrived in Havana, the committee shipped items 
based on the reports from Elwell and Barton.   
 As Clara Barton and Elwell were able to survey the regions outside of 
Havana, they requested permission from the DoS and the CCRC to send ANRC 
doctors and nurses to Cuba to help establish hospitals and orphanages.  Dr. A. 
Monae Lesser, physician at the Red Cross Hospital in New York, and his wife, 
Bettina Lesser; Dr. Julian B. Hubbell; Dr. E. Wingfield Egan; and Mr. J.A. 
McDowell were all specifically requested by Clara Barton to assist with  setting up 
hospitals around Cuba.  Mr. McDowell was the only person to actually represent the 
CCRC; the others were all representatives of ANRC (LoC: CPB, MSS11973, Box 
129, 135, & 136). 
 The team of Barton’s physicians and nurses went from town to town, 
selecting appropriate buildings for hospitals or orphanages as needed.  The spread of 
disease was a major problem for many of the places visited, so there was an emphasis 
on restoring sanitary conditions as well as teaching sanitation practices to prevent the 
spread of malaria, yellow fever, and tuberculosis: 
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 …we went from place to place founding nineteen asylums and taking in one 
thousand poor Reconcentrados leaving them in the care of the best people of 
the place and when we could get time, we visited them to find how they 
were getting along and we were more than pleased with the good work the 
people did with a little help (“Cuban Work” n.d. in LoC: CBP, MSS11973, 
Box 143). 
 
Many of the sanitation practices used by the Red Cross in Cuba were practices 
developed and learned by the Sanitary Commission’s work during the Civil War. 
 After the Spanish-American War, several representatives of the ANRC 
remained in Cuba to continue aid and reconstruction of various public services.  In a 
letter to Clara Barton, dated February 25, 1901, Miss Trotsig mentioned how she 
showed the Cubans to establish smaller orphan asylums within the areas where 
orphans are found rather than creating a large asylum and taking the children away 
from friends or possible relatives. 
 
With the large asylums started by the government this work of breaking 
them up was much harder, for their relatives and friends were so scattered it 
was almost impossible to find them.  I have made everybody see the 
difference and have had them say to me that the Red Cross Relief work 
down here was very fine and very successful, for it had taken care of the 
people when they needed help and stopped just at the right time.  So I am 
satisfied (LoC: CBP, MSS11973, Box 143). 
 
In addition to organizing public institutions according to American practices, strains 
of American Progressivism also influenced how the institutions functioned.  Reform 
was done with the objective of making the recipients of aid self-sufficient through 
training and providing means for self-support.  In a report by Dr. Hubbell to Clara 
Barton, he described how at an orphanage in Guinis the ANRC team arranged for 
children and staff to have farm land to not only provide a food source for themselves, 
but also as something they could sell (LoC: CBP, MSS11973, Box 143).  
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“In all that was said not a word of crimination, nor a blameful nor 
disrespectful allusion to any person, nation, or government was made, 
but the glistening eyes and trembling lips when the word American was 
spoken, told how deep a root, the course of our people had taken in the 
thrice harrowed soil of those poor broken hearts.”108 
The ANRC’s  involvement in Cuba prior to the US going to war with Spain 
demonstrates the use of engagement to ameliorate international tensions by the US 
government, although imperfect.  Though the CCRC was only able to run 
humanitarian relief operations for a few months before war ensued between the US 
and Spain, the initial intent behind US support for ANRC’s relief to the Cuban 
people was to avoid going to war with Spain due to both US public pressure and 
perceived pressure from the Cuban public.  The engagement of CCRC ostensibly 
had a specific political objective.  This is significant to later debates which arise in the 
development of public diplomacy.  Prior to and following WWII, many objected to 
using foreign public engagement for political goals.  As this study proceeds, the 
debate over using engagement for political ends becomes attached to the debate 
about the use of propaganda.  In this particular instance, using aid as opposed to 
armed conflict to alleviate the humanitarian crisis on the island, raises the question of 
whether all engagement can and should be apolitical if engagement helps to avoid 
violence.   
The formation of the CCRC to administer the humanitarian operation is 
representative of the period and another significant development in American 
foreign public engagement.  In the previous case, the US government refrained from 
joining private aid efforts to English textile workers, again out of concern that such a 
move by the US government would input political motives into the aid.  There are 
no existing records of the November 30th meeting between Clara Barton, President 
McKinley, and Secretary Day to understand why the CCRC was created or why the 
US government provided logistic and monetary support for the operation.  Looking 
at previous US humanitarian operations, this was the first instance where the 
government and private entities coordinated and pooled resources.  Just five years 
before, Congress fought over a Republican proposal to use government money to 
ship corn flour to Russia from Iowa.  Iowan private citizens and Red Cross societies 
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arranged for surplus corn crops to be donated to relieve the famine in Russia and 
Germany.  The Democrats opposed the bill on the grounds that US citizens’ taxes 
should not be used to help outsiders.  The bill died (Bloodworth 2011).  The 
coordinated relief operations between the ANRC and the US government set an 
important precedent not only for future humanitarian operations, but also for US 
foreign public engagement.  Henceforth, US engagement would inevitably involve 
both private and public aspects, whether one side initiated engagement and another 
merely provided support.  
As explained earlier, this period in American history marks a transition from 
distinct private and government initiatives in foreign public engagement, a trend that 
extends to other aspects of American diplomacy and government generally.  
Historians have attributed this merge between the public and private to a number of 
social influences in American society including Progressivism and social-Darwinism 
(Beisner 1986; Herring 2008; Ilchman 1961; Rosenberg 1982).  This, coupled with 
Americans’ new vision of their role in the world, led to more expansive and active 
involvement overseas.  Yet as the State Department remained a small institution, the 
Department often relied on private entities to supplement American diplomacy.  
Partnering with ANRC in Cuba was one of many organizations which the US 
government would work with to engage with people abroad.  The next episode of 
American foreign public engagement provides another illustration of this developing 
interconnection between private engagement initiatives and US foreign relations. 
 “Among the foreign relations of the United States…the Pan American 
policy takes first place in our diplomacy.”109 
 The present-day Organization of American States has undergone significant 
transformations since the idea of uniting the American republics was first proposed 
in 1824 by Simon Bolívar110 (Inman 1965).  The first Inter-American Congress took 
place in Panama in 1826, but a successful union between the American republics did 
not develop until the end of the century after several attempts.   The International 
Union of American Republics formed following an inter-American conference 
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110 A Latin American hero, who led Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia to 
independence from Spain between 1807 and 1827. 
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arranged by US Secretary of State James Blaine.  Secretary Blaine’s idea for a 
conference arose from frustrations in trying to stave off wars erupting between 
several Latin American nations during his time as Secretary of State from March to 
December of 1881 under President James A. Garfield (Bastert 1959; Healy 2001). 
 In 1881, Latin America was a mess of boundary disputes and diplomatic 
frays.  Aside from creating a diplomatic headache for the US Secretary of State, the 
tensions and fighting among the South American states posed problems for American 
trade and investments in the region as well as heightened America’s fear of European 
intervention.  The fighting among the Latin American nations resurrected the 
Monroe Doctrine and in effect re-interpreted how America put it into practice.  The 
doctrine, outlined by President James Monroe in his 1823 annual address to 
Congress, stated the United States’ belief that any American nation securing its 
independence from colonial rule should not be subject to re-colonization by another 
power.  Now American political leaders sought to keep Europe out of the American 
hemisphere altogether (Bastert 1959; Healy 2001).   
 Regrettably, Blaine’s first attempt to organize a Pan American conference 
failed.  President Garfield was shot in July and later died in September of 1881.  
With Chester Arthur’s arrival in office, Blaine was replaced with Arthur’s own 
choice for Secretary of State, Frederick T. Frelinghuysen.   Just as Blaine issued 
invitations for the conference to the Latin American states, Frelinghuysen cancelled 
the conference.  Additionally, Congress launched an investigation of Blaine’s 
diplomacy during the War of the Pacific111 (Bastert 1959; Healy 2001). 
 Despite this, the idea to gather all independent American states to discuss 
the future interests of all states did eventually come to fruition.  President Benjamin 
Harrison selected Blaine to be his Secretary of State in 1889 after taking office.  By 
this point, the American public supported Blaine’s idea of holding a conference to 
discuss the possibility of an arbitration system among the American states (Bastert 
1959; Healy 2001). 
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"The Union… has exercised a strong influence for peace and good 
understanding among all the American republics, and has promoted 
that mutual acquaintance and interdependence which is always a 
powerful factor for peace and friendship."112  
The first conference was held in Washington, D.C. from October 2, 1889 
to April 19, 1890.  The conference was divided into fifteen committees.  One of the 
committees discussed the issue of customs regulations and recommended the 
creation of a commercial bureau.  The rest of the representatives at the conference 
supported the idea of creating a commercial bureau which would collect and 
distribute among participating states commercial information for the benefit of 
merchants and investors.  The Bureau would be managed by the International Union 
of American Republics.  The regular publication of the Commercial Bureau of the 
American Republics, The Bulletin, was to distribute information most relevant to 
merchants and shipping agencies from countries participating in the union (Casey 
1933).    To some, the Bureau stood to circulate "a wealth of potentially valuable 
commercial and economic information, gradually broadened to encompass cultural 
and scientific matters"; while others argued the Bureau was simply a tool for the  US 
to develop hegemony over the region and to dominate overseas markets (Vivian 
1974, p. 556). 
 Interestingly, though the participants at the first conference agreed to 
continue the Union for a period of ten years, no plans were made for the next 
conference.  Indeed, over the years, no plan or effort was made to meet at regular 
intervals; rather members of the Union could call for a conference (Inman 1965).  
The second Inter-American Conference was called by Ecuador and held in Mexico 
City from October 22, 1901 through January 31, 1902.  The conference took 
measures to strengthen the International Bureau of the American Republics.  The 
executive committee of five was replaced with a Governing Board made of the 
twenty representatives of the Latin American Republics in Washington with the US 
Secretary of State as chair.  The Governing Board would be responsible for 
composing the program for future conferences and collecting details on each topic 
for conference agendas (Inman 1965).  The third conference was held in Rio de 
Janiero in 1906.  Of the various outcomes from the third conference two are 
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relevant to this case.  First, Andrew Carnegie pledged to donate funds to erect a 
building to house the Bureau in Washington, D.C. (Barrett 1911; Kunz 1945; Inman 
1965).  Second, the representatives at the conference resolved to return to their 
respective governments and establish within their foreign ministries, Pan American 
Union Committees for the purpose of interacting with the Bureau’s Governing 
Board (RG 59, CDF 1910-1929, 710.D/107).  
 In February of 1908, then Secretary of State, Elihu Root, formed the US 
Pan American Committee to work with the Department of State and the Bureau’s 
Governing Board regarding the work of the Union.  The Committee was composed 
of academics, businessmen, and politicians to include Andrew Carnegie (RG 59, 
CDF 1910-1929, 710.D/220a).  By the time planning for the Fourth Inter-American 
Conference was underway in the spring of 1910, Philander Knox was the serving 
Secretary of State, and Elihu Root, now a private citizen, served as the honorary 
president of the Committee as well as the Chairman of the newly created Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace.   
“To cultivate friendly feelings between the inhabitants of different 
countries…”113 
 On December 14, 1910 Andrew Carnegie announced to a distinguished 
grouping of scholars, diplomats, and business leaders his establishment of an 
endowment to end all war (Patterson, 1970).  More than ten years prior to the 
creation of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), Andrew 
Carnegie was asked by President Benjamin Harrison to serve as a representative for 
the Inter-American Conference in Washington, D.C. (Patterson, 1970).  In the 
years to come, Carnegie would not only be an active participant in the International 
Union of American Republics, but he would attend future conferences as an 
observer as well as later serving on the American Pan American Committee, 
providing input for conference agendas (Inman 1965; M862, R766).  Much of 
Carnegie’s support for the Pan American Union (PAU) was motivated by his own 
active interest in the peace movement and eagerness to establish arbitration as an 
international norm.  Carnegie’s interests in arbitration coincided with Blaine’s hopes 
for the First Inter-American Conference to arrange a multi-lateral arbitration 
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agreement among the American state participants.114  Since 1888, Carnegie had been 
active in attempting to arrange various arbitration agreements between the US, 
Britain, and France. 
 Coinciding with Carnegie’s interest in arbitration, the peace movement 
within the US transitioned under the influence of Progressivism and the desire to 
achieve real peace (Nurnberger 1987).  Many members of the peace movement 
became disgusted with the “sentimental pacifism” of the older elements of the 
movement and sought to find practical, scientific means to abolish war.115  Among 
those practical peace advocates included two former Secretaries of State, Elihu Root 
and John W. Foster; the President of Colombia University, Nicholas Murray Butler; 
editor of The Independent, Hamilton Holt, and international law scholar and former 
DoS lawyer, James Brown Scott.  All would be integral in persuading Carnegie to 
establish the Endowment (Dubin 1979; Patterson 1970).  The idea for the CEIP 
ultimately came from Hamilton Holt who raised the concept with Nicholas Murray 
Butler.  After a few proposals and input from Foster and Root, Carnegie agreed to 
set-up the Endowment. 
 This interconnection between private citizens, civil servants, and 
philanthropy members influenced not only the future of American foreign public 
engagement and its role in American statecraft, but also further demonstrates the 
entanglement between private entities and the US government.  The US Pan 
American Committee of 1910 is an excellent early example of the developing 
cooperative relationship between private entities and the US government.  There 
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115 Throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth century the peace movement in Europe 
and the US was dominated by religious organization.  These religious groups wanted to 
end all war, but did not offer any solutions to stave off conflict.  American Progressives 
of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries became irritated with the pious nature of 
religious peace activists and sought practical solutions to resolve political conflicts in 
effort to avoid war. 
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were four members who also served on the Board of the CEIP, not including 
Carnegie himself, who determined never to interfere with the CEIP board (CEIP 
1915; RG 59, CDF 1910-1929, 710.D/158; Paterson 1970).  The four included 
Congressmen James L. Slayden,; former Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Bacon; 
Professor Paul S. Reinsch; and Elihu Root.  Reinsch would later be asked to serve as 
a delegate to the Fourth Inter-American Conference in Buenos Aires.  These Pan 
American Committee members become key advocates and architects of American 
foreign public engagement over the next forty years including Elihu Root, John 
Barrett, Leo S. Rowe, and Paul Reinsch.  Their ideas of how to engage people 
abroad, the relationship between the US and the people of other nations are 
instrumental to the formation of American public diplomacy. 
“…the exchange of professor would be a very important factor in 
interpreting the aims and policies…of his country to the country of his 
mission…”116 
 Planning for the Fourth Inter-American Conference in Buenos Aires began 
early in 1908, following the Argentinian government’s announcement that they 
would host the conference.  The US Pan American Committee met throughout 1908 
up until the actual conference discussing the proposed agenda items.  The suggestion 
to add to the agenda student and academic exchanges did not appear until the spring 
of 1909.  James Brown Scott was serving as the Department of State’s solicitor, 
when he sent the recently appointed Secretary of State, Philander Knox, a note and 
accompanying memos.  The note referred to an earlier conversation between Knox 
and himself about adding professorship exchanges to the conference program: 
 
In a recent interview you approved the suggestion of broaching the subject 
of exchange professorships with Latin America, and suggested that it be 
presented to Pan-America by mean of the Bureau of American Republics 
(Brown to Knox, 8 May 1909, CDF 1910-1929, Box 7299, 810.42711/38). 
 
Attached to Scott’s note were memos from Jerome D. Greene, Secretary of Harvard 
University, an excerpt from Nicholas Murray Butler’s Report on exchanges between 
Colombia University and Germany, and a pamphlet written by another professor, 
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L.S. Rowe, “The Possibilities of Intellectual Co-operation between North and South 
America”117 (RG 59, CDF 1910-1929, Box 7299, 810.42711/38). 
 In these attached documents, various attitudes about the purpose of 
exchanges are discussed by each of the document authors.  Scott’s remarks regarding 
possible exchanges with Latin America tend to emphasize one way exchanges and 
undervalue the contribution of Latin American scholars to America. 
 
But while the present memorandum recognizes the importance of 
commerce and industry as a means of bringing the nations closer together, it 
seeks to accentuate the great benefit which would accrue to Pan-America by 
the establishment of exchange professorships by virtue of which competent 
professors in our various universities would familiarize Latin-America with American 
scholarship, expound the aims and purposes of our institutions, the means by which 
they have been created, maintained and their influence extended, and, in addition, 
carry to them a message of sympathy and encouragement with the efforts they are 
making toward a common goal. 
The presence of Latin-America professors at our universities would enable 
us to understand as never before, not merely the difficulties of Latin-
America but the progress made in spite of those difficulties, and even if the 
contributions of the visiting professors were not, in all cases, of value to our 
universities or to our people…we should not forget that the various professors would 
inform themselves upon our methods of instruction, our political aims, purposes and 
ideals, and, on returning to their various homes, would form a center of American 
influence (RG 59, 1910-1929, Box 7299, 810.42711/38, emphasis added). 
 
Here Scott emphasizes the contribution of the US over the contribution of Latin 
America to the US.  He also recognizes how education exchanges would provide 
opportunities to expose people from Latin America to US institutions, ideas, and 
ways of life as well as explaining US policies, creating “a center of American 
influence.”   
In comparison, Jerome Greene tends to emphasize reciprocity of the 
exchanges, despite acknowledging the political agenda attached to exchanges by the 
German government: “Our object has been to effect a fruitful exchange of inspiring 
teachers, each of whom had contributed something to his subject, and whose 
presence as a colleague in our teaching staff, with an outsider’s point of view, would 
be helpful and stimulating to our community” (RG 59, 1910-1929, Box 7299, 
810.42711/38).  There is little mention of the larger international impact of 
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exchanges, beyond a brief observation “that ultimately more can be done to promote 
international sympathy and goodwill through the success of the exchange Professors 
in their strictly academic work, and the mutual respect thus engendered” 
(810.42711/38).  This view of exchange diplomacy remains relatively apolitical.  
The purpose of exchange diplomacy is intended to establish and maintain foreign 
relations, not necessarily achieve policy objectives in the view of Greene. 
 Finally, Nicholas Murray Butler’s remarks are more balanced in terms of the 
political advantages of exchanges and the importance of reciprocity.  Like Gerome, 
he highlights the benefit to academic scholarship provided by professor exchanges 
while also connecting exchanges to improving understanding among the people of 
different countries.  “The effect of this interchange of professors upon productive 
scholarship, upon the movement to bring about better understanding between the 
people of different countries, and upon the influences that are making for the peace 
of the world, it would be difficult to overestimate” (810.42711/38).  He outlined 
the “systematic” nature of the exchange between Columbia University and the 
German government, ensuring American professors selected to teach would teach in 
German to maximize understanding and devised a program which would offer 
lectures on the history and institutions of America and the nation’s people.  The 
exchanges described by Butler are intended to educate people in both countries 
about each other. 
 All three see the exchanges as positive and beneficial to the US in one way or 
another, but the differences between them are more important.  The varying 
viewpoints point to the tensions which develop as foreign public engagement 
becomes a tool of the state, raising again the question of whether engagement should 
be apolitical or not.  Both Scott and Butler saw exchanges as a way to explain 
America to people of other nations; however, Scott took this a step further, 
suggesting that this could facilitate American influence.  Greene objected to using 
such exchanges for either social or political gains, instead emphasizing the potential 
of creating international sympathy and mutuality.  These ideas about the purpose of 
engagement and its role in relation to the state foreshadow future debates, as later 
cases will discuss.   
 Just a month and a half after Scott’s letter and accompanying documents 
were given to Philander Knox, he himself wrote a memo to the US Pan American 
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Committee suggesting exchanges be added to the conference agenda for 
consideration by the Governing Board. 
 
Turning from the subjects broached in the tentative program, I would add 
that, in the view of the United States, it would be very desirable to add as a 
subject for consideration, the question of arranging for an exchange of 
professors between universities of the various American Republics; and also 
for an exchange of students between the different countries.  Such a scheme, if 
practicable, would seem to hold great possibilities to facilitate and foster mutual 
understanding and sympathy, and, consequently, still better relations in thought, 
civilization and commerce.  A discussion of the subject might touch, also, upon 
the possibility of establishing foundations or scholarships for this purpose 
(Philander Knox to John Barrett, Director of the International Bureau of the 
American Republics, Jul 24, 1909, M862, R766, 11302/35-36, emphasis 
added). 
 
With this, student and academic exchanges were added to the agenda of the Fourth 
Inter-American Conference.  However, these brief pages scattered among the 
Department of State records remain the only discussion of the exchanges until after 
the conference was concluded, with only a single sentence on the topic included in 
the directions to the delegates from Secretary Knox: “An interchange of professors 
and students among the universities and academies of the American Republics will 
undoubtedly promote mutual intellectual and social understanding and sympathy, 
and you will give your hearty support to any practical plan tending to this end which 
may be devised” (RG 59, CDF 1910-1929, Box 6462, 710D/233A). 
 As with the previous conferences, each agenda item was discussed in 
committees where propositions were made regarding each topic.  The Tenth 
Committee took up item XII of the agenda, the interchange between universities of 
the American republics of professors and students.  US delegate Bernard Moses, a 
University of California professor of Latin American studies, served on the 
committee with six other delegates from the conference (RG 59, CDF 1910 -1929, 
Box 6463, 710D/291).  The Tenth Committee supported the plan for exchanges 
between the American republics and submitted a revised resolution for the rest of 
the delegation to consider.  The resolution only asked governments of the Union to 
recommend to universities in their respective countries to establish exchanges for 
students and professors, the creation of a congress among American universities for 
intellectual exchange, and to establish scholarships to enable student exchanges (RG 
43, Entry 57, Box 1).   
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In the US the resolution did not garner much support from the government.  
First, the resolution was simply a resolution, not a convention or treaty with legal 
weight.  Therefore, the US Senate would not consider the measure nor appropriate 
any funding towards fulfilling the resolution.  Second, the education infrastructure 
within the US prohibited federal interference in determining curriculum, especially 
within higher education where many colleges were either private or state funded 
institutions.  However, this does not mean there were not people within the US 
government and outside the government who did not see the value of such 
exchanges. 
“…I think it would be a very wise and far-seeing policy on our part to 
divert to the United States the currents of intellectual sympathy, and 
thereby contribute toward the policy of pacific penetration in Central 
America.”118 
 Leading up to the conference in the summer of 1910, the Department of 
State received despatches from consular officers and US ministers noting the rising 
number of European education institutions and offers for student exchanges.  In 
addition, after the conference, Latin American nations became eager for the US to 
establish exchanges between their countries.  Nonetheless, American exchange 
programs were slow to develop and met with a lukewarm response from the 
Department of State. 
 On December 15, 1911, Nicholas Butler Murray wrote to Secretary Knox 
on behalf of the CEIP to announce the Board of Trustees had agreed to establish 
funds for two scholars from Latin America to study in the US and two US scholars to 
study in a Latin American country for one year (RG 59, 1910-1929, Box 7299, 
810.42711/48).  Murray asked for the Department’s advice and assistance as well as 
asking if the Department would pass the news of the scholarships to US legations in 
Latin America.  From the correspondences between CEIP, the Department of State, 
and American legations in Latin America, CEIP developed as a de facto subdivision 
of the Department of State, responding to queries relating to exchanges passed on by 
the Department from serving US ministers and consul officers.  The State 
Department served as a clearinghouse.  This foreshadows the role the Department 
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would continue to play in relation to various private foreign public engagement 
initiatives until WWII. 
 On August 14, 1913, John Bassett Moore,119 then Assistant Secretary of 
State, wrote to Nicholas Murray Butler of the CEIP to ask for any information 
relating to exchanges for a report he was preparing for the Fifth Pan American 
Conference in Santiago, Chile (RG 59, 1910-1929, Box 7299, 810.42711/79a).  
Responding to Moore, CEIP’s A.H. Jones wrote “up to the present time no formal 
interchange of Professors and students of the American Republics has been 
established” (RG 59, 1910-1929, Box 7299, 810.42711/80).  More than two years 
after CEIP decided to fund education exchanges between the US and Latin America, 
and no exchanges had been arranged.  To which, Alvey Adee, Second Assistant 
Secretary of State, asked the CEIP to report “…any steps that your institution may 
take in regard to this proposed inter-American interchange of professors and 
students…” (810.42711/80).  This correspondence highlights the reliance of the 
DoS on private entities such as CEIP, to carry out foreign public engagement 
activities, where due to political and funding obstacles, the DoS was unable to 
administer directly.  CEIP, like the American Red Cross, became a chosen 
instrument.  The government increasingly relied on private entities to carry out 
various policies or operations, especially abroad.   
 Another example of CEIP’s relationship to the US government is evident in 
a  separate series of correspondence.  One month after Moore contacted the CEIP 
regarding academic exchanges, an American consul in Tampico, Mexico wrote to 
the Secretary of State on September 23, 1913, suggesting that education exchanges 
should be created between the US and Mexico to counter anti-American feelings 
among the Mexicans (RG 59, 1910-1929, Box 7299, 810.42711/83).  The consul’s 
suggestion was passed by the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Interior, 
“as of possible interest to the Bureau of Education” as well as to the CEIP 
(810.42711/83).  This not only demonstrates the way the DoS used CEIP, but also 
highlights the general lack of interest within the DoS for exchange diplomacy or any 
foreign public engagement.  As later cases will demonstrate, US representatives 
abroad urged the Department to do more to engage with the people of other nations.  
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Despite receiving information from representatives in country reporting on 
the interest of the local public to study in the US, the increased presence of 
European nations in Latin America looking to establish academic exchanges, and 
repeated suggestions by ministers and consuls to arrange exchanges; the Department 
of State assumed a passive role.  This could be construed as a failure to listen, 
disconnect between those in the field and those working at headquarters.  However, 
the tone of Department replies to such suggestions of public engagement 
demonstrates a lack of interest at best and extreme irritation at worst.  Mostly the 
DoS either forwarded these suggestions to the Bureau of Education or to CEIP.  
CEIP came to be viewed by the Department as being responsible for carrying out the 
resolution made at the Fourth Pan American Conference.  The Department of State 
was not prepared to take on educational exchanges without a mandate from the 
President or Congress.  As explained in Chapter 1, the Department of State 
remained a relatively tiny department until after WWI, and usually under serious 
scrutiny by Congress.  Realistically, the Department was only able to ensure posts 
kept up with America’s basic needs internationally.  It would not be until after WWI 
that the Department would be able to consider expanding its activities.  Thus, the 
US government’s intent for educational exchanges was nothing more than to 
encourage Pan American relations, specifically to benefit economic and trade 
relations.  For the Carnegie International Endowment for Peace, there was an 
optimistic hope that such exchanges would foster improved, deeper relations 
between the people of North and South America. 
“The peoples of these countries are anxious to know more of the United 
States, and American interests will be advanced if assistance be given in 
every way possible to bring the America’s closer together.”120   
This transition period presents American public diplomacy in an embryonic 
stage from which present-day public diplomacy develops.  Practices such as using 
technical education and humanitarian aid as engagement, employing engagement to 
secure foreign policy objectives, the coordination and cooperation between 
government and private entities in engagement activities, as well as the figures and 
organizations themselves mark this period as a turning point in the story of the 
origins of American public diplomacy.  Although both instances of foreign public 
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engagement during this period may not be viewed as great examples of American 
public diplomacy, they do demonstrate the growing realization within the US 
government about the connection between engagement and the potential benefits it 
holds as a mechanism of statecraft.  McKinley used engagement in Cuba to alleviate 
foreign and domestic concerns.  Whereas, Philander Knox, American ministers and 
consuls saw how engagement could not only provide benefits domestically, but also 
abroad.  
The ARC came to be a major figure in American international aid.  While 
the organization was privately funded, it was distinguished by Congressional charters 
as the "official voluntary" aid organization of the United States.  Business owners, 
the US government, and professionals in the emerging fields of public health, social 
work, and publicity helped to support ARC and make international aid not only a 
patriotic duty but also an important part of American statecraft.  This semi-official 
status of the ARC allowed the organization to receive government support for 
fundraising, and as Barton hoped, a monopoly over other aid agencies.  “The federal 
government benefited from this arrangement because the ARC carried out American 
cultural diplomacy on its behalf, obviating the need to commit state funds or personnel" 
(Irwin 2009, p. 8, emphasis added).  The ARC became the US government’s chosen 
instrument for international aid and technical education.  
On the other hand, the government’s relationship with CEIP was more 
complicated.  As the planning for the Fourth Inter-American Conference was 
underway in 1909, Carnegie had not yet created the Endowment.  Incidentally, 
James Brown Scott, Jerome Greene, John Barrett, Elihu Root, and Nicholas Butler 
Murray belonged to a group of lawyers, businessmen, and scholars who, like 
Andrew Carnegie, sought real peace and to bring about international understanding.  
All of these men were involved in the planning of the conference directly or 
indirectly, and just eight months prior to the start of the conference the Endowment 
was created, with Elihu Root, James Brown Scott, and Nicholas Murray Butler 
serving as members of the board.  Even before CEIP decided to fund exchanges 
between the US and Latin America the relationship between CEIP and the 
government was nebulous.  As this study proceeds, the connection becomes more 
murky, as more civil employees become affiliated with CEIP or CEIP members 
return to government.  Also, the interactions between CEIP and the government are 
interesting.  In this case the government expected CEIP to administer student 
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exchanges in accordance with the resolution passed at the conference in Buenos Aires; 
however, in the future, the government does not task CEIP.  Rather CEIP will rely 
more and more on the government to facilitate their international engagement 
activities abroad, even when these programs contradict government policies. 
The government’s new relationship with private organizations is not the 
only consequential development.  As mentioned above, there are individuals who 
play recurring roles in not only defining American foreign public engagement 
practice, but also shaping the role engagement should play in American statecraft.  
Figure 4.1 depicts not only the connections between private organizations, 
individuals, civil servants, and the US governments, but also denotes key people who 
will continue to play a role in the development of American public diplomacy.  The 
development of a cooperative private-public relationship is another important theme 
or pattern of this study.  The previous two cases reflect how US political culture and 
infrastructure tended to restrict government foreign public engagement as well as 
US diplomacy generally.  These factors meant private entities played a larger, more 
consistent role in engagement and the development of public diplomacy in the US.  
Proceeding cases will include similar charts, continuing to document the growing 
public-private relationship in foreign public engagement as well as featuring those 
individuals who maintain leading roles in ensuring foreign public engagement 
becomes a part of American statecraft.  This cooperative relationship between the 
government and private citizens and organizations is not the only significant 
development.  Key groups and individuals reappear in later chapters, either initiating 
engagement, facilitating government engagement, or providing guidance for 
engagement policy development. This is another relevant pattern in the 
advancement of public diplomacy.  In this case, Greene, Butler, and Scott all saw 
general benefits to using engagement, although only Butler and Scott imputed 
political benefits to such engagement.  This is important given their later roles in 
CEIP.  Nicholas Murray Butler becomes the Director for the Division of Intercourse 
and Education, and James Brown Scott becomes the Director of the Division of 
International Law.  
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Figure 4.1 This figure depicts the relationship between the US government and private 
entities which facilitated engagement overseas.  The chart also highlights certain 
private entities who in proceeding cases play an important role in the evolution of US 
public diplomacy. 
 
This period also raises contentious issues relating to the use of foreign public 
engagement as a tool of statecraft, especially the use of engagement to obtain 
political objectives.  This ties in with the issues impacting public diplomacy today as 
described in Chapter 1: conceptual and organizational.  This case raises questions 
about the appropriateness of engagement as a mechanism to attain foreign policy 
objectives as well as questions about what role engagement should play in statecraft.  
Prior to WWI, engagement with people abroad was not connected to propaganda.  
In the next case, the fear of propaganda generated not only by the war, but also by 
muckraking journalists prior to the war, causes those who support the use of 
engagement to become suspicious of using it for political gain.  The ethical question 
of whether engagement should be used for political purposes is not as clear cut as this 
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case illustrates.  Desperate to avoid war, but pressed by Congress, the American 
public, and by the Cuban public; McKinley recognized action of some sort was 
needed.  Barton’s meeting with McKinley and the Secretary of State was rather 
fortuitous for McKinley.  Barton offered a compromise which avoided military 
action.  Though no concrete exchanges developed immediately following the Fourth 
Inter-American Conference, the idea that such exchanges could provide the US 
opportunities to explain policies, spread American ideas, and “pacific penetration” of 
Latin America culturally and economically were raised by Secretary Knox, US 
consuls in Latin America, and future leaders in CEIP.  These ideas seemed innocuous 
at the time; the PAU was intended to link the US with Latin America socially, 
culturally, and economically.  But the idea of using such engagement to influence 
people politically became circumspect once war started in Europe.  Propaganda and 
anything that might seem like propaganda was viewed with extreme suspicion and 
fear.   
The following case continues to build upon the themes and issues already 
identified thus far, while also adding new concerns regarding the use of engagement 
as a mechanism of statecraft.  Even prior to the start of WWI and America’s 
entrance into the war, propaganda had already been deemed a threat to American 
liberal ideas.  The next chapter will explore how the Committee on Public 
Information tried to distinguish their work from other nations, particularly Germany.  
The Committee’s interpretation of their work and the materials they used to engage 
with people around the world add to the problem of conceptualizing public 
diplomacy, while also establishing patterns of practice for engaging foreign publics. 
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Chapter 5  
America’s First Public Diplomacy Agency? 
 “Remember that the coming year is to see more ‘people’s diplomacy’ and more propaganda of 
all kinds than any year so far in the war.” 
- Ernest Poole to George Creel, 27 December 1917121 
The story of the Committee on Public Information’s (CPI) activities 
overseas is essential to understanding the pathologies of present-day public 
diplomacy as well as the established practices of public diplomacy.  For all the 
criticism lodged at the CPI following World War I, the CPI was in essence 
America’s first public diplomacy agency.  As discussed in the last chapter, many key 
people continued to facilitate America’s engagement with the people of other 
nations and this did not stop with the onset of WWI.  In addition to serving as an 
archetype for future American public diplomacy, the existence of the CPI, though 
brief, builds upon some of the points raised in earlier cases.  Particularly, the 
methods used to engage people abroad remain the same though altered by 
technological advances and public-private partnerships which were instrumental to 
CPI operations.  Also, the recognized need to correct misperceptions and counter 
misinformation resurfaces as well as the connection between engagement and foreign 
policy. 
Perhaps most significantly, at this point in the story of American public 
diplomacy, US foreign public engagement becomes associated with propaganda.  
Until now, none of America’s efforts to engage with people abroad was ever 
referred to as propaganda, by either the US or by the people of other nations.  The 
CPI’s propaganda legacy makes a lasting impression, following the future 
development of American foreign public engagement.  However, whether the CPI 
did or did not use propaganda is not as important as understanding why those 
working for the CPI did not believe they were using propaganda.  Nor is it as 
important as understanding why America objected so much to propaganda.  
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Interestingly, the inability of the US to answer these questions influences the future 
of American public diplomacy.  
This case examines the CPI’s mission and what CPI personnel thought they 
were doing, exposing how the distinctions between German propaganda and 
American “publicity” and “democratic diplomacy” often blurred or faded altogether.  
The lack of clear distinctions and repeated comparisons contribute to the confusion 
of the word propaganda as well as creating problems for the future of American 
public diplomacy.  As the methods used by the CPI to engage people abroad are 
similar to earlier cases, the practices of the CPI are not what distinguishes CPI’s 
operations as propaganda.  The question must be then, what made CPI’s operations 
propagandistic?  In light of this, much attention is given not only to what the CPI 
officers thought they were doing, but what their stated intent was as well as how 
people from other nations viewed the CPI’s work.   
There were two key components to the function of the CPI.  First, the CPI 
was established to educate the US public about not just the government’s policies and 
operations in support of the war, but also about the country’s role in the world, as 
perceived and determined by the government.122  Second, the CPI was to publicize or 
advertise the US and the country’s war aims to the rest of the world.  For Wilson and 
others within the CPI, the overseas operations of the CPI prioritized advertising 
American ideals around the world, to sell those principles to the rest of the world in 
order to remake the world in America’s image.  The CPI was the active advocacy of 
America as the City on the Hill for others to imitate.  Instead of a vision in the 
distance for others to admire, now America was actively "selling" the idea that other 
nations should become like the US (Rosenberg 1982).   
Just as James Brown Scott, Jerome Greene, and Nicholas Murray Butler all 
had differing ideas about the relationship between education exchanges and US 
foreign policy objectives, this case explores the  differences within the CPI and on 
the fringes who expressed different views about the advantages of engaging with 
                                                     
122 This is the point of contention which both Gary and Sproule critique in their 
monographs on the domestic functions of the CPI in conjunction with the activities of 
the Postmaster General and the Department of Justice.  Though Creel’s report and 
How We Advertised America emphasizes fair and transparent distribution of government 
information (Creel 1920a; Creel 1920b); Gary (1999) and Sproule (1997) note that 
Wilson’s administration framed much of the information to suit predetermined policies. 
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publics abroad and what engagement was precisely.  There were those who believed 
there were commercial and economic advantages to publicizing America abroad: “For 
the interests of these ideals and for the future of American trade, this news 
propaganda should in some way be continued (“Compub Service in Finland,” written 
by US Consul Thornwell Haynes, no date (n.d.), RG 63, Entry 105, Box 13).”  
Others viewed such engagement as a return to America’s democratic roots, bucking 
Old World diplomacy in favour of New World diplomacy: “It is an anomaly, a denial 
of our own democratic faith, that our Republics should accredit its ambassadors to 
the kings and not to the peoples of Europe” (Bullard 1917, p. 492).  Some also saw 
foreign public engagement as necessary for the security of the nation.  
  
You may be sure that other nations will continue and increase the work of 
this kind which they are already undertaking in a much larger way than we 
have done.  An [sic] when such nations develop policies hostile to our own, 
they will campaign in this way against us, and their points will have to be 
met unless we are willing to suffer defeat in each big national purpose 
(Ernest Poole from George Creel, 15 November 1918, RG 63, Entry 13, 
Box 2). 
  
These similar, but varying perspectives about the appropriateness and necessity of 
foreign public engagement for security, for diplomacy, or for economic interest are 
themes which carry on through to the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act legally 
establishing American public diplomacy as a function of the state.  Though 
Americans did view engagement abroad as appropriate, ethical, and in some ways a 
part of the American diplomatic tradition, that did not extend to propaganda which 
was viewed as antithetical to the liberal, democratic values of America (Sproule 1997; 
Taylor 2003).   
“We did not call it ‘ propaganda,’ for that word, in German hands, had 
come to be associated with lies and corruptions.”123  
The American fear of propaganda and its use by governments predates WWI 
and is rooted to alarming assumptions about American society and democracy 
(Sproule 1997).124  Americans became aware of the power of mass persuasion at the 
                                                     
123 George Creel. 1920. Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public 
Information, p. 1 
124 US fear of foreign influence and subversion dates all the way back to the Revolutionary 
War and the framing of the US Constitution.  Many of America’s early leaders feared 
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beginning of the twentieth century with the exposés written by so-called muckraker 
journalists125 on how the railroad companies used publicity to garner public support 
for the railroad industry and how the newspaper industry manipulated public opinion 
(Sproule 1997).  In many respects, Americans reacted to the quick advancement of 
communication technology and the onset of modern mass communication.  
Information could be produced and disseminated in large quantities and at fast rates.   
Several other factors existed prior to the war which further compounded the 
impact of the CPI and the use of propaganda throughout WWI on the American 
psyche.  More and more American leaders and those involved in the CPI began to 
lose faith in the rationality of the American public even before the war began (Gary 
1999; Sproule 1997).  “Antirationalistic views of the public mind and of public 
communication began to emerge in the decades before the Great War” (Sproule 
1997, p. 30).  This loss of faith in the power of an informed democratic public can 
be attributed to the development of mass media, the legitimization of the fields of 
psychology and sociology, and the publication of Le Bon’s The Crowd (Gary 1999; 
Sproule 1997).126  Adding to this loss of faith in the people themselves was the 
confusion which existed regarding the actual definition of propaganda.  The many 
definitions for the concept of propaganda made the goal of exposing propaganda or 
finding methods to defend the general public against the influence of propaganda 
difficult (Sproule 1997).  The issue of defining propaganda remains a problem even 
today (Corner 2007). 
                                                                                                                                       
that extended and intimate contact with the Old World would subvert American 
idealistic principles.  George Washington also cautioned against foreign influence in his 
Farewell Address. Representatives in the Continental Congress and some of Benjamin 
Franklin’s co-commissioners believed he had succumbed to French influence, 
forgetting the values of nation he represented.  In debates about whether to have a 
foreign ministry, representatives at the Constitutional Convention also expressed 
concerns about foreign nations using diplomats to subvert and influence America.  
Over the years, some Congressmen suggested putting limits on how long a diplomat or 
consul could remain in post out of concern the representative would succumb to 
foreign influence (Ilchman 1961). 
125 Many of the people who worked for the CPI were muckraker journalists prior to the 
war, including Will Irwin, George Creel, and Walter Lippmann. 
126 Le Bon argued that the individual becomes anonymous in a crowd or within masses of a 
society losing sense of responsibility and an increased sense of invincibility.  The 
individual within a crowd tends to be unreasoning and emotional; susceptible to the 
power of suggestion (1896). 
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Consequently, even before the Germans and other belligerent nations began 
their propaganda campaign around the world, America already viewed propaganda as 
a pernicious mechanism which undermined the democratic process by intentionally 
withholding information required by a citizen to participate in democratic debate or 
by circulating false information.  In light of America’s perception of propaganda as 
antithetical to the democratic process, it is not altogether surprising that the CPI 
adopted an informational or news approach during the war.   
 
The American propaganda should inforce [sic] the truth about America’s 
intentions…It should be an information propaganda, a news propaganda. The 
work of the Committee on Public Information is criticized as having been 
too much political propaganda, the object of which is to spread democratic 
ideas in Germany; what is wanted is a war propaganda revealing the exact present 
situation, propaganda dealing with facts rather than with ideas” (“Memo for 
Committee on Public Information, Subj: American Propaganda in 
Switzerland,” RG 63, Entry 105, Box 13, emphasis added). 
 
Unfortunately, as Sproule explains in Propaganda and Democracy, though there was 
deep aversion to propaganda, Americans did not have a universal definition for the 
word (1997).  And despite Creel’s declaration that the CPI did not refer to its work 
as propaganda, many of the official documents and memos all use the word to 
identify the activities and material of the CPI.  As the memo quoted above suggests, 
there are different types of propaganda which were acceptable depending on the 
intent of the material, information that was truthful and informative to facilitate public 
discourse. 
Not only was the word propaganda used to describe CPI activities, but the 
term was also used interchangeably with other words such as educate, advertise, 
publicize, journalism, and news to identify the CPI’s work (RG 63, Entry 105, Boxes 3, 
4, 10, & 16).  Additionally, CPI personnel did not always distinguish between what 
the CPI was doing from what the Germans and other nations were doing.  As the 
Director of the Foreign Section, Will Irwin, explains “…we Americans invented 
modern advertising and worked out effective advertising method; and now the 
Germans had taken up our methods and using them against us” (“Report on Foreign 
Propaganda,” RG 63, Entry 105, Box 10, emphasis added).  In another memo, 
propaganda is defined as “only a matter of higher advertising method – a thing which we 
[America] invented” (untitled memo, n.d., RG 63, Entry 105, Box 10).  Besides 
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equating propaganda with advertising, some also described the CPI’s activities as 
educational in nature: 
 
...he said that your Committee is particularly interested in urging upon 
American Manufacturers the importance of conducting educational advertising 
campaigns in all foreign countries; that you feel that a wide expansion of this 
sort of effort will have a favorable affect in the contest for world markets at 
the close of war (Memo to George Creel (forwarded to Edward Bernays) 
from Mark Kellogg, Burroughs Adding Machine Company, 4 Sept 1918, RG 
63, Entry 105, Box 4, emphasis added).  
 
Or as journalistic news: 
 
The underlying purpose of this division is to help in the dissemination of news 
regarding America with special references to making clear the reasons why this 
country entered the war, its purposes, military preparations and efforts.  America 
is appealing to the good sense and democratic instincts of the world.  Such 
an appeal lacks reality unless it reaches the newspaper readers of the world 
(“Report of the Division of Foreign Press,” 1 February 1918, RG 63, Entry 
105, Box 16, emphasis added). 
 
The main point is that for Americans in 1917, or even today, to attempt to 
distinguish propaganda from other forms of foreign public engagement is made 
difficult by America’s own experience and non-specific understanding of what the 
CPI did in WWI.  This confusion over the necessity and appropriateness of engaging 
with publics overseas and the disapproval of propaganda remained unresolved after 
the CPI ceased operations abroad in the spring of 1919. 
“We shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our 
hearts – for democracy…and make the world itself at last free.”127   
 According to some historians, Wilson’s eventual decision to go to war 
rested on an idealistic vision to recreate the world order according to American 
liberal ideals (Flanagan 2004; Hamilton & Herwig 2004; Mock & Larson 1939a).  In 
the context of President Wilson’s own beliefs and background, the decision to go to 
war and to create the CPI to facilitate international reform makes sense (Herring 
2008; Turner 1957; Vaughn 1980).   
 
Long before the fighting ended, Wilson had begun to fashion a liberal peace 
program to reshape the postwar world.  The ideas he advanced were not 
                                                     
127 Woodrow Wilson, (2 April 1917). “War Message” 
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original with him.  Even before the founding of the nation, Americans 
believed they had a special destiny to redeem the world...Wilson promoted 
these ideas with a special fervor and eloquence and made himself their 
leading spokesman (Herring 2008, p. 411). 
 
Wilson’s plans for peace and the reasons for America’s intervention in the war 
would be the basis of much of the CPI’s messages directed at home and abroad.  
 When the war began in August of 1914, President Wilson firmly declared 
neutrality and asked the American public to remain neutral in thought and deed.  As 
the war continued, this became more and more difficult not only for the President, 
but also for the country more generally.  A combination of short-sighted decisions 
on the part of the US and belligerent actions on the part of both Germany and Britain 
eventually moved the US farther and farther from neutrality.  First the British cut the 
Atlantic cable and complained about German use of US radio stations to 
communicate with their war ships.  The first act cut communications between the 
US and Germany, hindering diplomatic communications.  In response to Britain’s 
complaint, Counsellor of the DoS Robert Lansing arranged for the Navy to take over 
two high-powered radio stations.  Regulations were drawn up to allow all 
belligerents to use the radio stations by giving the Navy Department a copy of their 
messages.  As the British and French could still use cables, they did not need to pass 
messages to the US government.  The decision inadvertently favoured the Allies 
(Clements 2004; Herring 2008). 
 Not long after, in August 1914, the British government announced they 
would arm merchant vessels for self-defence.  This led the German government to 
begin their policy of unrestricted submarine warfare in early 1915.  In May 1915 a 
German U-boat sank the British passenger liner, the Lusitania, killing 128 Americans 
(Hamilton & Herwig 2004; Herring 2008).  Though there was general outrage at the 
disaster, many Americans still did not feel they had any reason to become involved in 
what was perceived as Europe’s war.   
 With the Germans’ use of unrestricted submarine warfare against both 
Allied and neutral shipping, President Wilson began to change his stance toward 
neutrality and to advocate for “armed neutrality.”   At the same time, Wilson urged 
the Germans to stop targeting passenger and merchant ships.  Germany eventually 
agreed in the spring of 1916.  Removal of this immediate threat and the election of 
1916 seemed to move the war in Europe into the background, at least through much 
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of the summer and fall of 1916 until after the election (Flanagan 2004).  When 
Wilson won the election, he renewed attempts to end the war.  First, President 
Wilson threatened to cut off financial support to Britain.  He also sent an open letter 
to all belligerents asking them to state their peace terms, offered mediation, and 
promised American participation in a league of nations.  In January of 1917, he 
unveiled his plan for world peace, asking for a non-punitive settlement of the war - 
peace without victory (Flanagan 2004; Hamilton & Herwig 2004). 
While Wilson attempted to bring the war to an end without American 
military involvement, the situation for America further deteriorated over the next 
three months.   First, the Germans decided to resume unrestricted submarine 
warfare; determining that they could achieve victory before America ever entered 
the war.  Second, British intelligence intercepted a telegram on January 19th, 1917 
and on 24 February passed the telegram to President Wilson.  The telegram was sent 
by German foreign minister, Arthur Zimmerman, to the German ambassador in 
Mexico, Heinrich von Eckardt.  Zimmerman suggested that Eckardt approach the 
Mexican government with a proposal of a military alliance whereby Mexico would 
invade the US with German assistance (funding and supplies), promising that Mexico 
could take Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona.  The telegram was published in the 
American press on 1 March of 1917 (Hamilton & Herwig 2004).  
On March 20, 1917, Wilson held a cabinet meeting to discuss military 
intervention in the war.  Most of his cabinet supported intervention, but no firm 
decision was made that day.  According to biographers and historians, Wilson’s 
reason for asking Congress for a declaration of war against Germany on April 2, 
1917 was motivated by his desire to sit at the peace table rather than view it as a 
spectator (Arthur Link in Hamilton & Herwig 2004; Herring 2008).  Wilson 
believed that as a neutral he would have little say over the plans for peace, and 
"Wilson had long since concluded that the United States must play a central role in 
the peacemaking” (Herring 2008, p. 409).   Yet, even before the end of the Paris 
Peace Conference, he was unable to convince the European powers who had 
suffered so much throughout the years of fighting to accept his ideas of “peace 
without victory,” leading to disillusionment not only among Americans, but also the 
people around the world who had been stirred by Wilsonian ideals.   
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“Our work was educational and informative only…”128 
After Woodrow Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany, 
“…perhaps the greatest single task facing President Wilson was to achieve a 
complete national solidarity in support of the ‘Peoples’ War’ as he called it” (Mock 
& Larson 1939b, p. 6).129  Wilson knew he would need to obtain the support and 
cooperation of the American press in order to achieve public unity (Mock & Larson 
1939b).  At the time the US public was composed of approximately 14.5 million 
immigrants; 8 million of which considered Germany their home.  There were also 
strong pacifist sentiments in the US in 1917.  In addition to the ethnic diversity and 
pacifist inclinations, many Americans in rural regions remained relatively cut off 
from the world and subsequently tended to be uninterested in the war (Vaughn 
1980).    
On April 13, 1917, just after Congress voted to declare war against 
Germany, the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy addressed a joint letter to 
President Wilson suggesting that a government committee be created to oversee 
information about the war.  The “Committee on Public Information” would 
encourage a partnership between the public and the government in the business of 
government.  The Committee’s primary functions would be censorship and publicity 
(Mock & Larson 1939b; Vaughn 1979).  The task was to create an organization that 
would "make the fight for loyalty and unity at home, and friendship and 
understanding of the neutral nations of the world" (Creel 1920a, p. 1).   
President Wilson did not just receive input about preparing the public for 
war from his cabinet, but also from various other acquaintances and supporters.  
Walter Lippmann, a journalist, wrote often to Wilson regarding the dangers of 
                                                     
128 George Creel. 1920. Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public Information, 
p. 1 
129 America was not entirely unified in the decision to go to war, but this does not mean 
that the American public was completely opposed to war or as uninformed as 
presumed by many of America’s leaders at the time or implied by Gary (1999) and 
Sproule (1997).  Mock & Larson both recount how different portions of the American 
public became zealous in their belief that war was necessary to preserve US national 
security and to root out the thousands of German spies many believed already resided 
in America (1939b).  Aside from infringing on American civil rights, the CPI 
egregiously enflamed many groups to become even more intolerant of dissent and bent 
on persecution of their fellow Americans simply because they held different political 
views or objected to the war.   
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mobilizing public opinion (Vaughn 1980).  He was particularly worried about how 
raising an army might cause hatred to be manufactured in the press, as it was in 
Britain, and he raised concerns about military censorship.  Lippmann also stressed 
that it was important to control misinformation and lies, but not to suppress the 
truth.  A former student of Wilson's urged him to announce that America's quarrel 
was with the German government, but not with the German people (Vaughn 1980).  
He also emphasized the need to publicize US war aims abroad.  Arthur Bullard130 
wrote to Wilson as well, stressing the importance of publicity and the risks 
associated with censorship.  According to Stephen Vaughn, many of Bullard’s ideas 
for mobilising public opinion influenced the main functions of the CPI: to educate the 
US public and to inform the foreign public about America. 
Just before the CPI was created, Bullard wrote an essay, “Democracy and 
Diplomacy,” in which he criticized the American governments’ adoption of Old 
World style of diplomacy, secret diplomacy; therefore, violating the ideals of 
American democracy and untrue to the New World style of diplomacy, open 
diplomacy.  “In order to democratize our diplomacy…we must consciously work at 
the education of our public opinion” (Bullard 1917, p. 497).  Beyond just educating 
the American public about foreign relations, Bullard also advocated breaking 
“through the traditional barriers and to establish more direct contact with the 
popular forces of other countries” (Bullard 1917, p. 499).  He believed “democratic 
diplomacy,” a theme of Bullard’s work from 1916 through 1917, would bring 
international relations into agreement with the objectives of domestic politics.   
Bullard’s essay raises intriguing ideas about American diplomatic tradition, 
particularly in light of how Benjamin Franklin practiced diplomacy in France, 
emphasizing engagement with the people over the government of France.   Bullard 
explained how as a democratic nation, the diplomacy should also be democratic 
whereby the people are informed about America’s relations with other nations and 
representatives of America speak directly to the people of another nation.  He 
recognized President Lincoln for his use of democratic diplomacy during the Civil 
War, explaining how “Lincoln went over the heads of the Court of Saint James, 
                                                     
130 Bullard was a muckraker journalist and writer before the war began.  He had a 
longstanding interest in Russia, spending time there when the Russian Revolution 
began.  During the war, Bullard worked as a CPI representative in Moscow, Siberia, 
and Petrograd. 
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directly to the common people he loved and understood and trusted” (Bullard 1917, 
p. 497).  He blamed the deteriorated relations between the US and France on how 
the State Department did not make any effort to engage with the people of France 
directly.  Just as Benjamin Franklin had been advised over a hundred and fifty years 
ago to speak to the “people without doors,” Arthur Bullard was reminding American 
leaders to remember to engage with the citizens of nations vice the government.  
Following the input from Lippmann, Bullard, as well as the Secretaries of 
the Navy, War, and State, the CPI was created through an Executive Order (EO) on 
April 13, 1917.   There was some discussion of drafting legislation to make the 
committee a legal part of the US government, but the idea never came to fruition 
(Vaughn 1979).  The Committee was funded through the President’s Discretionary 
Fund 131  initially, with Congress providing war appropriations funds to the CPI 
between 1918 and 1919 132  (Creel 1920a).  Parts of the CPI’s operations were 
subsidized and supported not only by individual volunteers, but also other US 
government agencies and private organizations as well as earnings made from 
exhibitions and movie sales (Creel 1920a).  After the creation of the committee, the 
organization grew in a haphazard fashion (Mock & Larson 1939a; Vaughn 1980).  As 
ideas or new needs were identified, new offices, bureaus, or divisions were created 
or dissolved.  
                                                     
131 A fund established in the first few years after the Constitution was ratified and typically 
used by US Presidents for foreign policy emergencies.  Special agents appointed by the 
President were often paid with money from the President’s Discretionary Fund.  The 
use of the fund allowed the President to bypass Congress.  As will be explained in 
Chapter 7, President Franklin D. Roosevelt also used his discretionary fund to establish 
several information agencies prior to America’s entrance into WWII.  Funding for 
these agencies would eventually come from war emergency funds appropriated by 
Congress.   
132 Congress only appropriated $1.25 million dollars as opposed to the $5.6 million used 
from the President’s fund (Creel 1920a). 
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 “If we are entering an era of more and more open diplomacy, in order 
to make the policies of this government most effective abroad we must 
use the legitimate methods of publicity to reach widely great masses of 
people in other countries…”133 
The overseas operations of the CPI began in September 1917 with the 
establishment of the Wireless and Cable Service, known by the cable code address 
COMPUB, but the Foreign Section of the CPI was not formed until October 1917 at 
the behest of President Wilson (Unsigned, untitled document, n.d., RG 63, Entry 
13, Box 2).  More robust activities began in November and December of 1917 with 
the CPI sending representatives to posts overseas, in some cases inside US legations 
and other times in separate offices.  The work of the Foreign Section was divided 
into three divisions: Cable, Mail, and Film (Unsigned, untitled document, n.d., RG 
63, Entry 13, Box 2).  Much like the Domestic Section, the Foreign Section of the 
CPI used the (foreign) press, wireless service for spot news, window displays, 
posters, pamphlets, speakers, and films to engage with the public overseas.  Using 
these media platforms, the CPI explained American war aims, demonstrated 
America’s mobilization for war, and attempted to provide some understanding about 
America, the land and its people.     
Of those who were responsible for the CPI’s operations overseas, all of 
them had very clear ideas about what was required to engage with the people of 
various nations, and most of them emphasized the importance of knowing the people 
and the environment where the information would be sent:   
 
A body of ‘scouts.’  It should be their duty to go out constantly among the 
people in order to find the opinions which we must combat, and to let us 
know in general what the people are thinking.  This job requires reliable 
people of the newspaper reporter type, thoroughly conversant with the 
language.  If they had some other apparent job to lull suspicion so much the 
better (Report on Foreign Propaganda, Will Irwin, n.d. [circa winter 
1917/early 1918], RG 63, Entry 105, Box 10). 
 
As such, the Foreign Section of the CPI did a great deal of listening.  From military 
intelligence reports which detailed a country’s political structure and background, 
culture and psychology, as well as leading newspapers and their political leanings, 
                                                     
133 Ernest Poole to George Creel, 15 November 1918, RG 63, Entry 13, Box 2. 
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the military and the CPI identified country-specific objectives for American 
engagement (RG 63, Entry 133, Box 5).  These objectives were determined based 
on not only what America wanted to convey to the people of another nation, but 
also based on the situation of the country, internally and externally.  Just as Harold 
Lasswell observes in his study, Propaganda Technique during World War I, the CPI, like 
other nations, emphasized different messages for each country based largely on 
whether the country was neutral, an ally, or an enemy ([1927] 1971).  In a military 
assessment for Sweden, a neutral during the war, the objectives for American 
engagement were:  
 
1.) To counteract and dissipate Sweden’s fear of Germany… 
2.) To combat German peace propaganda and German falsehoods directed 
against the Allied [sic] 
3.) To block Germany efforts, already markedly successful to obtain 
complete control of the conservative party. 
4.) To show why America is in the war and prove that she is going to stay 
put. 
5.) To prove that in America Sweden has a friend who will see that the 
Swedish problems will be given a fair solution when peace conditions 
are imposed on Germany (“Sweden Military Intelligence Psychological 
Estimate,” 13 May 1918, RG 63, Entry 133, Box 5). 
 
While in Mexico the CPI’s:  
 
primary objective…is to convince that country that the successful solution 
of her political difficulties and her economic prosperity depend upon 
friendly relations and cooperation with the United States…German 
propaganda is making every effort to foment anti-American feeling, which is 
now extraordinarily bitter.  Its ultimate object is to force American 
intervention.  The secondary objective is therefore to combat this 
propaganda (“Propaganda Manual: Mexico, n.d., RG 63, Entry 133, Box 5). 
 
Though both Mexico and Sweden were neutral throughout the war, the CPI did not 
define the same objectives for both countries.  The goals for American engagement 
in both countries reflect concerns about America’s relations with the nation as well 
as Sweden’s and Mexico’s individual situation.134  Techniques for engagement were 
                                                     
134 According to the Sweden psychological assessment, the country had been subject to 
intensive German influence and subversion.  On the other hand, Mexico had suffered a 
great deal of internal political instability, some of which had been exacerbated by 
American interventions in 1914 - 1917.  Sweden’s population tended to be more 
- 138 - 
 
essentially the same for both nations, but in Sweden, the CPI ensured that the 
Swedish press received regular cable news service from the CPI office in New York 
and arranged for Swedish-American papers and magazines to be distributed in the 
country.  In Mexico, the CPI used films to show American agriculture, culture, and 
industry.  The CPI also arranged for a group of Mexican editors to tour the US as a 
way of generating goodwill. 
 This was not the only method of listening employed by the CPI.  The officers 
in Washington crafting and pulling together resources to disseminate overseas were 
constantly begging the officers posted in country to provide feedback on how the 
material was received by the public.  In one report, the Foreign Division complained 
about the lack of feedback received from CPI agents, reporting “…we sent a cable 
asking for criticism from all foreign agents, but as yet have had no replies” (Division 
of Foreign Press – Mail Report, 30 March 1918, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 11).  As a 
result, the Division started to include a questionnaire in each package they sent 
overseas which asked a series of questions about the content, style, and type of 
materials sent: 
 
(1) Is the material sent in convenient form?  Specify exactly what change, if 
any, desired. 
(2) What of our material has been used and not used... 
(6) What particulars of the situation in country where you are stationed 
should be kept in mind in preparation of material? 
(7) What are people talking about?  What seems to be their opinion of the 
US?  What do they want to read from the U.S…(RG 63, Entry 105, Box 
11). 
 
The documents and letters exchanged between the CPI officers in Washington and 
New York and the representatives abroad emphasize how crucial listening was to the 
work of the CPI.  This listening was only used to inform CPI engagement efforts; 
there is no indication in the archives that any of the information collected by the CPI 
was used to inform US policy.  When the demobilization order for the CPI’s foreign 
                                                                                                                                       
literate and educated, whereas many Mexicans were not.  These and other factors are 
noted in each of the country assessments, impacting the CPI’s approach to both nations.  
It should also be noted that in the case of both assessments, emphasis was placed on 
how each nation’s history was connected to national psyche (“Sweden Military 
Intelligence Psychological Estimate,” 13 May 1918 & “Propaganda Manual: Mexico, 
n.d., RG 63, Entry 133, Box 5). 
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operations was sent, many CPI agents, US ministers, and consular officers attempted 
to convey how halting American engagement with people abroad would hurt 
relations with their nation in the future.  Some suggested trying to hand-off 
operations to the DoS, but the decision to withdraw American engagement prevailed. 
“Our aim is to explain America to the world.”135   
 Perhaps the next important method of engagement for the CPI was advocacy.  
Though the objective of the Foreign Section was to inform the foreign public of 
America’s reasons for entering the war and the nation’s plans for peace, a great deal 
of the materials and information sent abroad advocated American values and 
objectives for peace.  As discussed earlier, Wilson and many working for the CPI 
hoped to remake the world when the war ended: 
 
The following notes are for a change of policy  - not to be adopted now but 
prepared for and put in action immediately when military activities 
cease…building up in all possible ways the international exchange service 
which you have begun – as it relates especially to the peace aims and 
reconstruction purposes of our government for a new international order 
(“Notes for Proposed New Policy – Hurt, n.d., RG 63, Entry 1, Box 19, 
emphasis added). 
 
One of the most effective ways for the CPI to advocate America’s peace program 
was through the publication of Wilson’s speeches, in particular his “Fourteen Points 
Speech.”  The speech was given to a joint session of Congress in January 1918, but 
the CPI went to tremendous lengths to ensure all of Wilson’s speeches were quickly 
disseminated, translated, and given to the foreign press for publication.  “Such a 
publication has gone a long way towards making clear to the world the American 
attitude and purpose” (Report of the Division of Foreign Press up to 1 February 
1918: RG 63, Entry 105, Box 16).  The famous speech reiterated the desire for 
peace without victory, the establishment of the League of Nations, open diplomacy, 
freedom of the seas, and emphasized the right of each nation to self-determination 
without outside interference.  
In addition to advocating Wilson’s ideas for peace, the CPI recognized how 
engagement could be used to generate support for American policies more generally: 
“…for to gain agreement abroad with our foreign policies we must gain the good 
                                                     
135 Poole to Irwin, 6 March 1918, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 16. 
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will of the world and arouse a friendly interest in all the aspects of life and work in 
the US” (Ernest Poole to George Creel, 15 November 1918: RG 63, Entry 13, Box 
2).  This was done by ensuring news and information about the American 
government and policies were made available to the foreign press. 
 
In September, 1918, there began at the Helsingfors American Consulate the 
receipt of news telegrams from the Committee on Public Information.  They 
were translated into Swedish and Finnish and given to the press.  In many 
instances they were not taken.  But quiet persistency together with news 
that really interested the reading public, and especially because of the non-
political matter, they gained headway…As was explained by the Consulate 
to many of the papers: “This news is not anti-German or pro-German or 
anti-French, or pro-French or anti or pro anything, except pro-truth.  It 
simply tells you what is happening in America and what Finns and Americans 
are not only thinking and saying but what they are doing – it is a narration of 
current human events”…The work done by the Committee of Public 
Information…has contributed wonderfully toward saving the situation…It 
has been done so as to create no irritation, and yet quietly demonstrated its force in 
supplanting William by Wilson and militarism by America.  While of course the 
turning of battle on the western front was the immediate cause of the 
turning of public opinion in Finland toward the Entente, the work done by 
the Committee has most effectively cleared the way and prepared a suitable 
soil wherein the unwillingly-changed public opinion can reasonably and 
conscientiously grow (“Compub Service in Finland,” n.d., RG 63, Entry 104, 
Box 13, emphasis added).  
 
The aims of America were also advocated using film.   
 
American moving pictures are extremely popular in Scandinavia…It is 
through moving pictures that America’s immense preparations for war can 
be put most convincingly before Swedish people, who are in the main 
ignorant of what we are doing and are not thoroughly convinced that our 
country intends to use all its resources and strength to beat Germany 
(“Sweden Military Intelligence Psychological Estimate,” 13 May 1918, RG 
63, Entry 133, Box 5). 
 
These efforts to advocate American plans for peace and different policies raises again 
the issue of what propaganda is and what propaganda is not.  According to the report 
on the Compub’s operations in Finland, initially the Finns did not want anything 
distributed by the CPI because they viewed the material as propaganda, and they had 
already been inundated with propaganda from the Germans, French, and British (RG 
63, Entry 104, Box 13).  Apparently what made the American material more 
acceptable was the fact that the news did not appear to have a slant.  While the 
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Domestic Section of the CPI operated in an environment where laws and social 
pressure often eliminated negative or dissenting views in the press, the Foreign 
Section had to work with foreign news outlets and compete with other governments’ 
propaganda.  
 
The underlying purpose of this [Foreign Press] Division is to help in the 
dissemination of news regarding America with special reference to making 
clear the reasons why this country entered the war, its purposes, military 
preparations and efforts.  America is appealing to the good sense and 
democratic instincts of the world…Speaking generally, it is fair to say that 
America has largely been misunderstood throughout the world and developments in 
this country have been badly or inadequately presented in the foreign press…With 
some notable exceptions, it can be stated that brief items, often sensational 
in character and never with background or proportion, have constituted the 
news sent from this country.  Many important news distributing centers 
have received no direct news from here (“Report of the Division of the 
Foreign Press (cable) up to February 1, 1918,” RG 63, Entry 105, Box 16, 
emphasis added).  
 
The report further explains how the division familiarized itself with all news channels 
around the world, looking specifically at those channels which carried news from 
America.  The Division engaged with foreign press correspondents and press agencies 
to encourage them to expand their coverage of America, emphasizing that the CPI 
does not wish to compete with established news agencies.  Given that the CPI did 
not have full control and had no way to control all media sources and channels in 
country, this suggests that if locals demonstrated a preference for American news 
information over other nations’ that there was in fact a difference in style and 
content.  According to reports provided by US military intelligence, US ministers, 
and consular officers, each noted how local publics viewed American reporting and 
why local publics liked or disliked American “propaganda” or “news.”136 
                                                     
136 Memo from Foreign Section to Paul Kennaday, Aug 16, 1918 passed information 
received by Military Intelligence from a confidential source in Paris regarding the 
impact of American propaganda abroad, specifically in France.  “Publicity in 
newspapers and magazines, and the talks in universities, in munitions works, and in 
industrial establishments, have a good result also...Propaganda by word of mouth is 
difficult to carry on and seems to have great effect” (RG 63, Entry 105, Box 10).  
Philip Patchlin (DoS) to George Creel passed along a request from the American 
minister posted in The Hague.  Dutch journalists complained about the lack of reliable 
American news and requested that the US establish a telegraphic news service for 
neutral countries (2 February 1918, RG 63, Entry 111, Box 1).  Memo addressed to 
American Chargé de Affaires in Zurich, Hugh Wilson, from CPI officer, Carl 
- 142 - 
 
“We are carrying back to our country, Mr. President, the most valuable 
token of your words which embody the highest ideals of mankind.  We 
feel happy at having heard such words from your lips and we assure you 
and the American nation of our deep appreciation for your kind 
hospitality...”137 
 In addition to three separate tours of the US for journalists from Mexico, 
Italy, and Sweden, there were both private and public efforts to facilitate academic 
exchanges, trading educational periodicals between the US and other nations, and 
arranging pen pals between American students and students of other nations.138  The 
first exchange of journalists occurred in June 1918 with a group of Mexican 
newspaper editors invited to tour America.  Mexican-American relations were 
seriously damaged after several US military incursions into Mexico starting in 1914.  
The relationship did not improve with the publication of the Zimmerman Telegram, 
though Mexico refused Germany’s proposal and remained neutral.   
A group of private businessmen organized a commission for the purpose of 
countering German misinformation, based on concerns about the continued efforts 
by Germany to foment anti-American sentiment in Mexico.  However, some of their 
efforts only exacerbated the mistrust and anger felt by many Mexicans toward the 
US.  The American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico printed a pamphlet “which 
purported to convince the Mexicans how desirable friendly relations were between 
the United States and Mexico.  The chief argument used was the vast undeveloped 
wealth of Mexico and the great advantage which close trade relations would be to 
the United States.  This merely gave anti-American newspapers a chance to raise the 
                                                                                                                                       
Ackerman, explained how information passed directly from the CPI was viewed as 
being official propaganda and was rejected outright by the Swiss.  He suggested that the 
Associated Press and United Press (both American news outlets) be asked to open a 
news bureau in Switzerland to receive American news from the US to provide to the 
Swiss press (RG 59, CDF 1910-29, Box 0736). 
137 Telegram to the White House, Addressed to President Wilson from the Mexican 
Editors who toured America, Jul 12, 1918 (RG 63, Entry 105, Box 13). 
138 Paul Kennaday reported to Ernest Poole that Guy Stanton Ford, Dean of the University 
of Minnesota, had proposed arranging academic exchanges.  James Shotwell, John 
Dewey, and other university professors agreed to work with Herbert Carpenter to 
finance the exchanges (28 March 1918, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 16).  Ernest Poole 
provided George Creel with the Education Division’s list of planned projects which 
included exchanging academic articles and journals between nations, international 
academic conferences, and organizing pen pals between school children in the US and 
abroad (1 July 1918, RG 63, Entry 13, Box 2). 
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old cry of ‘Yankee commercialism’” (“Propaganda Manual: Mexico, n.d., RG 63, 
Entry 133, Box 5).   
Further undermining the development of friendly relations, the CPI 
appointed Robert H. Murray, who became “the most hated and unpopular man in 
the American colony in Mexico City…” while serving as a correspondent for the New 
York World (“Propaganda Manual: Mexico, n.d., RG63, Entry 133, Box 5).  The 
CPI’s efforts were also hampered by virtual monopoly the Germans held over the 
Mexican press.  In June 1915, a consortium of German citizens and government 
officials formed a league to financially support ten major news outlets in Mexico, 
thus limiting the CPI’s access and effectiveness to compete with German control of 
the Mexican press.  The solution to this impasse was to invite the editors of the 
leading papers in Mexico to the US in an effort to counter the misinformation 
disseminated by the Germans and to improve relations with Mexico more generally.   
 Though the tours were financed by the government, many private citizens 
and businesses supported the tour by acting as hosts and guides, providing 
entertainment and dinners in honour of the guests.139  The US Navy and Army 
granted the groups access to shipyards and munition factories.  President Wilson met 
with each of the groups.  Companies such as Bethlehem Steel, General Electric, and 
Ford Motor Company offered tours of their factories (RG 63, Entry 105, Box 13).   
During both the Mexican and Italian visits, similar issues threatened to 
undermine the purpose of the tours.  With both tours, the CPI representative 
accompanying the groups reported that the tour was repetitive and overscheduled.  
Much of the tours consisted of visiting American factories from coast to coast: “A 
great many of the factories we show them all along the line are duplications of the 
larger and better factories, which they saw earlier on the trip.  We have seen so 
many of them that they dream of riveting machines, and can see pile drivers and 
ditch diggers on every corner of the street” (Lieutenant Reis to Will Irwin, 22 June 
1918, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 13).  There was an overemphasis on demonstrating 
                                                     
139 The New Orleans Association of Commerce hosted the Mexican journalists when they 
visited and the mayor of the city hosted a luncheon in their honour (Walter Parker to 
Will Irwin, 5 June 1918, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 13).  The Italians were shadowed on 
their tour of the US by the Roman Legion, a US civic organization of Italian heritage.  
The CPI representative travelling with the Italian journalists reported that the 
journalists found the Roman Legion offensive and irritating (Robert Whiting to Carl 
Byoir, 22 August 1918, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 10). 
- 144 - 
 
American military preparation and economic power on these tours, with little time 
for visiting cultural sites throughout the US.  The reason for the emphasis on military 
preparation and American economy was linked to the CPI’s objectives for both 
countries, as well as more long-term strategic national objectives.  German 
propaganda in both Mexico and Italy claimed America was unprepared for war and 
would not be prepared in time to win the war for the Allies.  CPI representatives 
believed the best way to show the world that America was ready for war was for 
people to actually see the preparations for themselves, through pictures and films, 
but also through the eyes of their fellow countrymen.  With the Mexican and Italian 
visits, the plan was for the journalists to send stories back to their newspapers in 
Mexico and Italy reporting on what they had seen of American preparations.  In the 
case of the Italians, demonstrating American mobilization and seriousness about 
winning the war was intended to improve Italian morale (Merriam 1919). 
On the other hand, the emphasis on America’s economy was connected to 
various ideas about what foreign public engagement meant for both America and the 
rest of the world.  In many ways, the emphasis on developing trade relations typifies 
America’s diplomatic tradition of favouring economic ties over political ones.140  
Many Americans, both inside and outside the government, believed the best way to 
maintain friendly relations was through commerce: “The idea of cooperation 
properly developed between countries should greatly help our foreign commerce, 
and may not only improve international relations but may prevent disagreements and 
even wars” (Harrison C. Lewis [General Manager, National Paper & Type Company] 
to Irwin, 21 July 1918 (a), RG 63, Entry 105, Box 12).  American ideas about 
improving trade relations as a means of ensuring peaceful relations can be traced to 
not only American experience, but also seventeenth century liberal thought 
emphasizing free trade as a means of ensuring peace and avoiding economic 
                                                     
140 Max Savelle explains how 17th century North American colonies prioritized trade 
relations over politics as a matter of survival, given the long distance between their 
colonial overseers in Europe (1934).  George Washington’s Farewell Address also 
emphasized “extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political 
connection as possible,” what he referred to as the Great Rule (1796).  
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competition (Howard 1978; Savelle 1934).  These ideas were emphasized by those 
working for the CPI and the private entities that assisted the CPI.141 
Both the Mexican and Italian journalists complained about feeling rushed 
through the US and not having enough time to relax, socialize, and write articles for 
their readers at home (Will Irwin to Walter Rogers, 13 June 1918, RG 63, Entry 
105, Box 13; Robert R. Whiting to Carl Byoir, 22 August 1918, RG 63, Entry 105, 
Box 10).   
 
May I also say that these Mexicans need more time to themselves than 
similar groups of Anglo-Saxons would need or desire.  It irritates them to be 
rushed too much, and they need for their own good and ours frequent 
opportunities of being by themselves, with possibly a few Spanish-speaking 
and ‘simpatico’ Americans.  A constant succession of formal entertainments 
and a never-ceasing program will weary them and dissipate some of the ideas 
they are absorbing.  They should also certainly have time to write their 
papers frequently, giving daily and weekly impressions, rather than await 
their return (Harrison Lewis, General Manager of National Paper & Type 
Company, to Will Irwin, 15 June 1918, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 12). 
 
Seemingly, with the third visit of Swedish journalists in September 1918, the CPI 
changed the schedule to include more cultural places of interest (“The Visit to 
Washington of the Delegation of Swiss Journalists,” October 1918, RG 63, Entry 
132, Box 3).  The Swiss were escorted to George Washington’s home at Mount 
Vernon, the Metropolitan Opera, as well as Charles M. Schwab’s142 steel factory. 
Other exchanges were encouraged by the CPI, but facilitated by private 
entities.  Colombia University, Yale University, and Harvard University professors 
                                                     
141 Mark Kellogg of the Burroughs Adding Machine Company wrote to George Creel to 
volunteer advertising space for the CPI based on the CPI’s belief “that a wide expansion 
of this sort of effort [foreign educational advertising] will have a favourable effect in the 
contest for world markets at the close of the war” (4 September 1918, RG 63, Entry 
105, Box 4).  James Carson and Harrison Lewis of the National Paper and Type 
Company spearheaded creating an advisory committee of American businesses with ties 
to Latin America for the purpose of improving relations between the US and Latin 
America and as a result improve trade relations. “The idea of cooperation between this 
recognized Giant of the North and the slowly developing but potentially important 
countries to the South, properly presented to the Latins and to the people of our own 
country, may create a bond of great political importance and develop a belief in the 
ultimate commercial supremacy of our country which the Latins will be quick to 
realize and eager to take advantage of” (Harrison Lewis to Will Irwin, 21 June 1918: 
RG 63, Entry 105, Box 12). 
142 Schwab was the owner of Bethlehem Steel and the son of German immigrants. 
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agreed to work together to create schemes for exchanges between students and 
scholars (Paul Kennaday to Ernest Poole, 28 March 1918: RG 63, Entry 105, Box 
16).  Dr. Huber William Hurt ran the Education Division of the CPI which worked 
with both the Foreign and Domestic Sections of the CPI.  In the summer of 1918, Dr. 
Hurt’s division started on education projects overseas.  He reached out to educators 
across the US to assist him with some of the exchange projects the division 
developed, including arranging for over a hundred French women to study in the US 
on scholarship (“September Report: Education,” 28 September 1918: RG 63, Entry 
13, Box 2).  Of significance to this study is how the activities of the Education 
Division were started and continued though the CPI eventually ceased operations.  
By December 1918, the Division was attempting to end all operations.  However, as 
will be demonstrated the following chapter, many of the people who initiated 
exchanges at the behest of the CPI, continued to arrange academic exchanges.  
Organizations such as CEIP, the American Library Association, the Pan American 
Union, and the National Educators Association along with university professors such 
as Guy Stanton Ford,143 James Shotwell,144 Paul Reinsch,145 and Nicholas Murray 
Butler146 launched programs for exchanges just after WWI concluded.  Thus they 
perpetuated the relationship between public and private entities in undertaking 
foreign public engagement initiatives. 
                                                     
143 Guy Ford Stanton was the Dean at the University of Minnesota.  Dean Ford provided 
support for the Education Division of the CPI. 
144 James Shotwell was a professor at Colombia Univesity.  He also served as a Director of 
Research for the CEIP alongside Nicholas Murray Butler. 
145 Professor Paul Reinsch was a representative at the 4th Pan American Conference in 
Buenos Aires.  He went on to serve as on the Committee of Research for CEIP in 1919 
as the American Minister to China. 
146 Nicholas Murray Butler was also a Colombia professor, who worked with the German 
government before the war to establish academic exchanges between Colombia and 
Germany.  Nicholas Murray Butler served on the Board of Trustees for CEIP. 
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“If we find the Foreign Office of any country standing in the way of 
cordial friendship, we must go over their heads, directly to the people.  
It is popular friendship more than the good-will of the rulers of the 
moment which we seek.”147 
From the start, President Wilson wanted to distinguish between the German 
government and the German people, believing that the way to conclude the war 
quickly was to ensure the German public knew that America was not at war with 
them, but with their government.  As mentioned earlier, America’s contact with 
Germany was severed when the war began in 1914, so the CPI with the US military 
worked together to find ways to reach the German people directly as well as 
indirectly.  The CPI used psychological warfare by attempting to speak directly to the 
people of Germany rather than the German government in order to secure peace 
more quickly (“Enemy Propaganda,” n.d., RG63, Entry 1, Box 16).  This was done 
in two ways.  First, the CPI made a concerted effort to engage the people of 
Scandinavia and Switzerland148 as a way to indirectly reach the German public.   
 
By “the indirect way” I mean the influencing and instructing of the German 
people through contiguous neutral countries, and let me state at once that I 
consider it by far the most effective which can be used…If it is desired to 
make known to the German people the extent and the spirit of American 
participation in the war, it can be laid down with reasonable certainty that 
ten days after such a conviction has passed into the minds of the German-
Swiss it will be shared by the Germans themselves.  Obviously…it is 
necessary to work upon the German-Swiss people, and this is best done by 
means of their newspapers, which are printed in German, which have been 
severely critical of all things American, and which circulate to an extent in 
Germany…(“Enemy Propaganda,” n.d., RG 63, Entry 1, Box 16). 
 
In addition to targeting the press of neutral countries such as Switzerland, the CPI 
also used films and exchanges as a way to get their message to the German people 
indirectly. 
 
                                                     
147 Arthur Bullard. (1917). “Democracy and Diplomacy,” Atlantic Monthly, p. 499. 
148 The CPI targeted these neutral countries because of their shared heritage with the 
Germans. 
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…I await Mrs. Whitehouse’s149 instructions to begin shipping to her both 
moving pictures and “stills.”  I have already shipped her copy of our big 
film…[The] Committee’s representative in Holland, recently came to 
France with two Dutch journalists…and this office did all it could to make 
their visit to the American front a success….Representatives of papers 
hitherto doubtful of the efficiency of the American military effort, from 
Switzerland, Holland and Spain, should be invited to see what we have done 
in France and elsewhere…Mrs. Whitehouse, I know, intends to arrange for 
a delegation of Swiss journalists, the General Staff of the American Army 
here has already invited Swiss officers to come…Needless to say, I am doing 
all in my power to encourage this form of propaganda, and this office is at all 
times ready to facilitate trips of such as reach France (“Enemy Propaganda,” 
n.d., RG 63, Entry 1, Box 16). 
 
The CPI believed that if people abroad could see what America was doing to prepare 
for war and their commitment to win the war, then they would pass along what they 
saw and heard to their countrymen.  The CPI considered this personal form of 
engagement to be more effective at getting their message across to the people, since 
the information was not coming directly from the US government.  This belief in 
personal contact contradicts the propagandistic characterization of the CPI.  Officers 
of the CPI recognized that personal exchanges between people were more likely to 
have a positive impact than mass propaganda. 
 Another way in which the CPI, along with the US military, tried to engage 
the German public was directly, using mechanical methods to disperse pamphlets 
and fliers.   
 
The military authorities (French, British, and our own) place chief 
dependence on rifle grenade and the paper balloon.  The grenade, fired from 
a rifle, and exploding in such a manner as to send a shower of tracts or 
pamphlets fluttering down into the trenches…The effect of this form of 
sending has been closely watched…As the distance to be covered grows, the 
use of the balloon becomes imperative…(“Enemy Propaganda,” n.d., RG 63, 
Entry 1, Box 16).  
 
                                                     
149 Mrs. Vera Whitehouse was an American advocate for woman’s right to vote and the 
CPI representative in Switzerland.  Her initial arrival in Switzerland started badly when 
she and the US ambassador Pleasant Stovall got into an argument over her position in 
the country.  The disagreement caused her to leave the country.  Eventually, President 
Wilson interceded on her behalf, writing to both Secretary of State Lansing and 
ambassador Stovall personally, demanding that they both cooperate with Mrs. 
Whitehouse (103.9302/64; 103.9302/71 RG 59, CDF 1910-1929, Box 0736). 
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The US military used two different types of balloons depending on their target.  
When targeting the German citizens behind German lines, they used a fabric balloon 
which carried twenty pounds of material, could travel for eighteen hours, and reach 
major cities like Hamburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Trieste.  For reaching German troops, 
the US military used a paper balloon which only carried four pounds of materials 
(“Enemy Propaganda,” n.d., RG 63, Entry 1, Box 16).  Similar methods would be 
used during WWII.  The CPI knew carrying materials distributed by the Allies was 
forbidden, but military intelligence observed Germans collecting the materials and 
hiding them to read later (“Enemy Propaganda,” n.d., RG 63, Entry 1, Box 16). 
 The material used to drop into Germany was excerpted from the German 
press, in keeping with the CPI’s emphasis on using facts to achieve their primary 
objectives. 
 
…[I]t is proved beyond a doubt that extracts from German papers tending 
to weaken the German spirit have the greatest value.  If, for example, the 
Arbeiter-Zeitung is found printing an article expressing war-weariness, or 
even so much as hinting at the possibility of German defeat, this is at once 
seized on, and is sent back with no further comment than that is an article 
from such-and-such a German paper, printed on such a date. 
 
It has been found that today the German is little, if at all, to be moved by 
anything coming from foreign sources – that is to say, from enemy sources.  
Only that which comes from within Germany, or perhaps from German 
Switzerland, will make an impression.  Thus, if it is desired to send over a 
general and impressive statement as to the extent of the American effort in 
France and at home, it would emphatically be best to secure publication in a 
German-Swiss paper of a story setting forth the facts.  Then, when this is to 
be sent into enemy trenches, it could be quoted as the statement of a paper 
known to be pro-German, and would stand a thousand times better chance 
of being believed than if it was obviously from enemy sources (“Enemy 
Propaganda,” n.d., RG 63, Entry 1, Box 16). 
 
These same observations are echoed by another CPI officer, Carl Ackerman, though 
in reference to the Swiss.  He advocated for the Associated Press and United Press to 
establish news bureaus in Switzerland, to ensure news items passed from American 
press outlets would go to the Swiss and German press without the label “American 
government propaganda” (RG 59, CDF 1910-1929, Box 0736, 103.9302/48).  The 
CPI thought that if the German people could be given the truth, both indirectly and 
directly, they could be convinced to stop fighting.  This meant convincing the 
Germans that their submarine offense would not be enough for them to win the war 
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and that America was already prepared to fight and currently fighting.  To achieve 
this, the CPI again used the press as the primary means, making sure these messages 
filtered into Germany, taking groups of journalists from neutral countries to the 
French and American fronts and ensuring news of America’s war efforts were 
reported in their press as well. 
 “Our educational effort in other countries from the first has had wider 
purpose than the facts of war.  What we have tried to do is to introduce 
America to the world, to make friends for America, to bring about 
intimate understanding and close cooperation and it may be that this 
work now is of greater importance than ever before.”150   
Long after the Domestic Section of the CPI ceased operations, the Foreign 
Section ended their operations in the spring of 1919.  Ernest Poole cabled all 
overseas offices on February 4th to demobilize no later than March 15th (Telegram to 
Norton from Rickey, 4 February 1919, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 14).  As rumours 
that the CPI would cease operations began to circulate, followed closely by the order 
to demobilize, various CPI representatives, US consuls and ministers began to 
protest that the CPI overseas operations should continue to operate.  Though there 
was support among the consular officers, ministers, and CPI representatives, they 
each voiced their own ideas of why engagement with the people of other nations 
should continue.  The consul of Finland noted the economic advantages, saying “[if] 
the Government could not lend a hand in carrying on this work, it would be financially 
beneficial if the interests of American trade could be influenced to carry on such 
propaganda…(“Compub Service in Finland,” N.D. written by US Consul Thornwell 
Haynes, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 13, emphasis added).  To others, the work of the 
CPI helped other people of the world to understand America: 
 
When you get this letter I wish you would cable your candid opinion as to 
how long this work is going to last.  This information is more important 
through the fact that most of Bullard’s men engaged in this work for the 
duration of the war and it seems rather difficult to convince them that the 
Compub end of the work is now more important than ever…Incidentally if 
the Compub should withdraw from all other parts of the World, this 
Division should continue.  Russia does not understand America and our work here 
has only begun (Report from Philip Norton, Russian Div. CPI, to H.N. 
Rickey, 9 Jan 1919: RG 63, Entry 105, Box 14, emphasis added). 
                                                     
150 Unsigned, undated memo, RG 63, Entry 13, Box 1 
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And others recognized not just the advantage to the US government, but also 
perceived the impact of retreating after establishing relations with people of other 
nations: 
 
“ACCUMULATING EVIDENCE IS CONVINCING DEMOBILIZATION MISTAKE REACTION 
FROM WHICH WILL BRING REVULSION FEELING AGAINST AMERICA WITH PECULIAR EFFECT AT 
THIS CRITICAL TIME STOP BULLARDS ORGANIZATION WORK INTIMATELY KNOWN 
TO ALL RUSSIANS IN SIBERIA AS DIRECT CONNECTION WITH AMERICAN PEOPLE 
THEREFORE THEY NOW SEE IN SUSPENSION ACTIVITIES ABSOLUTE 
ABANDONMENT STOP…YEARS OF  BELATED EFFORT MAY NOT ERASE IMPRESSION 
BURNED INTO PEOPLE DURING THEIR DARKEST HOUR STOP…AMBASSADOR IS 
CABLING STATE DEPARTMENT ASKING RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER UNTIL 
BULLARD ARRIVES AT WASHINGTON STOP…JAPANS PUBLICITY GROUP 
ARRIVED TODAY HEADED BY ZUMOTO STOP BRITISH HAVE PURCHASED AND 
COMMENCE NEXT WEEK PUBLICATION RUSSIAN ENGLISH NEWSPAPER STOP 
AMERICAN QUITS END” (Cable from Philip Norton to Harry N. Rickey, Feb 
15, 1919: RG 63, Entry 105, Box 14, emphasis added). 
 
The protests against ceasing CPI’s overseas operations did not alter the fate of the 
CPI.151 
 These objections against the closure of the CPI raises some important points 
regarding American foreign public engagement generally and its future specifically.  
As highlighted at the beginning of the chapter, many people whether within the CPI 
or outside, saw different benefits to engaging with people abroad.  The consul in 
Finland saw economic benefits to future engagement, while officers stationed 
throughout Russia believed US security and diplomatic relations were imperilled 
should the US break direct relations with the people of Russia.  Philip Norton’s 
report to Harry Rickey from Russia noted how the Russian people did not 
understand the US, a problem noted in two of the previous cases.  Then Norton’s 
cable sent one month later emphasized how the relationships established between the 
US and the people of Russia would be damaged by breaking off all future 
engagement.  He emphasized the diplomatic benefit of engagement.  Norton’s 
                                                     
151 By the conclusion of the Paris Peace Conference, President Wilson was facing a partisan 
political battle in the US which focused not just on the Versailles Treaty and the League 
of Nations, but also the CPI.  Congress, specifically Republican Congressmen, became 
suspicious of the CPI’s activities and how such an organization might be used for 
political campaigning.  The CPI was also facing accusations that the organization 
misused funds and that Creel did use the CPI to censor information. 
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communiques contrast with the consuls in terms of what the intent of engagement 
should be. This debate about the purpose of engagement reflects the overlap of issues 
as identified in Chapter 1.  These different views about the role of engagement, what 
it should or should not do create problems for conceptualizing what the CPI was 
doing.  Furthermore, the varying perspectives also demonstrate different ideas about 
the role of engagement in statecraft whether to benefit US economic relations, 
security, or foreign relations generally.   
In addition, this leads to the question asked at the start of this chapter: what 
made the operations of the CPI propagandistic?  As the methods to engage people 
abroad resemble earlier efforts by Benjamin Franklin, Thurlow Weed, John 
M’Clintock, Nicholas Murray Butler, and others to engage with people abroad, the 
techniques of engagement themselves do not signal CPI operations as propaganda.  
Rather, the CPI frequently slipped from merely representing America, American ideas 
and foreign policy to trying to implement American ideas and foreign policy around 
the world. 
With the creation of the CPI, President Wilson, George Creel, and others 
working for the CPI strove to create a “democratic diplomacy” based largely on 
Arthur Bullard’s own ideas.  Often, whether through eagerness and 
absentmindedness, the genuine intent to engage with the people both at home and 
abroad tended to veer toward more negative intentions to control domestic opinion 
and sell American ideals and products abroad in hopes that people around the world 
would adopt these same principles and buy American goods.  The CPI was created 
with the idea of preventing the uninformed citizen by educating and informing.  But as 
with the arranged tours for the Mexican and Italian journalists, the CPI tended to 
overemphasize American economic power rather than providing a sample of 
America as a nation and a people.  In essence, President Woodrow Wilson hoped to 
sell American principles to the world using the CPI.  Unfortunately, Wilson’s own 
compromises at the Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles undermined 
all the CPI had gained in publicizing American ideals of self-determination, peace 
without victory, and the League of Nations.  Wilson assumed that the other powers, 
in particular France and England, would accept his vision of peace, but he was 
gravely mistaken (Herring 2008).  Wilson and the CPI’s ideas and conceptualization 
of the purpose behind the Committee’s foreign engagement tie again to the issue of 
ideology raised in Chapter 1.   
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On the basis of America’s duty to uplift the world Wilson was convinced 
that the United States could no longer live isolated from the rest of mankind.  
Instead, she was bound to assume the new obligations for neighbourliness 
imposed by the increasing interdependence of the world and by her 
ascendance to world power.  However, he was always careful to point out that the 
realization of America’s mission did not imply an extension of her physical power, for 
he believed that it was American character and ideals, not American wealth or 
military might, that the world so keenly needed (Osgood 1953, p. 177, emphasis 
added). 
 
The CPI advocated American ideas not only to improve the image of the US, but also 
in conformity with Wilson’s foreign policy which envisioned a new role for America 
internationally as well as for the future of the world, one where other nation’s 
would adopt US principles.   
In many Americans’ eyes in the first decade of the twentieth century, the 
advances in mass communication and crowd psychology meant the traditional 
processes of the democratic society were being corroded.  Compounding this loss of 
faith in the democratic process was the fear of organizations, people, and nations 
who might intentionally use mass communications and advertising methods to 
misinform the public or withhold information needed for informed debate.  The CPI 
was intended to be the solution to this threat, but as many scholars have observed, 
the CPI did withhold information and to a certain degree misinformed the public by 
framing the information to ensure positive support for the war (Gary 1999; Sproule 
1997; Vaughn 1980).  Even the CPI’s activities abroad tended to portray America in 
positive terms and advocated for international political reform according to 
American principles. 
Analysing the different views of the CPI’s mission abroad raises some of the 
difficult issues which develop along with American foreign public engagement.  
Often, due to the CPI’s and America’s leaders’ own desire to validate their 
intervention in the war and achieve Wilson’s idealist goal of reshaping the world in 
the image of the US, the efforts of the CPI became propagandistic in nature.  The 
CPI pushed American ideals and idealism as the solution to the violence of the world 
war, seeking acceptance of America’s vision for the future, rather than simply letting 
“American events tell their story” (“Report of the Division of Foreign Press up to 1 
February 1918”: RG 63, Entry 105, Box 16).  As some serving American ministers 
or consular officers observed, the CPI’s efforts became political in tone, rather than 
honestly attempting to provide a broad understanding of America as a nation and a 
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people.152  For example, the CPI in Russia often ran into problems with both the 
Russian government and the Department of State for their attempt to support 
certain factions during the aftermath of the Russian Revolution of 1917 (Fike 1959; 
RG 63, Entry 1, Box 3).153 
Not only does this case bring to the surface some of the problems in 
distinguishing between American propaganda and public diplomacy, the CPI’s efforts 
to engage foreign publics in many ways is an extension of some the forces already set 
motion at the turn of the century.  Much of the foreign work undertaken by the CPI 
was supported by private organizations, including the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace and the American Red Cross, furthering the cooperative 
relationship between private entities and the US government in foreign public 
engagement efforts.  The CEIP gave the CPI use of their offices, rent free, for the 
duration of the war (RG 59, CDF 1910-1929, Box 0736, 103.93/1562A - 
103.9302/118H, [document unnumbered]).  CEIP also funded various efforts to 
establish libraries and American reading rooms abroad, an activity which continued 
after the war.  The ARC, along with the Young Men’s Christian Association 
(YMCA), were instrumental in ensuring CPI materials were distributed abroad, 
including operating mobile theatres.  These foundations were not alone in facilitating 
the CPI’s efforts abroad, private businesses volunteered office spaces for CPI 
window displays in foreign countries, they offered to distribute pamphlets and other 
                                                     
152 There was frequent concern expressed in particular countries, such as England, France, 
and Switzerland, warning the CPI not to attempt any sort of propaganda because the 
people had become desensitized due to other nations’ propaganda efforts: “Memo for 
Committee on Public Information, Subj: American Propaganda in Switzerland” warns 
CPI materials are too political in nature and reminiscent of German propaganda, the 
memo suggests the CPI stick to providing straight news (RG 63, Entry 105, Box 16).  
“Memo from John Balderston (Compub London) to Edgar Sisson 9 August 1918” 
warns Sisson that the CPI cannot just hand out spot news to British journalists, as they 
see it as government propaganda (RG 63, Entry 105, Box 3).  
153 Claude Fike argues that the CPI, the ARC, and the American YMCA usurped the State 
Department reporting directly to President Wilson and Colonel regarding the political 
situation in Russia (1959).  However, based on the records of the CPI, Arthur Bullard 
reported to George Creel why Edgar Sisson avoided sending reports through the 
American legation.  According Bullard, the American Ambassador, David Francis, was 
having an affair with a woman who was suspected by British Security Services to be a 
spy.  Bullard reported that Francis allowed the woman to file and encrypt State 
messages back to Washington.  As a result, none of the Allied governments trusted the 
US legation, and Sisson and Bullard started sending their reports through US military 
channels (Bullard to Creel, 20 December 1917, RG 63, Entry 1, Box 3). 
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materials, and hosted foreign visitors.  Without private support, CPI would not have 
been able to carry out many of their overseas operations, nor reach people in more 
remote regions.  Figure 5.1 highlights key figures and organizations which played 
significant roles in supplementing the operations of the CPI, either providing 
logistical or monetary support and in some cases carrying out actual engagement on 
behalf of the CPI.154  The chart also shows the evolving private-public relationship, a 
key theme in this study. 
 
Figure 5.1 This diagram shows how the public-private relationship deepened throughout 
WWI, as well as highlighting key figures which continued to influence the 
development of US public diplomacy. 
 
                                                     
154 This graphic only highlights private entities, public figures, and organizations which play 
recurring roles in the development of US foreign public engagement.  There were 
many private businesses, US labor unions, and civic organizations which aided in some 
part of the CPI’s operations throughout the war. 
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Additionally, as discussed in the previous chapter, the people who worked for the 
CPI or private organizations supporting the CPI, spearheading efforts to engage 
people abroad, act as key figures in continuing foreign public engagement, even 
when the government shows no interest.  Their efforts to keep foreign public 
engagement going and their perspectives toward what foreign public engagement 
means and its relationship to American statecraft impact the development of 
American public diplomacy.  This is an important pattern in this study: key figures 
and organizations which helped to develop and perpetuate US foreign public 
engagement. 
The CPI’s foreign operations are important to not only understanding the 
origins of American public diplomacy, but also some of the issues which continue to 
plague American public diplomacy today.  As will be demonstrated in the next two 
chapters, the same people, organizations, and methods of engagement will be used in 
the inter-war period and throughout WWII.  Though the CPI no longer existed, 
many of the activities of foreign public engagement continued, managed by private 
organizations, along with official support.  This semi-official foreign public 
engagement would continue in the interim between the two world wars.  Thus, 
when the US entered WWII, the people, organizations, and mechanism of foreign 
public engagement were in place when the US government again re-organized 
government agencies charged with engaging with people all over the world, to tell 
the truth and to tell America’s story.   
Following the demise of the CPI, US foreign public engagement shifted from 
government managed programs to private-run initiatives.  In the inter-war period, 
there was tremendous growth in the number of private organizations interested in 
engaging with people around the world.  The war coupled with the internationalist 
movement spurred private citizens to seek international engagement as a means of 
engendering understanding and ensuring peace.  The following chapter explores 
some of the key American organizations which maintained foreign public 
engagement throughout the inter-war period.  The case will continue to build on the 
patterns and issues already explored in the last four chapters including the private-
public relationship, communication, and methods of engagement.  
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Chapter 6  
Foreign Public Engagement in Perpetuity 
“The so-called isolation of the United States exists only in the brains of a few politicians, not in 
the American intellectual and academic world…The abandonment of this purely political 
isolation is only a matter of time.” 
- Neue Zuercher Zeitung, No. 1502, 17 November 1922155 
As the world’s leaders worked on arrangements for the Peace Conference in 
Paris, the US minister in Berne, Pleasant Stovall, received a proposal from Dr. 
Herbert Haveland Field156 for establishing an American Institute in Zurich.  Assistant 
Secretary of State William Phillips forwarded Stovall and Field’s memoranda for 
informational purposes only to the Bureau of Education within the Department of 
Interior.  No further action was taken by the US government, until August of 1920 
when the new minister in Berne reported that the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace (CEIP) presented the Zurich Central Library with a collection of 
two thousand books, “carefully selected, treating on people, history, law, policy, 
economic policy, literature…of the United States” (No. 183, 16 August 1920, 
M1457, R10, 854.428/1).  Ambassador Hampson Gary presented the 
accompanying framed deed of the gift to the library, as requested in the instructions 
CEIP sent in a diplomatic pouch.  Gary asked that this information along with 
acknowledgement of the receipt of the collection in Zurich be conveyed to CEIP 
(No. 183, 16 August 1920, M1457, R10, 854.428/1). 
Many private organizations and citizens, who supported the CPI’s work 
during the war, continued to engage people around the world throughout the 
interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s.  Private entities carried on arranging 
academic exchanges, founding libraries and international schools, as well as 
distributing American books and periodicals around the world, largely due to the 
widespread influence of internationalism.  The exchange described in the paragraph 
above is representative of American foreign public engagement practices in the 
                                                     
155 Translation attached to Despatch No. 700: M1457, R10, 854.42711/1 
156 Dr. Field was a prominent American and zoologist who spent much of his time in 
Switzerland. 
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ensuing interwar period.  This case highlights how the internationalist impulse 
perpetuated foreign public engagement and influenced the development of foreign 
public engagement despite the national inclination to remain politically “un-
entangled” during the interwar period.   
As George C. Herring explains, American foreign relations during the 
interwar period can be characterized as involvement without commitment (2008).  
The US remained involved in world affairs, by relying on private entities as “chosen 
instruments” to achieve foreign policy objectives without direct political 
commitment (Rosenberg 1982).  This type of public-private relationship is also 
reflected in American foreign public engagement of the period.  Although the US 
government showed little interest in foreign public engagement throughout much of 
the 1920s, the government was aware of private efforts to engage publics abroad and 
occasionally used the connections provided through such engagement to support 
American foreign relations. 
As such, this chapter also exposes the growing relationship between the 
government and private organizations conducting foreign public engagement.  Much 
of these foreign public engagement programs were initiated or supported by large 
corporate foundations, such as the Rockefeller Foundation (RF), the Laura Spelman-
Rockefeller Memorial Fund (LSRMF), and the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace (CEIP).   
 
Under the leadership of American corporate philanthropy, there evolved by 
the end of the 1920s a private institutional system for the conduct of cultural 
relations.  This network was characterized by a comfortable correspondence 
between idealist ends and nonpolitical organizational means… This private 
national policy structure also struck a balance between domestic tradition 
and the complex demands of international involvement, making possible full 
participation in an increasingly coordinated and interdependent, yet 
informal, transnational system (Ninkovich 1981, pp. 22-23). 
 
However, this chapter will also demonstrate that corporate foundations were not the 
only groups administering foreign public engagement.  Private American citizens and 
to a certain extent, members of the US government all played roles in American 
foreign public engagement during the interwar period.   
As mentioned above, the US government utilized private foundations as ad-
hoc agencies or chosen instruments.  When requests or queries regarding student 
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exchanges, international pen pals, exchanging American literature and academic 
materials, and touring musical groups, the State Department would defer such 
requests to CEIP, RF, the Institute of International Education (IIE), 157  and the 
American Red Cross (ARC), officially recognizing these organizations, in effect, as 
the primary institution for a particular form of engagement.  Furthermore, 
“…throughout the nineteen-twenties and thirties, the philanthropic elite of the 
Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations retained a certain closeness to officials in the 
State Department, and in the American embassies abroad.  There was no direction of 
foundation policies but there were certainly informal consultations without 
directions” (Rietzler 2011, p. 154).  Frequently these organizations acted as pseudo 
representatives at the League of Nations, going as far as to provide reports on the 
proceedings of the League to the Department of State, or bolstering the League 
through various engagement activities.   
The interwar period serves to demonstrate not only the continuity of foreign 
public engagement, but also the significant forces which impact the development of 
foreign public engagement into public diplomacy as a mechanism of American 
statecraft.  As such, the focus of American foreign public engagement, both private 
and government initiated, focuses on Europe and America’s relationship with the 
League of Nations as well as Latin America.158  Despite maintaining a strict non-
affiliation, non-contact policy with the League of Nations, many private American 
foundations and organizations maintained regular contact and supported the League 
through foreign public engagement programs.  As stated earlier, these same 
organizations provided reports and analysis to the Department of State and Congress 
regarding the activities of the League (Rietzler 2011; RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 
5069, 811.43/68).   
                                                     
157 The Institute of International Education was created in 1920 by Dr. Stephen Duggan.  
The Institute was essentially an administrative and coordinating organization, 
facilitating international exchanges by providing information to foreign governments 
interested in arranging academic exchanges as well as providing information to 
American students and academics who planned to study or teach overseas (Duggan 
1921). 
158 American foreign public engagement was not limited to Latin America and Europe 
during the interwar period.  This case simply focuses on the two major regions where 
foreign public engagement became the focus of American statecraft. 
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In looking at the relationship between private foreign public engagement 
activities and the government’s role throughout the interwar period, there is a subtle 
transition, whereby the government becomes more involved and interested in 
supporting and facilitating foreign public engagement.  As will be explored later, the 
transition from private foreign public engagement to a more cooperative relationship 
between public and private actors was precipitated by several factors: the Great 
Depression, the implementation of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Good 
Neighbor Policy, and the developing threat of war in Europe coupled with the 
perceived threat of Nazi influence in Latin America.   
“The Principle of international cooperation has been intensified during 
the past decade.”159 
Internationalism was a significant force in America since the late nineteenth 
century and garnered strength just prior to the start of WWI (Iriye 1997; Herman 
1969).  The internationalist perspective and proponents of internationalism played a 
vital role in the continued development and use of foreign public engagement 
throughout the interwar period.  It is the influence of internationalist ideas, the 
relationship between internationalists and the US government, and the practices and 
use of foreign public engagement in pursuit of internationalism which unites the two 
decades. 
According Akira Iriye (1997) and Sondra Herman (1969), internationalism 
existed for centuries, but grew in strength around the mid to late nineteenth century.  
A surge of American proponents of internationalism came at the end of the 
nineteenth century with the reorganization of the peace movement.  American 
internationalism advocated for international cooperation based on liberal principles 
such as the free exchange of ideas, cultural exchange and understanding, free trade, 
and the development of international relations based on international law (Iriye 1997; 
Kuehl 1969).  These liberal precepts are based on the same ideals advocated by 
American leaders and liberals of the late eighteenth century (Iriye 1997).  
Internationalists believed that world peace could achieved through cooperation and 
education.  Collaboration was the only way people could hope to achieve a peaceful, 
stable world; the interdependence of the world had to be embraced.  They also 
                                                     
159 Margaret Lambie “The Foreign Teacher: His Legal Status as Shown in Treaties and 
Legislation,” 1931,800.42711/25, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4558 
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believed national leaders had to give up balance of power politics in favour of a 
system of cooperation (Kuehl & Dunn 1997).  In many ways, internationalism of the 
twentieth century is the active projection and belief that Western liberal principles 
should be used to create an international framework for interstate relations.  This has 
serious ramifications for American foreign public engagement.  Though American 
internationalists presented a lofty ideal, they advocated for an ideal which was based 
solely on American ideas and political culture with little consideration for competing 
concepts for maintaining peaceful relations. 160   In other words, American 
internationalists were seeking to make the world in the US’s image.  With the start 
of WWII, this desire becomes more apparent in the rhetoric used by US officials and 
private advisors, as the following chapter will explore. 
Among American internationalists, there was little agreement as to how to 
achieve international cooperation and by extension international peace and stability 
(Herman 1969; Kuehl 1969; Kuehl & Dunn 1997).  This was made apparent with 
the fight over America’s participation in the League of Nations, even after President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected.  Internationalists sought to change how nations 
interacted using cultural exchange and understanding, inter-dependent economies, 
and an accepted international legal framework (Iriye 1997; Rietzler 2009).  
However, American internationalists all tended to emphasize one aspect of 
internationalism.  This is especially evident with the operations of CEIP throughout 
the 1920s, and their support for the League of Nations.  Some internationalists 
advocated the issue of free international trade; others stressed the need for the 
development of international law and a legal infrastructure to maintain international 
relations (Iriye 1997).  There were also internationalists who believed that an 
international legal framework could not be achieved until cultural barriers and 
international misunderstandings were overcome through education of the public and 
greater intellectual and cultural exchange.  In general, most internationalists 
advocated for some kind of greater intellectual and cultural understanding among the 
                                                     
160 An excellent example of this is presented by Nicholas Murray Butler in an interview 
printed in International Conciliation.  He characterized the socialist concept of a league of 
nations as “a colloidal or jelly-like internationalism without real nations…The 
achievement of this ideal would bring civilization to an end, make order impossible, 
destroy liberty and put mankind back at the foot of the ladder from which it began…” 
(1919, p. 167).  Butler went on to say that “[t]rue internationalism must be built on the 
union of strong and self-respecting nations...” (p. 167). 
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people of different nations in order to achieve greater economic inter-dependence 
and an international justice system.  Internationalism was not only a strong influence 
on American foreign public engagement in the interwar period, but many of the 
leading internationalists of the period were also trustees of CEIP, RF, IIE, and 
LSRMF.  Thus, they tended to advocate dual objectives: the development of 
international law and the establishment of cultural exchange networks. 
Influential internationalists such as Elihu Root, Nicholas Murray Butler, 
James Brown Scott, Raymond Fosdick, James Shotwell, and Stephen Duggan were 
on the boards of the philanthropic organizations of CEIP, RF, and IIE.  Prior to 
WWI, these same individuals advocated and supported efforts to develop 
international law, the international court at The Hague, and encouraged 
international exchanges through international congresses and academic exchanges 
(Kuehl 1969; Iriye 1997).  The rhetoric of internationalism as well as proponents of 
the internationalist movement was integral to the continued practice and 
development of foreign public engagement.  Both acted as a catalyst, providing 
reasoning, justification, and standardization for American engagement with people of 
other nations.   
“The Department is rather chary of involving itself with the League of 
Nations, however remotely…”161  
The interwar period is often categorized as the height of American 
isolationism, in part due to the United States’ continued refusal to join the League of 
Nations (Herring 2008).  Though there were significant isolationist impulses 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s, American foreign relations in the intervening 
decades between the First World War and the Second World War were more 
complicated than just a desire to remain detached from the world.  America’s refusal 
to join the League of Nations in 1920 was not solely due to isolationism.  On the 
contrary, many Senators who voted against League membership in March 1920 
supported some type of international association, as did much of the American public 
(Kuehl 1969).162  This was primarily due to widespread support for internationalism.  
                                                     
161 “First International Exhibition of Popular Arts,” circa 1 May 1931; unsigned, M1457, 
R26, 854.607 Popular Arts/2 
162 Republican Senators Henry Cabot Lodge and Philander Knox both supported the idea of 
an international association.  Polls conducted by various newspapers at the time 
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Many Americans also saw international cooperation and unification as a way to stave 
off future wars, to ensure peace.  The debates about American participation in the 
League were also based on partisanship, isolationism, a concern for national 
sovereignty, and competing internationalist perspectives (Herring 2008; Kuehl 1969; 
Kuehl & Dunn 1997).   
When the articles of the Covenant of the League of Nations were published 
on February 15, 1920, many who had advocated for so long for an international 
union were disappointed and concerned. The Covenant did not reflect mainstream 
internationalist ideas of the day (Kuehl 1969).  First, many internationalists as well as 
isolationists were alarmed by Articles X and XI, which to them seemed to ensure the 
continuance of war as a means to settle disputes.163  Second, the Covenant blatantly 
ignored the established international court at The Hague and remained vague 
regarding justiciable and non-justiciable cases.164 & 165  Third, the Covenant failed to 
create any infrastructure for the study and development of international law.  Finally, 
the League of Nations, as outlined, only made vague assurances as to the freedom of 
the seas.  Between Wilson’s unwillingness to alter the Covenant and the inability of 
                                                                                                                                       
indicated general support in favour of joining the League of Nations (Kuehl 1969, pp. 
299 - 300).   
163 Article X called members of the League to respect and preserve territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of all member nations against external aggression.  In the event of any 
external aggression, the League's Executive Council would determine what course of 
action to take.  Article XI allowed League members to take any action deemed 
necessary to ensure peace when threatened by a non-League member.  Senator Henry 
Cabot Lodge was concerned the article might lead to an international army, while 
future Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes believed such a measure limited a 
nation’s flexibility in responding to a crisis.  Ironically, President Wilson is credited 
with adding Article X, a modern version of collective security (Kuehl 1969). 
164 According to Warren Kuehl, the commissioners involved in drafting the Covenant 
intentionally made no reference to The Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration created 
in 1899 at The Hague Peace Conference because they deemed it to be a failure (1969).  
This sentiment may be due to the widespread and terrible violations of international 
law which occurred throughout WWI.  There were many who believed international 
law was unsalvageable (Rietzler 2009). 
165 Justiciable refers to a case which can be determined by a court.  A non-justiciable case 
would not be referred to a court.  These issues were important to many 
internationalists, especially those who favoured legal internationalism.  An accepted 
understanding of what qualified as a justiciable case and what did not was crucial for 
differentiating matters which were the domestic prerogative of a state versus those 
which were truly a matter for international evaluation.  
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internationalists to unify on a course to correct the Covenant, both parties ensured 
the US would never become a member of the League of Nations. 
As the League morphed into a political pariah in the US, the Department of 
State initially maintained a strict policy of non-interference and non-contact.  During 
the Harding administration, the Department of State initially ignored all 
correspondences from the League of Nations.  Raymond Fosdick and Hamilton Holt 
exposed this in the US press which caused a great deal of outrage among the 
American public.  The Harding administration was forced to rethink how to manage 
relations with the League despite the extreme political views at home.  In the end, 
the administration did begin to provide replies to League correspondence, but the 
US ambassador in Geneva was instructed to never enter the League building (Kuehl 
& Dunn 1997). 
As the League became an established political entity, with most nations 
participating in the League, America was unable to ignore the organization entirely 
(Herring 2008).  Advocates for American membership still hoped that the US might 
still join the League and to this end, supported the League through various programs, 
as well as encouraging US involvement through summer programs in Geneva.  Many 
of these advocates, such as Elihu Root, James Brown Scott, Raymond Fosdick, John 
D. Rockefeller Jr., Stephen Duggan, and Nicholas Butler Murray, were also trustees 
of philanthropic foundations and private organizations which initiated these programs 
to further internationalism both in the US and abroad as well as to bolster the League 
itself.  With the US government’s uncomfortable position between politics at home 
and the League of Nations, the US government increasingly relied upon private 
foundations to communicate with the League as well as supplement American 
foreign relations, becoming chosen instruments for US diplomacy. 
“In the field of world policy I would dedicate this Nation to the policy 
of the good neighbor…”166 
Almost five years prior to his inaugural address, Roosevelt articulated his 
Good Neighbor Policy in an article for Foreign Affairs magazine.167  According to 
                                                     
166 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Inaugural Address,” 4 March 1933 
167 In his 1928 article, Roosevelt argued that “since the war our [America’s] attitude is that 
we do not need friends and that the public opinion of the world is of no importance” (p. 
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Robert Dallek, the article was an attempt by Roosevelt to demonstrate his affiliation 
and support of internationalism (1995).  Roosevelt was a converted internationalist.  
Previously, he had advocated a more militant approach to American foreign affairs, 
modelled on his cousin’s, Theodore Roosevelt, ideas.  Roosevelt’s adherence to 
internationalism was perhaps more politically calculated than other internationalists 
of the period.  He began to support the ideas of international cooperation following a 
conversation with President Woodrow Wilson, returning from the Paris Peace 
Conference.  What convinced Roosevelt of internationalism was not so much the 
principles of the movement themselves, but the wild reception Wilson received 
upon arriving in Boston as well as his own observations of broad American support 
for international cooperation.  Roosevelt was “persuaded…that an aspiring politician 
with internationalist commitments could not now make his way with the kind of 
martial deeds and rhetoric T.R. [Theodore Roosevelt] had used” (Dallek 1995, p. 
11).  The ideas espoused in the article not only urged the US to adopt a more 
internationalist approach to the nation’s foreign relations, but also foreshadowed the 
Good Neighbor policy to be implemented when Roosevelt became president.   
Though many Americans were not as eager for international cooperation as 
they had been before the 1929 Crash and ensuing Depression, the internationalist 
sentiment remained relatively strong; enough to influence President Roosevelt’s 
handling of domestic and foreign policy.  FDR ran on the campaign promise of the 
New Deal; a deal to bring the country out of the Depression through a series of 
legislated measures.  He wanted nothing to hinder his relations with Congress which 
might prohibit the New Deal passing through the legislative process (Dallek 1995; 
Rosen 1966).  Thus the singular reference to foreign relations in his inaugural 
address, a brief reference to his “Good Neighbor Policy,” reflected not only FDR’s 
awareness of national priorities in 1933, but also the mood of the American public. 
Thus for the first few years of FDR’s presidency, foreign public engagement 
remained in private hands.  The only noticeable difference being that between 1930 
                                                                                                                                       
582).  He raised the issue of America’s repeated interventions in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, including the most recent intervention in Nicaragua.   He noted that the US 
is “…exceedingly jealous of our own sovereignty and it is only right that we should 
respect a similar feeling among other nations” (1928, p. 584).  While applauding 
Presidents Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge to end US occupation of several Latin 
American and Caribbean nations, more was needed to restore faith and friendship 
between the US and Latin America (Roosevelt 1928).   
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and 1935, Department of State representatives abroad began providing extensive 
reports on the activities of these private actors’ efforts overseas, particularly in 
connection with the League of Nations.168  These reports were received with greater 
interest.  Additionally, Secretary of State Hull set up the Information Service within 
the Department of State in 1934 as well as requesting officers overseas to conduct a 
survey in 1936 on how the foreign press reported on America. 
The 1930s brought about a slight transition as the Depression inhibited many 
foundations’ ability to fund overseas programs.169  Conversely, the US government 
took more interest in what private citizens and foundations were doing abroad to 
engage with citizens of foreign nations.  To some degree, the threat of another large-
scale war spurred many internationalists to renew their efforts for dialogue, 
cooperation, and exchange, including President Roosevelt (Iriye 1997).  
Corresponding with the rising tensions in Asia and Europe, private entities and the 
government sought ways to diffuse the situation, including using foreign public 
engagement.  In the same month President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) was 
inaugurated into office, Japan left the League of Nations, and by the fall of 1933, 
Germany also left.  As the situation abroad deteriorated further,  
 
[three] leaders…believed that unless the Washington government threw its 
influence on the side of freedom and international organization, civilization 
would suffer a severe defeat.  This trio was composed of President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and Under-Secretary of State 
Sumner Wells.  They believed that salvation lay in closer cooperation with 
the rest of the American Continent (Inman 1965, p. 160). 
 
                                                     
168 There are a series of reports scattered throughout the Department of State Archives: 
M1457, R23, 854/4; 854.43 Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales/1; 
854.43 Geneva School of International Studies/1; RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 5069, 
811.43/66; Box 5069, 811.43/68.  These will be discussed in greater detail later in 
the chapter. 
169 US Ambassador in Paris, Jesse Isidor Strauss reported having several meetings with 
Mariano H. Cornejo, former Peruvian minister in Paris and ex-member of the Council 
of the League Nations.  Cornejo wrote a book, La Lutte pour la Paix, which he wanted 
CEIP to buy from him and publish in English and Spanish.  Ambassador Strauss 
forwarded a copy of Cornejo’s book to Nicholas Murray Butler, President of CEIP.  
Butler replied to Strauss and explained that due the decreased value of the dollar, CEIP 
has been prohibited in making their usual expenditures abroad (RG 59, CDF 1930-39, 
Box 5070, 811.43 C 21/10). 
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FDR hoped to bolster Pan Americanism through his Good Neighbor Policy as a 
counter force to the rising totalitarianism and militancy in Europe and Asia (Dallek 
1995; Inman 1965).        
“…[But] through the efforts of these…societies definite aid has been 
and is being given to the Consulate General in maintaining the prestige 
of the United States and meeting the obligations which the presence of 
even a small number of resident Americans creates.”170 
 One of the more significant aspects of American foreign public engagement 
in the interwar period is the relationship between private entities and the US 
government.  As the exchange described in the opening of the chapter demonstrates, 
private entities initiated engagement activities both during and immediately 
following WWI.  Throughout much of the 1920s, the US government paid little 
attention to these initiatives, at least in Washington, D.C.  Most reports coming 
from consuls and ambassadors regarding private American engagement activities 
abroad went unanswered.  Regardless of the ambivalence expressed on the part of 
the US government, the relationship between private actors and the US government 
was a symbiotic relationship in the context of foreign public engagement.   Private 
entities served as chosen instruments, intermediaries between the US government 
and the League of Nations as well as fulfilling other roles for consuls and ambassadors.  
On the other hand, private foundations utilized the US government to facilitate their 
engagement efforts, either by using diplomatic pouching services or requesting 
ambassadors and consuls to gather information for foundation publications on 
international affairs. 
For ambassadors and consuls serving overseas, these private engagement 
efforts were viewed with more interest and garnered more support.  Official US 
representatives saw how private initiatives to engage with the foreign public not only 
relieved them of such duties, but also benefited American relations. One consular 
officer, Hugh Ramsay, wrote “there [were] certain ways in which efficient American 
organizations functioning at a consular post may lighten the burdens of the consular 
officer, without in any way encroaching upon his duties or prerogatives” (“Voluntary 
Report: Swiss-American Societies in Zurich,” 26 March, 1931, M1457, R23, 
                                                     
170 “(Voluntary Report) on Swiss-American Societies in Zurich,” 26 March 1931 ( M1457, 
R23, 854.43/4) 
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854.43/4).  Ramsay described how two such societies did much for Swiss-American 
relations and diminished some of the responsibilities of his post.  Two societies were 
created in the 1920s: Swiss Friends of the USA and the American Women’s Club.  
Both organizations sought “…to bring about a better understanding between the two 
countries” through various activities including publishing a monthly newsletter on 
American and Swiss topics of interest and celebrating both Swiss and American 
holidays.  “…[Through] the efforts of …two societies definite aid has been…given 
to the Consulate General in maintaining the prestige of the United States and meting 
the obligations which the presence of even a small number of resident Americans 
creates” (M1457, R23, 854.43/4).   
Ramsay was not the only official to notice the role of the foreign 
engagement efforts in relation to American diplomacy.  Prentiss Gilbert wrote a 
series of detailed reports on the various societies, committees, institutions, and 
schools supported or operated by private American donors and foundations.  Gilbert 
served as the American consul in Geneva, affording him the opportunity to observe 
how private American engagement efforts operated in conjunction with the League 
of Nations.  He noted how “[t]hese organizations…are so closely associated in their 
management, that to gain a clear understanding of their nature they should be 
considered conjointly” (No. 526, 27 February 1933, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 
5069, 811.43/66).  Gilbert described the League of Nations Association, the Geneva 
Research Center, the American Committee, the American Council on Disarmament, 
the Institut de Hautes Études Internationales (Geneva Institute of International 
Studies),171 and the Bureau d’Études Internationales (Geneva School of International 
Studies).172  Each of these organizations received financial support from CEIP, RF, 
                                                     
171 The Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales was established in Geneva in 
1927.  The project for setting up the Institute was pitched to the Laura Spelman 
Rockefeller Memorial Fund.  The Fund promised financial support for ten years 
starting January 1930, initially $85,000 and rising to $114,000.  Many of the faculty at 
the Institut were also connected to the League of Nations.  Elihu Root and James 
Brown Scott both served on the Honorary Committee for the Institut as well (No. 983, 
Geneva, 28 August 1934, M1457, R23, 854.43 Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études 
Internationales/1; “Institut des Hautes Études Internationales Programme,” 1924, 
M560, R50, 851.42711/29) 
172 The school was organized by Dr. Alfred Zimmern, a professor of International 
Relations at Oxford University, in 1924.  John D. Rockefeller donated $2,500 to the 
school in 1934.  In addition, serving American ambassadors also made generous 
donations.  US officials also either attended the Bureau d’Études Internationales or 
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LSRMF, and John D. Rockefeller, Jr. as well as being staffed by many of the 
foundations’ board members.  From Gilbert’s observations, he saw how the private 
organizations working with the League of Nations or alongside the League “they have 
frequently performed services which might otherwise have devolved on the 
Consulate or on American members of the League or International Labor Office 
Secretariat” (No. 1421, 2 October 1935, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 5069, 
811.43/68).   
This is in keeping with the policy established by the Harding administration 
with regard to how America would interact with the League. 173   Overtime, 
American policymakers realized the value of these private actors as a way of still 
maintaining relations with the large international political organization without 
sparking public criticism at home.  Private American citizens and organizations based 
in Paris and Geneva became chosen instruments or de facto intermediaries whereby 
the US government was able to keep informed about League activities and maintain 
some American representation within the League itself.   
In particular, the American Committee in Geneva worked as both a pseudo 
think tank and private public diplomacy agency.  The “avowed purpose is to supply 
means of informing American visitors as to the work of the League of Nations and 
the International Labor Office and to assist them in making contacts with officials in 
these two organizations” (No. 1421, 2 October 1935, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 
5069, 811.43/68).  With support from CEIP, the committee was mainly staffed by 
college graduates and teachers with an interest in international cooperation.  But in 
addition to facilitating American connections to the League and reporting on League 
activities to the US public, the American Committee also prepared reports on 
international issues of interest to the US, including a study on international arms 
                                                                                                                                       
served as advisors.  Laurence Duggan was a student and DoS historical advisor David 
Hunter Miller served on the school’s Advisory Council (No. 995 Geneva, 4 September 
1934, “The Geneva School of International Studies,” M1457, R23, 854.43 Geneva 
School of International Studies/1). 
173 The four part policy developed slowly overtime and was continued throughout the 
interwar period.  First, the US would never become a member.  Second, private 
citizens could participate in League work as long as they acted in an unofficial capacity 
and made no claim to represent the US government.  Third, official government 
participation would take place where a special interest was at stake or when it was to 
the advantage of the US to cooperate.  Fourth, any contact would be evaluated based 
on their merit.  Representation would never be automatically assumed (Kuehl & Dunn 
1997).   
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trade in 1934 for a Senate investigation and another report on the Chaco Arms 
Embargo (811.43/68).174 
 The foundations who supported organizations and institutions affiliated with 
the League of Nations did so with two main objectives.  First, to ensure the survival 
of the very organization many internationalists strove to create since the turn of the 
century.  Though the League did not meet many internationalists’ expectations, 
internationalists, such as Elihu Root, considered the League as an important step 
toward international cooperation and a permanent end to war.  American 
internationalists believed US membership was crucial to the future success of the 
League (Kuehl & Dunn 1997).  In order to guarantee the survival of the League, the 
RF, CEIP, and LSRMF sought to support the League.   
 
It is evident that the majority of these international bodies have been 
established in Geneva or set up their headquarters here because of the 
presence in Geneva of the two large organizations175… There is a formal 
relationship existing, particularly in technical and humanitarian matters, 
between certain of these organizations and the League and the Labor Office.  
While such formal relations do not exist in those engaged in the strictly 
educational field, these educational institutions nevertheless base the 
majority of their studies on international questions, in particular those 
having to do with the League or with its activities.  It might be said that, as 
educational institutions often do, they advance a political philosophy in such matters 
which becomes a part of the atmosphere of Geneva, which is not without its influence 
on the progress of League affairs.  Thus no picture of the complex situation which goes 
to make up Geneva is complete without some understanding of these organizations 
(No. 983, 28 August 1934, M1457, R23, 854.43 Institut Universitaire de 
Hautes Internationales/1, emphasis added).  
 
The secondary objective of American foundations was to mould the League to both 
suit their objectives as well as to form a League into something acceptable to 
American policymakers and the US public, as the quote from Prentiss Gilbert’s 
report suggests.  Foundations typically supported organizations and institutions 
which studied or developed international law specifically or international relations 
more generally.  CEIP tended to place an emphasis on international law, while 
LSRFM sought to promote the study of social sciences more generally (Rietzler 
                                                     
174 The League of Nations placed an embargo on munitions to Paraguay and Bolivia in an 
attempt to diffuse their ongoing dispute over the Chaco Boreal territory. 
175 Referring to the League of Nations and the International Labor Office 
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2009).  The Rockefeller Foundation focused more on natural sciences and the 
medical sciences in particular.176  This is not to say that American foundations were 
not also interested in developing international friendship and exchange through their 
engagement programs; it simply explains how internationalists such as James Brown 
Scott, Nicholas Murray Butler, Elihu Root, and James Shotwell helped to initiate 
programs attached to the very League of Nations they previously hesitated to support 
in 1919. 
 Connected to many of the American foundations’ endeavours to push the US 
towards League membership was the promulgation of internationalism, international 
cooperation, and international affairs through foundation published books, journals, 
and periodicals.  For this, foundations relied on the government to gather 
information needed for some of these publications.  On April 25, 1930, James 
Brown Scott, then the Secretary for CEIP, wrote to Wilbur Carr at the Department 
of State (DoS) to request assistance gathering information on municipal legal 
decisions concerning international law around the world as well as information on 
arbitration tribunals.  He asked Carr “to instruct diplomatic agents, or…the consular 
officers of the United States, to request the Minister of Justice or other appropriate 
official of each of the countries to secure two or three copies of each of the municipal 
decisions involving international law, and likewise request the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs for two or three copies of the decisions of arbitral tribunals or mixed 
commissions functioning within his country…”  Scott further requested that these 
documents be sent with English translations of them, so CEIP “would be able to 
prepare the special supplements and place these important and indispensable texts at 
the disposition of professors of international law and of international relations and 
also at the disposition of the Department of State and its officials, texts of the utmost 
importance but which had never before been brought together and published” (RG 
59, CDF 1930-39, Box 4527/4528, 800.04418/6).   
What is most striking about this exchange is that on May 5, 1930, a 
Department worldwide circular was issued to all US consular and diplomatic posts to 
compile the materials requested by Scott.  Nor was this the only time where a 
private entity directed the US government to supplement its activities.  Previously, 
                                                     
176 Up until 1928, the RF’s focus remained entirely on science.  In 1928, the LSRFM was 
subsumed into the RF.  The RF continued to support the same programs LSRFM had 
previously (Rietzler 2009; The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report 1929). 
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the Council on Foreign Relations, a US think tank founded with the help of Elihu 
Root, requested information about major newspapers around the world in 1929 for 
the publication of the Council on Foreign Relations’ Political Handbook of the World 
(RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 5070, 811.43 Council on Foreign Relations/34).177  
Also, as the exchange in the opening of the chapter described, CEIP used the DoS’s 
diplomatic pouching services to send donation materials and instructions to the 
ambassador in Switzerland (No. 183, 16 August 1920, M1457, R10, 854.428/1).  
In spite of the government’s general disinterest in the foreign public engagement 
activities of these private foundations, the Department of State did assist with some 
foundation activities, creating a relationship of mutual dependence which continued 
up through WWII.   
“Let the mission be instructed to make careful study to determine what 
particular field cultural relations with America might be 
developed…”178 
 Both private and public entities listened to people around the world during 
the interwar period, but for different reasons.  Private foundations tended to use 
listening as a way to ensure grants and foundation monies were being used effectively, 
a reflection of the Progressive attitudes which dominated private foundations 
throughout the 1920s and 30s.  CEIP, IIE, LSRMF, and RF used the information 
they gathered overseas to inform their program policies at home and abroad.  Both 
RF and CEIP conducted regular studies all over the world in preparation for new 
initiatives.  In 1923 and 1924, representatives from both the Rockefeller Foundation 
and the Carnegie Endowment travelled to Europe to gather information regarding 
the status of European universities, the study of social sciences, and the resources 
available to students and academics (CEIP Year Book 1921; Rietzler 2009; RF Annual 
                                                     
177 Ironically, Consul J.V.A MacMurray wrote to DoS to complain about the 1929 Political 
Handbook of the World.  He noted that “little use seems to have been made by the 
Council [on Foreign Relations] of the outline submitted by the Legation in 1928.  
James Orr Denby, consul in Peiping, also complained about the handbook.  “I venture 
to inform you that I felt a great disappointment, on receiving a copy of the 1929 issue 
of the ‘Political Handbook of the World’, to note that the editors have apparently 
endeavored to force the structure of the Chinese Government into a general mold with 
the result that the Handbook’s section on China is almost without meaning” (Denby to 
Howland 13 September 1929, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 5070, 811.43 Council on 
Foreign Relations/34). 
178 No. 109, 31 August 1936, Istanbul, “News Survey and Cultural Relations” (RG 59, 
CDF 1930-39, Box 5064, 811.42767/78). 
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Report 1925).179  James T. Shotwell and Guy Stanton Ford met with academics, 
university administrators, and state education officials to gather information about 
what was most needed to help rebuild academic institutions and communities 
following the war.  The results of this information gathering trip are evident in the 
subsequent donations and grants established to rebuild libraries, foster academic 
exchanges between nations, and schemes to ensure access to scholarly publications.   
 In addition to carrying out regular surveys and collecting information 
regarding foundation foreign programs, the Division of Intercourse and Education 
within CEIP maintained Special Correspondents positioned in different places 
around the world.  These correspondents tended to be local individuals.  There were 
five correspondents in 1920 based in London, Rome, Geneva, Tokyo, and Berne.  
The correspondent in Italy covered the Balkans and Greece, and the correspondent 
in Geneva covered the League of Nations as well as Europe.  By 1925, the Division 
had seven Special Correspondents, including one in Berlin.  Then in 1930, the 
Division employed eight Special Correspondents, including two covering Germany 
and one covering Russia.  The Special Correspondents reported on existing 
conditions, changes in public opinion, and economic and political policy changes 
(CEIP Year Book 1921; CEIP Year Book 1925; CEIP Year Book 1930). 
Before Stephen Duggan launched the IIE in 1920, he travelled to Great 
Britain, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, and Yugoslavia to meet with state 
education civil servants, university officials, journalists, and academics (IIE First 
Annual Report 1920).  He also sent out questionnaires to US universities and colleges 
to understand what exchange programs already existed and what funds were 
available for international exchanges.  By listening to university officials and 
academics in Europe, he discovered that many universities lost professors in the war 
and were not enthusiastic about sending professors to America.  “Nevertheless they 
are anxious to have American teachers at their institutions” (IIE First Annual Report 
1920, p. 4).  A member of IIE’s Administrative Board suggested American 
professors might volunteer to travel overseas during sabbatical leave.  Using this 
scheme, American professors would still receive a salary, leaving only travel 
expenses to be offset by a donor or scholarship, thus alleviating the financial burden 
                                                     
179 The Rockefeller Foundation’s Division of Medical Education conducted regular surveys 
of ongoing foundation supported programs overseas as well as conducting surveys prior 
to initiating new programs (RF Annual Report 1923). 
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for host universities abroad.  Dr. Duggan applied to CEIP for a stipend to cover 
travel expenses for American professors.  Prior to even implementing any plans for 
academic exchanges, the IIE made listening a first step to formulating its exchange 
programs.  This helped to ensure the success of the programs and avoided 
embarrassment for either US universities or universities overseas. 
On the other hand, both private citizens and US representatives abroad 
noted when people overseas expressed negative attitudes toward the US or when the 
US was somehow misrepresented abroad.  Citizens and DoS officers attempted to 
cajole Washington to address negative attitudes and misrepresentation of the US, but 
were frequently met with disinterest and even hostility.180  The US minister in Berne, 
Hugh Gibson, reported on how the press in Switzerland had become increasingly 
anti-American, largely in response toward Allied war debts, US-Mexico relations, 
US interventions in Haiti and Santo Domingo, and America’s policy toward the 
League of Nations.  The only positive articles or editorials were published by the 
legation “through the influence of” the Consul General in Zurich and the Consul at 
Basel (No. 478, 4 August 1925, M1457, R19, 854.911/10). 
 
The attitude of the Swiss press is important not only because of its effect in 
this country but perhaps even more because of the influence it exerts in 
other countries…The Legation has endeavored to learn the reason for this 
attitude of the Swiss press in the hope that it might be found possible to 
contribute in some effective way to improving the situation (M1457, R19, 
854.911/10). 
 
Gibson found after discussions with local news editors that they were not ill-disposed 
toward America.  They were primarily interested in finding good stories to publish. 
 
Some other countries have been quick to sense this situation and profit from 
it.  They have made a point of furnishing material to the Swiss press setting 
                                                     
180 An American living in Paris, Eleu Foster Cohu, complained to President Franklin 
Roosevelt about the attitude of the American ambassador in France and his attitude 
toward cultural relations with the French when he refused to attend a concert of 
American music performed by French musicians.  According to Cohu, the third 
secretary of the Embassy said “Yes of course we know that the French government 
backs its artists in foreign countries – but that didn’t keep Austria from fighting France, 
did it?”  The Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs in the DoS sent a reply, 
assuring Cohu that the US always seeks to encourage American artists both 
domestically and abroad (19 February 1936, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 5062, 
811.42751/34). 
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forth their point of view on various questions.  Some of them have assigned 
officials to their diplomatic missions in Berne to specialize in this work.  It 
frequently happens that an article which is prepared or inspired in this way 
has a far greater effect if printed in Switzerland than if it appeared in the 
country of the author (M1457, R19, 854.911/10). 
 
Other nations with a vested interest in America’s stance on certain policies, in 
particular France, saw the advantage of ensuring their view on certain issues, such as 
war debts, were circulated in the Swiss press. 
 
The only remedy that I can suggest is for us to resort to the same method of presenting 
our point of view.  The Legation has succeeded in establishing friendly relations with 
the owners and responsible editors of the principal papers throughout Switzerland and 
as has been reported on several occasions these gentlemen are disposed to 
publish anything we desire and to give friendly treatment to matters in 
which we are interested.  All this is, however, subject to one condition, - 
that we furnish original material in a form suitable for publication (M1457, 
R19, 854.911/10, emphasis added). 
 
Gibson said the news needed to be received in a timely manner.  He pointed to 
recent statements made by the Secretary of State and how such statements sent in 
advance to the Legation would have been extremely useful, but by the time the 
Legation received it a week later, the statements lost their news value.  Intermixed 
with Gibson’s listening are plans to advocate America’s position.  He used the 
information he gathered from listening to people to reshape and inform America’s 
relations with Switzerland.   
Gibson’s report and ideas caused an interesting reaction within the 
Department of State.  The Department’s response, written 24 September 1925, 
“recognizes the importance of the Swiss press in cultured and liberal thought in 
Europe, and has decided to authorise the procedure suggested by you” (M1457, R19, 
854.911/10).  The reply included three articles pertaining to the League of Nations, 
the Caribbean countries, and Mexico.  As “…the preparation of such articles is a task 
which makes serious calls on the time of the officers of the Department.  [Gibson 
was] therefore instructed to observe carefully the results of [the] experiment; 
ascertain whether the articles are followed by discussion and editorial comment, and 
report [on]…whether or not the result justifies the labor involved” (M1457, R19, 
854.911/10).  Gibson was thus instructed to listen to determine whether the articles 
had any impact on public opinion in Switzerland.  But this reply and the articles were 
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never sent to Gibson.  According to the note handwritten on the document, dated 3 
December 1925, “[this] instruction was carefully considered by C’s, A.H. and I.L. 
and it was decided not to send it.  Mr. Hugh Wilson wrote Mr. Gibson a personal 
letter about the matter. – R.S.” (854.911/10).181  There were no textual records of 
any discussions related to this particular correspondence to ascertain why the 
response had been delayed for so long and eventually never sent. 
Another interesting example of listening was actually initiated by the 
Department of State in 1936, six months after FDR suggested holding a special Pan 
American conference.  On June 25, 1936, a worldwide circular was issued to all 
consulates, legations, and embassies to conduct a survey of the local press, looking 
specifically at the coverage of American news in the last five years.  The Department 
wanted to know what subjects were covered more frequently and in detail (RG 59, 
CDF 1930-39, Box 4656, 800.911/33A).  The Chargé d’Affaires in Istanbul, G. 
Howland Shaw, caused a great deal of consternation with his reply.  He noted that 
the little news printed in the Turkish press is generally sensational in nature.   Shaw 
said that America seemed very remote to most Turkish, especially in comparison to 
Europe.   
 
And, finally, with the development of étatisme in Turkey in recent years the 
discrepancy between traditional American and modern Turkish ideals has 
become marked, and the natural tendency has been and is to turn more 
towards those countries in which the totalitarian point of view obtains and 
away from the countries of democratic and liberal background 
(800.911/33A). 
 
Shaw observed the Turkish regime was at the time “highly resistant to anything 
suggestive of foreign propaganda, but…observed that nevertheless the individual is 
eager to get hold of foreign books and foreign articles having to do with subjects 
which he is interested” (800.911/33A).  Referring to a standing agreement between 
the US and Turkey, whereby both nations agree to exchange official publications, 
Shaw said the Turkish officials do not make US official publications readily available 
to the public. 
 
                                                     
181 Unfortunately, the personal letter written to Mr. Gibson was not included in any of the 
archival records consulted for this research. 
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To secure results I suggest the following procedure and I am not making the 
suggestion with respect to Turkey alone, but as applicable to many, if not all, 
countries in which the United States maintains a diplomatic mission.  Let the 
mission be instructed to make careful study to determine in what particular field 
cultural relations with America might be developed...Having through careful 
investigation determined in detail the field in which cultural relations may be 
developed, the next step would be to find out just what material on these 
subjects is available in America.  Both Government and private organizations must 
be approached and it has been my experience that both are willing and anxious to 
respond generously to any appeals for help from abroad.  When the material has 
been assembled, it is essential that it be placed in the hands of the person or 
persons who will make the most of it.  It does little good to send a bundle of 
literature to a government department and forget all about it.  It should be 
the duty of the diplomatic mission to know just who the individuals are who 
can use the material and it should also be the duty of the mission to follow 
up the matter and discover when and how the material can be supplemented 
(800.911/33A, emphasis added). 
 
Shaw’s report and suggestion initiated a flurry of exchanges within the Department 
of State.  The first assessment was that Shaw used the “News Survey” circular “as a 
take-off for the writing of this despatch on educational and social propaganda as a 
function of the Foreign Service as a means of enhancing American prestige 
abroad…It seems clear, therefore, that Mr. Shaw’s suggestion may be regarded as 
entirely original and its merits examined without reference to other matters”; thus 
initiating a debate about the merits of Shaw’s suggestion (Unsigned, n.d., RG 59, 
CDF 1930-39, Box 5064, 811.42767/78).    Mr. Alling in the Division of Near 
Eastern Affairs observed that “[if] Howland’s plan were to be adopted it would 
require careful handling in the field for we should want to be careful to avoid giving 
the impression that we were consciously endeavoring to propagandize American 
ideas abroad” (24 September 1936, 811.42767/78).  As with the CPI, the issue for 
American efforts to engage with the public was also linked to the concern that any 
such engagement might be perceived as propaganda.  To avoid this impression, 
Alling suggested that materials could be required from foundations like Rockefeller 
and Carnegie: 
 
…we should have to have funds to purchase the necessary books.  I doubt 
whether such funds could be obtained from Congress, for it would smack 
too much of the French Foreign Office appropriation ‘Oeuvres Françaises à 
l’étranger’ which is used to support French missionary, educations, and 
similar institutions in foreign countries (811.42767/78).     
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Another DoS officer in the Division of Research and Publication suggested that 
rather than creating new programs to distribute and exchange published materials 
abroad that Shaw and other consuls and ambassadors conduct a survey on the 
exchange already taking place.  The officer suggested that the US embassy discuss 
with Turkish officials the types of documents they are most interested in and for 
what purpose they are needed.  In familiarizing themselves with what publications 
were sent by the US, what publications the Turkish officials need and how they are 
used, the author believed there would be side benefit of familiarizing the Turkish 
officials of where to look for accurate information about America.  The author used 
the example of the British and their British Library of Information office in New 
York, where the press frequently calls to get facts about Britain. 
 
The Director of the Library has stated that they are constantly called upon to 
give information and render assistance to representatives of the press, and he 
believes that a little guidance offered to the press will prevent a great deal of 
misrepresentation, misstatement, et cetera.  As this Government has no 
‘office of information’ in Europe, it might be advisable for our 
representatives at Istanbul (and elsewhere) to familiarize themselves 
thoroughly with the very generous shipments of our official 
publications…so that foreign newspaper men, officials and others may be 
promptly directed to such publications when they are in want of information 
(Unsigned, 29 September 1936, 811.42767/78). 
 
Cyril Wynne in the Division of Research and Publication raised additional concerns 
about Shaw’s suggestion and the obstacles to implementing such a scheme.  The 
biggest obstacle, one well-known to the Department of State, was funding. 
 
 I have been attending and taking part in hearings before the Bureau of the 
Budget and Appropriations Committees of Congress for quite a few years 
now and I think it can be said that a request for funds to be used for the 
purpose mentioned would not only be turned down but the State 
Department official who submitted it would be the recipient of some very 
unkind remarks (2 October 1936, 811.42767/79). 
 
Mr. Wynne went on to offer his thoughts on approaching the RF and CEIP for 
assistance. 
 
These institutions might be willing to send publications or literature of the 
nature desired but, I am frank to say, that I doubt it unless Mr. Shaw could 
make a Bostonian appeal to members of their respective Boards of Trustees 
who know him…it may be pointed out that institutions like the Carnegie 
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and Rockefeller Foundations generally proceed in their own way in 
distributing publications in foreign lands…As a general rule, these agencies 
act according to a settled procedure and it takes some powerful arguments 
from headquarters to change or vary the procedure in question.  The reason 
for this is not because such institutions as Carnegie and Rockefeller are set in 
their ways, but because they have a definite and specific objective (2 
October 1936, 811.42767/79). 
 
Wynne agreed with the earlier suggestion to survey how American publications 
were used in Turkey and what types of materials are needed. 
This exchange is significant for several reasons.  First, the fact that a 
suggestion made by one Chargé d’Affaires caused such internal debate within the 
Department of State is worth noting, especially in the context of the role of public 
diplomacy in statecraft.  At this point, many DoS officers did not see cultural 
relations as part of their declared duties, an issue which resurfaces again and again 
through the rest of this study.  Furthermore, while this debate between the Near 
East Division and the Division of Research and Publication continued other State 
Department officials were preparing for the upcoming Pan American Conference in 
Buenos Aires with plans for treaties to encourage cultural relations between the US 
and the rest of Latin America.  Finally, the discussion is also noteworthy for the 
suggestion and consideration by some of the officers to approach CEIP or RF to 
handle Shaw’s suggestion, to avoid any accusations of using propaganda.  But this 
also shows how CEIP and RF were viewed as almost de facto government agencies.  
Furthermore, the DoS seemed to be aware that CEIP’s and RF’s operations were 
guided by clear goals. 
Much of the information obtained by private and public entities regarding 
foreign public opinion was gathered by reading the national and local press, not 
unlike Charles Francis Adams throughout the Civil War, and through regular 
interactions with members of the press, students, and academics.  American 
foundations such as CEIP, RF, LSRMF, and IIE utilized intellectual networks, long 
established before WWI, to not only create new connections when setting-up new 
initiatives, but also to ensure the smooth running of ongoing projects as well as 
creating an easy way to gather information about the effectiveness of their programs 
(Parmar 2012; Rietzler 2009; Rietzler 2011). 
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“In the aggregate the misrepresentation of America in the foreign press 
is very hurtful to the nation.  It all tends to lower us in the estimation of 
foreigners, to diminish our prestige, to weaken our hand in whatever 
we are doing.”182 
 Private entities conducting engagement activities abroad not only advocated 
internationalist ideas or international cooperation, they were also advocating 
American ideas and culture.  The foundations’ support was in effect a form of 
advocacy; advocating the particular objectives and ideals which the boards of the 
foundations thought to be worthy of support and in keeping with the eventual 
development of a conflict free world society (Parmar 2012).  As Nicholas Murray 
Butler noted 
 
[appeals] are constantly...received...for financial support, and these must be 
given careful and kindly consideration and a decision must be reached as to 
whether they fall within the scope of the work of the Division [of 
Intercourse and Education], the object of which is…neither personal nor 
philanthropic, but the forming of an enlightened public opinion in matters of 
international concern (CEIP Year Book 1921). 
 
For CEIP, advocacy was an integral part of the foundations’ internationalist mission.  
Each of the divisions within CEIP sponsored and published books, journals, 
pamphlets, and magazines relating to international cooperation, arbitration, 
international law, and trade and economics.  Some publications were intended 
strictly for foreign audiences and others solely for domestic audiences.  The 
European Bureau of CEIP published an international law journal, La Paix par le Droit, 
for European audiences, while publications such as International Conciliation and 
Advocate of Peace tended to be for domestic audiences, though not strictly so.183  
International Conciliation featured printings of treaties, speeches given to the 
Assembly at the League of Nations, key decisions of the international court at The 
Hague, as well as critical articles by prominent academics, statesmen, and 
international lawyers, including board members and trustees of CEIP, IIE, and RF.  
                                                     
182 Stuart Perry, Editor & Publisher of The Adrian Telegram, to Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull, 29 November 1935 (RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 4656, 800.911/33). 
183 Publications such as International Conciliation and Advocate of Peace were distributed to 
libraries and institutions around the world which requested materials from CEIP.  The 
Year Book 1925 includes expressions of gratitude for International Conciliation from a 
New Zealand MP and an Australian Premier (pp. 68-69). 
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The Advocate of Peace was published by the American Peace Society, with financial 
support from CEIP which subsidized both the Society and the publication.  Advocate 
of Peace was a magazine featuring shorter articles mostly on arbitration and 
international law.  There were also some publications which were disseminated all 
over the world, translated into English and several other languages, including 
manuscripts by foreign writers.   
CEIP’s interest also extended to ensuring America was understood abroad.  
In 1920, CEIP’s Division of Intercourse and Education reviewed and collected 
official statements by past US presidents and Secretaries of State “...which have been 
formally or tacitly accepted by the American people and ….therefore constitute the 
foundation of American Foreign Policy…”(CEIP Year Book 1921, p. 47).  This 
publication was also circulated around the world.  The Division also published a 
book, Soldiers and Sailors of France in the American War for Independence, which was 
circulated in France and the US “as...more evidence of how much the two countries 
have in common” (CEIP Year Book 1921, p.47).   
 The Rockefeller Foundation’s grant giving also reflected the organization’s 
interest in promoting worldwide health and knowledge exchange.  Throughout the 
1920s and 30s the foundation used grants and fellowships to advocate for the 
development of state and local health boards as well as the implementation of health 
education in schools and industry internationally (RF Annual Report 1923; RF Annual 
Report 1929).  The RF also encouraged free exchange of knowledge, particularly in 
the areas of natural science and medicine.  In this work, the RF worked with the 
League of Nations to support exchanges between public health personnel, physicians, 
and scientists.    The objective was to break down national barriers to allow scientists 
and physicians opportunities to collaborate and find solutions for the betterment of 
international society.  Following WWI, the RF received reports from their 
representatives in Europe of the great need for lab equipment and access to medical 
and scientific journals.  European medical schools could not afford to subscribe to 
journals and purchase other publications as they had prior to the war.  The 
Rockefeller Foundation's Division of Medical Education (DME) began an initiative to 
provide British and American journals to countries in need.  Under the terms of the 
program, the DME would not allow requests for French journals or any publications 
not directly related to medical science (Solomon 2003).   
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Private foundations, societies, and citizens tended to support programs 
which championed their policies and ideas, so peace societies advocated for peace 
generally and arbitration more specifically.  CEIP encouraged the development and 
solidification of an international order premised on international law.  RF advocated 
for world health initiatives “for the benefit of humanity”184 as identified by the board 
of trustees and advisors.  The IIE encouraged academic exchanges as a way to ensure 
international understanding and education about world affairs.  The ideas advocated 
tended to promote American ideas of internationalism and culture. 
 The US government did develop a form of advocacy in 1934 with the 
establishment of the Information Service.  On July 27, 1934, Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull issued a circular announcing the formation of the Information Services 
within the Department of State.  The information provided by the service would fall 
into three categories: Confidential, Background, and Attribution.  Background 
information was to be used to freely, but not attributed to the DoS, the Secretary of 
State, or any officer of the government.  Information categorized for Attribution was 
any information attributed to the President, the Secretary of State, DoS, or some 
specific named individual.  This heralded the start of what is better known as the 
Wireless File or Washington File, which would be an integral part of US 
informational public diplomacy under the US Information Service (USIS). 
Secretary Hull asked for constructive suggestions on how to improve the 
service as operations began.  Hull was “…convinced that there exists a need in the 
field for more comprehensive data concerning both [US] domestic affairs and [US] 
foreign relations” (RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 232, 111.33 Information Service/7).  
Most US foreign service officers expressed appreciation for the new service, 
declaring the need to explain American policies abroad, not just to foreign 
government officials, but also the local press and to the people of the host nation. 
 
There have been many times during even my short period of service in the 
Field when accurate information concerning the policies of our Government would 
have been extremely helpful to myself and fellow officers in shaping opinion in various 
circles abroad concerning the activities of the American Government, and in 
adequately answering the ever recurrent criticism of our Government and 
people, much of which arises through lack of understanding due to the 
absence of accurate information.  The absence of such information has not 
                                                     
184 The Rockefeller Foundation motto. 
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infrequently been a source of embarrassment, since people abroad seemed to think that 
the representatives of the American Government were certainly informed of the policies 
and background of the actions of that Government at home.  This has often not 
been the case…The ability to give publicity abroad to certain types of information 
emanating from high officials of the American Government…should be very 
helpful, it is believed, not only in creating a better understanding of America in 
foreign countries, but in demonstrating a cooperative attitude on the part of American 
Foreign Service officers in their contacts with Government officials, the press 
and influential organizations, and as a result of such demonstration may open 
up in turn to such officers new avenues of approach to a variety of subjects 
of interest to our Government (No 269, American Vice Consul Barbados, 
28 July 1934, RG 59 CDF 1930-39, Box 232, 111.33 Information 
Service/19, emphasis added). 
 
Vice Consul Perry Jester was intimating that by sharing information more openly 
with the press and local public, mutuality and trust could develop between the US 
legation and the host nation.  He also went on to make two suggestions.  He asked if 
the Information Service would be amenable to providing specific information on 
varied subjects at the request of the mission.  Jester said US representatives are often 
asked “to speak intelligently on matters they are unfamiliar” with the host 
government.  He also asked if the Information Service would be able to provide 
publications and data on specific subjects as needed.   
Here again is an example where US representatives in the field recognize the 
importance of interacting with the public of a nation in addition to the traditional 
role of engaging with the host government, just as the G. Howland Shaw noted in 
Istanbul.  However, only certain individuals within the Department of State began to 
acknowledge this need and develop mechanisms to facilitate the needs of US 
representatives in the field to enable and facilitate foreign public engagement. 
“…we have been unconsciously laying the foundation on which we may 
consciously work for the promotion of world friendship.  Education is 
the only sure and permanent method for producing changes in 
civilization.”185 
 International exchange was perhaps the most overt and predominate feature 
of US foundations and private organizations engaging with people abroad.  Many 
                                                     
185 Cornelia Adair, “The Public Schools and International Friendship.” Address from: 
World Conference on International Justice; from the Report of the Proceedings of the 
Commission on International Implications of Education, Cleveland, Ohio 7-11 May 1928, 
printed in Advocate of Peace through Justice, September 1928, Vol. 9, No. 9, p. 542. 
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internationalists believed that with widespread international exchanges, people could 
get to know one another culturally, exchange knowledge, and diminish 
misunderstanding which could lead to conflict.  Foundation programs were often 
designed to foster an international outlook, an awareness of international issues and 
different cultures.  To this end, foundations emphasized cross-cultural exchanges. 
From the beginning, CEIP had volunteered to support and arrange academic 
exchanges in response to the resolution passed at the 4th Pan American Conference in 
1910.  The RF also created fellowships and scholarships for students, scientists, 
teachers, and physicians the opportunity to work and study in the US and other 
nations.  The exchanges arranged by CEIP were not limited to students and 
academics either, they also set-up exchanges between professionals such as lawyers, 
jurists, and journalists (CEIP Year Book 1930).  In the spring of 1929, European 
journalists from Italy, Latvia, Spain, Yugoslavia, Belgium, France, Greece, and 
Poland were invited by the Division of Intercourse and Education to tour the US and 
meet with their professional American counterparts, not unlike the tours arranged 
by the CPI during WWI.   
 
All seem to feel that not only wider acquaintance with America and 
Americans has been attained, but that the association with each other has 
contributed to a clearer conception of the problems of the various European 
countries represented in the group.  Each of the visitors has given publicity 
to happenings and impressions of his experiences through his own and 
through foreign newspapers.  It seems apparent that advantages have been 
gained through this visit that could not have been gained in any other way 
(CEIP Year Book 1930, p. 47). 
 
The trip resulted in a similar invitation issued to the US for American journalists to 
tour Europe.  American journalists were also invited to tour Japan, occupied 
Manchuria, and China, which CEIP also supported.   
The Guggenheim Foundation also sponsored grants for fellowships to study 
in Latin America.  The foundation was created in 1925 to provide grants to US 
citizens to conduct research in Latin America, but in 1929, the Guggenheims 
expanded the program to include grants to students and artists in Mexico desiring to 
study in the US.  In the fall of 1930, the Foundation announced additional grants for 
students and artists in Argentina and Chile.  Cuba would be added soon to the list of 
countries eligible for grants.  Arrangements for the grants were made through 
consultations with academics and business leaders in the recipient countries.  As with 
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each foundation, the grants and scholarships were guided by the Guggenheim 
Foundation’s own objectives and policies. 
 
The plan upon which these Fellowships are based embodies in my opinion 
fundamental considerations which are important for any intellectual 
exchange.  Only individuals of superior ability should go abroad to pursue 
their studies.  It is only the best which each of our several countries has to 
offer that should be passed on to others and only the best minds will be able 
to master the complicated conditions of study in another country and to 
profit by such study.  It is inevitably upon such minds that we are dependent 
for better international understanding.  To them we must look for the 
greatest improvements in social and economic conditions and upon them we 
are dependent for that progress in the intellectual and spiritual realms which 
alone would make truly worthwhile so vast an enterprise as we are 
undertaking (President of Swarthmore College, Dr. Frank Aydelotee, 
Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Guggenheim Foundation, RG 59, 
CDF 1930-39, Box 5048, 811.42710 Guggenheim Foundation/3). 
 
The Guggenheim Foundation used academics and businessmen from both the US and 
Latin America to help set up and supervise student exchanges. 
 On the other hand, the IIE did not fund academic exchanges per se.  The 
organization provided administrative assistance to facilitate exchanges and collected 
large amounts of information regarding academic institutions as well as any 
opportunities for studying or teaching abroad.  IIE did help to manage many 
foundation gifts for students and teachers to study in the US or overseas, including 
scholarships offered by CEIP, the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, 
and the RF (Bu 1999).   
In addition to private US organizations, many foreign governments and 
foreign organizations were also eager to arrange exchanges.  Foreign governments 
often elicited the US government’s assistance in either establishing formal exchanges 
or requesting the American government select academic advisors to review their 
education system.  These requests were frequently deferred to organizations such as 
the IIE, CEIP, and RF.186 
                                                     
186 In May 1934, Dr. Moses Bensabat Amzalak, Director of the Institute of Economic 
Studies at the Technical University of Lisbon, and Dr. Francisco Antonio Correia from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Portugal met with US Ambassador R.G. Caldwell to 
create an American reading room in the university library as well as invite American 
professors to teach.  Caldwell explained that such a scheme would be hard to arrange 
“on account of the organization of the American higher education, it would not be easy 
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 “…the Government has in the main been content to leave to private 
organizations what should at least in part have been its own 
responsibility.  These agencies and foundations have done much during 
recent years to encourage and facilitate international intellectual 
cooperation.”187 
 The interwar period is an important epoch in the development of American 
public diplomacy.  The most significant driver of foreign public engagement at the 
time was private foundations and organizations.  Private entities were driven by 
internationalist ideas; they saw foreign public engagement as a way to foster 
internationalism more broadly as well as facilitating international cooperation 
through mutual exchange and understanding.  The interwar period is also significant 
to understanding the issues and concerns expressed by government officials 
regarding the prospect of engaging with publics abroad.  Some officials did not 
believe ambassadors and consuls were responsible for engaging with foreign publics, 
including Secretary of State Hull.  Hull believed cultural activities should remain 
distinct from consular duties (Telegram #73, 9 April 1935, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, 
Box 5064, 811.426765/45).  Others were concerned about obtaining funds for 
engagement programs or about the possibility of being accused of propagandizing.  
These issues relate to both organizational and conceptual problems identified in 
Chapter 1.  While private entities and the US government increasingly recognized 
the need for foreign engagement in American statecraft, integrating the practice and 
defining it became more and more difficult. 
Additionally, the symbiotic relationship between private entities and the US 
government, which developed during the interwar period, presaged the framework 
for American public diplomacy eventually established after WWII.  This case 
demonstrated how private entities and foundations helped with American foreign 
                                                                                                                                       
to establish such relations with the United States directly through any government 
agency.”  Caldwell suggested the men contact Dr. Stephen Duggan of the IIE to make 
such arrangements (RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 5062, 811.42753/3).  Also, in 
November 1932, the Siamese government requested the DoS help to recommend 
American professors in civil engineering, electrical engineering, mechanical 
engineering, and mathematics to help the government improve education in their 
country.  The DoS replied that the Siamese minister in the US was asked to contact Dr. 
Stephen Duggan of the IIE to find instructors needed by Siam (RG 59, CDF 1930-39, 
Box 5065, 811.42792/52). 
187 Secretary of State, Cordell Hull to Ben Cherrington, 29 June 1938 (RG 59, CDF 1930-
39, Box 235, 111.46/1A) 
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relations and foreign policy.  As many of CEIP, LSRMF, and RF supported groups 
and institutions backed the League of Nations, the foundations provided an indirect 
way for the US government to maintain relations unofficially.  The US government 
provided foundations logistic support and in some cases, official backing.  This 
mutualistic relationship deepens as the US government moves to establish foreign 
public engagement as a permanent part of American statecraft. 
Much of the practices used by private entities to engage with people abroad 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s become standard practices for American public 
diplomacy.  Frank Ninkovich noted how CEIP “…established what was to become 
the standard repertory of cultural relations: exchanges of professors and students, 
exchanges of publications, stimulation of translations and the book trade, the 
teaching of English, exchanges of leaders from every walk of life - all of these were 
to become the stock-in-trade of future governmental programs” (1981, p. 12).  
However, CEIP was not the only entity funding libraries, arranging international 
exchanges, and advocating the US in print.  This chapter only highlights the activities 
of some of the larger foundations, though State Department records show that 
smaller civic groups were equally active in engaging with people all over the 
world.188  These same individuals and groups will be called upon to advise and carry 
out what is thought of today as the start of American public diplomacy.  Figure 6.1 
details some of the many connections between not only the US government and 
private foundations, but also key people who remain integral to the development of 
American public diplomacy.  Both the private-public relationship and the leading 
private entities which continued foreign public engagement throughout the inter-war 
period are significant motifs of this study. 
                                                     
188 There were many organizations in the US and around the world which were eager to 
establish international engagement among people of different nations.  Some of the US 
organizations included the Committee on Friendly Relations Among Foreign Students, 
the ARC, the National League of Women Voters, the National Peabody Foundation for 
International Education Correspondence, the National Federation of Music Clubs, and 
the Foreign Policy Association (RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Boxes 5062 – 5073, 
811.42741/21 – 811.43). 
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Figure 6.1 Compared with the two previous diagrams, this chart depicts how the public-
private cooperative relationship became more complex and enlarged in the inter-war 
period.  There are also individuals and organizations which continue to facilitate the 
evolution of public diplomacy. 
 
With the commencement of WWII in Europe the US government become more 
involved in American foreign public engagement.  Although, government officials 
recognize from the beginning that private entities will still be needed to engage with 
publics abroad.  Therefore, the private-public relationship is solidified throughout 
WWII. 
The culmination of foreign public engagement in the interwar period is the 
Pan American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace.  Like the Fourth Pan 
American Conference in 1910, members of the Pan American Union again gathered 
in Buenos Aires, and again, academic exchanges were added to the agenda.  This 
time, rather than simply passing a resolution for academic exchanges, the 
Department of State drafted a treaty for cultural exchanges.  This formalization of 
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cultural exchanges between the United States and Latin America was touted as 
another aspect of President Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy.  The effort was also 
viewed by both the US and other Latin American nations as a way to hold onto peace 
as Europe and Asia moved closer towards war (Inman 1965).189 
 The treaty received Senate support shortly after the conference concluded 
and only required Congressional appropriation to fund the administration of the 
treaty (Doyle 1937).  Hence, discussions ensued as to which government 
department would be responsible for ensuring the treaty was administered and make 
the request to Congress for funding.  Interestingly, there were several key figures 
within the Department of State who did not believe the Convention for the 
Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations should be administered by the State 
Department.  
In the fall of 1937, about eight or nine months before the Division of 
Cultural Relations was established within the Department of State, a series of letters 
were exchanged between the Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, various 
State Department officers, and the Commissioner of the Office of Education in the 
Department of Interior.  Donald Heath in the Division of American Republics wrote 
to Sumner Welles apprising him of a conversation he had with Dr. John W. 
Studebaker, Commissioner of the Office of Education.  Dr. Studebaker informed Mr. 
Heath that his office requested Congressional funding to carry out the work required 
for the new Convention, and he expressed concerns that the Bureau of the Budget190 
might reject the request on the grounds that the work should be done by the 
Department of State (RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 235, 111.46/31/2).  Five days later, 
G.A. Butler of the Department of State, replied to Heath and indicated that the State 
Department’s Chief of the Budget Bureau, Charles Hosmer, knew nothing of the 
arrangement with the Office of Education.  “[Heath] told [Hosmer] that all [he] knew 
was that Mr. [Laurence] Duggan had mentioned to [him] that an office to take charge 
of carrying out provisions of the Convention for the Promotion of Cultural Relations 
was to be set up in the Office of Education” (Butler to Heath, 8 November 1937, RG 
                                                     
189 The conference was actually called in response to the growing tensions in Europe and 
Asia, hence, the conference name: the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance 
of Peace. 
190 The Bureau of Budget was part of the Department of Treasury and was responsible 
creating fiscal budgets based on each government departments’ funding requirements. 
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59, Box 235, 111.46/31/2).  The following day, Under Secretary Sumner Welles 
wrote to Hosmer saying no agreement existed between the Office of Education or 
the Department of State with regard to the Convention.  “In former 
conversations…with Dr. Studebaker during the past summer, [Welles] expressed to 
him [his] own belief that the Office of Education was the appropriate office in the 
Government at the present time to handle the exchange of teachers and students 
with the other American Republics…” (Welles to Hosmer, 9 November 1937, RG 
59, Box 235, 111.46/31/2).  Hosmer responded to Donald Heath the same day: 
 
Subject to changing my views when I know more about the subject, they are 
as follow: (1) If the Office of Education is to handle exclusively the activities 
contemplated by the Convention and in a manner satisfactory to this 
Department and we require no funds to finance State Department activities 
in this connection, I believe we should support the Department of the 
Interior in obtaining an appropriation; although there is always a chance the 
Budget Bureau will not approve this arrangement even if we recommend it. 
 
(2) If the State Department requires any funds to finance any activities of its 
own under the Convention, I think it would be preferable that the 
appropriation be under the administration of this Department (Hosmer to 
Heath, 9 November 1937, RG 59, Box 235, 111.46/31/2). 
 
This exchange of memos is rather significant to the origins of American public 
diplomacy.  According to both Frank Ninkovich’s (1981) and Justin Hart’s (2013) 
accounts, the Department of State always intended to carry out the Convention for 
the Promotion of Cultural Relations of 1936.  Both attributed this convention to the 
official origins of the Division of Cultural Relations within the Department of State, 
which did eventually manifest in 1938.   
What makes this exchange interesting is not only that many within the DoS 
believed the implementation of the treaty should be managed by the Office of 
Education, but the fact that two of the leading champions of cultural relations within 
the DoS also believed the Office of Education should administer the treaty: Laurence 
Duggan and Sumner Welles.  Furthermore, the exchange also demonstrates a rather 
narrow interpretation of the treaty.  Heath, Hosmer, Welles, Duggan, Butler, and 
Studebaker all believed the sole purpose of the treaty was to ensure academic 
exchanges between the American republics.  Based on this interpretation, the Office 
of Education was perhaps the best government department to manage the 
administration of the treaty.  As the following chapter will discuss, while plans got 
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underway to develop a government office to carry out the new Convention, the plan 
for simply ensuring academic exchanges expanded into a full program of foreign 
public engagement which included cultural diplomacy and international broadcasting 
alongside exchange diplomacy.   
The next chapter looks at three US agencies which were created to engage 
with people abroad.  Though President Roosevelt and those working in the Division 
of Cultural Relations, the Office of War Information, and the Coordinator for Inter-
American Affairs believed their missions were different, the agencies’ operations 
often overlapped.  This further complicates conceptualization of foreign public 
engagement, as well as determining its role in American statecraft.  Moreover, the 
underlying intent behind the engagement becomes tangled with US concerns about 
national security and economic priorities, and less interested in developing friendly 
relations. While highlighting these issues, the last case continues to build on the 
themes of communication, the private-public relationship, and methods of 
engagement. 
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Chapter 7  
American Foreign Public Engagement in Chaos & Ambiguity 
“….a decision must be made as to the role of government in the international information 
programs and where the foreign office fits into the governmental program... ‘Cultural 
Cooperation’ and long range information are part of a whole single texture and should be 
treated as such. 
– Archibald MacLeish, Information Service Committee Meeting Minutes, 
Department of State, January 4, 1945191 
 By the end of World War II, US leaders came to accept foreign public 
engagement as a tool of statecraft, though it remained unclear what role engagement 
should play.  Now, with the war’s end within sight, these individuals raised concerns 
about the future of American foreign public engagement.  Though most agreed the 
practice should continue after the war’s conclusion, each organization and individual 
involved all had their own ideas of what American foreign public engagement should 
and should not be.  As Frank Ninkovich illustrates in his book The Diplomacy of Ideas, 
the conflicting ideas about the nature of cultural and information relations programs 
were not adequately resolved, even with the passage of Smith-Mundt in 1948.  This 
case will outline the complicated history of how several pre-wartime and wartime 
agencies came to be consolidated into the Department of State by 1945, and how 
these different organizations helped to shape the future of American foreign public 
engagement, highlighting some of the endemic problems which still plague American 
public diplomacy today as well as connecting to past cases.   
On the eve of WWII, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) created offices 
and agencies to engage with foreign publics, marking the start of foreign public 
engagement as a distinct and permanent part of American statecraft.  In many 
instances these offices and agencies were created out of concern for US national 
security, not to improve US foreign relations. This becomes significant as more 
agencies are tasked to engage with people abroad and, in attempting to coordinate 
                                                     
191 RG 353, Entry 401-403, Box 94 
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operations with other agencies also engaging with foreign publics, discover different 
views about the purpose and role such engagement should play in statecraft. 
The origins and work of Division of Cultural Relations (DCR), the Office of 
Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), and the Office of War Information (OWI) illustrate 
how each agency was created to implement specific foreign policies and attain more 
general foreign policy objectives without determining any policy for the use of 
foreign public engagement, resulting in confusion and ambiguity regarding what role 
foreign public engagement should play in American statecraft.  This is also made 
apparent in the opposing perspectives about how foreign public engagement should 
be used in American statecraft, whether as a more diplomatic tool or weapon of war, 
control, and influence, and how these differing views were left unresolved and 
became ingrained into American foreign public engagement.  This chapter will 
analyse the creation and demise of these agencies in the context of the previous cases, 
highlighting recurring issues and patterns where appropriate; bringing to light new 
perspectives toward not only this particular epoch in American foreign public 
engagement, but also toward American public diplomacy in the present day. 
Much of the history of these agencies has been recounted previously by both 
scholars and the officers who worked in the agencies (Cull 2008; Hart 2013; 
Ninkovich 1981; Thomson 1948; Winkler 1978).  What is interesting about each of 
these historical accounts is the discussion of the relationship and distinction between 
foreign relations, foreign policy, diplomacy, and foreign public engagement.192  This 
is key to understanding the role of foreign public engagement in American statecraft.  
Over the course of the decade from 1938 to 1948, this question and the relationship 
between foreign public engagement and foreign policy and foreign relations becomes 
more and more indistinct, compounded both by the multiple agencies handling 
foreign public engagement, WWII, and the onset of the Cold War.   
In Justin Hart’s analysis, he differentiates between foreign relations, foreign 
policy, and diplomacy, by distinguishing diplomacy as being contacts between 
officially designated representatives of nations.  Foreign policy is a government's 
"formal" approach to the world, and foreign relations is the sum total of a nation's 
                                                     
192 The general term of foreign public engagement is used here to cover all other terms 
used including propaganda, cultural relations, and public diplomacy. 
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contact with governments and people of other nations (2013, p. 12).  Cull’s own 
analysis coincides with Hart’s observing that “[what] would eventually be known as 
US public diplomacy would always tend to be seen as a tool for the enactment of 
foreign policy rather than a dimension of foreign-policy-making as a whole" (2008, p. 
38).   Thomson does not seem to make a distinction between either foreign relations 
or foreign policy, as he describes information to be an instrument of both (1948, p. 
158 & p. 188).  Yet he makes a clearer distinction in his declaration that the US 
government “must decide clearly what the main objectives of its information work 
shall be…a program designed to spread information, understanding, and culture for 
their own sake; or…a program designed to use information and cultural relations for 
national objectives” (p. 291, emphasis added).  In this statement, Thomson is making 
the distinction between information work as either a tool of foreign relations 
generally or a tool to attain foreign policy objectives without direct reference to 
either term.  Ninkovich makes a similar observation, noting the subtle change in how 
the US government handled cultural relations around the middle of 1941: 
 
…the need to expand the program and the new short-term orientation 
toward immediate results placed inexorable pressures upon the informal 
system of policy and administration to give way to a greater degree of 
governmental control.  The result was that the traditional conceptions of the 
legitimate role of governmental cultural activities - whether of the national 
interest or the liberal universalist variety, both of which emphasized reciprocity 
and the primacy of the private sector in policy and administration - were 
challenged in nearly every one of the United States' overseas cultural 
activities (1981, p. 43, emphasis added). 
 
Now Hart argues that this change was spurred by “policymakers recognition that US 
foreign relations had entered a new era in which the US government could no longer 
remain indifferent to perceptions of the United States abroad” (2013, p. 5).  As a 
result of this view, US leaders now saw a requirement to project America’s image 
abroad.  However, as the previous cases have already demonstrated, US leaders were 
interested in the image America projected abroad, but within the confines of 
American political tradition left the projection of America’s image largely in private 
hands, preferring not become involved.  Though there were indeed some officials 
within the US government who did see the need to pay more attention to America’s 
image overseas, the reasons behind creating the Division of Cultural Relations, the 
CIAA, and the OWI were not due to concerns about America’s perceived image 
abroad.  Rather, the CIAA and OWI were both created to obviate national security 
- 195 - 
 
concerns, and although the Division of Cultural Relations was arguably a 
manifestation of the Good Neighbor Policy, the Inter-American Conference for the 
Maintenance for Peace was primarily called in response to the growing tensions in 
Europe and the fighting in Asia.  As all these agencies were created with specific 
intent and objectives in mind, this forced each organization, the Division of Cultural 
Relations, CIAA, and OWI, to interpret their own connection to either foreign 
policy or foreign relations.  With some agencies this connection was still disputed 
when all of them were consolidated into the DoS in 1945.   
Using methods of engagement to compare and contrast the Division of 
Cultural Relations, the CIAA, and the OWI, this case will reveal the tensions and 
analogous operations between each of the agencies.193  As will become increasingly 
apparent, all three agencies used news, film, books, libraries, music, cultural centres, 
and exchanges to achieve their objectives.  Thus, the discussion of this chapter will 
focus more on what each agencies objectives were as well as what the agencies 
believed they were doing and how using news, films, books, and libraries helped to 
attain these objectives.  The different attitudes in each agency become increasingly 
relevant when all three agencies are consolidated into the Department of State in 
1945 and impact the tortuous journey to the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act in 1948 
with implications for the future of US public diplomacy.  
“The Division will have general charge of official international activities 
of this Department with respect to cultural relations…”194 
By December 1937 key figures within the DoS still planned to give the 
Office of Education the responsibility of managing educational exchanges as 
prescribed by the recently ratified treaty for the Promotion of Inter-American 
Cultural Relations.  In fact, the DoS suggested creating a bureau within the Office of 
Education which would answer to the DoS vice the Department of Interior, guided 
                                                     
193 The focus of the archival material remains largely at the headquarter level, as the 
research is mostly concerned with the role of foreign public engagement in America’s 
general statecraft.  However, where events occurred in the field and connect with 
issues emanating from headquarters there is some discussion.  Compared with previous 
chapters, there is also limited discussion regarding the actual methods employed by 
each agency.  This is also again due to the confines of space, but also to avoid repetition.   
194 Departmental Order No. 768, 28 July 1938, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 235, 
111.46/1 
- 196 - 
 
by DoS policies and by a Directive Council comprised of both government and 
private representatives (“Points to be Considered…for the Promotion of Inter-
American Cultural Relations,” RG 353, Entry 14, Box 2).195  However, two months 
later, the DoS reconsidered plans to create an interdepartmental bureau, as 
“experience has indicated that where control over an office is lodged in two or more 
departments or agencies the administration of that office usually suffers” (Memo to 
Sumner Welles196 and George Messersmith,197 8 February 1938, RG 353, Entry 14, 
Box 2).  Furthermore and perhaps most significant, the DoS  noted “the necessity for 
final policy decisions in all matters directly affecting the conduct of international 
relations to rest with the Secretary of State…the Bureau of Inter-American Cultural 
Relations…will be active in a field which, while not classically associated with foreign affairs, 
under modern conditions is very directly related to foreign affairs” (Memo to Sumner Welles 
and George Messersmith, 8 February 1938, RG 353, Entry 14, Box 2, emphasis 
added).  Whether the Office of Education or another agency handled the exchanges 
with Latin America, the DoS wanted to maintain full control over US foreign 
relations and foreign policy.  The primacy of the Department with regard to foreign 
relations and foreign policy would continue to be a source of contention once the 
CIAA and OWI were created.  Since experience showed the inefficacy of inter-
agency office, the only solution was to create an office within the Department of 
State.   
Only at this point did Laurence Duggan voice his agreement that the proper 
place for an office to manage US education exchanges should be in the State 
Department, though he did warn that such an agency would be viewed by some as a 
propaganda agency. 
                                                     
195 Almost a full year after the Division of Cultural Relations was created under the 
Department of State, there was still unresolved tension about the division of 
responsibilities between the Division of Cultural Relations and the Office of Education.  
Essentially, the Division was both a policymaking and administrative office, responsible 
for ensuring all aspects of the Convention were implemented.  “Under these 
circumstances the Division of Cultural Relations would be essentially a policy making 
group for these particular functions and as such should make regulations and determine 
procedures to govern them.  The agency which would carry out any given aspect of the 
program delegated to it would be bound…by these policies and regulations” (Fred 
Kelly, Chief of Division of Higher Education, to Dr. Ben Cherrington, 22 May 1939, 
RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 236, 111.46/135). 
196 Under Secretary of State 
197 Assistant Secretary of State 
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The establishment of an independent office for the promotion of cultural 
activities may be greeted in certain quarters with disapproval on the ground 
that the new office is to engage in propaganda.  It seems to me that if 
information with regard to the establishment of this office is properly 
presented to the press this type of criticism could be minimized.  Moreover, 
what little [criticism] there may be I feel confident will in time disappear 
when the press and the public become aware of the real activities of the 
division.  It has always been my idea that such a division would not engage in 
competition [sic] propaganda but would endeavor solely, carefully and 
meticulously to construct solid foundations for cultural interchange (Lawrence 
Duggan to Sumner Welles, 9 March 1938, RG 353, Entry 14, Box 2, 
emphasis added). 
 
Duggan also envisioned a division which merely established the infrastructure and 
mechanism for exchange.  In discussions among key officers of DoS, including 
Duggan, Sumner Welles, and George Messersmith, the new division and its primary 
objectives would be mainly administrative.  There was no connection to national 
policy, nor any idealistic internationalism expressing the aspiration for greater 
international cooperation.  As plans moved forward to create a division within the 
Department of State to administer the Buenos Aires treaty 198  on educational 
exchanges, the scope of the office broadened to include not only student exchanges, 
but cultural relations more broadly. 
Once the Department of State determined the office should be created 
within the Department rather than Department of Interior, the DoS hosted a 
conference “to consider the activities of private organizations and Government 
agencies with a view to formulating some coordinated program for the promotion of 
cultural relations between the United States and the other American Republics” 
(“Conference to Consider Inter-American Cultural Relations,” 23 February 1938, 
                                                     
198 The actual Convention only required signatories to award two graduate students and 
two professors a fellowship for one school year annually.  At the time the DoS began to 
organize the Division of Cultural Relations, the US and the Dominican Republic were 
the only signatories.  Officers within the State Department noted that “that the 
exchange provided by the Convention is of a reciprocal nature, and it is doubtful if 
there can be any interchange for the next few months.”  (“Convention for the 
Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations,” 11 March 1938, RG 353, Entry 14, 
Box 2).  
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RG 353, Entry 14, Box 2).199  According to Ninkovich the DoS intended that the 
policies of cultural relations should remain in private hands: citizens and 
organizations.  The State Department envisioned a role as both administrator and 
coordinator, leaving the actual operations of cultural engagement to private entities. 
 
While creation of the Division indicates recognition by Government that it 
has a contribution to make in this field [of cultural relations], the function of 
the new Division will not be to supplant in any degree the significant activities toward 
international understanding now carried on by colleges, universities, foundations, 
institutes, and other private agencies, but rather to render those activities more 
effective by the provision of an official agency serving as a clearing house for 
exchange of information and a center of coordination and cooperation (Address by 
Charles A Thomson, before the Institute of Public Affairs of the University 
of Virginia, 3 July 1939, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 237, 111.46/211, 
emphasis added). 
 
The DoS assured private entities would remain the primary agents for US cultural 
relations; however, by mid-1941 private organizations were fading into the 
background with regards to cultural policymaking and funding (Ninkovich 1981).  
“The events of the last few months have brought the peoples of this 
hemisphere face to face with a new and a very different kind of world.  
Our answer in the Americas has been to choose preparedness as the 
road to peace.”200   
 The motivation to create the forerunners to the OWI and CIAA did not 
originate with FDR (Steele 1970).  "Roosevelt's reservations ensured that the first 
attempts to establish any propaganda network would be halting and hesitant...” 
(Winkler 1978, p. 20). 201   Hence the ideas for Office for the Coordinator of 
                                                     
199 The Division of Cultural Relations worked with an Advisory Committee which included 
Stephen Duggan of IIE; James Shotwell of the American National Committee on 
Intellectual Cooperation; John Studebaker of the Office of Education; and Carl Milam 
of the American Library Association.  The Advisory Committee included leaders from 
private organizations already conducting foreign public engagement activities.  Other 
private entities were asked to form subcommittees to advise the Division of Cultural 
Relations on student exchanges, educational films, radio, publications, and translations 
(“Summary of Activities of the Division of Cultural Relations,” 23 November 1938, 
RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 235, 111.46/61 ½). 
200 President Franklin D. Roosevelt Message to Congress, 16 July 1940, RG 229, Entry 1, 
Box 510 
201 Both Richard Steele and Robert Dallek note FDR’s regard for US public opinion and 
attempted to steer policies with the support of public opinion.  The general opposition 
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Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics (OCCCAR), 
Coordinator of Information (COI), the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF), the Office 
of Government Reports (OGR), and the Foreign Information Service (FIS) were 
generally the ideas of individuals close to FDR.  The other reason for the creation of 
some these agencies stemmed from growing concerns about the war in Europe and 
Asia, as well as a way for FDR to bolster American defences without raising criticism 
from isolationists and Republicans (Steele 1970).   
 Just five days after Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand declared war 
on Germany in September 1939, FDR signed an Executive Order (EO) establishing 
the Office of Emergency Management (OEM).  The office was to act as a 
clearinghouse and public liaison regarding defence matters.  Also created with OEM 
was the OGR which was to provide the public with information about government 
activities as well as keeping the government informed about public reactions to their 
activities (Winkler 1978).   
Meanwhile, as the Nazis made advances across Europe from September 
1939 up through the spring of 1940, the US government sought to bolster American 
hemispheric security with the creation OCCCAR in August 1940. 202   “As the 
character and probable outcome of the European war changed in the spring and 
summer of 1940, the President, recognizing the acute character of both the 
immediate and long run aspect of our trade relations with Latin American countries, 
created a Cabinet Committee on Inter-American Economic Affairs…” (“Plans or 
Programs for the Increase of Trade…,” 7 August 1940, RG 229, Entry 1.5, Box 
472).  US policymakers believed that approximately 55% of Latin American exports 
were purchased by Europeans.  With the onset of war in Europe, American leaders 
anticipated the reduced purchasing power and priorities for Latin American exports 
would destabilize not just Latin America’s economy, but also America’s economy.  
This concern about the stability of Latin America’s economy in light of the ongoing 
                                                                                                                                       
to any foreign involvement plus extreme suspicion toward propaganda prevented FDR 
from making decisive and strategic policy decisions in both areas (Dallek 1995; Steele 
1970). 
202 In the spring of 1940, the Nazis began invading Denmark, Norway, France, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.  By the summer of 1940, Holland, Belgium, and 
Norway had surrendered to the Nazis, and France signed an armistice with Nazi 
Germany.  The Battle of Britain began in early July 1940. 
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war in Europe was in part predicated on past experience with WWI.203   These 
apprehensions coincided with FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy.  Now, in 1940 the 
policy became more concerned with US national and economic security as a bulwark 
against Nazi influence and potential invasion; whereas in 1933 the policy emphasized 
diplomacy and creating goodwill between the peoples of Latin America and the US.   
 
 The events of the last few months have brought the peoples of this 
hemisphere face to face with a new and a very different kind of world.  Our 
answer in the Americas has been to choose preparedness as the road to peace.  
We are going to become strong enough to protect ourselves against any 
emergency that may arise… Within this hemisphere, we are convinced that 
the best way to prevent an aggressor nation from succeeding in its policy of 
divide and conquer is to protect the American republics from the economic 
and political consequences of having to deal with that power on its own 
terms (President Franklin D. Roosevelt Message to Congress, 16 July 1940, 
RG 229, Entry 1, Box 510). 
 
The Council of National Defense created the Office of the Coordinator of 
Commercial and Cultural Relations (OCCCAR) under the authority of the Council 
on August 16, 1940.  Though subordinate to the Council of National Defense, the 
Coordinator, Nelson Rockefeller,204 was to report directly to the President (“Order 
Establishing the Office of the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations, 16 
August 1940, RG 229, Entry 1.5, Box 472).205  Almost exactly a year later, the 
Council of National Defense disestablished the Office for the Coordinator of 
Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics, and President 
Roosevelt created the Office of the Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) 
with an Executive Order (EO) (“The Executive Order Creating the Office of the 
                                                     
203 An officer within CIAA noted that when the “[hostilities] ended in November, 
1918…the period of wartime effect on commerce and finance lasted at least until 1924, 
or 10 years in all” (McQueen to Friele, 24 June 1941, “Functions of the Coordinator’s 
Office with respect to future trade and economic developments, RG 229, Entry 1.4, 
Box 235). 
204 Son of John D. Rockefeller, Jr. of the Rockefeller Foundation. 
205 The US was not the only nation concerned about the impact of the war on the Western 
Hemisphere’s economies.  The governments of the American Republics were also 
concerned and called for a meeting of all foreign ministers of American Republics in 
Havana on July 21, 1940 (“Statement of the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural 
Relations between the American Republics,” 17 June 1941, RG 229, Entry 1.5, Box 
472). 
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Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs,” John Lockwood to Executive Staff of 
OCCCAR, n.d., RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 435).  The EO did two things, first the 
CIAA was placed under the direct authority of the President.  Second, the EO 
connected US commercial and cultural relations to national security and defence.  
According to the EO, the CIAA was to “[serve] as the center for coordination of the 
cultural and commercial relations of the Nation affecting Hemisphere defense” 
(“Executive Order – Establishing the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American 
Affairs in the Executive Office of the President and Defining its Functions and Duties, 
18 July 1941, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 435).   
 Also of significance is the fact that CIAA was created alongside an already 
operational Division of Cultural Relations engaged in essentially the same task: 
cultural relations with Latin America.  As the earlier quote from Frank Ninkovich 
observes, the perceived threat to national and economic security required more 
expedient results than the small and slow program created by the DCR (Ninkovich 
1948; United States 1947).206  Furthermore, the CIAA maintained a direct line to 
the President, while the Chief of the DCR reported to an Undersecretary who 
reported to an Assistant Secretary of State before finally getting to the Secretary of 
State and then the President.  Additionally, the CIAA was well-funded,207 while the 
DCR was unable to do much beyond encourage private entities in their ongoing 
operations.208  And finally, under the language of the EO, the CIAA seemed to hold 
policymaking authority when it came to both commercial and cultural relations: 
                                                     
206 The History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs asserts the creation of 
OCCCAR “was a definite implication that the Department of State was not functioning 
in such a way as to meet the emergencies of war in the Latin America areas…” (United 
States 1947, p. 181). 
207 The CIAA received funds initially from the President’s Discretionary Fund, and then 
later received emergency funding from Congress through a series of Deficiency 
Appropriation Acts.  In CIAA’s first year of operation, the organization had a budget of 
$2.5 million, most of which came from the President’s fund (FDR to Secretary of the 
Treasury, 24 August 1940, RG 229, Entry 1, Box 510). Through the course of the war, 
the CIAA expended a total of almost $50 million dollars on foreign projects alone 
(United States 1947). 
208 The Division of Cultural Relations received an initial appropriation of just $75,000, 
solely for educational exchanges in 1939.  For the Fiscal Year of 1941, Congress 
increased funding slightly, appropriating $236,500, but still only funded half of what 
the DCR requested (Espinosa 1976; “Outline of Tenative Program for the Division of 
Cultural Relations,” 16 March 1939, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 236, 111.46/1261/2).   
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…[It] shall be the policy of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American 
Affairs to collaborate with and to utilize the facilities of existing departments 
and agencies which perform functions and activities affecting the cultural and 
commercial aspects of Hemisphere defense.  Such departments and agencies are 
requested to cooperate with the Coordinator in arranging appropriate clearance of 
proposed policies and measures involving the commercial and cultural aspects of Inter-
American affairs (“Executive Order – Establishing the Office of the 
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in the Executive Office of the 
President and Defining its Functions and Duties, 18 July 1941, RG 229, 
Entry 1.4, Box 435). 
 
This would prove to be a point of contention never adequately resolved between the 
Department of State and the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Nelson 
Rockefeller. 
 As the CIAA transformed from the OCCCAR, another office was created in 
July 1941: Coordinator of Information.  After a fact-finding mission to Europe in 
1940, Colonel Bill Donovan returned to report to the President that America 
needed a central intelligence agency which could carry out special operations and 
counter Axis propaganda (Winkler 1978).  When the COI was created, the 
organization’s primary functions were to “collect and analyse all information and 
data, which may bear upon national security,” and ensure the intelligence and 
analysis was disseminated to the President and any government agency as determined 
by the president (“Executive Order Designating a Coordinator of Information,” 11 
July 1941, RG 208, Entry 6H, Box 4).  Shortly after FDR created the COI, the 
President granted the COI the authority to conduct psychological warfare through 
the Foreign Information Service (FIS).  The idea for the FIS had come from Robert 
Sherwood,209 who had persuaded FDR that an organization like the FIS could tell the 
rest of the world about the aims and objectives of the American government and the 
American people (Winkler 1978).  The FIS was to collect all news from around the 
world, particularly in the theatres of war, and “to disseminate to the people of all 
nations intimate information currently and promptly of what the United States and 
Western Hemisphere were doing to overthrow the Axis” (“History of 
Communications Operations,” by G.E. Hughes, n.d., RG 208, Entry 6H, Box 2).  
                                                     
209 Robert Sherwood was a Pulitzer Prize winning playwright and former speechwriter for 
FDR. 
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Sherwood and his colleagues at FIS were soon at odds with Donovan.  Donovan 
wanted to use information as a weapon of war, using rumour and misinformation to 
create disunity and confusion.  Sherwood wanted to use only truthful information as 
he feared using lies would impair US credibility.  Sherwood also insisted on civilian 
rather than military control and he argued that foreign information should not be in 
the same organization which carried out secret espionage (Winkler 1978). 
 In addition to the OGR, CIAA, COI, FIS, and the Division of Cultural 
Relations, the OFF was created.  The OFF was established by Executive Order on 
October 24, 1941 “to facilitate a widespread and accurate understanding of the 
national war effort, and of the war policies and activities of the Government” 
(“Description of the Organizational Breakdown and Function of the Units within the 
Office of Facts and Figures,” 11 March 1942, RG208, Entry 6E, Box 12).  The 
Librarian of Congress, Archibald MacLeish,210 was named as the director of OFF.  
Prior to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, the OFF ensured facts and figures relating to 
national defence were made available to the public while also withholding any 
information which was deemed to aid the enemy.  However, the OFF was not 
responsible for dissemination of information.  The organization conducted extensive 
research on public knowledge and compiled factual reports for distribution, but 
government agencies still maintained the responsibility and authority to distribute its 
own information.  The OFF simply offered guidance on subject matter and materials. 
 Following the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, FDR faced 
demands from the press and the leaders of the multiple “information” agencies to 
centralize US information operations (Steele 1970; Thomson 1948; Winkler 1979).  
Milton Eisenhower was tasked to survey US information agencies and outline a plan 
for centralization, but he was cautioned to avoid the type of centralization of 
authority held by the Committee on Public Information (Winkler 1978).  As plans 
moved forward for a central agency, Rockefeller insisted that the CIAA remain 
outside of the OWI with the explanation that information was part of his total 
                                                     
210 Archibald MacLeish was a Pulitzer Prize winning poet and essayist.  During WWI, 
MacLeish was an outspoken critic against the war.  Through his experiences abroad in 
the 1920s and 30s, he reversed his anti-war beliefs, and returned to the US as a fervent 
supporter of US intervention in Europe.  In his role as Librarian of Congress, he 
offered space for propaganda intelligence research, later named the Division of Special 
Information and absorbed by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) (Gary 1999). 
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program, combining culture and commercial relations.  Sumner Welles supported 
Rockefeller's argument, while Harry Hopkins, and others in FDR's administration 
opposed CIAA's exclusion, but FDR eventually sided with Rockefeller.  Colonel 
Donovan also objected to incorporating the COI into any central organization, 
arguing that propaganda was a weapon of war.211  Initially, Donovan got his way.  
The COI was dissolved effectively with the creation of the OWI and the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS).  The FIS of COI, OGR, and OFF were all consolidated into 
the OWI.  The remaining parts of the COI were incorporated into the OSS.  Figure 
7.1 depicts both the evolution of the many organizations as well as the hierarchy of 
each agency within the US government. 
 
Figure 7.1 The figure illustrates the organization hierarchy for US foreign public 
engagement agencies from 1937 through 1948, while also depicting the changes these 
organizations underwent during the period. 
 
                                                     
211 Colonel Donovan’s views regarding the use of information as a weapon of war would 
eventually put him at odds with FDR as will be discussed later. 
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By 1942 the US had at least three organizations engaging with foreign publics.  
These agencies are important to the development of public diplomacy as a tool of 
American statecraft.  By the end of WWII, these three organizations become 
consolidated into the DoS, as policymakers debated about whether to keep foreign 
public engagement as a permanent function of the state.  Once the Smith-Mundt Bill 
of 1948 was passed by Congress, the former OWI, CIAA, and Division of Cultural 
Relations remain as a permanent part of America’s public diplomacy apparatus. 
"You and your government do not understand.  In all the world yours is 
the only government and people with a record of defeat after defeat for 
centuries and every time because you did not understand people."212 
 Unlike the CPI, the three agencies did not consistently connect listening to 
inform long term policy.213  The CIAA and OWI did use information gathered in the 
field to help shape their operations overseas, but they did not use it for longer term 
strategic objectives, such as US policy after the war.  The DCR’s circumscribed 
mission and budget also inhibited any significant control or contribution to 
policymaking.  This is not say that the OWI and CIAA did not intend to or did not 
try, but rather they were prohibited from influencing or informing higher policy, 
from participating in the policymaking process (Thomson 1948; United States 1947; 
Winkler 1978).214  From 1941 through 1943, this was often a point of contention 
between the CIAA, the DoS, and the OWI.   
                                                     
212 John Steinbeck. [1942] 1995. The Moon Is Down, New York, NY, Penguin Books, p. 48, 
emphasis added.  John Steinbeck wrote The Moon is Down in the fall of 1941 after 
spending time in Mexico, witnessing Nazi influence there and becoming concerned 
about events in Europe.  Steinbeck received biting criticism in the US for writing a 
propaganda piece as well as labelling him as a Nazi sympathizer.  Ironically, the book 
became a sensation throughout occupied Europe, Asia, and even the Soviet Union.  
The manuscript was secretly smuggled into Norway, Denmark, Holland, and France 
where it was clandestinely translated, printed, and distributed.  When asked about its 
significance to the people under occupation, many replied that the book 
sympathetically conveyed how they felt during invasion and under occupation.  
Steinbeck was awarded the Norwegian Liberty Cross by the King of Norway in 1946 
for his little book (Coers 1995). 
213 Much of CPI’s messaging was tied to Wilson’s plans for after the war and his Fourteen 
Points.  Though FDR did have the Atlantic Charter, as Winkler explains, the primary 
objective of ending the war trumped any idealistic or long-term policy objectives (1978, 
p. 73). 
214 As discussed previously the EO creating the CIAA seemed to indicate the CIAA had 
policymaking authority.  However, as Rockefeller soon found out, this was not the 
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The DCR relied heavily on private organizations already conducting foreign 
public engagement in Latin America, especially in the first few years of the 
Division’s existence, to gather information on public sentiment.  For example, Dr. 
Carl Milam of the American Library Association (ALA) travelled to Mexico to 
establish an American library. 215   Dr. Milam interviewed local Mexicans and 
Americans regarding how the advisory board for the library should be arranged.  He 
“found a divergence of opinion as to the proper composition of the directing Board” 
(Meeting of the General Advisory Committee of the DCR,” 17-18 September 1941, 
RG 353, Entry 22, Box 29).  Dr. Milam also asked locals about what types of books 
should be included in the new library.  Mexicans wanted books about the US 
translated into Spanish.  In a similar example, the Director of the Hispanic 
Foundation, Dr. Lewis Hanke, went on a three month tour of Latin America to 
survey the book market in Latin America.216  In the course of his survey, Dr. Hanke 
spoke with local publishers and government officials about US books, discussed 
agreements with Latin American publishers to obtain rights to translate and publish 
certain US books, and arranged for Latin American books to be sold in the US 
(Meeting of the General Advisory Committee of the DCR,” 17-18 September 1941, 
RG 353, Entry 22, Box 29). 
                                                                                                                                       
case.  On 22 April 1941, President Roosevelt wrote to Rockefeller asking him to 
ensure all aspects of the CIAA’s program were discussed and fully approved by the 
Department of State.  This meant that the DoS controlled not only policy, but also 
execution (Thomson 1948, pp. 143-144, 153).   The matter was still unresolved.  In 
May 1941, a meeting was held to discuss the division of labour between the two 
agencies with the Assistant Chief of the Division of Cultural Relations at DoS, Charles 
Thomson, and the CIAA counterpart, Edward Trueblood.  In response to a memo 
drafted by Thomson, Rockefeller, who was not at the meeting, said he generally 
agreed with the working principles established between the CIAA and the Division of 
Cultural Relations.  However, Rockefeller believed that the parameters for both 
agencies should “indicate a greater responsibility on the part of this Office [CIAA] for 
determination of policy…” as CIAA is “charged by the Congress and the President with 
full responsibility for all funds expended” (Rockefeller to Laurence Duggan, 31 May 
1941, RG 229, Entry 1, Box 495). 
215 A $45,000 grant for the library was given by the CIAA (Meeting of the General 
Advisory Committee of the DCR,” 17-18 September 1941, RG 353, Entry 22, Box 
29). 
216 Dr. Hanke’s tour and the subsidies arranged with Latin American publishers were all 
funded by the CIAA, a total of $80,000 (Meeting of the General Advisory Committee 
of the DCR,” 17-18 September 1941, RG 353, Entry 22, Box 29). 
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 Due to the initial interpretation of the government’s role in the realm of 
foreign public engagement as assumed by the Division of Cultural Relations, the 
DCR did not prioritize nor initiate listening.   
 
There are numerous private agencies for international intellectual 
cooperation in this country, many of them doing a splendid work.  There is 
a lack, however, of adequate coordination, toward the working out of a 
clearcut [sic] and long-range policy (“The Importance of Intellectual and 
Cultural Cooperation Between Nations,” 20 April 1938, RG 353, Entry 14, 
Box 2). 
 
Listening remained in private hands, as the DCR conceived of its role as a 
coordinator. However, the DCR’s program did emphasize reciprocity.  In ensuring 
cultural and educational exchanges remained reciprocal, the DCR relied on Latin 
American governments and private organizations to tell them what types of 
exchanges they wanted to start.  With books and book translations, the DCR with 
the ALA compiled bibliographies of available books, allowing libraries and 
institutions in Latin America to choose what books they would like to purchase or 
borrow.  Furthermore, the DCR received information from US embassies, consuls, 
and legations throughout Latin America regarding different aspects of their program 
and plans.217 
 The CIAA gathered information regarding local sentiments in two ways.  
First, the CIAA’s Communications Division created a “public opinion reporting 
service” throughout Latin America.  This service was facilitated by the American 
Association of Advertising Agencies using American businesses Export Information 
Bureau in each country (“Program of the Communications Division,” by Nelson 
Rockefeller, n.d., RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235). 
                                                     
217 The DCR did consider using film as part of its cultural program.  Ambassador Fay Allen 
DesPortes cautioned the Division of Cultural Relations with regard to using films in 
Guatemala, as the people there were highly suspicious of any time of foreign 
propaganda.  “…[It] must be emphasized that Guatemala suffers from an 
understandably well developed inferiority complex vis-á-vis the United States.  This, 
however, in no way diminishes the interest of Guatemalans for American tourists, 
artists, and archeologists [sic].  At the same time it makes Guatemalans, on the one 
hand, suspicious of foreigners and foreign propaganda, and on the other almost 
childishly pleased at any distinction conferred on Guatemala or Guatemalan citizens by 
leading foreign nations.  In handling cultural relations with Guatemala, this 
combination of sensitiveness and vanity must be given very careful consideration” (No. 
945, Guatemala, 26 July 1939, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 237, 111.46/183). 
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These offices will conduct research for the purpose of improving our 
knowledge of markets and advertising media in these countries…This 
reporting service will employ the techniques of public opinion interviewing 
long used in this country in commercial marketing research…[The service] 
will constantly supply us with more accurate reports than are now available 
of the stats of public opinion in each country…[and] it will furnish a 
measurement of the attitudes in Latin American countries regarding our 
own points of view…It will furnish us with more accurate information than 
is now available about the channels of communication through the press, 
radio, and motion picture facilities in these countries (“Program of the 
Communications Division,” by Nelson Rockefeller, n.d., RG 229, Entry 1.4, 
Box 235). 
 
The reporting service conducted weekly public opinion measurements using the 
leading press in each country and operated listening posts for totalitarian radio 
propaganda.  The Communication Division also surveyed Argentina and Brazil to 
determine how many people had radio sets; how many people listened to European 
and/or American broadcasts; what types of programs they preferred; and what hours 
people typically listened to help shape CIAA’s own broadcasting programs. 
 Prior to beginning a series of short films for CIAA, Walt Disney and Orson 
Welles both spent several months traveling throughout Latin America around 1941 
as part of a CIAA sponsored good-will tour.218   Orson Welles was invited by the 
Brazilian government to produce a film, It’s All True, in Rio de Janiero with the 
support of CIAA.219   Walt Disney proposed twelve pictures based on his travels 
throughout Latin America (“Organization of the Motion Picture Division,” CIAA, 
n.d., RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235). 
 In addition, the CIAA employed special advisers from Latin America.  These 
advisers were Latin American specialists in economics, politics, and culture and 
advised Rockefeller and other division chiefs on policy and operations.  The advisers 
were not representatives or affiliated with their native government, nor were they 
American citizens, which was especially important for advising the CIAA on 
                                                     
218 CIAA supported Disney’s tour for $70,000 (“Organization of the Motion Picture 
Division, CIAA,” n.d., RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235). 
219 CIAA paid to ship both crew and equipment to Brazil for the movie (“Organization of 
the Motion Picture Division, CIAA,”  n.d., RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235). 
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opposition groups and ensure no material offended various segments of Latin 
America (Thomson 1948, p. 143). 
 The second way the CIAA gathered information on local populations 
throughout Latin America was by using coordinating committees.  The committees 
were composed of private US citizens and in some cases the committees predated 
the CIAA.220  The committees worked with locals and occasionally local government 
officials to either initiate or run CIAA programs.  The committees suggested 
programs for CIAA to fund based on their assessments of local needs in relation to 
CIAA’s operating directive (United States 1947).  These coordinating committees 
functioned much like the OWI’s own outpost offices.    
OWI outposts were tasked with compiling reports and analysis for 
operational and planning purposes of the Overseas Branch as well as disseminating 
information and propaganda in their posted region.  In describing the information 
gathering function of the outpost branch, the OWI likened their operations to those 
of an international business which must: “Do a competent job of market analysis as to 
the products of competitors (the enemy), analyze the likes and dislikes of the 
customers (the local population), and determine the sales appeal of its own product 
(radio, publications, movies, pictures, etc.)” (“Outpost Bureau,” n.d., RG 208, 
Entry 6B, Box 1). 
The various outposts worked with the OWI’s Central Intelligence Panel 
based in Washington, D.C.  The Panel was responsible for “gathering, classifying and 
assaying all intelligence material in the waging of psychological warfare…[and] 
developing constantly all outposts as sources of intelligence material” (“Central 
Intelligence Panel,” 22 November 1942, RG 208, Entry 6B, Box 3).  The Panel also 
liaised with other US agencies to obtain further information to guide OWI’s 
operation and policy planning.  Information gathering was not only used to 
formulate new campaigns, but also to determine the effectiveness of the OWI’s 
materials.   
                                                     
220 A group of 35 American businessmen organized in conjunction with the local Chamber 
of Commerce in Rio de Janiero.   The group worked with the embassy and local press a 
full two years before the existence of CIAA (Thomson 1948, p. 156). 
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 In October of 1944, the Cairo outpost analysed the impact of a series of 
booklets produced by the OWI which included The American Worker and His Family 
and Life in America.  The books were published by the outpost in Arabic and 
distributed to individuals on a mailing list compiled by the OWI.  Cairo’s outpost 
assessed the impact of these booklets based on letters sent to the post from Egyptian 
workingmen asking for more copies.  Between August and September of 1944 the 
outpost received 941 requests for copies of either booklet or both.   
 
Not one of the letters dealing with The American Worker contained a word 
of adverse criticism.  In a way we were disappointed to find that this was so, 
since we feel criticism can often be of help to use in our endeavor to 
improve the quality of our publications, but on the other hand it was 
encouraging to find that so many people approved of the way in which we 
are carrying out our program (“Reception of the Booklet The American 
Worker by the Egyptian Public,” 1 October 1944). 
 
Trade unions throughout Egypt also wrote letters of appreciation to the outpost.221 
 All three agencies used listening primarily to support the immediate needs of 
their individual programs.  The DCR relied on private organizations to conduct 
surveys to determine what was required to open a library, support a cultural centre, 
initiate books translations and book exchanges, and what types of exchanges were of 
interest to people in Latin America.  The CIAA and OWI used listening to shape 
their programs, determining the social and political environment of the people they 
would be engaging.  This information was used for the immediate objectives of the 
CIAA’s and OWI’s programs.  Yet as the leaders of both the CIAA and the OWI 
often remarked, the information they gathered never went beyond their own 
individual programs.   
 
                                                     
221 Some excerpts from Egyptian trade union’s letters: Commercial Stores, Belkas: “We 
would like to thank you for the effort you have made to encourage close relations 
between the American and Egyptian Laborers.  With the help of the forward policy of 
the Americans among the workers there has been created a fine spirit among the 
workers in Egypt.”; Egyptian Oil & Cake Workers, Alexandria: “We have received 
The American Worker and extend our thanks.  We want to ask a favor: if possible, 
send us some more copies of The American Farmer, as we need these badly.  All 
members of the syndicate can read and write fairly well, and are very anxious to study 
this topic” (“Reception of the Booklet The American Worker by the Egyptian Public,” 
1 October 1944). 
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It is not up to us to make policy.  Our task is to carry it out…But, since we are the 
agency through which the US Government speaks to the people of Europe, and since 
we are in a position to know from day to day what the reactions to what is said by the 
Voice of America, it is our duty to raise this question in the minds of those who are 
responsible for policy…under our present policy instructions, we are unable to 
do our full job of softening up Europe for invasion, or of preparing Europe 
for permanent peace (James Warburg to Elmer Davis and Robert Sherwood, 
11 August 1943, RG 208, Entry 6B, Box 4, emphasis added). 
 
Nelson Rockefeller also became frustrated with the CIAA’s exclusion from policy 
making.  In a letter to Secretary of State Hull, Rockefeller criticized the Department 
for not inviting “this Office to participate in the formulation of foreign policy, nor 
have we deemed it our province to do so…,” but Rockefeller felt it was his duty 
make suggestions in light of the serious situation in Latin America (Rockefeller to 
Hull, 7 September 1944, in United States 1947, p. 185).  Rockefeller was also 
irritated by the lack of responsiveness and clarity with regard to US foreign policy.  
Both CIAA and OWI recognized their programs were limited in terms of their 
effectiveness while both organizations remained outside the policymaking process.   
To an extent, the OWI and the CIAA accepted the State Department and 
US military’s lead in the formation of policy, but they recognized the need to use the 
information they gathered on foreign public opinion to inform policy.  The effective 
block against the OWI and CIAA participating in policymaking contributed to the 
confusion and ambiguity about these agencies’ role in American statecraft.   
“Our projection of America is not an end in itself.  It is a means of 
making other peoples favourably disposed toward us, - of diffusing 
among them an atmosphere of liking and respect for us which will aid in 
the implementation of our national policies”222 
 The frustrations of the CIAA and OWI were perhaps most felt in their 
attempts to advocate American policies overseas.  In shutting the CIAA and OWI out 
of the policymaking process, the agencies were forced to constantly check to see 
what US policy was on particular issues.  Given the changing international situation 
due to the war, US policies toward different nations often changed or were unclear.  
The DoS was slow to respond to queries from the OWI and CIAA which impacted 
their efforts to counter Axis propaganda (“Elmer Davis to President Roosevelt,” 30 
                                                     
222 “Outline of a Directive for Projection of America,” 30 November 1944, RG 208, Entry 
6E, Box 13 
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August 1943, RG 208, Entry 6H, Box 3; United States 1947).223  Sometimes neither 
agency had a clear understanding of what US policy was regarding particular issues.   
Aside from ensuring their advocacy efforts corresponded with US policy 
generally, the OWI and CIAA also had to contend with the Division of Current 
Information (DCI), an information office within the State Department.  The DCI 
was “charged with maintenance of liaison between the Department and domestic and 
foreign press, the radio, the newsreels, and all governmental agencies concerned 
with the collection and dissemination of information in which the Department has an 
interest…” including “dissemination of information regarding the activities and 
policies of the Department and of the Government generally to American 
representatives abroad…” (Register of the Department of State 1943).  The Division of 
Current Information was charged with clearing information for use abroad and 
providing policy directives for the COI and later the OWI.   
While the COI still existed, Robert Sherwood wrote to Colonel Donovan 
raising concerns about the coordination between the FIS and the DoS.  An FIS 
broadcaster, Stanley Richardson, had personal contacts within the DoS which he 
often used to re-write and edit various policy directives which pertained to news 
broadcasts.  “Mr. Richardson acts as censor of these stories on his account.  He 
exercises the right to reject a story in toto, or revise it, according to his own 
judgement” (Robert Sherwood to Colonel Donovan, 22 November 1941, RG 208, 
Entry 6B, Box 6).  The problem came to a head over US policy toward the Vichy 
government in France. 
 
 On the morning of November 19th, the F.I.S. was advised by Mr. Pell of 
sensational developments in Vichy resulting in the retirement of General 
Weygand.  Since this produced a considerable change in the whole attitude 
of the US government toward Vichy France, it was felt by Mr. Pell and our 
own staff that this change should be reflected instantly in American short-
wave broadcasts to France – before the Nazis had time to anaesthetise the 
French with their own propaganda.  It was Mr. Pell’s suggestion that 
broadcasting to France could now take the strong tone which has for long 
                                                     
223 When President Roosevelt asked about the Rockefeller’s efforts to coordinate with the 
DoS the activities of CIAA on March 3, 1941, Rockefeller explained how the Advisory 
Committee of the Division of Cultural Relations within the DoS only met once or 
twice a year, whereas CIAA’s committees met once a week as they are “charged with 
the prompt execution of an emergency program…” (Rockefeller to President 
Roosevelt, 7 March 1941, RG 229, Entry 1, Box 510). 
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reflected American opinion toward the Vichy government but which 
previously we have soft-pedalled because of our obligation to reflect the 
foreign policy of our government.  The strong directive we had received 
from Mr. Pell was delivered to Mr. Richardson.  He then consulted with his 
own contacts in the State Department and weakened the directive 
appreciably (Robert Sherwood to Colonel Donovan, 22 November 1941, 
RG 208, Entry 6B, Box 6). 
 
This highlights two issues which remained obstacles for the OWI throughout the war.  
First, the OWI was reliant on the DoS to inform them of US foreign policy which 
often developed quickly and required quick response given the objectives of the 
OWI.224  Second, though processes for coordination existed, policy planning and 
response to policy changes were developed within the DoS, often leaving OWI and 
even the CIAA in the dark about US policy.  Personal politics and the DoS’s own 
organizational nature also got in the way of any rapid decision making (Thomson 
1948; Winkler 1978).  In this particular case, the Chief of the Division of Current 
Information, Michael McDermott, was Stanley Richardson’s contact in the 
Department who overruled the OWI and Robert Pell. 225   Robert Pell was an 
Assistant Chief within the Division of Current Information and a part of the Planning 
Section, specializing in European Affairs.  Based on Sherwood’s memo to Colonel 
Donovan, Robert Pell and Michael McDermott did not agree on what the US policy 
stance should have been toward the Vichy government.  However, as Winkler 
explains, President Roosevelt and State Department did not have a clear policy 
stance toward the Vichy regime nor toward the Free French National Committee 
through much of the war (1978). 
 While both the CIAA and the OWI endeavoured to resolve bureaucratic 
problems, the imperatives of the war required them to make the best of the situation.   
                                                     
224 The OWI attempted to garner the trust of the world public.  Trust was crucial to 
OWI’s own objectives in order to get people to listen and continue to listen as the war 
progressed.  “If the peoples of foreign countries trust and like this America who comes 
to them across the oceans, they will listen to it sympathetically and be influenced by its 
suggestions.  If they do not like, or at least trust America, the will not be influenced by 
what they read in the daily press or hear over the air.  Since the first prerequisite of 
trust and friendliness is understanding, there is literally no aspect of American life 
which is not worth while presenting clearly and truthfully…” (“Long-Range Directive, 
15 January 1943, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 13). 
225 Robert Pell was not only the Assistant Chief of DCI, he also served in the Planning 
Section of the Liaison Branch for DCI, representing the Division of European Affairs 
for the DoS (Register of the Department of State 1942). 
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Both were able to use general information about America to advocate support for 
Allied and American policies.   In a long-range directive from 1943, the OWI 
encouraged field outposts to develop material which explained America’s history 
both in terms of the nation’s government and culture.  The idea was to “establish the 
feeling that the past actions of the United States in peace and war, despite inevitable 
shortcomings, failings, and blunders, and occasional wrongdoing, have been basically 
decent…by implication we can convey the idea that the United States has aligned 
itself with good causes and stood firmly against evil ones” (“Long-Range Directive on 
the Projection of America,” 6 February 1943, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 13).   
To implement this, the OWI developed different ways to engage with highly 
educated citizens, those who are literate as well as those who were uneducated.  For 
a highly educated audience, the OWI suggested the idea of distributing books on US 
history.  For illiterate audiences, the Bureau arranged for items such as tea, dried 
bouillon, chocolate bars, soap, sewing kits, and match books to carry messages.  Also, 
just as the CPI did in WWI, the OWI felt the most effective way of advocating US 
war and peace aims was to use the words of the nation’s leaders, such as President 
Roosevelt, Vice President Henry Wallace, Secretary of State Cordell Hull as well as 
US military leaders.  “It must be remembered that the people of most parts of the 
world today attach far greater importance than we do to immediate personalities 
rather than to traditional institutions such as the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, etc.” 
(“Long-Range Directive, 15 January 1943, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 13). 
The broad objective of the Communications Division in CIAA was “to secure 
a more effective use of these channels [of mass communication]…to form and influence 
Central and South American public opinion in ways more favorable to our Hemispheric defense 
policy” (“Program of the Communications Division,” by Nelson Rockefeller, n.d., 
RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235, emphasis added).  The Communications Division of 
the CIAA was also responsible for counter-propaganda; correcting and resolving 
misunderstandings and myths between the US and Latin America; to improve 
knowledge and understanding between the US and Latin America; and “to give 
greater expression to the forces of good will between the Americas, in line with the 
Good Neighbor Policy” (“Program of the Communications Division,” by Nelson 
Rockefeller, n.d., RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235, emphasis added).  For this, the 
CIAA produced “informative and documentary pamphlets” intended to “acquaint the 
other Americas with the war program, the life and the peace aims of the United 
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States…” (“Summary of Activities: Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American 
Affairs, 16 August 1944, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 447). The pamphlets distributed in 
Latin America “highlight hemisphere cooperation in the war, outline the progress of 
the United States war effort, explain how the people in the United States live and 
what they think, and deal with hemisphere peace aims and problems of the future.”  
Just as the OWI used information about America’s culture and history in their 
advocacy of American policies, the CIAA did the same.  The CIAA also printed 
different materials for both educated and uneducated audiences.  For illiterate 
audiences, pamphlets in the form of cartoon strips were distributed.  The cartoons 
told stories about US war leaders, war heroes, and heroes of democracy. 
The advocacy of American policies and ideas were not only spread through 
published pieces such as pamphlets, magazines, and leaflets, but also via the radio and 
film.  Again, much like the CPI, both organizations emphasized current or spot news 
as the best way to inform foreign audiences about US policies and to counter Axis 
information.226   
 “It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of informal personal 
relationships in forging better international understanding”227 
 Exchange diplomacy is perhaps where all three agencies converged and often 
clashed the most.  The OWI, CIAA, and DCR all used exchange diplomacy to meet 
various objectives; the intent and purpose of those exchanges were different for each 
agency.  The CIAA actually categorized exchanges as psychological warfare, along with 
other engagement programs (“Activities of the Coordination Committees,” 10 
February 1942, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 455). CIAA’s fellowship and exchange 
program was “designed to stimulate exchanges in three major groups: young and 
adult students, creative workers in the arts and sciences, technicians, and 
administrators (“Cultural Relations Division, Programs & Plans,” 15 September 1941, 
                                                     
226 As will be discussed in greater detail later, the DCR, CIAA, and OWI distinguished 
between theatrical and non-theatrical films.  Non-theatrical films included newsreels 
and documentaries highlighting different aspects of American life.  These films were 
produced using 16 mm film so they could be shown outside of theatres in town halls 
and schools and on mobile projection units to reach a wider audience.  Theatrical films 
were produced using 35 mm film and were intended for movie theatres. 
227 “Outline of the Tentative Program for the Division of Cultural Relations,” 16 March 
1939, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 236, 111.46/126 ½ 
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RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 435).   In 1941, the CIAA established the Roosevelt 
Fellowship program, which created an annual exchange of students, in addition to 
the exchanges already managed by the DCR under the terms of the Convention for 
the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations.  Ten students from the US and 
twenty students coming to the US to study (one from each American republic) 
(“Summary of Activities: Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, 16 
August 1944, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 447).  Eventually the program was 
transferred to the DCR, who delegated administration of the fellowship to IIE.  
CIAA also worked with the Department of State and the Office of Education to 
survey Latin American schools.  CIAA used the information to guide funding for 
educational projects such as book translations and distribution, teaching materials, 
and films to schools in Latin America as well as the US.  In Latin America, the 
education program sought “to increase among the people of the other American 
republics a knowledge not only of the United States but also of one another” 
(“Cultural Relations Division, Programs & Plans,” 15 September 1941, RG 229, 
Entry 1.4, Box 435). 
Additionally, the CIAA sponsored tours for journalists from Latin America, 
just as the CPI did during WWI.  As with the CPI in 1918, the tours of Latin 
American journalists were intended to demonstrate US war preparations and 
military strength.  The CIAA arranged for the journalists to interview government 
leaders as well as meet with American journalists and editors.  The visits were 
intended to have two-way effect.  While the journalists toured the US, the CIAA 
ensured the US local and national press reported on the tour and the reception of the 
journalists.  At the same time, the journalists were encouraged to file stories 
regarding their time in US and what they had seen.  “Extensive accounts written by 
the visiting journalists for their papers both while in the United States and after their 
return to their countries have made a deep impression in the other republics” 
(“Summary of Activities: Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, 16 
August 1944, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 447).  Alongside these exchanges, the CIAA 
also developed “information” and “technical” exchange programs as part of their 
health and sanitation and economic programs.228 
                                                     
228 The Basic Economy Program of CIAA was “directed toward the well-being of all the 
people and the Coordinator’s Office is endeavoring realistically to relate its program to 
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Ostensibly, the OWI’s objective was to facilitate the end of the war using 
propaganda and information; however, the OWI used exchange diplomacy to engage 
the people of other nations.  OWI representative in India, Ralph Block, suggested 
Indian psychiatrist, Dr. K.R. Masani, be invited to the US to learn about American 
psychiatric teaching and training.  US consul, Howard Donovan, vehemently 
disagreed with Block’s suggestion. 
 
 It is the Consulate’s understanding that the proper activities of the United 
States Office of War Information in India relate to the field of war publicity 
and not to that of cultural relations.  In the present instance, however, the 
United States Office of War Information has seen fit to interject itself into a 
sphere in which in my opinion it has neither the necessary authorization nor 
competence (No 1755, Bombay, India, 5 January 1945, RG 59, CDF 1940-
49, Box 307, 103.9166^1-545). 
 
Donovan went on to say that Dr. Masani was not “the type of Indian to whom an 
official invitation to visit the United States should be extended.  Officers of this 
Consulate who know him are inclined to the belief that he is a man of only average 
competence who would like to further his personal ambitions by receiving the 
publicity which would probably accompany an officially sponsored journey to the 
United States” (No 1755, Bombay, India, 5 January 1945, RG 59, CDF 1940-49, 
Box 307, 103.9166^1-545).  In another letter to the US Ambassador in New Delhi, 
Clayton Lane, Donovan explained that though Dr. Masani “holds several important-
sounding positions…His competence in his chosen field has been described…as only 
fair” (No 1755, Bombay, India, 5 January 1945, RG 59, CDF 1940-49, Box 307, 
103.9166^1-545).  This exchange exposes not only the overlap between the 
Department’s exchange program and OWI’s exchanges, but also the elitist attitudes 
of the DoS as well as a perceived distinction between what the State Department was 
doing and what the OWI was doing.  OWI used these exchanges as part of their 
propaganda campaign, while the State Department’s DCR argued exchanges managed 
by them were part of American diplomacy and foreign relations.  
                                                                                                                                       
these objectives” of the “hemisphere policy.”  The program considered health and 
sanitation conditions, nutrition and food supply, and emergency rehabilitation.  “The 
program is being advanced by education and example.  Every encouragement is being 
given to make known to others methods and techniques which have been used in the 
United States with a full and objective evaluation of results which have been obtained” 
(“Basic Economy Program, Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs,” 
(Circa June 1942), RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235). 
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However, this claim that the DCR’s exchanges were only implemented and 
intended to improve US foreign relations is questionable.  The DCR was in essence 
responsible for two different types of exchange: technical and educational exchanges.  
In May 1938, the Inter-Departmental Committee on Inter-American Cooperation 
(IDC)229 was created to “encourage cooperation between the various governmental 
agencies and the American Republics in considering cultural and economic problems 
of mutual interest” (“Order Establishing the Office of the Coordinator of 
Commercial and Cultural Relations, 16 August 1940, RG 229, Entry 1.5, Box 472, 
emphasis added).  The DCR participated and often chaired the committee, which 
was distinct from the CIAA-chaired Inter-Departmental Committee on Inter-
American Affairs,230 though many of the same agencies were represented on both 
committees.  One of the primary programs initiated under the IDC was a technical 
and expert exchange program.  The exchanges received Congressional sanction with 
the passage of Public Law 63.231  US government officials and experts could serve in 
                                                     
229 “Fearful of a German victory and domination of Latin American trade by Germany, with 
the threat which this may involve to the economic and political security of the United 
States…” numerous government committees and agencies were created between 1938 
and 1940.  The IDC was one of these agencies established by FDR under the 
chairmanship of Sumner Welles, and included representatives from several US 
government departments.  The IDC made recommendations for funding initiatives 
within the different representative agencies in cooperation with Latin American nations 
with the specific purpose to bolster Latin American governments and economies 
against potential Nazi influence (“Plans or Programs for the Increase of Trade…,” 7 
August 1940, RG 229, Entry 1.5, Box 472). 
230 The Inter-Departmental Committee on Inter-American Affairs was created along 
OCCCAR in August 1940 and continued its existence in the transition to CIAA in 
1941.  Nelson Rockefeller served as the chairman and included representatives from 
the Export-Import Bank, the Treasury, DoS, Department of Agriculture, and the 
Department of Commerce.  According to Rockefeller, “…the President in issuing this 
order had in mind not just another duplicating Government agency but rather a 
reorientation of the whole American problem from the viewpoint of National Defense.  
[Rockefeller] therefore felt that in all of its activities the Committee should keep the defense 
angle firmly in mind” (“Meeting of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Inter-
American Affairs,” 27 August 1940, RG 229, Entry 10, Box 543, emphasis added). 
231 The law came out of discussions in the IDC.  Secretary Cordell Hull asked FDR to 
request Congress pass a bill to improve cooperation between the US and Latin America 
to offset European experts currently detailed to Latin American governments.  Public 
Law 63 was passed by Congress on May 25, 1938.  The IDC began recommending 
projects including economic development, transportation initiatives, public health and 
sanitation assistance, as well as cultural and informational projects under the 
administration of the DCR.  For these projects, the IDC originally requested a budget 
of one million dollars, but only received $370,500 from Congress for the 1940 fiscal 
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an official capacity in the service of a Latin American government and officials from 
Latin America could come to the US to work in a US government agency.232  Under 
Public Law 63, experts were sent “to give advisory services in highway engineering 
and road building, immigration procedure, taxation and monetary problems, custom 
administration, the development of statistical services, fishery and library 
organization” (“Plans or Programs for the Increase of Trade…,” 7 August 1940, RG 
229, Entry 1.5, Box 472).  These exchanges ran parallel to the exchanges under the 
auspices of the DCR.  Both types of exchanges emphasized reciprocity; however, 
due to the underlying assumptions and organizational directive of the IDC, the 
exchanges became less about international cooperation and more about extending 
American influence and markets.233   
                                                                                                                                       
year.  The IDC’s budget was eventually consolidated into the DCR’s budget and the 
other government agencies represented on the committee (Espinosa 1976). 
232 The DoS and the Inter-Departmental Committee for Cooperation with American 
Republics often described various projects as being cultural interchange.  In general, 
these initiatives were exchanges, but they tended to be between government officials 
rather than among the citizens of each nation.  The Department of Interior planned to 
“loan” six employees from their offices (Office of Education, Indian Affairs, Mines, 
National Parks Service, Geological Survey, etc.) “to share with other American 
governments their knowledge and experience in their respective fields, for a period of 
one year.”   In “exchange,” the Department of Interior would receive Latin American 
students for practical training within the Department (“Committee of Representatives 
of Executive Departments and Independent Agencies to Consider the Question of 
Cooperation with the American Republics – Meeting Minutes 17 August 1938,” RG 
353, Entry 22, Box 29).  Other plans included textbook revision of US textbooks, 
removing any unfriendly or prejudiced statements; conducting a survey of US 
curriculum and add emphasis on Latin American nations in history, geography, and 
economics; sponsoring and co-sponsoring cultural exhibits; and promoting educational 
radio programs. 
233 Vice President Henry Wallace adamantly opposed making any distinctions between 
economic programs and cultural relations: “…I wish to emphasize the interrelationship 
that must exist between the economic action programs and the Cultural Relations 
Program.  There is no sharp line of division between these two.  One must supplement 
the other… However, it is also necessary that we establish helpful relations with the 
remaining 90 percent of the people, who are for the most part engaged in agriculture.  
Unless we help them to improve their economic lot, thus making it possible for health 
and education to develop, there will be no dependable basis for democracy…in a truly 
democratic system, cultural and economic cooperation are largely interdependent.  
The one cannot thrive long without the other.  A Cultural Relations Program that is 
correlated with our various activities in the economic sphere is far more desirable than 
one which does not march in step with our efforts to meet the economic problems of 
the Hemisphere” (General Advisory Committee, 17-18 September 1941, RG 353, 
Entry 22, Box 29).   
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The word cooperation often used by internationalists from the start of the 
twentieth century up through the 1930s was used in a very different context by US 
officials.  Cooperation became synonymous with technical assistance and 
development, especially among the officials on the IDC.  Though there were those 
who wanted to ensure that any assistance provided to Latin American nations was 
only given based on requests and not forced upon nations;234 the rather dubious 
assertion that technical assistance and development was mutual and altruistic caused 
the distinctions between cultural relations and hegemonic aspirations to become 
blurred, thus undermining the very purpose of cultural relations. 
 
“The word ‘cooperation’ is the keynote to our activities…Effective 
international cooperation cannot exist unless there is an appreciation and 
understanding in each country of those problems in other countries which arise from 
national customs, traditions, achievements, and philosophies of life.  Since these 
attributes of the people in each country are the fountain sources from which 
spring national policies, we must give them a prominent place in our 
international relations… We have the task of learning to appreciate and 
understand the viewpoints, traditions, and customs of our neighbors in the 
other American republics and of making it possible for them to see our problems 
and ways of life – not by propaganda or proselyting, but rather by the joint execution 
of useful undertakings and through the personal associations incident thereto…for 
there is no more effective basis for lasting international accord than mutual 
appreciation and respect among men and national governments.” (Sumner 
Welles, Interdepartmental Committee on Cooperation with the American 
Republics, Meeting Minutes, 12 August 1942, RG 353, Entry 22, Box 29, 
emphasis added). 
 
The underlying assumption in this statement is that the US has problems which can 
be understood and cooperatively resolved with the assistance of other Latin 
American nations, just as cooperative assistance from the US can resolve problems 
throughout Latin America.  Yet this was not put into practice.  The way the technical 
exchanges were structured, US problems were not the focus.  Cultural relations 
fields of “cooperation” included economic development, scientific investigation, 
social welfare, and intellectual activities within Latin America and less in the US 
                                                     
234 In reference to the IDC’s plans to initiate technical exchanges, members of the 
committee agreed that “the language should be carefully drawn, and the especial care 
should be taken to avoid any appearance of ‘forcing’ projects upon the other American 
republics” (“Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee on Cooperation with the 
American Republics on October 12, 1938,” RG 353, Entry 14, Box 2). 
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(Interdepartmental Committee on Cooperation with the American Republics, 
Meeting Minutes, 12 August 1942, RG 353, Entry 22, Box 29).   
From the time discussions began within the Department of State in 1937 up 
through 1942, the participants of the General Advisory Council and those within the 
DCR itself concerned themselves primarily with how to execute the Convention of 
1936.  Most of their discussions focused on implementing exchange activities.  Very 
little discussion was had regarding what these exchanges meant, what messages they 
conveyed, if any.  Various members of the Interdepartmental Committee on 
Cooperation, however, sought to implement “exchanges” for several reasons: as a 
component of the Good Neighbor policy; to obtain appropriations for various 
projects; and to promote American economic, commercial, and cultural power.  
Their plans and projects for “exchange” were implemented for some strategic goal of 
economic power and national interest. 
“…all cultural activities are, in the last analysis, forms of propagation of 
friendship or of enmity.”235 
 Toward the end of the war, as various countries began to be liberated, the 
OWI shifted focus from strictly advocacy and international broadcasting forms of 
engagement to use more cultural diplomacy (“OWI’s Participation in Cultural 
Activities,” 11 April 1945, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 13).  The reason for the shift was 
due to the fact that many of the formerly occupied countries had been cut off from 
the world for over five years.  “…[It] will be a proper activity of OWI to inform the 
people not only of America’s war effort but of American progress in all fields since 
1939” (“OWI’s Participation in Cultural Activities,” 11 April 1945, RG 208, Entry 
6E, Box 13).  According to the Operational Guidance for European Information 
Program issued on October 30, 1944, the OWI was to re-establish “as quickly as 
possible all of the normal channels of thought between Europe and America which 
have been disrupted during the war…This is to say that from now on the principal 
tasks of OWI in Europe are those of gradually decreasing its own production and 
increasingly becoming a transmission belt for contacts and materials of other public, 
semi-public, and private organizations” (“OWI’s Participation in Cultural Activities,” 
11 April 1945, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 13).  OWI’s role was only to facilitate 
                                                     
235 “Summary of the Activities of the OCIAA,” 1 March 1942, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235 
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restoring lost cultural contacts between private and semi-private entities.  The 
objective was to “inspire and assist” cultural exchanges between private groups and 
events.  “We shall not finance nor otherwise sponsor such exchanges and events in 
our own name unless it can be demonstrated that they have an immediate relevance 
to our assigned propaganda objectives.” 
 Interestingly, the DoS did not ask the OWI to alter their engagement 
activities to include more cultural engagement until the formation of a joint 
committee in January 1945.  In the spring of 1945, the DoS also recognized the need 
to transition to post-war operations in terms of both cultural and information 
relations.  The DoS did not have the legal authority, personnel, experience, or funds 
to take over the activities of the OWI, so the two organizations agreed to run post-
war foreign public engagement programs conjointly until legislation and funding 
made it possible for the DoS or another government agency to take charge. 
 
In present operations OWI, on an emergency basis, is also devoting some 
effort to the re-establishment of scientific and professional contacts; has 
helped in the exchange of specialized periodicals; has arranged lectures, 
exhibitions, and the exchange of specialists.  In the absence of an American 
cultural cooperation program in many countries, these OWI activities are 
considered essential to the success of the over-all information 
program…some of the Department’s activities have been similar to those of 
the OWI – i.e., answering requests for books and periodicals, for exhibit 
materials and music, for lecturers… (“Memorandum to State Department 
Heads of Missions and OWI Outpost Chiefs,” 15 March 1945, RG 208, 
Entry 6E, Box 15). 
 
The DCR’s reliance on OWI was not new.  Through much of the war, the DCR 
relied on the CIAA as well as private organizations for funding and executing cultural 
and educational exchanges in Latin America as the Division lacked the funding to 
maintain robust operations (Espinosa 1976; Fairbank 1976).  As mentioned earlier, 
the ALA facilitated the DCR’s efforts to initiate book exchanges between Latin 
America and the US.  The ALA would also help to distribute books and academic 
periodicals in China when DCR expanded their program in 1940 (Fairbank 1976).  
The ALA along with foundations such as the Guggenheim and Rockefeller 
Foundations also provided funds and personnel to set up libraries in Latin America 
and China (“Outline of the Tentative Program for the Division of Cultural Relations,” 
16 March 1939, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 236, 111.46/126 ½; Fairbank 1976).  
In addition to books and libraries, the DCR arranged for private funds to aid 
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American schools in Latin America and China as well as establishing American 
cultural centres.  The DCR also worked to distribute non-theatrical films in Latin 
America.  The films tended to be produced by either private entities or by other 
government agencies with the DCR only screening the films (“Committee on 
Cooperation with the American Republics Meeting Minutes,” 28 October 1938, RG 
353, Entry 22, Box 29). 
 While the DCR received funding support from the CIAA, not all of CIAA’s 
cultural diplomacy was carried out jointly with the DCR.  The CIAA had to clear 
projects with the DoS and DCR, but the DCR and IDC had to request funds for 
many of their projects for Latin American “cooperation.”  Similar to the DoS, the 
CIAA had its own Cultural Relations Division.  The Cultural Relations Division was 
further subdivided into committees for specific areas such as art, education, music, 
publications, and fellowships (“Cultural Relations Division, Programs & Plans,” 15 
September 1941, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 435).  The Arts Committee arranged for 
traveling art exhibitions around the US and Latin America as well as working with 
art museums in Latin America and the US to arrange exchanges between museums.  
The CIAA also sponsored artist exchanges where artists could work for a few months 
in another country.  To increase awareness of different artists and techniques used, 
the CIAA promoted publications and translations of existing pieces on art.  Music 
was another area the CIAA developed programs.  The office established a Music 
Center in the PAU building in Washington, D.C.  Another centre was opened in 
Montevideo.  The US music centre offered a sheet music library, recordings, and 
books on Latin American musicians.  The centre was also used to conduct research 
on Latin American music.  There were also tours arranged for US and Latin 
American performers.  The Yale Glee Club and American Ballet Caravan toured 
Latin America, and Hugo Balzo, a pianist from Uruguay, toured the US.  The CIAA 
helped to support cultural centres created by Latin Americans independently.  
Cooperating with DoS, CIAA hoped to strengthen the existing centres as well as 
help to set up new ones (“Cultural Relations Division, Programs & Plans,” 15 
September 1941, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 435). 
 In addition to art, music, and literature, the CIAA also encouraged the 
production and distribution of theatrical and non-theatrical films throughout Latin 
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America.  The Motion Picture Division236 of CIAA was responsible for not only just 
cultural diplomacy, but also economic diplomacy and advocacy.  The division “was 
organized to employ motion pictures as a media for the development and 
improvement of the cultural, commercial and political relations between the 
American republics” (“Motion Picture Division of the CIAA,” circa 30 July 1943, RG 
229, Entry 1.4, Box 235).  The underlying premise of the Motion Picture Division 
was that “[motion] pictures, particularly those originating in the United States, 
provide the most direct approach to the widest audience in the hemisphere…serving, 
as no other media can serve, to cause the people of the other American republics to 
like, trust, and respect the peoples of the United States, and to join with them in the 
development of a lasting policy of hemisphere solidarity, which is the basis for a 
permanent Good Neighbor Policy” (“Motion Picture Division of the CIAA,” circa 30 
July 1943, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235).  The Division distributed short 16 mm 
films on matters relating to health, sanitation, medicine, and other educational 
subjects (non-theatrical films).  Using portable 16mm projectors, the Division was 
able to reach more remote areas in Latin America which did not have their own 
facilities.  As with other aspects of CIAA’s initiatives, the film division’s program 
was also “reciprocal.”  Short films were produced and distributed in US schools and 
colleges.  Attendance at these films was recorded to gauge audience reach and 
impact. 
 For theatrical films, the Motion Picture Society acted as a liaison between 
the CIAA’s office and the movie industry, including guilds, organizations, and 
individuals.  In addition, the society helped to find employment for Latin American 
artists in Hollywood productions.  The Motion Picture Society also helped advise the 
Motion Picture Division and CIAA on the selection of writers, directors, and 
producers to visit Latin America as well as helping to arrange talent and technical 
exchanges with Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile.  In tangent with the Motion 
Picture Division, the Communication Division worked “to correct some of the 
                                                     
236 The Division was headquartered in Washington with offices in both New York and 
Hollywood.  Policy and planning of the Division took place in Washington.  Within the 
Division, there were two departments: theatrical and non-theatrical.  Non-theatrical 
productions tended to be educational rather than for entertainment.  The New York 
office coordinates its initiatives with the help of two committees from the motion 
picture industry.  One committee was composed of the presidents of the leading 
companies and another of export managers (“Organization of the Motion Picture 
Division,” n.d., RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235). 
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unconscious practices which have made motion pictures a source of trouble to our 
public relations in these countries” (“Program of the Communications Division,” by 
Nelson Rockefeller, n.d., RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235).  The Communication 
Division wanted to prevent production of films which contained offensive characters 
or incidents to Latin Americans as well as forestall showing films which showed the 
US in bad light.237  The Motion Picture Producers’ Association agreed to allow a 
CIAA representative to review scripts prior to production. 
 “The whole field of radio broadcasting offers almost unlimited 
possibilities for the increase of international understanding through 
effective cultural relations”238 
 The OWI, CIAA, and to a certain degree, the DCR all used or were 
involved in international broadcasting.  Another point of contention between those 
working in the DCR as well as among others within the DoS and the OWI and CIAA 
was the use of information as a component of cultural relations.  When the DCR 
first began considering what cultural relations encompassed, radio, films, and 
newsreels were all considered as possible ways of communicating culture between 
the US and Latin America.  Secretary Hull, Laurence Duggan, and Senator Dennis 
Chavez discussed possible legislation to create a government owned broadcasting 
facility in January 1938.  The station “would effectively present to the peoples in 
other American countries the ideals and traditions of the United States” 
(“Conversation…in Secretary’s Office,” 15 January 1938, RG 353, Entry 14, Box 2).  
The Celler Bill, jointly proposed by Congressmen Emanuel Celler and Chavez, 
never made it through Congress, due to industry pressure and opposition to anything 
that might become a platform for American propaganda (Gilpin 1938).  In the 
                                                     
237 One example of a film which the Communication Division blocked from overseas 
distribution was Mr. Smith Goes to Washington which was deemed to portray Congress 
and American democracy in a negative light.  Another film, Down Argentine Way, was 
found to be objectionable because “[three] Argentine business men and one Argentine 
government official shown in it were comedy characters…”  Further objections were 
raised about one of the main Argentine characters being a gigolo; the only Spanish 
speaking Argentine character spoke with an obvious Mexican accent; and the plot of 
the movie focused on a corrupt race at the Buenos Aires Jockey Club, “…an institution 
of which Argentinians are proud.”   The producer agreed to reshoot the movie before 
releasing in Latin American countries. (“Program of the Communications Division,” by 
Nelson Rockefeller, n.d., RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235). 
238 Address by Richard F. Pattee, 11 November 1938, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, Box 235, 
111.46/43 
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winter of 1939, the Inter-Departmental Committee on Inter-American Cooperation 
explored setting up a one hundred kilowatt broadcasting station to use on 
international broadcasting frequency bands.  The Committee reasoned the basis for 
establishing the station was two-fold: to improve international relations and for 
national defence.  “The station is to be devoted exclusively to international short-wave 
broadcasting; it [short-wave international broadcasting] is defined as ‘an implement for 
broad gauged international policy’” (Philip Bonsal to Duggan, 22 December 1939, RG 
353, Entry 14, Box 2, emphasis added).  However, some questioned using 
international broadcasting in a cultural program. 
 
I personally feel that the investigations which have been made during the past 
few months prove that the role of international broadcasting in improving 
international relations and in orienting public opinion in favour of or against certain 
nations is at the present time a very small one, and often a negative one.  I also feel 
strongly that for our Government to establish an international broadcasting 
station, while at the same time leaving domestic broadcasting in private 
hands, would produce an unfortunate effect in other American republics.  In 
Great Britain and in Germany all broadcasting is governmental and therefore 
the British and German Governments’ activities in the international field are 
merely a projection of domestic policy.  I believe that one reason for the high 
opinion in which the United States is held in the other American republics is that our 
Government has at no time made any attempt to spread competitive cultural or 
political propaganda; an international broadcasting station under Government 
auspices might, even with the best intentions in the world, arouse suspicion and 
prejudice rather than improve our position (Philip Bonsal to Duggan, 22 
December 1939, RG 353, Entry 14, Box 2, emphasis added). 
   
The desire to distinguish and separate information from cultural relations remained 
strong within the DoS and DCR, which directly opposed Rockefeller’s perspective 
toward information and cultural relations.  Rockefeller, and by extension the CIAA 
he oversaw, believed information and cultural relations were mutually reinforcing 
and could not be separated.    
The CIAA was responsible for creating and implementing “programs in the 
commercial and economic fields, which, by the effective use of governmental and 
private facilities, will further the commercial well-being of the Western 
Hemisphere.”  In addition, the CIAA was also expected to develop and administer 
initiatives “in such fields as the arts and sciences, education and travel, the radio, the 
press, and the cinema, [to] further the national defense and strengthen the bonds 
between the nations of the Western Hemisphere” (“Summary of the Activities of the 
CIAA, 1 March 1942, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235).   To the CIAA, these two 
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responsibilities broke down into “two important fields of operation…economic and 
psychological” (“Summary of the Activities of the CIAA, 1 March 1942, RG 229, 
Entry 1.4, Box 235).   Cultural relations planned and funded by the CIAA were 
psychological rather than diplomatic.  The objective was to change the mentality of 
Latin Americans to back US policies rather than an objective to create a relationship 
with other American republics and represent US policies.239   
Thus despite opposition from the DoS, the CIAA went on to broaden 
American broadcasting into Latin America. 240   Rather than trying to establish a 
government owned facility, the CIAA created contracts with private broadcasting 
companies including General Electric and Westinghouse. 241   The CIAA also 
established a semi-private corporation, Precinradio, Inc., to further US broadcasting 
into Latin America.  In addition to broadening US radio presence in the American 
Republics, the CIAA also bolstered newsreel coverage throughout the Americas by 
providing funds for permanent news crews in Latin America (“Summary of the 
Activities of the CIAA, 1 March 1942, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235).   
Additionally, the CIAA produced a monthly illustrated magazine, En Guardia, 
published in both Spanish and Portuguese.  “The purpose of this magazine is to give 
readers in the other Americas a full picture of the hemisphere war program and of 
facts and information in general about the United States” (“Summary of Activities: 
Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, 16 August 1944, RG 229, 
Entry 1.4, Box 447).  The OWI used the magazine in both Spain and Portugal for 
                                                     
239 Rockefeller said “the only concept we are trying to sell at the moment is ‘Democracy’ 
and that this has not been thought out from the point of view of Latin America…our 
emphasis on Democracy might even be a boomerang, as most of the governments of 
the Latin American republics are dictatorial in nature” (Policy Committee of Cultural 
Relations Division of Coordinator’s Office, Meeting Minutes, 27 September 1940, RG 
229, Entry 10, Box 543). 
240 According to the Executive Committee Meeting Minutes for OCCCAR, Sumner 
Welles did not approve of the Coordinator’s cultural information program (Executive 
Committee of the Coordinator’s Office, Meeting Minutes, 25 September 1940, RG 
229, Entry 10, Box 543). 
241 The CIAA emphasized private over government sponsored or affiliated initiatives.  To 
avoid directly sponsoring programs, the CIAA established corporations. Several 
corporations were set-up during the course of CIAA’s existence, including the Motion 
Picture Society for the Americas, Hemisphere Films, Incorporated, and Prencinradio, 
Incorporated (Thomson 1948; “Summary of Activities: Office of the Coordinator of 
Inter-American Affairs, 16 August 1944, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 447). 
- 228 - 
 
their own operations in addition to producing two other magazines which became 
quite popular: Victory and USA.  The Victory magazine was printed in English, French, 
Arabic, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, and Afrikaans.  “…the purpose of ‘Victory’ 
[was] to show the United States as it is – its industry, agriculture and war effort, its 
public works, its culture, its people and their leaders” (“Bureau of Overseas 
Publications,” 31 May 1943, RG 208, Entry 6B, Box 4).  The USA publication 
included abridged versions of articles printed in American magazines as well as 
special articles.  The digest was printed in English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and 
Norwegian. 
The OWI was responsible for broadcasting to the rest of the world, to 
neutral, occupied, free, and newly liberated areas.  By the end of the war, the OWI 
established a large network for world-wide broadcasting in twenty-five languages.  
Broadcasts focused on current news and entertainment.  Programming included 
round-table discussions with multiple voices, question and answer sessions where 
listeners’ questions mailed to stations were answered on air, and programs on 
American politics and public opinion.  Entertainment programming consisted of 
radio dramas, music, poetry readings, and discussions on non-political subjects 
(Thomson 1948).  The OWI was able to get feedback from listeners regarding their 
broadcasts, despite the obstacles of occupation.  John Elwood, Manager of the 
International Division of National Broadcasting Company, Inc. (NBC), received 
feedback regarding US broadcasts into Switzerland.  A relative of one of the NBC 
broadcasters still residing in Lausanne wrote to tell him how people in Switzerland 
responded to the broadcasts (Elwood to Robert Sherwood, 15 August 1941, RG 208, 
Entry 6B, Box 6). 
 
The shortwaves play an increasingly important role around here; the owners 
of short wave sets become increasingly polite when they happen to talk to 
me; this is because of your programs.  Even my shirtmaker, a woman from 
Brittany, who nearly threw herself in my arms as I was trying on a shirt, 
when she discovered that the voice she heard from America was that of my 
son.  It is a fact that the American radio, which avoids the tiring phraseology 
of the English stations, is awaited here like the Messiah by a great number of 
our people badly informed on what happens in the world…But I am quite 
sure that your name has been for quite a while on the blacklist of the 
Gestapo…(Elwood to Robert Sherwood, 15 August 1941, RG 208, Entry 
6B, Box 6). 
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However, just as the CIAA conceived of its information and broadcasting operations 
with regard to their agency’s mission, the OWI also developed its own sense of what 
function their broadcasting operations served.  As will be discussed in greater detail, 
the OWI often used propaganda and psychological warfare to describe their information 
operations.  This overlap in terminology was especially problematic when it came to 
OWI and OSS operations.  Furthermore, there is little to distinguish between the 
objectives of either the CIAA’s or OWI’s magazine publications which both 
conveyed American history and culture to readers around the world.  The only 
distinction is in terms of each agency’s operating environment.  CIAA restricted its 
operations to Latin America, while the OWI was prohibited from conducting 
operations in Latin America.  
 “It is further clear that the term ‘psychological warfare’ is used merely 
as a cover for propaganda.  What is called subversion and political and 
cultural pressure is actually propaganda”242 
 One of the more contentious relations among the agencies throughout the 
war was the relationship between the OSS and OWI.  Pertinent to the general 
observation of this period, differentiating between the two concepts was a matter of 
perspective; whether one defined the concept by the means used or the desired ends 
(Linebarger 1948).243  "Psychological warfare, which in time became so important, 
was neither defined nor discussed" (Winkler 1948, p. 31).  Compounding this issue 
was the residual confusion left by the concept of propaganda after WWI.  There was 
never any consensus on what propaganda was, despite much public debate and a 
great deal of research on the subject (Gary 1999; Sproule 1997).  Unlike those 
running CPI operations, the OWI and OSS used the term propaganda regularly to 
describe their operations, but they also used psychological warfare to describe 
operations as well.   
As mentioned in the development of the OWI and OSS, Colonel Donovan 
held rather different opinions from key personnel within the OWI, in particular 
                                                     
242 James P. Warburg to Elmer Davis, 8 March 1943, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 9 
243 “Definition is open game…There are three ways in which ‘psychological warfare’ and 
‘military propaganda’ can be defined: first, by deciding what we are talking about in a 
given situation…second, by determining the responsibilities and authority involved in a 
given task; or third, by stating the results which are believed to be accomplishable by 
the designated means” (Linebarger 1948, p.37). 
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Robert Sherwood and Archibald MacLeish.244  Colonel Donovan sought short term 
objectives regardless of long-term consequences which included using 
misinformation, deception, and rumours.  The conflicts of approach appeared in the 
first psychological warfare campaign initiated by COI in the summer of 1942, just as 
the OWI and OSS was being created.  A covert letter writing campaign targeting both 
France and Germany was outlined by COI in late July 1942.  Most of the letters 
were sent to specific correspondents, identified through refugee interviews.  The 
letters were also “written in various hands or typed in a slipshod ‘personal’ manner 
on various kinds of stationery.  They all carry fictitious return addresses, which 
[were] filed by a Watch List with the US censors for eventual delivery” to the COI 
(“Letter Writing Plan…Unoccupied France,” 20 July 1942, RG 208, Entry 6B, Box 
4).  The COI also worked to use different postmarks to further avoid suspicion by 
French or German censors.  For the German letter campaign, agents in Sweden and 
Switzerland posted letters to correspondents in Germany.  For the French campaign, 
the “objectives [were] to alienate…officials from their Vichy affiliation so that they 
will allow more freedom to the already active revolutionary movements; also to win 
the officials themselves to outright espousal of our ideas, as useful leaders” (“Letter 
Writing Plan…Unoccupied France,” 20 July 1942, RG 208, Entry 6B, Box 4).  The 
plan for France also demonstrated listening on the part of the COI by acknowledging 
varied beliefs the French and how the people were very knowledgeable about their 
own political beliefs as well as their opposition.  Thus for each political view, the 
COI developed general replies for each.   
The fact that the US government was writing these letters to both members 
of the French and German public as well as each country’s government was to 
remain hidden in the original conception of the campaign.  In the case of Germany, 
the letters would not be sent from the US, but by agents in Italy and Switzerland 
(“Letter Writing Plan…Germany,” 30 July 1942, RG 208, Entry 6B, Box 4).  
However, once the OWI established their operations, the letter campaign became 
overt (“Plan for an Overt Direct-Mail Department,” n.d., RG 208, Entry 6B, Box 4).  
OWI outposts would be responsible for ensuring letters were sent to enemy and 
occupied countries.  The letters would be sent using connections between families 
within enemy or occupied countries or through professional organizations.  OWI 
                                                     
244 MacLeish was responsible for policy and planning within the OWI. 
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also utilized private organizations affiliated with the Catholic church, scientific 
institutes funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, and international organizations such 
as the Rotary Club and the Alumni Association of the International House to write 
form letters to individuals around the world.  Foreign-born Americans were also 
asked to write “Letters to the Editor” to their hometown newspaper (“Plan for an 
Overt Direct-Mail Department,” n.d., RG 208, Entry 6B, Box 4).  The plan covered 
much of the world including places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, 
Spain, Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania (“Plan for an Overt Direct-Mail Department,” 
n.d., RG 208, Entry 6B, Box 4).   
Though operations continued, confusion remained regarding the roles of the 
OSS and the OWI as well as the government’s understanding of propaganda and 
psychological warfare.  In December 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) drafted a 
directive defining the functions of the OSS, which was broken into two primary 
functions (J.C.S. 155/1.b, “Functions of the Office of Strategic Services,” 7 
December 1942, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 9).  These functions included “[the] 
planning, development, coordination, and execution of the military program for 
psychological warfare.” And “[the] compilation of such political, psychological, 
sociological, and economic information as may be required for military operations.”  
The directive also declared “[propaganda] operations included within the military 
program for psychological warfare will be executed by the Office of War 
Information,” thus, implying a distinction between propaganda and psychological 
warfare.  To this directive, the OWI Chairman of the Central Intelligence Panel, 
William Whitney, verbally stressed “the proposition that the Executive Order 9182 
and the accompanying ‘military order’ which created the Office of Strategic Services 
was intended by the President to eliminate Colonel Donovan from the psychological 
warfare operation, and …the proposal now before the Joint Chiefs…would reverse 
this position and actually put Colonel Donovan in charge of all psychological warfare, 
leaving to the Office of War Information merely the task of executing the 
‘propaganda phase’ of such warfare…the conduct of psychological warfare is 
subordinate to the plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but should not be subordinate to 
the Office of Strategic Services” (“OWI Board of War Information Minutes,” 21 
December 1942, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 9).  FDR wrote to the JCS informing them 
of his disapproval of assigning the OSS the responsibility for psychological warfare. 
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Your Directive to the Office of Strategic Services satisfies me as conforming 
to the Executive and Military Orders of June 13, so far as it concerns 
research and analysis functions, and special secret operations as espionage, 
sabotage and the fomenting of guerrilla warfare.  However, I do not feel that 
psychological warfare is an OSS function…it was intended to be established 
as a function of the Office of War Information (“Draft of Memorandum 
from the President to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” n.d., RG 208, Entry 6E, 
Box 9). 
 
December 23, 1942 the JCS issued a new directive with a more detailed break-down 
of OSS’s responsibilities with regard to both propaganda and psychological warfare 
(“Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive: Functions of the Office of Strategic Services, J.C.S. 
155/4/b, 23 December 1942, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 13).  Of the three specified 
functions of the OSS in the directive, the OSS was still responsible for “planning, 
development, coordination, and execution of the military program for psychological 
warfare.”  However, as the document specifies later, “[propaganda] operations 
included within the military program for psychological warfare will be planned and 
executed by the Office of War Information upon request from the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.”   In terms of psychological warfare, the OSS was not given the planning or 
operational authority for either propaganda or economic warfare.  Special operations 
were the only activities which the OSS maintained any authority, though still under 
military command. 
 In March 1943, FDR signed an additional EO to clarify OWI’s activities 
with regard to foreign information: 
 
The Office of War Information will plan, develop, and execute all phases of 
the federal program of radio, press, publication, and related foreign 
propaganda activities involving the dissemination of information.  The 
program for foreign propaganda in areas of actual or projected military 
operations will be coordinated with military plans…and shall be subject to 
the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (“Executive Order: Defining the 
Foreign Information Activities of the Office of War Information, 9 March 
1943, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 7). 
 
However, in the fall of 1943, the functions of OSS were clarified again.  The 
directive issued by the JCS this time made no mention of psychological warfare.  
Duties of the OSS were restricted to intelligence collection and analysis, 
counterintelligence, subversion and sabotage, as well as training and supplying 
weapons to guerrilla fighters and resistance movements (“Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Corrigendum to J.C.S. 155/11/b Directive: Functions of the Office of Strategic 
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Services, 28 October 1943, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 13). 245   In the area of 
intelligence collection the OSS was restricted from collecting or running operations 
within the Western Hemisphere including in Latin America.  However, in terms of 
intelligence analysis there were no geographic restrictions placed on the OSS.  
Further attempts were made to distinguish between the activities of both the OWI 
and OSS in 1944.  Eventually, it was generally agreed that “all ‘black’ propaganda 
activities behind enemy lines [belong] in the hands of OSS…[and] left all ‘white’ or 
official propaganda activities conducted from outside enemy territory in the hands of 
OWI” (Unsigned document, 14 April 1944, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 13). 
 This debate between the OSS and OWI and the attempt to distinguish 
between propaganda activities and psychological warfare activities is important to 
understanding the origins and inherent issues of American foreign public engagement 
because OWI’s propaganda or psychological warfare were unlikely to be acceptable 
in peacetime.  Yet as the previous pages have demonstrated there is little to 
distinguish between what the OWI did in Europe, Asia, and Africa and what either 
the CIAA or DCR did in Latin America.  Arguably the only differences between each 
agency were the objectives or policies each agency sought to achieve through various 
methods of foreign public engagement.  
 “It will be a new departure for the United States, the last of the great 
nations of the earth to engage in informing other peoples about its 
policies and institutions.  We cannot expect to carry on our foreign 
relations effectively unless we recognize this activity as, in your own 
words, ‘an integral part of the conduct of our foreign affairs’”246 
 Despite attempts to consolidate and centralize America’s information 
activities both leading up to and following WWII, most of the organizations were 
denuded of any real authority over US foreign public engagement, especially 
overseas due to the State Department’s grip on foreign policy.  The Department of 
                                                     
245 The OSS did engage in what would today be considered black propaganda, with the 
generation of “false rumors, ‘freedom stations,’ false leaflets and false documents…all 
for the purpose of creating confusion, division and undermining the morale of the 
enemy” (“Joint Chiefs of Staff Corrigendum to J.C.S. 155/11/b Directive: Functions 
of the Office of Strategic Services, 28 October 1943, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 13). 
246 James Byrnes to President Harry S. Truman, 31 December 1945, RG 353, Entry 22, 
Box 29 
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State continued to develop both informational and cultural policy, often without 
consultation with either CIAA or OWI. 247   The Department believed that both 
organizations would dissolve following the war and the responsibility of 
communicating with the world would fall to the DoS.  As the agency designated for 
the formation and implementation of American foreign policy, many within the 
Department of State believed outlining the policy of American foreign public 
engagement was solely the duty of the Department.  However, this attitude toward 
the OWI and CIAA created more problems than it resolved.  In many respects, the 
Department of State was reinventing the wheel with regard to the problems raised 
when contemplating how the US government would communicate with the world.  
The DoS wanted to maintain control of US foreign policymaking, but did not want 
to become involved in the production of US information engagement overseas.248  
This wreaked havoc on both the effectiveness of American foreign public 
engagement and caused agencies such as the OWI and CIAA to view the DoS as an 
obstacle rather than a cooperative partner.  Both the OWI and CIAA saw how 
international communication was connected to US foreign policy and foreign 
relations; they desired to at least be included in the foreign policymaking process.  
As Thomson observed, part of the State Department’s problem was that the 
organization lacked the administrative structure to address the policy requirements 
of international communications.  Various issues were either overlooked or were 
viewed as irrelevant to US foreign policy.  With the creation and expansion of both 
                                                     
247 In March 1944, the Department of State formed another committee to explore the 
problems regarding information dissemination to missions worldwide.  The committee 
was comprised of all the geographic area divisions.  According to the committee chair, 
Mr. Erhardt, “[it] was essential that the Committee should study and adopt all possible 
new techniques for the gathering, evaluation and dissemination of information” 
(“Minutes, Information Service Committee,” 10 March 1944, RG 353, Entry 401-403, 
Box 94). 
248 In the fall of 1944, John Begg of DoS invited CIAA and OWI information officers and 
field representatives to discuss the future of US information policy after the war.  He 
noted that “[several] people in the Department had been recommending the use of 
information as a part of diplomatic technique as far back as several years ago.”  In 
summarizing the meeting, Charles Lee (CIAA) said that the “questions put by the field 
men and some of us from this Office [Communications Division/CIAA] soon made it 
clear that there was no provision at present for permanent information officers under 
the Department of State, nor had great thought been given to the operation in the field.  
They also brought out clearly that the field men were not in favour of a [sic] operation 
directed or controlled by information officers in the Embassies” (“Meeting in Mr. John 
Begg’s Office,” 20 November 1944, RG 229, Entry 1, Box 493).   
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the CIAA’s and OWI’s foreign postings, the DoS was bombarded with queries from 
the field regarding matters not yet considered by the Department (1948).  The 
relationship the DoS maintained with information agencies both during and after 
WWII also had far reaching implications for US public diplomacy.  Without 
experience in information policymaking and an understanding of the connection 
between American foreign policy, US foreign and domestic communication, and US 
relations with the people of other nations, the DoS was unprepared to take on 
international broadcasting or advocacy.  The tendency of the DoS to view cultural 
relations distinct from international communications also impacted the future of US 
public diplomacy.  Both the CIAA and the OWI did not make the distinction 
between culture and communications. 
 Related to the issue of multiple bureaucracies, a recurring problem often 
noted by OWI and sometimes CIAA, was the need for them to participate in the 
policymaking process.  Though both agencies were able to communicate and engage 
with people abroad without involvement in policymaking, the CIAA and OWI 
recognized the engagement was less effective and sometimes added to 
misperceptions about the US.  As James Warburg acknowledged, the OWI is able to 
successfully convey the inevitable Allied victory; however, the OWI is unable to 
communicate to all people that the only chance of a durable peace is through Allied 
victory, even those presently in occupied or enemy territory: “… we have so far 
failed to develop a clear political attitude toward a liberated Europe and toward the 
enemy peoples themselves” (James Warburg to Elmer Davis and Robert Sherwood, 
11 August 1943, RG 208, Entry 6B, Box 4).  While the OWI may have only desired 
“constant and intimate cooperation between the policy-makers and the actual 
propagandists” (Percy Winner to John Houseman, 12 April 1943, RG 208, Entry 6B, 
Box 6), Rockefeller felt the CIAA should be more intimately involved in 
policymaking.  He felt the 
 
[determination] of policy shall be a joint function of the Department of State and the 
Office of the Coordinator working in close collaboration…Execution of policy shall be 
the joint function of the Department of State and the Office of the Coordinator.  
Activities in the foreign field shall be under the direction and control of the 
Department of State.  Activities in the United States shall, for the 
emergency program, be under the supervision and control of the 
Coordinator’s Office…Operations both in the field and in the United States shall 
be carried out by appropriate competent agencies both private and governmental 
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(Rockefeller to Laurence Duggan, 31 May 1941, RG 229, Entry 1, Box 
495). 
 
This put both the OWI and CIAA in the position of representing US policy to people 
abroad and helping to attain US foreign policy objectives without a role in forming 
the policies they represented abroad.  Based on the operating directive for the CIAA, 
this confused their role in American statecraft.  OWI was also left in an ambiguous 
position both with its relationship with OSS and with the DoS.   
 Aside from the bureaucratic issues and confusion regarding policy, WWII 
did help to permanently solidify the public-private partnership for US foreign public 
engagement.  The creation of the DCR incorporated input from many private 
organizations and individuals who already managed various foreign public 
engagement initiatives.  Even more significantly, as the DCR was being set-up, the 
Chief of the new department, Ben Cherrington, met with key figures of the IIE, 
Rockefeller Foundation, CEIP, and the Guggenheim Foundation to get input about 
how the division might cooperate with existing private efforts and what policies 
should be developed regarding government engagement (RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, 
Box 236, 111.46/131; Box 237, 111.46/223).  In addition, much of the CIAA’s 
operations relied heavily on private entities.  Rockefeller felt it was imperative that 
engagement with Latin America stem from private organizations and individuals, 
rather than the US government, as engagement initiated by the federal government 
could be viewed as propaganda.  The CIAA established corporations to avoid 
government affiliation with engagement activities (“Summary of Activities: Office of 
the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, 16 August 1944, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 
447).  The decision to use corporations also came from the experience of the 
Rockefeller Foundation with health and sanitation initiatives in Latin America.249  
Using private citizens and pseudo-private organizations, the CIAA “…from the 
unofficial character of their organization, [would] be in a position to carry out a 
variety of tasks in the other American republics which the United States Government 
                                                     
249 A corporation could conform to local practices, unlike a government entity.  
Corporations also had executive power to determine policies and methods which also 
permitted more flexibility.  Corporate bodies also allowed for negotiation and 
execution of cooperative agreements with foreign agencies, a crucial component of 
CIAA’s operations.  If a US minister or consul wanted to negotiate an agreement with 
a local or national foreign government, there would be Constitutional obstacles to 
carrying out the agreement (Thomson 1948). 
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officially could not do” (Rockefeller to President Roosevelt, 19 August 1941, RG 
229, Entry 1.4, Box 235).  Furthermore, as the war came to an end, the OWI 
worked to facilitate private initiatives to re-establish cultural and educational 
exchanges around the world.  Figure 7.2 displays the connections between private 
entities and the various government organizations tasked with engaging with people 
abroad.   
 
Figure 7.2 By WWII, the public-private relationship is a standard component of US 
foreign public engagement.  Private individuals and organizations would continue to 
facilitate and initiate engagement abroad in cooperation with the US government 
throughout the Cold War. 
 
These connections are built upon ties forged at the turn of the century.  Both private 
organizations and individuals helped to not only develop government foreign public 
engagement throughout WWII, but also helped to shape the policies of engagement, 
as previous cases have shown. 
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Perhaps the most significant finding of this case is how the multiple agencies 
and subsequent multiple “coordinating” committees created not only different 
terminologies for foreign public engagement, but also different perspectives on how 
foreign public engagement as a tool of statecraft could and should be used to 
facilitate foreign policy objectives.  In other words, between 1938 and 1945 the 
government outlined specific objectives and policies with regard to relations with 
Latin America and winning the war, but failed to clearly define their policy of using 
the tool of foreign public engagement.  Based on the archival evidence, this occurred 
because each organization believed they were doing something different.  The focus 
of the different agencies was more on the foreign policy objectives they were created 
to achieve, rather than the policy of the mechanism the CIAA, DCR, and OWI 
employed to attain those objectives.  Though key figures within the Division of 
Cultural Relations did work hard to standardize American cultural relations policy, 
these efforts were unsuccessful because of the DCR’s circumscribed role and 
hierarchy in comparison to either the CIAA or the OWI which both resided in the 
Executive Branch with directors who maintained close personal ties to the President. 
 The people working for OWI, CIAA, and DCR were not the only ones to 
believe they were doing different things.  In a memo to William Donovan, President 
Roosevelt expressed a similar view: “It appears some question has been raised as to 
the fields of responsibility of your work and that of Nelson Rockefeller’s 
organization.  I continue to believe that the requirements of our program in the 
Hemisphere are quite different from those of our programs to Europe and the Far 
East” (Roosevelt to Donovan, 15 October 1941, RG 229, Entry 1, Box 472).  The 
emphasis was not on how to use foreign public engagement for policy or what 
mechanisms were appropriate to achieve policy goals; the emphasis was on the goals 
themselves.  Furthermore, the goals tended to be related to defence and national 
security, not the more general purpose of improving foreign relations.  This puts the 
path to Smith-Mundt in a different perspective from ones previously presented or 
understood, with implications for present-day American public diplomacy  The 
disputes over foreign public engagement being used to achieve policy ends, the 
debates over whether the projection of American culture should be used to achieve 
policy, as well as the ultimate debate over America’s use of propaganda have their 
origins with the creation of the multiple agencies and committees tasked to engage 
foreign publics, creating confusion and ambiguity for the future. 
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 The final chapter examines the patterns which developed across the six cases 
featured in this research.  These patterns of foreign public engagement are compared 
with the practices and issues of US public diplomacy today as well as connecting 
issues of conceptualization, ideology, and organization to the cases in this study.  
Before delving into these subjects, the chapter will look at how foreign public 
engagement became a legal component of American statecraft. 
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Chapter 8  
Foreign Public Engagement: An American Tradition in Context 
“Modern international relations lie between people, not merely governments.” 
- Dr. Arthur Macmahon, 1945250 
 
Three days after Japan surrendered, a group of OWI executives gathered to 
read over a draft memorandum for President Harry Truman.  The group stayed late 
into the night redrafting the memo “to recommend its own termination.”  “OWI did 
not want to perpuate [sic] itself and it would be in a better position to make 
recommendations as to what activity should be continued if it had planned out its 
own end before it was ordered.  This was the effort made that night of Aug. 17” 
(“Conference with Bracken,” 26 September 1945, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 7).  Two 
OWI officers “took the letter to the White House personally at 3 AM and there was 
a great to do at the gate about letting the letter through at that hour but finally it was 
delivered to oneeof [sic] the White House secretariat through a barred door and thus 
it was expected that the President’s breakfast would be made happier” (“Conference 
with Bracken,” 26 September 1945, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 7).   
Just two weeks later, President Truman issued an Executive Order to 
abolish the OWI, though not all of the office.  “Although it is now possible to curtail 
governmental information activities, some of our foreign information operations will 
continue to be necessary” (“Statement by the President for EO 9608,” 31 August 
1945, RG 208, Entry 6H, Box 4).251  Crucially, when President Truman dissolved 
the OWI and CIAA, he identified foreign public engagement as a mechanism of US 
statecraft: “The nature of present day foreign relations makes it essential for the 
United States to maintain informational activities abroad as an integral part of the 
conduct of our foreign affairs” (“Statement by the President for EO 9608,” 31 August 
                                                     
250Memorandum on the Postwar International Information Program of the United States, 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), p. xi 
251 President Truman’s statement mentioned the consolidation of the CIAA as well.  Much 
of the CIAA’s activities were transferred to the Department of State as early as 1943 
(Espinosa 1976; United States 1947). 
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1945, RG 208, Entry 6H, Box 4).  Though the President of the United States and 
many who worked with and in the OWI, the CIAA, and the DCR throughout WWII 
recognized the need and importance of foreign public engagement, it would take 
another three years before foreign public engagement was legally accepted as a tool 
of statecraft.  And the fight to include foreign public engagement into statecraft 
perpetuated, exacerbated, and ingrained many of the issues already confronting 
foreign public engagement. 
President Truman’s EO requested the Secretary of State to conduct a survey 
of US foreign information needs and to construct a program to administer US 
foreign public engagement, by the end of the year.  In the meantime, elements of the 
OWI and CIAA were consolidated within the DoS under the Interim Information 
Service (IIS).  Dr. Arthur Macmahon, a DoS consultant, conducted a survey of US 
international information requirements and the report along with Secretary of State 
Byrnes’ findings led to the creation of the Office of Information and Cultural Affairs 
(OIC) in December 1945, which fully absorbed the remaining operations of the 
OWI and CIAA (“Letter from Secretary Byrnes to the President,” 31 December 
1945, RG 208, Entry 6H, Box 4).    The OIC would continue American libraries 
overseas, to supply information and background material via wireless and mail to 
missions abroad, to translate and distribute documentary films, to publish a Russian-
language magazine for the Soviet Union, and to maintain personnel in sixty-two 
countries to manage US informational and cultural relations.  These activities were 
formerly managed by the OWI and CIAA.  In addition, the Department planned to 
continue short-wave radio broadcasting “on a reduced scale” until Congress could 
make a decision regarding the transmitters and frequencies under the government’s 
control (“Letter from Secretary Byrnes…,” 31 December 1945, RG 208, Entry 6H, 
Box 4). 
At the same time, the DoS began a campaign of sorts to get legislation 
passed to not only extend the legal mandate for Division of Cultural Cooperation,252 
                                                     
252 The Department of State reorganized in January 1944, creating the Office of Public 
Affairs and a position for Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs.  The Office of 
Information and Educational Exchange combined the Division of Cultural Relations 
along with the Division of Current Information.  
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but also to incorporate information functions of the OWI and CIAA.253  In October 
1945, Representative Sol Bloom (Democrat, New York) made the first attempt to 
present legislation to add foreign public engagement as a tool of the state.254  Getting 
legislation passed was critical for government administered foreign public 
engagement.  Without legislation, the DoS could not justify to Congress the need for 
appropriations beyond what was required to comply with the treaty for the 
Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations.  Legislation was also needed to 
recruit staff both in the US and overseas (William Benton to Senator Karl Mundt, 19 
June 1947, RG 59, Entry 1559, Box 73).  While many within the DoS had been 
converted to the idea that post-war foreign relations would become more 
democratized,255 Congress remained unmoved by such liberal ideas, in part because 
many did not trust the Department and also because with the war ending, many 
Representatives and Senators desired to shrink the government not enlarge it.  
Without the Bloom Bill, US information and cultural relations might have been 
halted completely, but the DoS was saved by the State, Justice, Commerce, and 
Judiciary Appropriation Bill for 1947.  The bill gave temporary authority for the DoS 
to continue foreign public engagement worldwide and provided some funding for 
                                                     
253 Though the DoS had attempted throughout WWII to extend their mandate beyond 
managing cultural relations in Latin America under the 1936 treaty for the Promotion 
of Inter-American Cultural Relations, the Department had not been successful.  By 
1944, the Department now sought to not only expand cultural relations worldwide, 
but to also include many of the information operations managed by the OWI and CIAA. 
254 Senate and House debates on the bill were delayed by controversy between the DoS and 
the Associated Press and the United Press over selling their news services to the US 
government.  The Bloom Bill was further delayed by the DoS Appropriation Bill for 
1947.  When the bill was finally put before both the House and Senate, Senator Taft 
blocked the proposal to bring the bill to the floor and the bill died (Paulu 1953). 
255 John Begg, former Chief of the International Information Division within the DoS, sent a 
memo to Harley Notter in the Planning Division of DoS in 1943 regarding the 
democratization of international relations.  “When we, as a country became 
independent, it was again the ruling groups that had the contacts, but during the last 
war, radio, motion pictures, newspapers, and fast communication had developed an 
interest in the people; they wanted to participate.  This was democracy…in 
international relations…It was inevitable, in my mind, that we should have people 
involved in international relations” (Oral History Interview with John M. Begg 
[Transcript], in Harry S. Truman Library, 11 July 1975, pp. 18 – 19). 
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engagement through June 30, 1947 (Congressional Record 1946 Vol. 92 Part 4, pp. 
4347 - 4351; Congressional Record 1946 Vol. 92 Part 6, pp. 8021-8023).256   
A year later, debates over the State, Justice, Commerce, and Judiciary 
Appropriation Bill for 1948 coincided with Representative Karl Mundt’s 
presentation of HR 3342, the Smith-Mundt Bill.  From May through June of 1947 
the House of Representatives debated the purpose, efficacy, and necessity of adding 
foreign public engagement to the duties and responsibilities of the Department of 
State.  There were five arguments against providing any further funding to the OIC: 
international broadcasting was not the business of the government; the OIC should 
be abolished to save money; the OIC was inefficient; and private agencies should be 
used to conduct US international broadcasting if there was a need for such an activity 
(Paulu 1953; Congressional Record 1946 Vol. 93, Pt 4, pp. 5282 – 5295).  When 
debating HR 3342, four arguments against the measure were made throughout the 
debates which went beyond criticizing the OIC information program, including that 
government cooperation in international and educational exchange programs was 
unwelcome; there was no need for such activities; the DoS did not run the 
international information program well; and finally, bringing people from abroad 
into the US would allow Communist influence agents and spies to manipulate 
American students and steal US secrets (Congressional Record 1946 Vol 93, Pt. 5, pp. 
6621 – 6626; pp. 6739 – 6745). 
After much debate, HR 3342 made it through the House to the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations.  The State Department gave testimony and 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles both provided written 
statements in favour of maintaining US foreign public engagement.  The Committee 
unanimously supported the measure; however, when reported in the full Senate, 
there were attempts to prevent the bill from ever coming to debate.  Eventually, a 
                                                     
256 Debate over the appropriation bill (HR 6056) centred primarily on funding for both the 
DoS information and broadcasting program.  The primary argument against the 
measure was the legality of funding a program that Congress had not legislated.  As 
Representative Halleck noted, “[authorizations] for agencies, the creation of agencies, 
and the changing of the powers and duties and functions of agencies are for the 
legislative committees of Congress.  In recent years we have seen a practice develop 
under which the Appropriations Committee, by making appropriations for agencies 
and functions not authorized by law…usurps many of the responsibilities, duties, and 
powers of the legislative committees” (Congressional Record 1946 Vol. 92 Part 4, p. 
4347). 
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resolution was passed to launch a joint investigating committee to tour twenty-two 
European countries in September and October of 1947 (Congressional Record 1946 
Vol. 93 Pt 7, p. 8996).  The delegation was composed of five Senators, seven 
Representatives, and staff.  Prior to the delegation’s arrival, Assistant Director of the 
OIC, William Tyler, travelled to Europe, “[to] confer with the Chief of Mission and 
his staff on preparations for the visit of the Smith-Mundt group” (“Report on 
European Trip, 25 August – September 30 1947, RG 59, Entry 1559, Box 2).  Tyler 
provided the Chiefs of Mission with background on each of the delegates of the 
Smith-Mundt group.  He also helped to refine the information gathered by the 
missions to present to the delegation.   
 
In general, the material drafted by the Mission was too long and too 
detailed…In every case I went over the draft of the answers to the questions 
[posed by the delegation]…I emphasized that the impression which should 
be conveyed to the visiting group was fourfold: 1) The need, in support of the 
objectives of our foreign policy, of the Information and Cultural program. 2) The 
extent to which other countries carry on this type of activity in the country 
concerned, compared with the U.S.  3) The adverse effect on the general 
work of the Mission of the cuts in the USIS personnel and operations.  4) 
The extent to which OIE257 complements, stimulates, and assists American 
private enterprise whenever possible, and as circumstances permit (“Report 
on European Trip, 25 August – September 30 1947, RG 59, Entry 1559, 
Box 2, emphasis added). 
     
Tyler’s visit to Europe is significant for two reasons.  One, his visit and preparation 
with each of the missions illustrates part of the lobbying effort made by the OIC to 
ensure HR 3342 passed.258  Second, the missions were encouraged to explain US 
foreign public engagement as supporting the objectives of foreign policy.  In 1947, 
this involved engaging in a counter-propaganda battle against the Soviet Union.  
More importantly, this meant justifying foreign public engagement as a mechanism 
to implement US foreign policy, rather than a style of conducting foreign relations as 
previously advocated by the DoS in 1946. 
                                                     
257 Successor to the OIC, the Office of Information and Exchange. 
258 Within RG 59, Entry 1559, there are over twenty boxes containing correspondence and 
memorandums on members of Congress.  William Benton, Director of OIC, spent 
most of his tenure lobbying Congress to draft and pass legislation in support of US 
international information and culture programs.  Nelson Rockefeller maintained 
similar records and correspondences with Congress throughout the existence of CIAA 
(RG 229, Entry 1.4). 
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 Upon the return of the delegation, the bill was reconsidered in the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations and later debated in the full Senate on January 16, 
1948.  Justifications and support for the bill largely focused on the extreme need to 
combat Soviet propaganda.  The delegation reported on the Soviet Union’s efforts to 
discredit the Marshall Plan and the US generally.  Since the debates in the summer, 
various measures were included in HR 3342 to address concerns about the loyalty of 
State Department employees, the effective management of the engagement program, 
and competing with private entities.259  The only new point of contention arose 
between cultural purists who did not want cultural relations and education 
exchanges in any way combined with US information programs (Congressional Record 
1948 Vol. 94, Pt. 1, p. 247; Ninkovich 1981).  Former director of the Division of 
Cultural Relations, Ben Cherrington, believed combining informational relations 
with cultural relations would taint culture by politicizing culture, making it 
propaganda.  Others, such as Charles Thomson objected to the separation.  Thomson 
and Archibald MacLeish both saw information and culture as mutually reinforcing. 
“The failure of the multilateral system to take root following the war and the 
concomitant rise of nationalist approach to cultural relations as a competitor to 
liberal internationalist tenets set the stage for a showdown between once compatible 
foreign policy outlooks…America's active world role inflated the expectations of 
both the pragmatic and the idealistic advocates of cultural relations, a development 
further enhanced by the creation of competing bureaucracies eager to impress their 
version of cultural relations upon foreign policy" (Ninkovich 1981, pp. 125-126).  
Thus, to get the legislation passed, the OIC broke into the Office of International 
Information and the Office of Educational Exchange.  Both offices would remain 
under the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs.  The bill, which passed without 
debate in the House on January 19, 1948, and the debates among the members of 
Congress did little to resolve the problems which developed throughout WWII: 
defining what foreign public engagement was and what its role was.  The long fight 
                                                     
259 The bill included a requirement for personnel involved in the State Department’s foreign 
public engagement program to undergo a security check by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation before being hired.  To monitor the effectiveness of the program, two 
independent commissions composed of private citizens appointed by the President 
would be asked to make annual reports on both the information and exchange 
programs.  The language of the bill also emphasized that the State Department only fills 
the gaps where private companies or organizations are not able to or do not operate 
overseas (Congressional Record Vol. 94, Pt 1, 271-274). 
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from 1945 through January 27, 1948, when the bill was signed by President Truman, 
only established that foreign public engagement should be an element of US statecraft.   
“‘To see ourselves as others see us,’ or rather, to know the impression 
which our national habits and modes of thought produce upon our 
neighbours, must always be amusing and often instructive”260   
 Despite public diplomacy having legal recognition as a mechanism of US 
statecraft with the passage of Smith-Mundt, its role was anything but clearly defined.  
As this study has demonstrated, public diplomacy may have been incorporated into 
American statecraft, but none of the questions about what it was, its purpose, or role 
were ever fully resolved in 1948, nor were they resolved in the decades that 
followed.  The goal of this research is to shed light on the proper role of US public 
diplomacy, by examining the origins of the issues which effect the tool today in order 
to understand public diplomacy within the context of US historical experience and 
political culture.  In the six cases, several patterns emerge which provide important 
connections between foreign public engagement and public diplomacy.  Four major 
patterns or themes surface in each of the cases.  These patterns include 
communication; methods of engagement; people and organizations; and private 
versus public foreign public engagement (see Figure 8.1). 
 
Figure 8.1 
 
                                                     
260 “To see ourselves as others see us,” The Times, 10 January 1862, p. 6, Issue 24139 
Communication 
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The following pages will explore each of these patterns in detail examining how 
these themes are connected to the development of public diplomacy and present day 
public diplomacy generally. 
“The want of intelligence affects the Cause of the United States in every 
department; what Accounts of Our Affairs arrive in Europe at all comes 
thro’ the hands of Our Enemies…we are the last who are acquainted 
with Events which ought first to be announced by Us. We are really 
unable to account for this Silence, and…must intreat [sic] the honorable 
Congress to devise some Method for giving Us the earliest and most 
certain Intelligence of what passes in America.”261 
 One of the recurring themes or patterns in each of the cases is communication.  
In this study, communication as a theme appears in three ways.  First, there is 
consistent recognition by nearly every US leader or private citizen from Benjamin 
Franklin through President Harry Truman of the need to communicate with the people 
of other nations, not just the governments.  Second, in several of the cases within 
this study, advances in communication technology helped or hindered engagement 
relationships between the US and the people of another nation as well as changed 
audience dynamics between the US and the world.  And finally, communication 
between those in the field and headquarters is often a concern, with those in field 
feeling excluded from policy decisions made in Washington or overlooking 
information provided by the field. 
 The imperative need to communicate with the people of other nations, to 
correct misperceptions and explain US policies and character is clearly demonstrated 
in the first two cases.  Benjamin Franklin’s seemingly frantic reports back to the 
Continental Congress and the Committee of Secret Correspondence illustrate the 
importance of providing news about the colonies in order to counter what the British 
press circulated.  Even being the last to know about events in the colonies impacted 
the public perception of the commissioners and by extension the US.  Franklin wrote 
four letters in succession from February 6th through April 1777, pleading for 
information to use with the public.  Not only could the American commissioners not 
refute any of the information disseminated by the British, but the commissioners also 
noted how their “total Ignorance of the truth or Falsehood of Facts, when Questions 
are asked of us concerning them, makes us appear small in the Eyes of the People 
                                                     
261 BFP 23:421 
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here, and is prejudicial to our Negotiations” (BFP 23:466).  While serving as the US 
minister during the American Civil War, Charles Francis Adams noted how: 
 
The industry of the Confederate emissaries are poisoning the sources of 
opinion, as well as in disseminating wholly erroneous notions of the nature 
of the struggle in America has been unwearied.  And here the seed has fallen 
on favorable ground it has germinated strongly and fructified well…I ought 
before closing…to make one remark in regard to the manner in which the 
telegraphic intelligence from America is made up here.  Finding what its 
tendency is [sic] I thought it expedient to seize the occasion of a voluntary 
transmission of the favourable news from Port Royal to me by the agent, Mr. 
Reuter, to have some conversation with him on the subject.  I concluded to 
go so far as to offer to subscribe for the American portion of his labors for 
the time…I regard the step as having been so wise that I shall continue it in 
any event during the present season.  The telegrams are not yet what they 
should be, though not so bad as they were.  I learn from another source that 
they are transmitted through Liverpool, where they suffer gentle 
modifications from the hands of some directors of the Company not well 
affected to our cause (No. 95, 27 December 1861, M30, R73). 
 
The need or importance of communicating with the people of another nation in both 
cases is connected to a profound concern for the image of the United States and how 
America’s image could be or is affected by misconceptions or misinformation about 
the US and its policies.  This same concern surfaces throughout WWI, the inter-war 
period, WWII, and through today.   
One month after the attacks of 9/11, the US State Department launched the 
“Shared Values” initiative which was intended "to correct a mistaken image of 
American hostility to Islam that research showed was prevalent in the Arab and 
Muslim world" (Djerejian 2003).  The 9/11 Commission Report also noted how after 
2003, people in Muslim countries in the Middle East, Indonesia, and parts of Africa 
became increasingly negative toward the US.  According to the report, "these views 
are at best uninformed about the United States and, at worst, informed by cartoonish 
stereotypes, the course expression of a fashionable 'Occidentalism' among 
intellectuals who caricature U.S. values and polices" (2004, p. 375).  In over two 
hundred years of US history and experience, the importance of communicating with 
the people of other nations to correct misperceptions never really diminished in 
relation to US image, policies, and values.  "Just as we did in the Cold War, we need 
to defend our ideals abroad vigorously. America does stand up for its values...If the 
United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the 
extremists will gladly do the job for us" (The 9/11 Commission Report 2004, p. 377).  
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The importance or relevance to the US government tended to alter based on US 
foreign policy or the international situation, as this study has demonstrated.   
Generally, when foreign public opinion obstructed US foreign policy and 
posed a perceived threat to the United States itself, the government tended to value 
communicating with foreign publics more, as with both WWI and WWII and when 
President McKinley chose to send humanitarian aid to Cuba in 1897.  Private citizens 
and organizations were more consistent in their recognition of this need to 
communicate with the public of other nations.  Stuart Perry, Editor & Publisher of 
The Adrian Telegram, was so concerned about the misperceptions held by people 
overseas, he wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull.  Perry discovered that most of 
the American news items printed in Europe were about crime.  He said American 
news tends to be very negative in the foreign press and wanted to know if the 
Department could do anything to remedy this. 
 
Correspondents of foreign newspapers in Washington and New York have 
all the news there is, but they send only what they choose – which is the 
news they think their editors in Europe want.  The editors, in turn, print 
what they please, or what they think their readers like to read.  In short the 
problem seems to be one of converting the foreign press to a more sensible 
and ethical treatment of news from America…We can take an indifferent or 
contemptuous attitude…but the fact remains that we do care, if we are 
intelligent.  In the aggregate the misrepresentation of America in the foreign 
press is very hurtful to the nation.  It all tends to lower us in the estimation 
of foreigners, to diminish our prestige, to weaken our hand in whatever we 
are doing (Perry to Hull, 29 November 1935, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 
4656, 800.911/33). 
 
This concern about misunderstanding between the people of other nations also drove 
private foundations such as CEIP, RF, and the IIE to encourage mutual exchanges.  A 
key component of internationalism argued that war and conflict were caused by 
misconceptions which existed among people from different cultures.  Peace and 
stability were attainable if cross-cultural communication could take place. 
 Another aspect of communication reiterated throughout many of the cases in 
the study is how either limited means of communication or the advance of 
communication technologies caused the international dynamics to change and 
affected both the nature of engagement and the platform for engagement.  Benjamin 
Franklin was woefully inhibited by the lack of communication capabilities, 
compounded by the fact that the US colonies at the time of the Revolution did not 
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have naval vessels that could compete against the British navy.  In many cases, 
Franklin and the Continental Congress had to rely on trusted couriers to send 
correspondences across the Atlantic.262  Given the technological limitations, Franklin 
had to adapt the way he engaged with the people of France.  Since the US desired to 
show France and the world that the US was a stable, independent, and lucrative 
investment, Franklin used the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of 
Confederation, and state constitutions to demonstrate these qualities in the face of 
repeated military defeats.   
Unfortunately, the advent of the telegraph caused a great deal of problems 
for the Union throughout the Civil War.  Despite warnings from Reverend Dr. 
M’Clintock and Minister Adams regarding the bias of the telegraph services, 
Secretary Seward did little to alter or address the problem.  Additionally, Seward 
and other US leaders did not seem to understand how the telegraph diminished the 
wall between the domestic and foreign audience.  The European public now had 
access to whole speeches given by US leaders and other dignitaries only a few days 
after giving the speech.  Charles Adams’s son, Charles Francis Jr., saw the problem, 
writing to his brother, Henry  
 
...I must confess I think the government’s cards, so far as the public sees 
them, are played badly enough both here and in England.  While the agents 
of the Confederates are abroad working the whole time at public opinion 
and at the foreign mind, influencing papers and thinkers and undermining us 
the whole time, our press at home does but furnish them the materials they 
need and our agents abroad apparently confine their efforts to cabinets and 
officials and leave public opinion and the press to take care of themselves (6 
October 1861, in Ford 1920, p. 52). 
 
This was not only the time US engagement lagged behind the progress of 
communication technology.  When WWI broke out in Europe, the US 
communications relied heavily on private European communications infrastructure 
(Rosenberg 1982).  In an effort to ensure the rapid broadcast and dissemination of 
                                                     
262 Unfortunately for Franklin, he was surrounded by spies, both French and British.  He was 
warned repeatedly that his entire household was composed of spies.  Franklin provided 
a seemingly unconcerned response to these warnings: “I have long observ’d one Rule 
which prevents any Inconvenience from such Practices. It is simply this, to be 
concern’d in no Affairs that I should blush to have made publick; and to do nothing but 
what Spies may see and welcome. When a Man’s Actions are just and honourable, the 
more they are known, the more his Reputation is increas’d and establish’d” (“To 
Juliana Ritchie,” 19 January 1777, BFP 23:211). 
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President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points Speech the Committee on Public 
Information used a patchwork system, relaying the speech from US Navy wireless 
stations to cooperative European governments’ wireless stations.  A Japanese news 
service, Kokusai Agency, described how they received President Wilson’s speeches. 
 
It had travelled overland for nearly four thousand miles and then 
commenced its long under the sea trip from San Francisco to the Island of 
Guam.  Here again the long message was taken down and ‘relayed’ once 
more for China and Japan where the Reuter agent in Shanghai and the 
general manager of Kokusai had been notified to accept it…During the 
afternoon…the first section of about one hundred words came in on the 
wire to the headquarters of the Kokusai Agency at Sojuro-cho.  
Here…translators, manifolders [sic] and messengers had all been organized 
to work.  Experienced editors taking turns, received the telegrams as they 
came… Short “takes” were passed to translators and then to the chief 
translator in Japanese and English for reediting.  The retouched and 
compared sheets were then re-written and passed to the manifolder [sic] for 
the machine work of reproduction of the copies necessary…Literally 
hundreds of telephones were commandeered and from one end of Japan to 
the other the contents of the message were distributed and made ready for 
publication (“Report of the Division of the Foreign Press,” 1 February 1918, 
RG 63, Entry 105, Box 16). 
 
Even by WWII, the US still had not developed a world-wide communications 
network.  "The Americans were comparatively slow in developing an 'information 
policy' to combat restrictions, censorship, and aggressive propaganda.  Liberal 
traditions nurtured a deep distrust of direct governmental involvement in the 
dissemination of culture and information; Americans had always insisted that 
'freedom' meant privately controlled mass media" (Rosenberg 1982, p. 204).263   
 Today, technology continues to play a role in shaping US public diplomacy.  
The US no longer suffers from an inadequate communication infrastructure to 
engage with people abroad; however, the changes to the communication 
environment have presented both problems and opportunities for US public 
diplomacy.  Perhaps the most recent and glaring problem is the same problem 
Secretary Seward suffered – a change in audience dynamics.  Communications 
technology is not what it was in either 1865 or 1918 when the US had to rely on 
                                                     
263 Private US companies did not extend into international communications (beyond Latin 
American) until after WWII partly due to a lack of interest and also due to the 
difficulty of breaking into a communications market largely controlled by European 
companies (Rosenberg 1982). 
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foreign telegraph services or a cobbled cable relay system.  Now, US leaders are 
heard and quoted in real-time between mobile networks and Twitter.  An example 
of this disconnect was seen in the aftermath of the attacks on the US compound in 
Benghazi on September 11, 2012.  Following the attacks, US Ambassador to the 
United Nations, Susan Rice, made several public appearances on American television 
attributing the attacks to an angry protest incited by a YouTube video ridiculing the 
Prophet Muhammad. 264   Two days after these public statements regarding the 
YouTube video, protests began at American diplomatic posts throughout the Middle 
East (“Timeline: Protests over anti-Islam video,” September 2012).  The DoS 
provided answers with only the US public and Congress in mind.  By raising the 
profile of the YouTube video, the DoS caused anger and violence to spread 
throughout the Middle East.   
On the other hand, advances in communications technology have provided 
opportunities for US public diplomacy.  The government funded and established a 
social media network in Afghanistan called Paywast, which means “to connect” in 
Dari.  One of the frustrations faced in Afghanistan is the resistance to central 
authority and the firm adherence to tribal, cultural, and linguistic affiliations.   “But a 
social media network initially financed by the United States is finding a way around 
those barriers. It is connecting millions of Afghans equipped with cellphones and 
other mobile devices, allowing an exchange of ideas that has never been possible in 
Afghanistan outside Kabul, the capital” (Nixon 2014).  Unfortunately, once the US 
pulled financial support for Paywast, the Afghan company which manages the social 
network began charging users a fee and many Afghans discontinued using the 
network. 
Finally, the need for communication between those in the field and 
headquarters or lack of communication between the field and headquarters is a 
recurring problem in many of the cases featured in this study.  Frequently, 
individuals who lived and worked abroad saw the importance and need for 
communicating with people abroad and urged the Department of State to engage 
                                                     
264 The YouTube video was created by a private US citizen with support from US donors.  
The fourteen-minute video was posted on YouTube on July 1, 2012 and went 
unnoticed until the Egyptian media reported on the video on September 8th (“Timeline: 
Protests over anti-Islam video,” September 2012;Willon & Keegon 13 September 
2012). 
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more with people of other nations.  Unfortunately, either due to political or policy 
constraints or a genuine lack of interest, the DoS often left such requests either 
unanswered or refused to become involved.  When Charles Francis Adams requested 
Secretary Seward to send him updates about the Civil War to use with the British 
public, Seward replied he “should be pleased if it more prudent to give you at all 
times our plans concerning military operations.  It would at first sight seem that I 
might safely give you accounts of results, but there would be so many hazards of 
misinterpretation at home and abroad of what I might write upon such matters, that I deem 
it safest to have you obtain your knowledge as best you may from a feverish and 
confused press” (No. 163, 11 January 1862, M77, R77, emphasis added).   
Following the Fourth Pan American Conference, Latin American nations 
were enthusiastic about starting inter-American academic exchanges.  Guatemala 
was the first nation to announce their government would offer up to five scholarships 
for students in the US to study in Guatemala.  This announcement was printed 
throughout the US in the press and resulted in dozens of letters and postcards from 
across the US addressed to the Secretary of State, asking for more particulars about 
the scholarships (RG 59, CDF 1910-29, Box 7299, 810.72711/77).265  Applicants 
were told to contact the Guatemalan embassy.  Meanwhile the DoS in Washington 
did little after the conference to either encourage other nations to establish academic 
exchanges or to arrange US exchanges, despite repeated queries and requests from 
US officers serving in Latin America. 
 
I have the honor to respectfully suggest to the Department that my 
experience of six years in this country has convinced me that a great part of 
misunderstanding between the people of the two countries and the feeling of 
anti-Americanism which always exists to more or less degree in this country 
is due to the fact that the individuals citizens [sic] are not very well 
acquainted with the people, customs, etc. of the other country.  It has 
occurred to me that perhaps an extensive and systematic exchange of 
scholarships between American and Mexican Institutions might serve in the 
course of time to create a better understanding (Consul Clarence A. Miller 
to Secretary of State, Tampico, Mexico, 23 September 1913, RG 59, CDF 
1910-29, Box 7299, 810.42711/83). 
 
                                                     
265 Box 7299 contains an entire folder of postcards and letters from all over the US from 
children as young eight years old to adults, all inquiring about how they might apply to 
study in Guatemala. 
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The suggestion was forwarded to the Secretary of Interior “as of possible interest to 
the Bureau of Education” and to CEIP, then the request was filed 7 October by DoS 
(810.42711/83).  Similar suggestions were sent throughout 1913 and 1914 with 
little impact on the Department of State.   
This disconnect between those operating in the field and headquarters 
carried on through WWI and WWII.  When Assistant Director of the Office of 
Information and Educational Exchange (OIE), William Tyler, travelled to Europe in 
1947, he asked about the concerns and problems of the officers working in the field.   
Tyler found that United States Information Service (USIS)266 officers did not have 
access to the same information about US foreign policy as Foreign Service officers 
within the same mission.  “One of the symptoms and consequences of the USIS not 
yet being used to its fullest advantage as an instrument of the Mission’s work, is that 
our PAO’s [Public Affairs Officers] are often badly informed as to what is going on 
and what our policy is” (“Report on European Trip, 25 August – September 30 1947, 
RG 59, Entry 1559, Box 2).  As Benjamin Franklin, Thurlow Weed, Charles Francis 
Adams, officers of the CPI, CIAA, and OWI all found, without information from 
headquarters, they were unable to do the very thing they were asked: to correct 
misperceptions or explain US policies and culture.  Conversely, foreign public 
engagement was inhibited when headquarters refused to listen or ignored what 
officers in the field reported. 
With advances in communication such as the Internet and mobile networks, 
the distance between one nation and another has faded into seeming insignificance.  
Foreign audiences sit right beside domestic audiences; therefore, US statecraft must 
now consider not just the American public when communicating, but also the public 
abroad.  There is a clear disconnect among US leadership in recognizing that the 
communication environment has altered and the implications this has for every 
aspect of US statecraft, not just public diplomacy.  Now the President, the Secretary 
of State, a Senator, or a state governor are not just speaking to a domestic audience 
they are simultaneously speaking to foreign audiences, as advances in communication 
make it possible for people everywhere to hear.  In 2009, a Congressional research 
report noted this same issue that “with the rise and rapid evolution of Internet 
                                                     
266 USIS was the overseas designation for the United States’ information services.  The name 
remained even after the United States Information Agency was created in 1953. 
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communications, the U.S. government must determine how to effectively 
communicate with foreign publics in an increasingly complex, accessible, and 
democratized global communications environment” (Nakamura & Weed 2009, 
“Summary”).  As this study has shown, this is not a necessarily new development.  
The US, in many ways, still sees itself as a nation isolated from the world.  
 “Science and literature have no frontiers.  Music and art have universal 
appeals.  Contacts of men of letters, science, the arts bring about a better 
appreciation of the finer achievements of people”267  
 Another pattern or theme throughout this study is the methods used to 
engage with people of other nations.  Even removing the framework used, with the 
five core elements of public diplomacy, the practices used from 1776 up through the 
present-day remain the same.  This study opened by describing how the missionaries 
sent to the Ottoman Empire were first tasked to gather information about the 
Empire and the people to report back to the American Board of Commissioners for 
Foreign Missions (ABCFM).  The missionaries were also to report on the progress 
and problems they faced in the work, so the Board could alter the mission to fit the 
requirements of the people in the Empire.  And John Adams described how 
Benjamin Franklin preferred to listen to the people around him than speak. 
 
His reputation was more universal than that of Leibnitz or Newton, 
Frederick or Voltaire, and his character more beloved and esteemed than 
any or all of them...But Franklin’s fame was universal. His name was 
familiar to government and people, to kings, courtiers, nobility, clergy, and 
philosophers, as well as plebeians, to such a degree that there was scarcely a 
peasant or a citizen, a valet de chambre, coachman or footman, a lady’s 
chambermaid or a scullion in a kitchen, who was not familiar with it, and 
who did not consider him as a friend to human kind. When they spoke of 
him, they seemed to think he was to restore the golden age... He was 
considered as a citizen of the world, a friend to all men and an enemy to 
none. His rigorous taciturnity was very favorable to this singular felicity.  He 
conversed only with individuals, and freely only with confidential friends. In 
company he was totally silent (Adams 1856, Vol. I, pp. 660 – 661). 
 
Gathering information and listening to the people of other nations is a relatively 
consistent feature in each of the cases, performed with varying degrees of 
effectiveness.  As described in the proceeding section, understanding what people in 
                                                     
267 “The Importance of Intellectual and Cultural Cooperation Between Nations,” 20 April 
1938, RG 353, Entry 14, Box 2 
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other nations believed or perceived often spurred the US to begin engagement or 
change the way in which the US engaged with people abroad.   
However, there have been times, as noted throughout this study, when the 
US failed to listen or understand the people of other nations, which made 
engagement ineffective and in some cases entirely counterproductive.  During WWI, 
the US Chamber of Commerce in Mexico attempted to engage the Mexican public 
with a pamphlet.  The primary argument for building US-Mexican relations, 
according to this pamphlet, was the yet undeveloped economic potential of Mexico.  
To Mexicans, this only confirmed their belief that the US was only interested in 
economic imperialism.  In another instance where the US failed to understand the 
people they wish to engage with, the CPI sent a representative to Mexico, who did 
more harm than good.  Robert H. Murray’s previous work as a journalist for The 
New York World in Mexico made him an extremely unpopular person to the Mexican 
public.  Throughout the Civil War, William Seward failed to listen on numerous 
occasions regarding the importance of British public opinion in relation to the 
government’s policies.   In the case of the American National Red Cross and the 
Central Cuban Relief Committee, the organizations struggled initially to gather 
information from the Cubans as to what was required and relaying this to either the 
DoS or the CCRC.   
This is a major issue confronting US public diplomacy today.  As Rhonda 
Zaharna notes in the aftermath of 9/11, “U.S. public diplomacy was very much a 
Washington-driven, or source-driven, rather than audience-driven campaign" (2010, 
p. 47).  Similarly, a Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and 
Muslim World, also noted the US has “failed to listen and failed to persuade.  We have 
not taken the time to understand our audience, and have not bothered to help them 
understand us… Arabs and Muslims, it seems, support our values but believe that 
our policies do not live up to them. A major project for public diplomacy is to 
reconcile this contradiction through effective communications and intelligent 
listening” (Djerejian 2003, p. 23). 
Understanding and information gathering about foreign publics is not the 
only constant feature of foreign engagement.  US missionaries in the Ottoman 
Empire translated books into local languages, established newspapers and magazines, 
and arranged for students from the Empire to study in the US.  This study saw how 
CEIP, the CPI, the ALA, CIAA, DCR, and OWI translated US literature, textbooks, 
magazines, and newspapers as a means of engaging with people of other nations.  
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Though Benjamin Franklin did not set-up the Affaires de l'Angleterre et de l'Amérique, he 
was one of the primary editors for the newsprint.  The purpose and content of 
Affaires de l’Angleterre et de l’Amérique is not unlike the L’Amérique en Guerre magazine 
produced by the OWI during WWII, which contained news about the Allied war 
effort and other news and information about America (3 February 1943, RG 203, 
Entry 6B, Box 4).  CEIP produced and supported several magazines and journals on 
international law and peace initiatives, while the RF and LSRMF ensured institutions 
in Europe and other parts of the world received the latest medical and science 
journals.  One of the many recommendations in The 9/11 Commission Report included 
translating textbooks and more of the world’s knowledge into local languages as well 
as establishing libraries in the Middle East (2004, p. 377-378). 
Student exchanges have also been a consistent method of engagement.  Pliny 
Fisk and Levi Parsons arranged for four Greek boys to travel to the US in 1824 to 
begin school.  “We think these lads of much promise, and earnestly desire that they 
may enjoy all the best means our country affords, for securing a thorough education” 
(Missionary Herald 1824, Vol. 20, p. 32).  In addition to missionaries arranging for 
students to study in the US, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century, 
Chinese students came to the US either with support from American missionaries, 
the Chinese government, or the Boxer Indemnity scholarship fund.268  Following the 
Fourth Pan American Conference, CEIP agreed to establish scholarships for US 
scholars and students to study in Latin America and for Latin American students and 
academics to come to the US.  The creation of the Institute of International 
Education facilitated and encouraged more exchanges.  During WWI, the CPI with 
the help of US universities arranged for students to study in the US.  Educational 
exchanges are clearly a pillar of public diplomacy. 
Not only does this lend credence to the core elements of public diplomacy, 
but it also validates the repeated attestations that public diplomacy is not a twentieth 
century phenomenon.  Numerous other scholars have made similar connections 
between private entities and government organizations and present-day public 
                                                     
268 In May of 1900, Chinese Boxers, a political movement, attacked several foreign 
embassies in Peking.  The siege went on through June.  Britain, Germany, Japan, 
Russia, France, and Italy demanded large indemnities for the loss of life and damage 
done to the legations.  After negotiating an indemnity, the US was to receive 
$24,440,000 over thirty-nine years, though the US knew the amount was excessive.  In 
1908, after several years of debate, the US established a scholarship with the indemnity 
for Chinese students to study in the US (Hunt 1972, Malone 1926). 
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diplomacy practices.  Duncan Campbell noted how there were established practices 
in the mid-nineteenth century to engage people of another nation, which both the 
Confederates and the Union employed to engage the British public.  These 
techniques included the use of pamphlets, public meetings, speeches, and editorials 
(2003), which are not dissimilar to those used by Benjamin Franklin.  Emily 
Rosenberg also observed how the CPI’s methods of engagement resembled those 
used by American missionaries in the nineteenth century (1982).  At the start of the 
twentieth century, foundations such as CEIP, RF, and IIE took over supporting 
schools, academic exchanges, and medical schools started by US missionaries while 
also initiating their own parallel programs (Daniel 1970; Grabill 1971; Karl & Katz 
1981).   
In addition, the parallels between the engagement techniques used from the 
eighteenth century through the twentieth raise questions about public diplomacy and 
its association with propaganda.  Throughout each of the cases the emphasis has been 
on both the techniques used as well as intent.  The question is whether schools set-
up by missionaries, foundations, and the US government can be considered public 
diplomacy.  Certainly, the missionaries wanted to convert people to Christianity, 
but this quickly became incidental to efforts to build relationships in the 
communities they served.   
 
At the present time, when through our community so much sympathy is manifested 
for the Greeks; when, in their behalf, meetings are held, addresses made, 
resolutions passed and funds procured; it is confidently expected, that these 
young sons of Greece, who have been sent to our shores for qualifications to 
exert, in future years, a strong regenerating influence upon the civil, literary 
and moral character of the interesting people to which they belong, will not 
fail of receiving sufficient support.  It is pleasing to think of the mutual 
acquaintance and free intercourse, which may arise between this country, Palestine, 
and Greece (Missionary Herald 1824, Vol. 20, p.32, emphasis added). 
 
The missionaries saw the people in the Ottoman Empire as people who could 
achieve a better life with more education and technical training.  Foundations such as 
CEIP and RF viewed their educational and medical programs similarly, believing that 
with mutual exchange, cross-cultural relationships could be fostered.  CEIP and RF 
also saw education as a way to establish real peace.  US public diplomacy raises first 
the importance of using activities such as exchange and education initiatives to 
persuade and influence, but also observes that these programs serve to build 
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relationships and to provide opportunities to people to better their lives through 
education and technical training. 
 
Public diplomacy provides a foreign policy complement to traditional 
government-to-government diplomacy, which is dominated by official 
interaction carried out between professional diplomats.  Unlike public affairs, 
which focus communication activities intended primarily to inform and 
influence domestic media and the American people, U.S. public diplomacy 
includes efforts to interact directly with the citizens, community and civil 
leaders, journalists, and other opinion leaders of another country.  PD seeks to 
influence that society's attitudes and actions in supporting U.S. policies and national 
interests.  Public diplomacy is viewed as often having a long-term perspective 
that requires working through the exchange of people and ideas to build lasting 
relationships and understanding of the United States and its culture, values, and 
policies (Nakamura & Weed 2009, p.1, emphasis added). 
 
Thus, for over two hundred years, the United States has continued to engage with 
people from other nations, to build relations, exchange information and ideas, as 
well as spreading American culture and values. 
 “In the [American] Red Cross as it is now the government has a weapon 
for propaganda which hardly existed before the war...No other country 
has, or ever had, just such an instrument for this purpose…In the allied 
countries the effectiveness of the Red Cross work as propaganda is 
obvious...”269 
 Another significant theme of this study is the recurring role of many private 
organizations and individuals in not only administering US foreign public 
engagement, but also shaping it.  Private entities have been recognized as partners 
with the government and leaders of US public diplomacy since the Cold War.  
However, this research suggests further study should be done looking at how these 
private groups and citizens have impacted the development and role of public 
diplomacy in the US.  The ideas and motivations behind these actors undoubtedly 
left indelible marks on American public diplomacy.  Going back to the ABCFM, to 
the American National Red Cross, to CEIP and its first board members, to the 
Advisory Committee for the DCR, there are connections between US foreign public 
engagement in the nineteenth century through the twentieth century.  These ties 
help to answer one of the posed research questions: how has foreign public engagement 
from 1776 through 1948 shaped the role of modern public diplomacy in American statecraft?  
                                                     
269 F. Hoppler to Arthur Woods, 20 February 1918, RG 63, Entry 111, Box 1 
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Private foreign public engagement and to a smaller extent government foreign public 
engagement has had a profound effect in determining the role of public diplomacy in 
statecraft.  Figure 8.2 demonstrates this visually by showing the connections 
between all the individuals and organizations featured in this study which contributed 
to not only the continual effort to engage with people from other nations, but also 
helped define and formulate US public diplomacy.  This figure clearly illustrates not 
only the cross-generational connections between different groups and individuals, 
but also the significant importance of private entities in developing US public 
diplomacy. 
 
Figure 8.2 This chart includes all private and public entities in the study which contributed 
to the development of US public diplomacy.  The chart is a visual demonstration of 
the relative continuity of US public diplomacy, and also shows the importance of 
private individuals and organizations in maintaining and advancing public diplomacy. 
 
Foreign public engagement continued throughout US history due primarily 
to private initiatives.  As some of the cases in this study have demonstrated, left in 
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government hands, foreign public engagement would have withered away or never 
gone beyond Benjamin Franklin’s efforts in France.  Therefore, in terms of impact, 
without these private actors, public diplomacy in the US would not exist today.  It 
could be argued that the CPI might still have acted as a catalyst to further US public 
diplomacy; although, much of the CPI would not have functioned or existed without 
the assistance of private organizations such as the American Red Cross, the American 
Library Association (ALA), the YMCA, CEIP, and even the ABCFM.  Dr. Carl 
Milam helped the CPI and Library War Service while working for the ALA to 
establish libraries for US soldiers as well as for locals in Europe.  Throughout the 
inter-war period, the ALA worked with CEIP to establish libraries and exchange 
books between the US and other nations.  Milam would later serve as an advisor to 
the Division of Cultural Relations in 1938.  This is one of the many examples in this 
study where private entities have played important roles in ensuring US foreign 
public engagement continued as well as shaping the policies and practices. 
Not only are the private organizations and citizens integral to the continuity 
of American foreign public engagement, but there are key figures who helped to 
shape many of the ideas about what foreign public engagement is, what it should do, 
and what role it should play in relation to the state.  In fact, many of the 
disagreements regarding foreign public engagement can be traced to the varying 
ideas about the practice as described in Chapter 4.  Both James Brown Scott and 
Nicholas Murray Butler became crucial figures in American foreign public 
engagement, and both expressed rather different ideas about what foreign public 
engagement could do and what its role was in relation to US foreign relations and 
foreign policy.  Scott’s views of foreign public engagement saw it as a way to not 
only explain US institutions and ideas, but to spread American influence (RG 59, 
CDF 1910-1929, Box 7299, 810.42711/38).  While Butler saw exchanges as a way 
of bringing about international understanding and achieving permanent peace 
(810.42711/38).  Both men served on the board of CEIP; Butler as the Director of 
Intercourse and Education and Brown as the Director of International Law.    
As noted earlier, these differing viewpoints about the role of foreign public 
engagement remain as foreign public engagement developed over the course of the 
twentieth century up through present-day.  The varying perspectives toward foreign 
public engagement were reflected in the way CEIP, RF, IIE, LSRMF, and other 
agencies conducted engagement; these ideas also shaped the policies of their foreign 
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public engagement (Rietzler 2009; “Cyril Wynne Memo,” 2 October 1936, RG 59, 
CDF 1930-39, Box 5064, 811.42767/79).  These views and ideas were then used to 
develop US public diplomacy when the Department of State established the Division 
of Cultural Relations.  The DCR invited leaders of organizations which already 
conducted foreign public engagement to advise the DCR on the administration and 
formation of the US government’s own cultural relations.  James Shotwell, Stephen 
Duggan, Carl Milam, Henry Allen Moe, Malcolm Davis, and Waldo Leland among 
others all served as advisors to the DCR (“Summary of Activities of the Division of 
the Cultural Relations Division,” 23 November 1938, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 
235, 111.46761 ½).  This study only scratches the surface of how private 
organizations and citizens helped to shape US public diplomacy.  Future research on 
the development of US public diplomacy should examine the individual views of 
some of these figures and organizations who played lasting and key roles in advising 
and cultivating foreign public engagement.   
“…the Government looks with favor upon the organization you 
propose…a Committee among the existing business organizations 
interested in Latin American countries for the spreading of American 
ideas in that region.”270   
 The final major pattern in this study is the cooperative foreign public 
engagement which develops from private-public partnerships.  Through much of this 
study, private entities have played a major role in initiating and conducting US 
foreign public engagement.  When private foreign public engagement aligned with 
government foreign policy or foreign relations needs, the government would 
facilitate private efforts to engage with people abroad.  Even when the government 
determined to use engagement as a component of statecraft, such as during WWI 
and WWII, the government relied heavily on private businesses and non-profit 
organizations to perform the actual engagement.  Much of the CPI’s operations 
would not have been possible without the support of private business and 
organizations such as the Red Cross, YMCA, and CEIP, as stated previously.  Private 
entities were also crucial to US foreign relations in the inter-war period, by 
providing de-facto representation at the League of Nations.  
                                                     
270 Unsigned memo to Benjamin La Bree, Advertising Club of NY, Apr 9, 1918 (RG 63, 
Entry 105, Box 12) 
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The major role private entities played in maintaining and activating US 
foreign public engagement through much of the nation’s history is unsurprising.   
Much of US diplomacy in general was carried out by private entities, when 
throughout most of the nation’s history there was no real professional foreign service 
and few US legations around the world.  More than this, the supremacy of private 
foreign public engagement over government foreign public engagement is reflective 
of US political culture.  The fear of a large federal government has often made 
Americans favour private initiatives over government administered ones.  After the 
alarm of propaganda, fear of government controlled communications further 
inhibited government-run foreign public engagement.  Connected to this, and a 
frequent criticism for US public diplomacy throughout the Cold War, is the issue of 
allowing the government to decide what American culture is and how this is 
represented abroad.  Representing a diverse culture composed from various 
immigrant backgrounds and shaped by regional differences throughout the US makes 
any portrayal of United States’ culture a thorny political subject.  In many ways, 
allowing private entities to play the primary role of engagement avoids many of the 
concerns and problems which government engagement would have to negotiate.  
The government as coordinator and facilitator aids private initiatives by averting 
duplicated efforts.  This was the model which developed from 1937 to 1938 with the 
creation of the Division of Cultural Relations.  Unfortunately, this model never had 
the time or funding to develop properly with the onset of WWII.  The idea to 
incorporate foreign public engagement into US statecraft was only to fulfil President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor foreign policy, not necessarily to sustain and 
foster amicable foreign relations. 
Some of the cases have not only highlighted the development of a 
cooperative relationship between the US government and private entities carrying 
out foreign public engagement, but also discussed whether it was more appropriate 
for private entities to conduct foreign public engagement and how much of a role the 
government should play in engagement generally.  Charles Francis Adams thought 
appointing private entities to undertake engagement on behalf of the government, in 
a quasi-official stance, undermined the role of those officially appointed by the 
government.  In Adams’ case, sending four private citizens to Britain would suggest 
that the US government did indeed believe the appointed minister was not capable of 
handling the duties of the post.  On the other hand, when private entities already 
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initiated engagement, as with the aid organized for the textile workers in Britain, the 
US government was afraid that by providing any assistance, the aid would become 
politicized.  This is interesting in light of the fierce debate about keeping US cultural 
relations from becoming politicized.  However, politicization of cultural relations 
had little to do with government management and more concern about its 
connection with US information relations and propaganda.   
This debate over the appropriateness of joint private-public foreign public 
engagement did not appear when the Central Committee for Cuban Relief (CCRC) 
was formed.  This is likely due to the fact that Congress was not consulted when 
President William McKinley and the Assistant Secretary of State decided to work 
with Clara Barton.  Previous examples where Congress considered assisting private 
aid and engagement, such as with the Russian famine in 1893, never came to fruition.  
The debates over funding US foreign public engagement and passing the Smith-
Mundt Act argued essentially the same thing: engagement and aid should remain in 
private hands.   
Notably absent from many of the reports and audits published since public 
diplomacy became of renewed importance after 9/11 is the discussion of private 
entities’ role in US public diplomacy.  There is much discussion in these reports 
about the need to use private entities for technical support, providing access to the 
latest technology to enable faster and top-quality communication with people abroad.  
These reports also note how private entities, such as businesses and public relations 
firms, have been consulted and hold contracts with the government to consult on the 
best public relations techniques, audience research, and impact evaluation 
(Nakamura & Weed 2009, p. 52).  This type of relationship differs markedly from 
the one which evolved from the end of the nineteenth century through the end of the 
Cold War.  Despite the creation of the Office of Private Sector Outreach in 2006 
within the Department of State’s Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the quality 
and nature of the relationship between the federal government and private entities is 
not the same cooperative partnership which evolved in 1937.   
This is reflected in the audits and reports on US public diplomacy since 9/11.  
According to an Inspector General audit of the Bureau of International Information 
Program (IIP), the 2011 reorganization within the IIP created an Office of Talent 
Management and Partnerships.  The office was to recruit speakers and writers as 
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well as develop partnerships with other government agencies and private 
organizations to administer public diplomacy activities.  “No organic connection 
exists between the work of the speakers program and that of partnerships.  IIP has 
actively sought partnerships with government and private-sector organizations....In 
some cases, the bureau did not determine in advance the PD [public diplomacy] 
value of the proposed partnerships...did not devise a strategic plan that included a 
buy-in from embassies, and did not commit sufficient bureau resources…” 
(Inspection of the Bureau of International Information Programs May 2013, p. 9).  
The Djerejian report noted the strength and value of institutions such as the 
American University of Beirut and American University of Cairo (2003).271  The 
report suggested strengthening these institutions and along with the creation of 
intercultural centres for US-Arab/Muslim studies and dialogue, recommending 
private organizations could sponsor these centres.  These ideas are not new.  US 
private entities voluntarily created these types of centres, often without government 
assistance in the 1920s and 30s.  Some of the first inter-cultural centres in Latin 
America were created by US businessmen.    
One reason for this change in the relationship between the government and 
private organizations could be due to private businesses’ and foundations’ reluctance 
to be associated with the government, particularly in light of US foreign policy in last 
decade.  US policies following 9/11 have contributed largely to United States’ 
unpopularity in the world with revelations of waterboarding, black prison sites, the 
invasion of Iraq, and US digital surveillance.  Many of these policies directly 
contradict the values US public diplomacy espouses.  On the other hand, 
redeveloping government partnerships with private entities could serve as a means 
for listening.  Private entities are less likely to support or be associated with 
government policies which they know would alienate the public abroad, unless they 
benefit in some way.  Furthermore, past experience would indicate public diplomacy 
                                                     
271 Even the government’s relationship between private entities which manage education 
and professional exchanges appears to be disconnected.  A compliance review of the 
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) done by the Inspector General noted 
how the ECA had no way of gathering information or coordinating privately 
administered exchange programs and those handled by other government agencies.  
The review also noted how participants in private schemes often did not understand 
visa procedures or which portions of the program were funded or unfunded 
(“Compliance Followup Review of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs” 
September 2013). 
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is more effective with private entities in a primary engagement role and the 
government playing the coordinator and facilitator role. 
“…we have counted too heavily on vast systems of concrete 
fortifications and big navies to guard our frontiers.”272 
 This study demonstrates how past experience with US foreign public 
engagement has come to shape American public diplomacy today.  In addition, the 
cases have highlighted various factors which have inhibited and facilitated the 
development of public diplomacy.  Though many forces and events can be identified 
as playing some role in the development of public diplomacy, the main factors 
identified in the six cases of this study are political culture, private foreign public 
engagement, historical experience, state infrastructure, and foreign policy traditions.  These 
forces contributed not only to how public diplomacy was used to engage with people 
overseas, but also acted as catalysts to either inhibit or encourage continued 
engagement with people abroad.  Some of these factors overlapped and combined to 
either aggravate obstacles to engagement or in some cases competed with one 
another. 
In the case of political culture, this study has shown where attitudes about 
US foreign relations and diplomacy have served to both spur foreign public 
engagement as well as inhibit it.  Identifying some of the elements which compose 
US political culture confirms how it has shaped public diplomacy.  US republican and 
liberal ideas such as liberty, human rights, freedom of speech, and equality are 
typically featured in public diplomacy as the characteristic values of the United States 
and often spur engagement based on the belief that these ideas are universally 
appealing.  American federalism, the relationship between the federal government 
and the states, frequently throughout this study inhibited engagement.  When the US 
government considered starting academic exchanges, state infrastructure posed as an 
obstacle.  US education is under the purview of individual states, not the Federal 
government.  This made implementing the resolution passed at the Fourth Pan 
American Conference in 1910 impossible for the US government, leading private 
actors to fulfil the requirement.  Hence, political culture facilitated other factors, 
such as the heightened importance of private foreign public engagement in the 
                                                     
272 Sherwood, Robert E.1945. There Shall Be No Night, p. 21 
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development of public diplomacy.  Political culture overlaps with state infrastructure 
and foreign policy traditions, as it is the culture of the nation which has shaped both 
of these factors.   
However, as explained in the Preface and Chapter 1, US political culture 
and foreign policy traditions are also a by-product of historical experience.  US 
“isolationism,” or tendency to refrain from political involvement in the world, is 
connected to historical experience.  This tendency influenced both US attitudes 
toward diplomacy and impacted foreign policy as well as state infrastructure.  The 
lack of political will to enlarge or professionalize the Department of State due to the 
circumscribed foreign policy of the eighteenth and nineteenth century served to 
inhibit state infrastructure.  The limitations of the Department in terms of personnel 
and responsibilities frequently inhibited foreign public engagement, but again, only 
heightened the importance of private foreign public engagement. 
 US public diplomacy is defined and confined by these forces which should be 
taken into consideration when using public diplomacy.  American political culture, 
infrastructure, and foreign policy traditions tend to limit what is feasible with public 
diplomacy, especially government public diplomacy.  Historical experience and 
private foreign public engagement have done much to define public diplomacy, both 
in terms of what it is and how it is practiced.  Given this, and the history of US foreign 
public engagement, the following sections will explore what this means for the key 
problems facing public diplomacy today as outlined in Chapter 1. 
"For the federation of the world is inevitably the Americanization of the 
World, recasting of the Old World systems in the new mould of the 
American idea."273 
As Juliana Pilon notes, the idea that American values are universally 
acceptable inhibited US public diplomacy (2008).  Pilon focuses on how in the past, 
the belief that the world saw US principles as naturally decent served as justification 
for not engaging with people and communicating these ideas abroad.  The US stood 
as an exemplary model for others to follow, without the need to engage with the 
world further.  However, as America became more involved in the world and 
American citizens and leaders found that there was a great deal of misunderstanding 
                                                     
273 Stead, W.T. May 1909. Internationalism as an Ideal for the American Youth of America. 
The Chautauquan. 54(No. 3), p.336. 
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about the US overseas, the universality of US principles were used to correct 
misconceptions.  American principles underlie the Wilsonian ideals which the CPI 
disseminated around the world in WWI, thus US foreign pubic engagement came to 
connect US ideas with the formation and execution of foreign policy.  In this, there 
is an assumption that if American values are generally agreeable, national policies 
which are guided by these values will be accepted.   
This belief guided US foreign public engagement in WWI, WWII, the Cold 
War, and continues to frame public diplomacy today.  The Shared Values campaign is 
an excellent illustration of this belief and how it impacts US public diplomacy.  In 
American thinking, because people around the world naturally accept and value 
freedom of speech, free exchange of information and ideas, and human rights, they 
will also understand and support US foreign policy.   Such assumptions undermine 
the effectiveness of public diplomacy.  As with the Shared Values campaign, the values 
highlighted were often contradicted by many of the United States’ policies in the 
region the initiative was intended to engage, subsequently impairing the entire 
purpose of the Shared Values programme and damaging US credibility.  The US 
cannot base public diplomacy efforts solely on the syllogism that its principles are 
universally accepted and by extension the nation’s foreign policies, especially when 
these policies contravene American values.   
“…we must be clear in our minds as to the purpose, the ‘raison d’etre 
[sic] OIE as an Office of the Department…It has been stated many times 
that the primary purpose of OIE is to serve as an arm of our foreign 
policy…If a premise is accepted, and if the consequences which flow 
from the premise are rejected or ignored, then the result is 
frustration.”274 
Several cases in this study have illustrated the importance of integrating 
foreign public engagement into statecraft and more importantly into the 
policymaking process.  An issue frequently cited by public diplomacy scholars and 
practitioners as well as government reports (Cull 2008; Cull 2012; Dodaro 2009; 
Epstein & Mages 2005; Kiehl 2006; Lord 1998; Tuch 1990; Zaharna 2010).  The 
bureaucratic obstacles facing US public diplomacy are rooted in much deeper issues, 
as mentioned in Chapter 1.  Some of these issues are tied to the development of the 
                                                     
274 “Report on European Trip,”  25 August – September 30 1947, RG 59, Entry 1559, Box 
2 
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Department of State itself, while other problems stem from the dim view, long-held 
by Congress, of diplomacy generally.  Based on these factors, the role of public 
diplomacy in American statecraft is confined and defined by US political culture, 
state infrastructure, foreign policy traditions, and historical experience. 
 
Figure 8.3 
 
Figure 8.3 depicts how each of these factors contributed to the role public diplomacy 
plays in US statecraft today.  These same factors also contributed in some way to the 
endemic problems which continue to plague US public diplomacy.  The role of 
public diplomacy in American statecraft is tied to America’s understanding of its role 
internationally and what relationship the nation should maintain with the rest of the 
world.   Public diplomacy as a mechanism of the state inputs limitations on the tool 
itself, putting up parameters based on America’s relationship with the world and 
what is deemed acceptable by the people. 
There is general agreement that the Department of State should be the 
agency to administer US public diplomacy, given the Department’s primary 
responsibility for US foreign relations and foreign policy after the President.  Yet this 
study has demonstrated an institutional belief within the Department of State which 
does not believe engaging with the public of other nations is the responsibility of DoS.  
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Throughout the twentieth century, whether in peace or during times of war, the 
Department showed indifference and in some cases irritation with the idea of foreign 
public engagement, preferring to pass such responsibilities off to another agency such 
as the Office of Education or to a private organization.  This appears to be, from the 
cases examined in this study as well as literature on US public diplomacy throughout 
the Cold War, ingrained into the institutional culture of the Department.  While 
adding another US agency or department to the already enormous federal 
government would be counter-productive for public diplomacy, redefining 
institutional culture within the Department of State would present many challenges.   
If US public diplomacy was to remain within the Department of State, the 
internal priority would be to completely reformulate the culture within the 
Department.  Public diplomacy would need to be on an equal footing with political 
and economic relations and the responsibility of every individual within the 
Department.   Implementing public diplomacy training for all personnel would also 
be needed.  To truly alter the culture within the Department to integrate public 
diplomacy completely would likely take years and require consistent implementation, 
even when administrations change.   
 “…[A] government which abruptly adopted a new policy of absolutely 
open and public diplomacy would run a grave risk of being out-
manoeuvered [sic] by its neighbors.”275  
One of the great advantages this study has afforded is to see foreign public 
engagement in use without the stigma of propaganda attached.  Many of the same 
techniques were used in all the cases to engage people abroad, thus eliminating the 
argument that methods themselves identify something as propaganda.  The cases 
exploring foreign public engagement during WWI and WWII clarified not only why 
Americans oppose and fear propaganda, but also how propaganda and public 
diplomacy became intertwined, creating problems for its implementation into US 
statecraft.  Most importantly this study revealed another way to conceptualize public 
diplomacy within the context of US history and political culture: democratic 
diplomacy.   
                                                     
275 Bullard, A. 1917. The Diplomacy of the Great War. New York: The Macmillan 
Company, p. 271. 
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Though Arthur Bullard coined the phrase, the idea that a liberal, democratic 
nation, which believed in the sovereignty of people over the state, should conduct 
diplomacy reflecting these ideals made sense.  This was the way Benjamin Franklin 
conducted diplomacy in France.  He spent a great deal of his time engaging with the 
people, making only weekly appearances at Versailles (Schiff 2005).  Ernest Poole of 
the CPI recognized that the democratization of the world, meant “people’s 
diplomacy” would become increasingly important.  Charles Francis Adams noted 
that British sentiment was of more diplomatic importance than the British ministry in 
his reports to William Seward.  At the end of WWII, various people within the DoS 
believed that a world composed of more democracies required US foreign relations 
to include a public dimension to diplomacy.  As Bruce Gregory observes, 
“[diplomacy’s] context…changes with time and circumstance…What changed was 
not a generic concept of diplomacy that included a public dimension.  What changed 
was situational…Public diplomacy has always been part of diplomacy” (2014, pp. 7-
8). 
One of the recurring observations in each of these cases is that representing 
the US to the people of another nation is an integral part of diplomacy in general.  As 
discussed in Chapter 1, public diplomacy is typically thought of in terms of 
communication, including public relations or public affairs.  This is perhaps due to 
the fact that scholars typically associate the origins of public diplomacy with WWI 
and WWII, with the CPI and the marketing and PR techniques employed (Snow 
2009).  However, this study demonstrates how atypical this approach is.  If public 
diplomacy is thought of less in terms of communication or information, and more as 
a diplomatic relationship, the approach and expectations of public diplomacy 
significantly alter.  The primary objective of public diplomacy becomes about 
representation rather than persuasion.  When Benjamin Franklin went to France, he 
never set out to persuade the French as his first objective.  His first objective was to 
represent the character of the US, to define the British American colonies as an 
independent, unified nation. 
Furthermore, these case studies have demonstrated how when people set 
out to engage with people abroad, it was not about convincing foreign publics to like 
the US.  Rather, the goal was simply to provide a broader picture of the US and to 
correct misperceptions.  The goal should be to build a relationship where the people 
of another nation are more inclined to engage with the US in a discussion rather than 
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violence.  The US will not be able to convince the entire world that American 
policies are good or acceptable to everyone, even if they understand the reasoning of 
US policies.  Public diplomacy can instead be used to build trust, credibility, and 
dialogue, but only if the US sees public diplomacy as diplomacy and not solely as a 
communication tool.  There is a fine line between using public diplomacy to develop 
amicable relations and using public diplomacy to ensure a nation supports US 
policies.  Adopting a marketing or PR model automatically discloses the intent 
behind the engagement, when the idea behind marketing and PR is to sell and induce 
acceptance of a statement, argument, or policy.  The intent is not to represent the US 
or its policies, but gain acceptance for national policies. 
As a diplomatic tool, the tool is wielded differently and subsequently, the 
anticipated results should be different.  Public diplomacy is not a marketing tool, to 
market or sell American policies either.  Putting public diplomacy in those terms 
makes disassociating the practice from propaganda more difficult.  According to 
David Welch, “[modern] political propaganda is consciously designed to serve the 
interests, either directly or indirectly, of the propagandists and their political masters.  
The aim of propaganda is to persuade its subject that there is only one valid point of 
view and to eliminate all other options” (Welch in Cull, Culbert, & Welch 2003, pp. 
318 – 319).  Within this context, US public diplomacy is certainly used to serve 
American interests; however, the intent is what helps to distinguish between 
propaganda and public diplomacy.  The kind of results the US should be looking for 
are real dialogue with other nations.  The intent should not be solely to garner 
acceptance of US policies or even US principles; to implement US foreign policies 
unilaterally.  US public diplomacy should ultimately intend to foster relationships 
and represent itself as a nation to the people of other nations.  There are too many 
nations which the US no longer has diplomatic relations or nations which the US has 
rather tense relations.  If there is a problem with these nations, US policy options are 
very limited in terms of how the government could respond to a threat.  The goal of 
public diplomacy, properly used, should be to open discussion, to reach 
compromises where there is disagreement, to broaden policy options toward nations 
which the US has limited relations.   
Based upon this study and preceding sections, a middle-range theory or 
conditional generalizations about the practice and role of public diplomacy, may be 
specified.  First, public diplomacy, in the US context, is best understood as 
- 273 - 
 
diplomacy.  This facilitates easier integration into the nation’s statecraft.  In this 
frame, public diplomacy fits into US political culture and becomes disassociated with 
the historical experience of propaganda.  Second, care should be taken when 
equating American principles with foreign policies.  This leads to a third condition, 
that for public diplomacy to be effective, the tool requires access and participation in 
the policymaking process.  From the attacks on 9/11 to the Arab Spring beginning in 
the winter of 2010, recent world events have only demonstrated the increasing 
importance of human intelligence or the psychological and informational aspects of 
state power (Jablonsky 1997).  Of the fifteen intelligence agencies in the US 
intelligence community, few if any report on public opinion and views toward the 
US.  Public diplomacy is a missing component of US policymaking and diplomacy. 
The last decade has demonstrated that people make a nation, not 
governments.  This study suggests the United States has forgotten what Benjamin 
Franklin knew to be true – countries are more than just governments.  America 
claims to be a nation which values the sovereignty of the people.  Based on the 
historical evidence amassed in this study, the US did view countries as more than just 
governments.  Sometime during WWII the US seems to have prioritized the 
importance of government relations over relations with the people of other nations.  
Unfortunately, engagement with people became a matter of selling US ideas and 
policies rather than representing the United States to people abroad and fostering 
relationships.  Thus, American diplomacy - public diplomacy - is a lost American 
tradition.  The question is whether the nation can recover this old American 
tradition.  
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